1. Web Site Security Andrew Cormack JANET-CERT Andrew.Cormack@ukerna.ac.uk ©The JNT Association, 1999

2. Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Where’s the problem? Number of CIAC bulletins since October 1997: Apache0 IIS5 Solaris8 Windows NT8 (Internet Explorer3 ) See especially CIAC bulletin J-042 on web security

3. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack First fix your host Minimal configuration don’t run things you don’t need Up to date with patches Keep it that way new bugs every month Pay attention to logs you may only get one warning

4. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Limit the scope for errors Minimal access restricted users restricted hosts (e.g. use TCP wrappers) Single function others will compete with web serving and make operation much more complicated

5. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack What can go wrong Denial of service (availability) Information leakage (privacy) Loss of control (integrity) unauthorised modification or worse

6. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Denial of service Not much you can do to prevent it! when does popularity become DoS? Precautions have more performance than likely attacker have different servers for different readers be ready with a "sorry" backup

7. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Information leakage (web stuff) Web is designed for publishing Protection mechanisms are weak files have many names addresses can be faked passwords can be sniffed Shared authentication puts other systems at risk! Use offline encryption if you must

8. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Information leakage (system stuff) Caused by badly configured servers badly written scripts misguided scripts (finger, last, etc.) Can lose script source code password or other configuration files

9. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Loss of control (severe) Beware of uploads replacing graphics or your home page who can publish? how do you know who they are? Unexpected interactions uploads of scripts java applets on multi-purpose server

10. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Loss of control (fatal) Allowing readers to run commands Never run server as root hackers have to work harder Never put test scripts on live server and check, check and re-check production scripts Compromised system probably a write-off

11. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack The worst cgi script w $1 What if $1 is ”andrew;cat /etc/passwd”... Use perl -wT to trap errors better a 500 error than a lost system Even commercial scripts have errors!

12. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Conclusion Don't build on sand Think carefully about "ease of use” Plan for the worst Talk with CERT Never stop!

13. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Don’t forget the browser Browsers sometimes run untrusted code ActiveX - can run any Windows application JavaScript - limited but powerful functions Java - runs in a sandbox, but this may leak Added “viewers”, e.g. word, excel Beware!

14. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack Applet capabilities Such programs can do anything the user can read or write files on local disk or network make calls on the network Browser control is a hard problem but not unique: mail and office apps are the same Technical fixes are draconian User education (like viruses) is the best bet

15. ©The JNT Association, 1999Web Site Security, Andrew Cormack