1. ® SNAKES IN THE GRASS: Open Source Intelligence Doctrine Robert D. Steele, OSS CEO

2. ® Information Superiority Information Peacekeeping Relevant Information Information Operations OSINT Support to Acquisition OSINT Support to Operations Security

3. LONG TIME SHORT SHORT TIME WAR PEACE THEREHERE INFORMATION WARFARE INFORMATION PEACEKEEPING EDUCATION INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SECURITY & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ®

4. Information Warfare Information Peacekeeping Open Source Intelligence Education Electronic Electronic Security & Counterintelligence Big SecretNot Secret PrivateSector Private Sector! INFORMATION COMMONS ® CIVIL CENTER OF GRAVITY

5. OSINT as Input All-Source Intelligence (Spies, Satellites, and Secrets) Information Warfare Information Peacekeeping INFORMATION OPERATIONS Dont send a bullet where a byte will do…. OSINT as Output ®

6. Information Peacekeeping is the active exploitation of information and information technology--in order to peacefully modify the balance of power between specific individuals and groups--so as to achieve national policy objectives. The three elements of Information Peacekeeping, in order of priority, are intelligence (providing useful actionable information); information technology (providing tools for truth which afford the recipient access to international information and the ability to communicate with others; and electronic security & counterintelligence (a strictly defensive and preventive aspect of being able to sustain Information Peacekeeping operations. Robert D. Steele, 1994 ® DEFINITION

7. J-1No OOB for refugee/POW info. J-2Assumes SI/TK will have it all. J-3No OOB for IO/IW/IP J-4No role in information supply J-5Not held accountable for supportability of plans in terms of information availability J-6Not accountable for coalition-civil interoperability or for ensuring that external information can be integrated/exploited ® JOINT STAFF ISSUE AREAS

8. INFORMATIONINFORMATION TIME Available Information Actionable Intelligence The New Intelligence Gap: the difference between what you can know and what you can use! OSINT is as complex as the other disciplines… ® NEW INTELLIGENCE GAP

9. ® Existing doctrine assumes RI comes from IC or other units!

10. SIGINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters IMINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters HUMINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters MASINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters OSINT: ??? ALL-SOURCE ANALYST Whats Missing? ®

11. ® COMPETING OSINT MODELS SI/TK Selective Importation System High/Firewall Just Enough, Just in Time Default to Validated OSINT SI/TK Validated OSINT

12. HIC/MRC STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY WAR SOLIC/LEA UNCONVENTIONAL LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND GANG WARFARE IW/ECON INFORMATION WAR/ CRIME & ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE MINDWAR RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES PROLIFERATION/ MIGRATION JIHAD/ GREENPEACE TERRORISM/ GLOBAL CRIME INFOWAR/ ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ® FOUR THREAT/IO TYPES

13. ® Thats it for doctrine….now on to the shortfalls and the budget.

14. AFRICA ASIA & PACIFICEUROPE & MEDWESTERN HEMISPHERE Algeria BangladeshGreeceArgentina Angola ChinaTurkeyBolivia Djibouti Indonesia Brazil Ethiopia KazakhstanColombia Ghana KyrgystanEcuador Kenya MalaysiaGrenada Liberia MyanmarJamaica Madagascar New CaledoniaMexico Mozambique Papua New GuineaParaguay Namibia RussiaPeru South Africa Sri LankaSuriname Sudan Viet-NamUraguay Uganda 4 Key Island GroupsVenezuela For each of these countries, less than 25% available in 1:50,000 form, generally old data. ® REAL WORLD SHORT-FALLS

15. ® PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER Step 1: Commercial Imagery for wide-area mapping Step 2: Commercial Imagery for urban detail (1-2M) Step 3: NRO Precision Points for Map Orientation Step 4: Russian Military Maps for Data Extraction Step 5: Current City Maps for Embassy Locations Step 6: Ask a Defense Attache Before Targeting Only one of these steps is classified and only one of these steps is fully funded…

16. ® THE PUBLIC BUDGET Here is what we know about U.S. spending on intelligence: TOTAL U.S. INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (BARE BONES)29.3B NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM16.4B National Reconnaissance Program06.4B Community Cryptologic Program03.4B Central Intelligence Agency03.2B General Defense Intelligence Program02.0B Other Departmental Activities01.4B JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM03.6B Defense Advanced Reconnaissance01.7B Defense Mapping Agency (now NIMA)00.8B Other DoD00.6B TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES09.3B Air Force Tactical Intelligence04.0B Army Tactical Intelligence02.8B Navy Tactical Intelligence01.8B Other DoD Tactical Intelligence00.7B

17. ® BUDGETARY TRADE-OFFS I do not advocate any cuts in the national or defense intelligence budget but for the sake of comparison, here are some over-funded and under-funded elements: OVERFUNDEDUNDERFUNDED Large U.S. Stations Overseas (0.75B)Multi-national Stations (0.50B) Imagery satellites (2.0B)Commercial imagery purchase (0.50B) Imagery collection (0.50B)Open source collection (0.50B) Signals operations (1.0B)Non-official clandestine ops (0.25B) Signals satellites (1.5B)NATO/PfP OSINT Program (0.25B) Production armies (0.75B)FBI Support to Business (0.25) Designer C4I (2.5B)Education of State & Local (0.25B) Rough Total: $9B Over-FundedRough Total: $2.5B Under-Funded