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What about Japan?. Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6.

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Presentation on theme: "What about Japan?. Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6."— Presentation transcript:

1 What about Japan?

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3 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6

4 4

5 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6

6

7 US Response Federal Regulations Industry Response

8 NRC Order NRC issued three orders 1.FLEX - companies to enhance protection of portable emergency equipment and to obtain additional equipment to ensure facilities can cope with events that may affect multiple reactors at a site 2.Reliable hardened vents for boiling water reactors with Mark I or Mark II containments 3.Requires additional instrumentation to monitor water levels in used fuel storage pools NRC issued three orders 1.FLEX - companies to enhance protection of portable emergency equipment and to obtain additional equipment to ensure facilities can cope with events that may affect multiple reactors at a site 2.Reliable hardened vents for boiling water reactors with Mark I or Mark II containments 3.Requires additional instrumentation to monitor water levels in used fuel storage pools

9 Industry Response Nuclear industry Fukushima Response Steering Committee provided responses to NRC Orders Coordinated through Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) –NEI is the policy organization for the nuclear technologies industry Nuclear industry Fukushima Response Steering Committee provided responses to NRC Orders Coordinated through Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) –NEI is the policy organization for the nuclear technologies industry

10 F L E X Approach for adding diverse and flexible mitigation strategies—or FLEX extended loss of alternating current (ac) power (ELAP) increase defense-in-depth for beyond- design-basis scenarios loss of normal access to the ultimate heat sink (LUHS) Approach for adding diverse and flexible mitigation strategies—or FLEX extended loss of alternating current (ac) power (ELAP) increase defense-in-depth for beyond- design-basis scenarios loss of normal access to the ultimate heat sink (LUHS)

11 FLEX Elements Portable equipment power and water to maintain or restore key safety functions Reasonable staging and protection of portable equipment from BDBEEs Procedures and guidance to implement FLEX strategies Programmatic controls that assure the continued viability and reliability of the FLEX strategies. Portable equipment power and water to maintain or restore key safety functions Reasonable staging and protection of portable equipment from BDBEEs Procedures and guidance to implement FLEX strategies Programmatic controls that assure the continued viability and reliability of the FLEX strategies.

12 Overview of FLEX Concept

13 Spent Fuel Pool Spent Fuel Cooling - Makeup with Portable Injection Source SFP Parameters - Reliable means to determine SFP water level –to prevent undue distraction of operators –and identify conditions when makeup/spray is required Spent Fuel Cooling - Makeup with Portable Injection Source SFP Parameters - Reliable means to determine SFP water level –to prevent undue distraction of operators –and identify conditions when makeup/spray is required

14 Flex Objectives & Guiding Principles The objective of FLEX to establish an indefinite coping capability to prevent damage to the fuel in the reactor and spent fuel pools to maintain the containment function Both by using installed equipment, on-site portable equipment, and pre-staged off-site resources. The objective of FLEX to establish an indefinite coping capability to prevent damage to the fuel in the reactor and spent fuel pools to maintain the containment function Both by using installed equipment, on-site portable equipment, and pre-staged off-site resources.

15 Off-Site Resources Pre-staged off-site resources will be housed at two locations One on the east coast and one near the west coast. –The west coast site will be in Arizona (phoenix metropolitan area. Pre-staged off-site resources will be housed at two locations One on the east coast and one near the west coast. –The west coast site will be in Arizona (phoenix metropolitan area.

16 Questions?

17 NISA Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency Regulatory and Technical Organizations International Japan United States

18 Palo Verde Containment and Fuel Buildings

19 San Andreas and Sonora Faults PaloVerde

20 “In Arizona, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station sits in the "low" earthquake hazard area.” Lee Allison Arizona State Geologist arizonageology.blogspot.com March 13, 2011 Source (map): Arizona Geology, Volume 30, No. 1, Spring 2000 / Arizona Geological Survey Palo Verde

21 PaloVerde

22 Back-up Power Two redundant emergency diesel generators in each unit Two diesel fueled turbine generators shared by all units Four redundant sets of batteries in each unit

23 Emergency Preparedness

24 Full-scale Drills and Exercises held annually Joint Response –Palo Verde –State –Maricopa County –Local Groups and Agencies –Federal Agencies –Media Full-scale Drills and Exercises held annually Joint Response –Palo Verde –State –Maricopa County –Local Groups and Agencies –Federal Agencies –Media

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26 Knowledge and Training

27 Key Points No Vulnerability to TsunamiNo Vulnerability to Tsunami Technical Differences/UpgradesTechnical Differences/Upgrades Significant Differences in Organizational Support (U.S. and International)Significant Differences in Organizational Support (U.S. and International) High U.S. Industry Standards/Unity/SupportHigh U.S. Industry Standards/Unity/Support Mitigation Strategies/Procedures in PlaceMitigation Strategies/Procedures in Place Extensive Emergency Preparedness (Palo Verde, Local, State and Federal)Extensive Emergency Preparedness (Palo Verde, Local, State and Federal) Lessons Learned / Continuous Improvement of Safety MarginsLessons Learned / Continuous Improvement of Safety Margins No Vulnerability to TsunamiNo Vulnerability to Tsunami Technical Differences/UpgradesTechnical Differences/Upgrades Significant Differences in Organizational Support (U.S. and International)Significant Differences in Organizational Support (U.S. and International) High U.S. Industry Standards/Unity/SupportHigh U.S. Industry Standards/Unity/Support Mitigation Strategies/Procedures in PlaceMitigation Strategies/Procedures in Place Extensive Emergency Preparedness (Palo Verde, Local, State and Federal)Extensive Emergency Preparedness (Palo Verde, Local, State and Federal) Lessons Learned / Continuous Improvement of Safety MarginsLessons Learned / Continuous Improvement of Safety Margins


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