1. 1 World War One

2. 2 WW1: Strategic Overview Contributing factors & conditions Growing populations, industry, transportation: –Road networks & railroads Central Government control of above: –Enhanced power & direction of population; –More efficient mobilization –More resources available for larger armies Nationalism shapes attitudes of people: –Patriotism verging on jingoism

3. 3 Contributing factors & conditions- 2 WWI involved global participation – 50 Million people Divided world into opposing alliance blocs: –Central Powers versus the Allies Plus 30+ from Europe, Asia, & Africa VS.

4. 4 Contributing factors & conditions- 3 Initial Expectations & assumptions? –?________________ … again!… (why?) –Hugh ?________________ & ?________________ expected –Therefore modern societies would force political leaders to end it Reality? (both right and wrong about above- how?) –What did World War I soon evolve into? ?________________

5. 5 WW1: Total War Government dedicated all people & resources to war –Beyond Napoleonic or American Civil Wars Central economic planning extensive Total industrial mobilization Mass armies for battle Conscription of all eligible males Lethal weapons for more efficient killing WWI produced new Strategies & innovative tactics: –Tactical & Operational Aim & motivation? Maneuver break-through of opponent’s defenses quickly Overcome the stalemate of the trench New weapons make debut: –Aircraft, SS, Tank & others much improved (MG & Arty)

6. 6 Europe’s Political & Social Institutions Impact of WWI on Europe’s social institutions? Major Geo-political, strategic, military, & $$$ changes: –Russia underwent major revolution –Austria-Hungry ceased to exist –US became a major power Hugh casualties: –8.5M killed & 20M wounded –Entire generation of Europe’s best & brightest lost Ultimately sew the seeds of even more destructive war

7. Major War Plans: Germany Background: German Unification in 1871: –Victory of Franco-Prussian War & annexation of France’s Alsace-Lorraine –Prime focus of the French Key assumption: short decisive war of maneuver German approach: make detailed & precise plans Plan’s architect: Chief of General Staff (1891-1906): –Count von ?________________ 7

8. 8 Germany’s Original strategy Original strategy for sequential 2 front War: –Initially beginning with attack on Russia first What complicaton forced Germany to modify the plan? Complication: 1894 - France & ?_________ alliance –Innovative but very risky strategy now was required –Forced German planners to reverse sequence

9. 9 Revised Strategy Germany was forced to revise their strategic plan –Numerous iterations made (The Count made 49 as COS) –What exactly was the major change made to the plan? Attack France first – then Russia – why? –Time expected for Russia’s mobilization? ?_____ __________ Operational Concept: –Sweep through Holland & Belgium & envelope Paris Key Assumption? –Exploit French strategic aims to recapture what? –?________________

10. 10 Moltke’s Modifications of the Plan Moltke (the Younger) took over General Staff in 1906 –Made major changes to von Schlieffen’s basic plan – result? Weaken & compress German Right Flank (violate only Belgium neutrality) + Modified mission of German Left Flank to hold, then attack=> impact? –Moltke weakened the weight of the ?________ to strengthen his ?________________

11. 11 Friction & Murphy’s Law Problem: German shortfalls & Murphy’s Law: –Not enough troops for 2 Front War: France & Russia have more troops –Plan’s secrecy also impeded timely coordination Logistics & transportation challenges significant: –Especially as LOCs are stretched => + attrition: Compounded by Strategic consumption –Inflexible deployment schedules (rigid RR time tables) Friction: no margin for error or missed deadlines: –Result: Murphy’s Law & its many correlations intrude

12. 12 France: Plan XVII- Offensive a’outrance French troops with Élan,’ courage & the bayonet: – Assault entrenched positions against rifles, machine guns & arty –Problem with this plan: Germans have similar capabilities & determination French Strategy? –Fight & win decisive battle with Germans –Big question: how exactly? Great flexibility but short on details; –No clear strategic objective: With one possible exception? Regain ?________________

13. 13 French Objectives & Operational Concept Two pronged attack into Lorraine: –All forces attack on each side of Verdun-Toul line –French Fourth Army held in reserve– (to change later): (to strike NE into Belgium if required); Reason: Halt possible German RF envelopment; Result – French will play into German hands – how? –Where is main attack axis?

14. 14 Great Britain’s War Plans British Navy to effect control of North Sea: –British to cover English Channel & French North coast –French to cover Mediterranean British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to cover French 5 th Army’s Left Flank –Fill gap North to the Channel & prevent German envelopment –Also provided BEF with LOC to the English Channel & Royal Navy –But Britain also had no clear strategic objective

15. 15 Russia’s Military Plans Russia – establish Eastern (2nd) Front: –Collaborate with French efforts in West Plan G: –Defend against East Prussia & Austria-Hungary –Mobilize & counterattack Plan A: –Assumed France is attacked first: –Mobilize & attack Austria-Hungary & East Prussia –Fulfill promised deployment of 800K troops by D+15 & attack ASAP

16. 16 Other War Plans Austria-Hungary – address 3 contingencies: –Threats on 3 sides: Italy, Russia, Serbia; Case I, R, & B –Army divided into 3 major groups Main forces for either of cases I & R Secondary force against Serbia; Third force available to reinforce either of above; Complication: –Nation has multi-ethnic peoples & languages Common factor for all of above plans: –All mostly Offensive (over Defensive) Strategies –Most fatally flawed – why? Plan is only as good as worst ?________________ No plan survives the 1st ?________________ At best – provides ?________________ to adjust to

17. 17 World War One- Strategic Overview (Map) Background: –Historical events: Escalation of Terrorist act in Balkans to… A Regional crisis and from there to a World War –Significance of mobilization => Act of War: August 1-6 sequence of events- series of miscalculations & reactions

18. 18 Western Front (Aug-Sept 1914) Execution: Opening Battles- (Map): –Initially according to plan: Germans sweep around French Left Flank (LF): France attacks into Lorraine Russia attacks East Prussia & Austria-Hungary Austria-Hungary attacks Serbia

19. 19 Friction & “The best laid plans…” Then friction intrudes (definition & impact?): –Bottleneck of 1st & 2nd German Armies in Belgium (space!) –Time & Forces required to reduce fortifications Strategic consumption Impact on Moltke's rigid RR timetable => delay Command, Control, Communications problems: –Timely HQ decisions OBE as they tend to chase events –Rigid timetables impossible to keep- result in confusion –Moltke in rear & out of touch & control=> (indecision) Von Kluck placed under OPCON of Burlow (2 nd Army) –Attempt to retrain & control outer belt’s freedom of movement –1st Army over extended its LOC Meanwhile the French labor under their own illusions

20. 20 French Offensive – Belated Response to Real Threat Joffre follows Plan XVII (ground truth?!) –Concludes enemy activity to North is what? –German ?________________ German 6th & 7th Armies invite attack IAW Plan –French blunder heroically into Germans’ kill zone –French infantry fail to coordinate arty support –Ordered by Joffre to advance & suffer heavy causalities as a result

21. 21 Better Late Than Never Joffre finally realizes his mistake & quickly responds: –Relies on FM French’s BEF to cover extreme left flank of French Army (5 th ) Joffre shifts remaining available French troops north to confront German main attack –Situation in doubt – desperate actions required to salvage it

22. 22 Allied Retreat: 24 Aug to 5 Sep 1914 Germans continue to push Allies SW in retreat: –French 5 th Army keeps retreating w/o informing BEF –Result: BEF’s right flank exposed forcing their belated withdrawal under fire –Any attempt to hold line results in heavy Brit casualties so entire Allied line must continue retreat FM French rapidly loses confidence in French Army –Looks to protect his LOC for withdrawal as a contingency

23. 23 “Miracle of the Marne” The German Advance Kluck is over-extended –1 st Army outruns its logistics & supplies –Horse drawn guns fail to keep up with advance Moltke detaches 2 corps from 2nd & 3rd Armies: –Sends East to reinforce 8th Army against Russia advance Messages from HQ delayed & OBE: –Uncertainty, confusion, & misunderstandings reign Result: contradictory orders to Kluck from both Moltke & Burlow: –Leave Kluck on own to decide which ones best to comply with –Decision factor: 1st Army almost a day ahead of 2nd Army & its logistics

24. 24 “Kluck’s Turn” Kluck complies with Burlow’s request of 30 Aug to cover 2 nd Army’s Right Flank: –Concludes Moltke behind events now unfolding rapidly on the ground to Kluck’s front What exactly does Kluck decide to do? –Turns to ?________ & inside of ?________ to close 2 nd Army’s exposed RF –Result: opportunity presents itself (what & for who?)

25. 25 Opportunity Knocks 1st Army’s move to SE exposes its own RF to Paris & the newly formed 6 th Army –Air recon sent by Gallieni verifies Kluck’s exposed right flank –Gallieni urges Joffre to attack it immediately Gallieni rapidly deploys troops to front by all means, including “Taxis of the Marne” With BEF’s support, Joffre orders 6th Army to deploy to threaten Kluck’s RF: –Move east & prepare to counter-attack French troop redeployment alerts Moltke on 4 Sept: –Realizes Kluck’s right flank is now vulnerable –But Moltke’s message warning arrives 11 hours later & only serves to confuse Kluck

26. 26 Kluck’s Turn- 2 Kluck is convinced Moltke uninformed: –Believes (wrongly) that French still not ready to attack –Kluck’s 1st Army therefore continues its move South & across the Marne But Kluck hedges his bets– leaves 1 corps in Reserve -positioned on the North side of the river to guard his RF French 6th moves East & attracts Kluck’s Reserve corps attention –Kluck’s Corps held in reserve attacks 6th Army: Pre-emptive strike eliminates tactical surprise just in time Buys time for Kluck to realign to face west & protect his RF But Realignment offers Joffre another opportunity: –What is this second & very critical opportunity? –What does Joffre do about it?

27. 27 French Response Kluck’s Realignment to protect his RF opens gap between 1st & 2nd Army –A 45 KM gap opens between the two armies near Chateau Thierry Burlow’s RF exposed & is forced to withdraw toward North –Kluck soon forced to follow to protect his Left Flank Joffre seizes opportunity to counterattack – Pushes BEF & left flank of French 5 th in gap & attacks => Result? –Germans must ?_______________

28. 28 “Race to the Sea” Germans are forced to retreat & attempt to re-establish front on Aisne River –Joffre saves Paris & Moltke is relieved (too pessimistic) Falkenhayn replaces Moltke –Rebuilds German right wing for another try at flanking Allies –Allies in turn move North in attempt to out flank Germans Both sides counter the other’s movements to sea –By winter (1914-15): 350 mile extended & entrenched Front established from the Swiss border to the North Sea

29. 29 Eastern Front – Aug-Dec 1914 Contrast between Western vs. Eastern Front (Map): –Geography & distances to maneuver Impact on logistics support –Transportation needs favor internal LOCs – why?

30. 30 Key Factors Affecting Match Up Size of Russian Army (12M) vs. 11M of Germans –French have 8.4 million troops Russian tactics: –Massive frontal assaults (Set piece, mindless & brutal) Conscript Troops not trained or properly equipt –No coordination between supporting arms: Infantry, artillery, & Calvary do their own thing Infighting & petty jealousy at Russian high command levels: –Result: Operational support between & among Armies suffers –Incompetent generalship & poor leadership => bad tactical & Op. decisions German Factors & Tactics: –Small but well led & trained forces; –Better coordination developing; –Effective exploitation of internal LOCs Exploit lateral Railroad transport for redeployments & concentration

31. 31 Eastern Front- Strategic Goals & Map Overview Germany’s strategic goal: – Avoid defeat in East –Maintain stabilized Eastern Front –Delay Russian advance Russian strategic goal: –Fulfill promise to France Establish 2nd Front in East –Relieve pressure from Germans on France in West –Attack East Prussia ASAP

32. 32 Battle of Tannenberg Order of Battle & Operational Plans Russia NW Army Group (Commanded by the incompetent Zhilinski) with two Armies: –1st Army – (Rennenkamph): 200K troops Marches West to the North of Masurian Lakes to attack German Army defending East Prussia –2nd Army- (Samsonov): 14.5 Infantry & 4 Calvary Divisions with 1160 guns Marches West around South of the Lakes & then North Objective: Join Rennenkamph in attack by enveloping German Army from the south in its rear & trap it German 8th Army (Prittwitz): –135K Troops (11 undermanned Inf & 1 Calvary divs) –Plan: Establish defense line to hold off Russian advance –Concentrate to either North or South as required

33. 33 Battle of Tannenberg- Prelude Germans forced to engage Russian 1 st Army in North –8th Army attacks 1st Army w/9 Divisions at Gumbinen: –Indecisive tactical outcome- but Prittwitz withdraws to the West Intel reports indicate that 2 Russian Armies are to his south –Prittwitz panics –Fears his LOCs will be cut off –Decides to retreat behind Vistula River & abandon East Prussia! Informs Moltke – who does what? –Soon decides to relieve Prittwitz –Replaced by whom? ?________________ & ?________________

34. 34 Battle of Tannenberg- 8 th Army’s New Plan Meantime: 8th Army HQ staff (LTC Hoffman) comes up with good plan: –Hold static Russian 1st Army in place in North: One Calvary Division to screen 1st Army Bulk of 8th Army to deploy South via internal lateral LOC Tactical Objective: Lure & trap vulnerable 2nd Army into the weak center of an arc –Then hit both of Samsonov’s right & left flanks –Pincer Envelopment –Unfortunately Prittwitz failed to inform Moltke of this revised plan – so he was relieved Hindenburg & Ludendorff arrive & take over: –Concur with Hoffman’s revised plan –Ludendorff deploys 4 corps South to attack –(Intel windfall: Russian plan & C3 intercepts) –Samsonov & 2 nd Army completely unaware of danger until too late

35. 35 Battle of Tannenberg- Samsonov’s Blunder Samsonov blunders into 8th Army’s trap –Presses into “soft” German center –Ignores serious reservations of his subordinate commanders Pressured by Zhilinski to continue 2 nd Army’s advance (“Won’t let Samsonov play coward”) –Aug 26-27: 2 German corps attack 2nd Army RF –Another German Corps hits his Left Flank soon after –Aug 28: 2nd Army then attacks soft center & is trapped as planned At same time Russian 2nd Army’s LOC has been seriously overextended: –Troops & horses begin to starve (3 days w/o rations or winter clothes) –Samsonov’s appeals for help & relief, but his pleas go unheeded: –Zhilinski & Rennenkamph simply abandon Samsonov & his army

36. 36 Battle of Tannenberg- Results Disaster follows – Samsonov shoots himself in forest: –Russia’s 2nd Army destroyed: Russian loss: 92K POWs & 50K casualties Tactical & short lived operational victory for Germans –Certainly not a strategic victory – why? Russian losses easily ?________________ – (37+ corps) Hindenburg & Ludendorff re-deploy forces to North: –Objective: Attack Russian 1st Army –Rennenkamph withdraws across Russian border By 20 Sept: Russian Army would return w/stronger force: –Push Germans West to East Prussian frontier –By 25 Sept – strategic situation in East is unchanged

37. 37 Operations in Galicia & Poland Austria-Hungary vs. Russia: –Superior Russian numbers ultimately overcome initial Austrian successes –Russian victories preclude exploitation of Tannenburg Poland: Germans forced to come to Austria-Hungary’s rescue: –Enables Austria-Hungary to push Russians back to start of Offensive –Both Germans & Austria-Hungary exhausted –Unable to exploit short lived tactical victories for strategic or Op success Serbia: –Austrians fail to sustain earlier limited success –By 15 Dec: Serbs drive Austrians out of Serbia –Remains under Serbian control until late 1915

38. 38 Assessment Central Powers fail to achieve quick, decisive tactical & strategic victory- why? Joffre & “Miracle of the Marne” –Firm & decisive action & leadership at critical moment –Last minute adjustment to reality of ground truth –Seized opportunity & retrieved initiative from Germans Eastern Front: –German tactical & operational victory: Battle of Tannenburg –But Germans fail to achieve strategic victory - why? Major limitation: limited ?______ & ?______ & ?______ !

39. 39 Assessment- Longer Term Perspective From longer term perspective – Germany’s future grim –Austria-Hungary ally more of a liability than credit Von Schlieffen Plan (as modified) failed in execution: –HQ (Moltke) leadership poor & indecisive –Command, control, & communications problems severe –Overextended lines of communication – (Kluck’s 1st Army) –No quick victory possible (key German assumption for war) Western Front: long static defensive stalemate ensues: –Numerous attempts by both sides to break stalemate: Result in costly & unsuccessful frontal assaults Focus now: sustain logistics needs of Army - top priority –While both sides desparately search for new strategy & tactics to break the stalemate

40. Back-up Slides 40

41. The World at War 1914-1918 41

42. 42 Battle of Tannenberg- Samsonov’s Blunder Samsonov blunders into 8th Army’s trap –Presses into “soft” German center –Ignores reservations of subordinate commanders Pressured by Zhilinski to continue 2 nd Army’s advance (“coward”) –Aug 26-27: 2 German corps attack 2nd Army RF –Another German Corps hits his Left Flank soon after –Aug 28: 2nd Army then attacks soft center & is trapped as planned At same time Russian 2nd Army’s LOC seriously overextended: –Troops & horses begin to starve (3 days w/o rations or winter clothes) –Samsonov’s appeals for help & relief unheeded: –Zhilinski & Rennenkamph abandon Samsonov