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A New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment Ronald P. Loui Washington University St. Louis CAEPIA 2003

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A New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment Preliminary Remarks CAEPIA 2003

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Preliminary Remarks 1985-2000+ Logic of Argument 1987 - Defeat among Arguments 1988 - Workshop on Defeasibility 1989 - G. Simari's thesis 1991 - NATHAN in C 1992 - H. Prakken's thesis 1993 (1997) - Process & Policy 1993 - G. Vreeswijk's thesis 1993 - T. Gordon's thesis 1995 - B. Verheij's thesis 1997 - A. Lodder's thesis 2000 - ACM Computing Surveys

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Preliminary Remarks 1990-2000+ Logic of Arguments & Cases 1991 - LMNOP in LISP 1992 - Argument Game 1993 - Policies and Precedents 1995 - Rationales 1997 - Room5 in GAWK/CGI 1998 - Prakken-Sartor 1999 - Bench-Capon 2003 - Johnston-Governatori

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui "Why does there have to be a winner? Why can't you work on negotiation instead of argument?" -- Prof. Anne Johnstone* *"University of Maine assistant professor of computer science Anne Johnstone died of complications resulting from lung cancer on February 28, 1995. After completing her PhD [in Artificial Intelligence at the University of Edinburgh approx. 1990], Anne took a position as senior research associate in the computer science department at Washington University in St. Louis, and while there established a successful research program in natural language processing, funded by Southwestern Bell Technology Resources." (http://www.umcs.maine.edu/~larry/csdept/johnstone.html) **This invited talk is dedicated to the memory of my faculty colleague.http://www.umcs.maine.edu/~larry/csdept/johnstone.html Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1985-87 - K. Sycara's thesis 1993 - G. Ferguson's thesis 1994 - Computational Dialectics Workshop 1995 - Mark Foltz's (WU/MIT) u. thesis 1996 - Parsons-Jennings 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. Main Idea: One may argue for or against a proposal (a proposed settlement). Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1985-87 - K. Sycara's thesis case-based problem-solving for labor-management disputes = argument 1993 - G. Ferguson's thesis 1994 - Computational Dialectics Workshop 1995 - Mark Foltz's (WU/MIT) u. thesis 1996 - Parsons-Jennings 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. Main Idea: One may argue for or against a proposal (a proposed settlement). Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1985-87 - K. Sycara's thesis 1993 - G. Ferguson's thesis "mixed initiative" planning = mixture of argument & negotiation 1994 - Computational Dialectics Workshop 1995 - Mark Foltz's (WU/MIT) u. thesis 1996 - Parsons-Jennings 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. Main Idea: One may argue for or against a proposal (a proposed settlement). Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1985-87 - K. Sycara's thesis 1993 - G. Ferguson's thesis 1994 - Computational Dialectics Workshop notation & protocol for proposal, threat, inform, justify, etc. as speech acts 1995 - Mark Foltz's (WU/MIT) u. thesis 1996 - Parsons-Jennings 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. Main Idea: One may argue for or against a proposal (a proposed settlement). Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1985-87 - K. Sycara's thesis 1993 - G. Ferguson's thesis 1994 - Computational Dialectics Workshop 1995 - Mark Foltz's (WU/MIT) u. thesis 1. Cooperative protocol level: reciprocal progress 2. Cooperative protocol level: immediate response 3. Cooperative protocol level: arguing for proposals 4. Uncooperative protocol level: using threats 1996 - Parsons-Jennings 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. Main Idea: One may argue for or against a proposal (a proposed settlement). Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1985-87 - K. Sycara's thesis 1993 - G. Ferguson's thesis 1994 - Computational Dialectics Workshop 1995 - Mark Foltz's (WU/MIT) u. thesis 1996 - Parsons-Jennings uses Fox's argument logic for formalizing arguments about proposals 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. Main Idea: One may argue for or against a proposal (a proposed settlement). Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1985-87 - K. Sycara's thesis 1993 - G. Ferguson's thesis 1994 - Computational Dialectics Workshop 1995 - Mark Foltz's (WU/MIT) u. thesis 1996 - Parsons-Jennings 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis list of speech acts in negotiation dialogue, including: o change of focus o request for proposal o "settlement" as a linguistic object (a contract) 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. Main Idea: One may argue for or against a proposal (a proposed settlement). Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1985-87 - K. Sycara's thesis 1993 - G. Ferguson's thesis 1994 - Computational Dialectics Workshop 1995 - Mark Foltz's (WU/MIT) u. thesis 1996 - Parsons-Jennings 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. Main Idea: One may argue for or against a proposal (a proposed settlement). Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1985-87 - K. Sycara's thesis 1993 - G. Ferguson's thesis 1994 - Computational Dialectics Workshop 1995 - Mark Foltz's (WU/MIT) u. thesis 1996 - Parsons-Jennings 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. Main Idea: One may argue for or against a proposal (a proposed settlement). Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Argument and Negotiation 1970's - R. Fisher-(Ury-Patton) "principled negotiation" … 1998-2001 - Jennings-Parsons-Noriega, Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Parsons- Noriega-Sierra, Parsons-Sierra-Jennings, Jennings-Faratin-Lomuscio-Parsons- Wooldridge-Sierra, etc. UN-ANSWERED QUESTION: What cost is incurred by the party to a negotiation who refuses the consequences of rational argument? Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1991 - pre-Lesser Sandholm 1992-93 - S. Lander's thesis 1993 - CMU talk 1994 - Strategic directions in AI (ACM Computing Surveys) 1996 - T. Sandholm's thesis 1996 - Kay Hashimoto (Harvard/FJC) 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1991 - pre-Lesser Sandholm "strategy for reducing overall computation costs" by trading tasks, TSP's 1992-93 - S. Lander's thesis 1993 - CMU talk 1994 - Strategic directions in AI (ACM Computing Surveys) 1996 - T. Sandholm's thesis 1996 - Kay Hashimoto (Harvard/FJC) 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1991 - pre-Lesser Sandholm 1992-93 - S. Lander's thesis "uses conflict as a source of control information for directing search" 1993 - CMU talk 1994 - Strategic directions in AI (ACM Computing Surveys) 1996 - T. Sandholm's thesis 1996 - Kay Hashimoto (Harvard/FJC) 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1991 - pre-Lesser Sandholm 1992-93 - S. Lander's thesis 1993 - CMU talk consider the strategic form payoffs to be heuristic! 1994 - Strategic directions in AI (ACM Computing Surveys) 1996 - T. Sandholm's thesis 1996 - Kay Hashimoto (Harvard/FJC) 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1991 - pre-Lesser Sandholm 1992-93 - S. Lander's thesis 1993 - CMU talk 1994 - Strategic directions in AI (ACM Computing Surveys) "Instead of starting with a matrix of payoffs to each player … introduce a structure that can be altered through computation" 1996 - T. Sandholm's thesis 1996 - Kay Hashimoto (Harvard/FJC) 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1991 - pre-Lesser Sandholm 1992-93 - S. Lander's thesis 1993 - CMU talk 1994 - Strategic directions in AI (ACM Computing Surveys) 1996 - T. Sandholm's thesis Negotiation Among Self-Interested Computationally Limited Agents 1996 - Kay Hashimoto (Harvard/FJC) 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1991 - pre-Lesser Sandholm 1992-93 - S. Lander's thesis 1993 - CMU talk 1994 - Strategic directions in AI (ACM Computing Surveys) 1996 - T. Sandholm's thesis 1996 - Kay Hashimoto (Harvard/FJC) each agent solves non-linear constrained optimization, asks "why not", responds with list of binding constraints 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1991 - pre-Lesser Sandholm 1992-93 - S. Lander's thesis 1993 - CMU talk 1994 - Strategic directions in AI (ACM Computing Surveys) 1996 - T. Sandholm's thesis 1996 - Kay Hashimoto (Harvard/FJC) 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis o can search: your problem OR partner's problem; o the simplest formal model of utility-revision / joint problem-solving Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1991 - pre-Lesser Sandholm 1992 - K. Decker's thesis, Sandholm-Lesser 1994 - Strategic directions in AI / ACM Computing Surveys 1996 - T. Sandholm's thesis 1997 - Diana Moore's (WU/NSA/EnGarde) u. thesis 1997 - Kay Hashimoto (Harvard/FJC). Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks 26911 581013 791015

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks 2?6?9?11? 5?8?10?13? 7?9?10?15?

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks 2?6?9?11? 5?8?10?13? 7?9?10?15? proposed

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks 2?6?9?11? 5?8?11?13? 7?9?10?15? proposed …search…

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks 2?6?9?11? 5?8?11?13? 7?9?10?15? proposed …search…

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks 2?6?9?11? 5?8?11?13? 7?9?10?15? proposed …search…

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks 2?6?9?11? 5?8?13? 7?9?10?15? proposed …search…

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! Main Idea: Payoffs (in strategic form) are not fixed, but can change with search. Preliminary Remarks 2?6?9?11? 5?8?16?13? 7?9?10?15? proposed …search… accepted

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! UN-ANSWERED QUESTION: Is it rational to accept a proposal if its heuristic valuation looks good JUST BECAUSE more time was spent searching to make it look good? Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation OBSERVATION: If anytime search is focused on proposals then agreement is easier to achieve! UN-ANSWERED QUESTION: Is it rational to accept a proposal if its heuristic valuation looks good JUST BECAUSE more time was spent searching to make it look good? Preliminary Remarks Sandholm: Look for deliberation equilibria!

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation Preliminary Remarks Sandholm: Look for deliberation equilibria! Loui: Equilibrium is a silly idea! Negotiation is a process. How about looking at trajectories?

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Search and Negotiation 1997 - Anne Jump (Harvard) Negotiation game Preliminary Remarks

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui

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A New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment CAEPIA 2003 *thanks to F. Tohme, K. Larson, S. Braynov, J. Nachbar, B. Dheeravongkit, L. Cai, K. Chin, R. Bujans, M. Looks, E. Wofsey, J. Rosen, S. Grubor, K. Ormsby, J. Badino, R. Pless, and M.A. Clark.

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements Party 1's aspiration Party 2's aspiration

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements Party 2's proposals at t Party 1's proposals at t

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements inadmissible (dominated) at t

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements In black: admissible settlements at t (probability of agreement Is non-zero)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements Breakdown row Breakdown column

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements Breakdown would occur here (BATNA)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements 1's aspiration 2's aspiration

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements Breakdown (BATNA)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements Breakdown (BATNA)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements Rising probability of break down

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements 1's security level 2's security level 2 would rather break down 1 would rather break down

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: parties to a negotiation (can) construct a probability distribution over potential settlements Eu 1 |s = 51 Eu 2 |s = 49α +54(1-α) Prob(bd) = ?

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Observation: From probability, one may calculate 1. An expected utility given settlement (Eu|s) and 2. An expected utility given continued negotiation, Eu = Eu|s (1 - prob(bd)) + u(bd) prob(bd) Observation: It may be rational to 1. Extend an offer, o, if Eu < u(o) 2. Accept an offer, acc, if Eu < u(acc), acc offers(t) 3. Break down unilaterally if Eu < security

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Probability here is OBJECTIVE PROBABILITY: 1. It is based on data and induction 2. Given the data (and method), prob is fixed 3. Cannot subjectively will the prob to be different (see Keynes) Rationality here is CONSTRUCTIVE RATIONALITY: 1. Action may be justified in a variety of ways 2. Expected utility is one way to justify action 3. These constraints are one-sided: (permissions, not prohibitions) (see Simon/Shafer/Tversky)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui To construct prob(bd|situation), consider similar past situations in which: 1. Similar stakes & securities 2. Similar negotiating partners 3. Similar progress … (see Kyburg) The one-sided constraint is similar to: bargaining representative of a union with proxy to act but not to censor union action (probabilities are of independent union action) But is here a general model of rationality for a single mind (see Minsky)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui (Empirical) Claim. Pessimism For sufficiently large Δ, for all t: prob(bd | NP(t+Δ)) > prob(bd | NP(t)) where NP(t) denotes non-progress for a period t What is progress? A non-trivial offer by the other party What does this mean? (at some granularity, the past record implies that:) If there are no offers, the likelihood of breakdown rises

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui (Empirical) Claim. Pessimism For sufficiently large Δ, for all t: prob(bd | NP(t+Δ)) > prob(bd | NP(t)) where NP(t) denotes non-progress for a period t Linear Pessimism prob(bd | NP(t)) = π t Exponential Pessimism prob(bd | NP(t)) = 1 - e -πt

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Pessimism causes Eu to fall Next offer is made at this time and prob(bd) resets to 0 Expectation starts to fall again

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui reciprocated offers offers

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Agreement reached as Eu < u1

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui security Best offer received Whenever u(acc) > security, acceptance occurs before breakdown!

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui security Best offer received Would you accept an 11-cent offer if your security were 10-cents?

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Design Idea. Resentment u(bd) = security + resentment(t) s.t. NP(t) where NP(t) denotes non-progress for a period t What is resentment? 1. Dignity 2. Pride 3. Investment in society 4. Protection against non-progressive manipulators

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Design Idea. Resentment u(bd) = security + resentment(t) s.t. NP(t) where NP(t) denotes non-progress for a period t What is resentment? 5. Non-standard utility (process or transactional utility) 6. Re: procedural fairness, not substantive fairness 7. A (speech act) distinction: acc@bd vs. BD! 8. specific (BD! by ME on YOU) vs. indifferent (BD!)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Design Idea. Resentment u(bd) = security + resentment(t) s.t. NP(t) where NP(t) denotes non-progress for a period t linear resentment r(t) = ρt sigmoid resentment r(t) = r max (2/(1+e -ρt ) -1)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Breaks down instead of agreeing because of rising resentment security+resentment security

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Actually accepts because resentment resets with progress Resentment resets to zero Nontrivial progess

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Resentment does not reset to zero Agent breaks down before accepting

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Variety of Behaviors Agent can wait, then offer Agent can wait, then accept Agent can wait, then break down Agent can accept immediately Agent can offer before accepting and vice versa Agent can breakdown before accepting and vice versa Agent can offer before breaking down and vice versa Agent can be on path to breakdown, then on path to acceptance because received offer changes Eu or resentment because extended offer changes Eu

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui low-valued ρ high-valued ρ (Assumes no progress)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui low-valued ρ high-valued ρ (Assumes no progress)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui (Assumes no progress) low-valued ρ high-valued ρ

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui rare alternation (Assumes no progress)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui What happens when two P&P agents interact? Dominated by BATNA 1's offers in this round 2's offer in this round Eu 2 2's aspiration BATNA = 1's aspirationEu 1

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui What happens when two P&P agents interact? Eu 2 Eu 1 (t=2)Eu 1 (t=1)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui What happens when two P&P agents interact? 1's security+ resentment 2's security+ resentment 1's offers in this round

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui What happens when two P&P agents interact?

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui What happens when two P&P agents interact?

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui What happens when two P&P agents interact? 1 breaks down Amount of (specific) resentment Laissez-faire path is through time

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Does the starting offer affect the laissez-faire path? Both generous at the start 1 is generous at start, 2 is not 2 is generous at start, 1 is not

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Breakdown at t=2 (pure pessimism)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Different laissez-faire paths

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Breakdown at t=5 with resentment

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui All paths lead to breakdown

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui In a different negotiation, some paths lead to acceptance, some to breakdown Fixed agent characteristics Varied acceleration of offers

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui A third example where player 1 can guarantee an acceptance outcome with the right initial offers

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Laissez-Faire Paths What are they? They are the path taken if Eu drives all speech acts (offers, acceptance, and breakdown) BUT rationality is constructive: constraints are one-sided, specifying latest times, not earliest times One may deviate from the path by accelerating offers take initiative show free will, self-determination

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Laissez-Faire Paths What are they? They are the path taken if Eu drives all speech acts (offers, acceptance, and breakdown) So how about a meta-game over the "when to accelerate offers" strategy space? We could find Nash Equilibria!

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Laissez-Faire Paths What are they? They are the path taken if Eu drives all speech acts (offers, acceptance, and breakdown) So how about a meta-game over the "when to accelerate offers" strategy space? We could find Nash Equilibria! OK, but it is a control problem (like flying an airplane): estimation and correction Are we on a path to agreement? Does other party need new reason to continue?

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui All sorts of meta-games whenever you combine laissez-faire behavior and elective initiative-taking…

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui All sorts of meta-games whenever you combine laissez-faire behavior and elective initiative-taking… Payoffs adjusted for substantive fairness, time, concessions, aspiration, and security

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Desiderata for an AI model of negotiation Should be able to participate in the process of negotiation: make offers, respond to offers, deliberate upon offers, (even threaten, search, argue…) NOT just insist on a solution Should model the phenomenon directly: pessimism, expectation, security, resentment… NOT just implement a mathematical analysis

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Desiderata for an AI model of negotiation Should be able to participate in the process of negotiation: make offers, respond to offers, deliberate upon offers, (even threaten, search, argue…) NOT just insist on a solution Should model the phenomenon directly: pessimism, expectation, security, resentment… NOT just implement a mathematical analysis Should be robust in poor information settings: there may be no common knowledge, no model of other's mental states (our model is decoupled!) Should learn about negotiating partner and social norms: offline, objective probability is based on data; online estimation is anticipated (agent can be calibrated)

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Desiderata for an AI model of negotiation Should be able to participate in the process of negotiation: make offers, respond to offers, deliberate upon offers, (even threaten, search, argue…) NOT just insist on a solution Should model the phenomenon directly: pessimism, expectation, security, resentment… NOT just implement a mathematical analysis Should be robust in poor information settings: there may be no common knowledge, no model of other's mental states (our model is decoupled!) Should learn about negotiating partner and social norms: offline, objective probability is based on data; online estimation is anticipated (agent can be calibrated) Should be an architectural paradigm for design of agents: pessimism and resentment are internally balancing forces; this is a design proposal, not an empirical claim

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CAEPIA-2003 San SebastianA New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment – R. P. Loui Desiderata for an AI model of negotiation Should be able to participate in the process of negotiation: make offers, respond to offers, deliberate upon offers, (even threaten, search, argue…) NOT just insist on a solution Should model the phenomenon directly: pessimism, expectation, security, resentment… NOT just implement a mathematical analysis Should be robust in poor information settings: there may be no common knowledge, no model of other's mental states (our model is decoupled!) Should learn about negotiating partner and social norms: offline, objective probability is based on data; online estimation is anticipated (agent can be calibrated) Should be an architectural paradigm for design of agents: pessimism and resentment are internally balancing forces; this is a design proposal, not an empirical claim much work to be done!

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A New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment R. P. Loui Washington University St. Louis CAEPIA 2003 thanks to M. Foltz, V. Reddy, D. Weisberger, I. Figelman, D. Moore, K. Hashimoto, A. Jump, F. Tohme, K. Larson, S. Braynov, J. Nachbar, B. Dheeravongkit, L. Cai, K. Chin, R. Bujans, M. Looks, E. Wofsey, J. Rosen, S. Grubor, K. Ormsby, J. Badino, R. Pless, and M.A. Clark.

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A New Model of Negotiation Based on Pessimism and Punishment R. P. Loui Washington University St. Louis CAEPIA 2003 thanks to M. Foltz, V. Reddy, D. Weisberger, I. Figelman, D. Moore, K. Hashimoto, A. Jump, F. Tohme, K. Larson, S. Braynov J. Nachbar, B. Dheeravongkit, L. Cai, K. Chin, M. Looks,R. Wofsey, J. Rosen, S. Grubor, K. Ormsby, J. Badino, R. Pless, and M.A. Clark. Research Funding from: NSF Information Technology and Organizations Program: Multi-Agent Negotiation, as co-PI with T. Sandholm, July 1997 to July 1999. 9610122. NSF Office of Cross-Disciplinary Affairs and Interactive Systems Program: Summer Undergraduate Research Assistants, March 1995 to February 1996. 9415573. NSF Office of Cross-Disciplinary Affairs: REU Continuing Award, April 1992 to September 1994. 9123643.

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