1. 1 CHINAS CHANGING MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

2. BASIC FEATURES OF CHINAS MEDIA ENVIRONMENT A controlled media environment where government exercises central control over most aspects of the media BUT A rapidly changing media environment where a number of outlets increasingly push the envelope 2

3. HOW MEDIA CONTROL WORKS Oversight of media from highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party 3

4. HOW CHINA CONTROLS ITS MEDIA 4

5. 5 Potitburo Central Committee Organization Department International Department Propaganda Department United Front Work Department

6. BASIC PILLARS OF THE CHINESE PROPAGANDA SYSTEM RENMIN RIBAOParty daily XINHUAOfficial news agency CCTVOfficial television network 6

7. WHAT CONTROLLED MEDIA LOOK LIKE Central media carefully crafted to send messages about government policy priorities Central media tends to be formulaic When reading this media, you need to learn to read between the lines, decode the signals 7

8. LOOSENING OF SOME CONTROLS FROM 1990s Commercialization and cutting of subsidies for many publications, television networks Development of new technologiesInternet cell phones and satellite TV-- and greater access to these technologies Chinas accession to WTO in 2000, requiring China to partially open its market to Western media firms Professionalization of journalism 8

9. IMPACT OF COMMERCIALIZATION Created need to develop content that would appeal to readers, advertisers Creation of a small but increasing number of quasi-commercial publications that occasionally tend to push the envelope in their reporting Caijing Caixin Xinjing Bao Guandong-based publications Nanfang Dushi bao Nanfeng Chuang 9

10. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: NANFANG DUSHIBAO 12 December 2010 10

11. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: NANFANG DUSHIBAO 1 June 2010 11

12. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: XINJINGBAO 4 JUNE 2010 12

13. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: XINJINGBAO, May 2012 13 In the still of the deep night, removing that mask of insincerity, we say to our true selves I am sorry.

14. IMPACT OF WTO ACCESSION Reorganization of television networks Creation of a number of regional companies that have often pushed the envelope on programming to attract viewers Hunan Satellite TVs Supergirl program 14

15. IMPACT OF THE INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA Chinese Communist Partys Ambivalent Approach to the Internet Tool for economic development, better disseminating party line But Efforts to restrict sensitive content that cross party red lines 15

16. CHINESE INTERNET CONTROLS External – Great Firewall Internal – Party retains ability to shut down sectors of Internet within the country Censorship Guiding public discussion – 50 Cent Cadre 16

17. RAPID GROWTH OF CHINESE INTERNET USE 17

18. INTERNET PENETRATION IN CHINA 18

19. CHINAS SOCIAL MEDIA LANDSCAPE 19

20. MEET SINA WEIBO 20

21. MEET SINA WEIBO 21

22. FOREIGN MINISTRYS SINA WEIBO PAGE 22

23. GOVERNMENT MICROBLOGS ON SINA WEIBO 23

24. MEET QQ (TENGXUN) WEIBO 24

25. LOCATION MATTERS 25

26. CENSORSHIP ON SINA WEIBO 26 s.weibo.com, 5 Nov 2012

27. CENSORSHIP ON QQ (TENGXUN) WEIBO 27 t.qq.com, 5 Nov 2012

28. CENSORSHIP ON SINA WEIBO 28 An image deleted from Sina Weibo. The text reads, Smashing special provisions [for Party leaders] is better than boycotting Japanese goods, 21 September 2012 (http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/09/27/27607/)

29. CENSORSHIP 29 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTJmtfjVerw

30. THE LIMITS OF CONTROL? 30 But The Internet is so large that even with all the partys resources, some sensitive postings still get through, however briefly Increasingly savvy social media users adept at getting around party controls

31. ANALYZING CHINAS CONTROLLED MEDIA: BASIC PRINCIPLES 1.Authoritativeness of media vehicleshelps determine level of leadership involvement 2.Comparison of shifts in media formulas and patterns to help identify policy shifts 3.Examine media aimed at different audiences to decode policy signals aimed at specific audiences 4.Look for signals of policy debate, early signs of policy shifts in lower level, less authoritative media 31

32. AUTHORITATIVENESS Basic point: All media are NOT created equal Authoritativeness: the degree to which a report in controlled media reflects the views of the highest levels of the PRC party and government Examination of the levels of authoritativeness through which PRC media sends messages can shed light on the degree of leadership involvement in and concern over an issue 32

33. LEVELS OF AUTHORITATIVENESS IN PRC MEDiA 1.Major party documents, government work reports 2.Statements by PRC leadersthe higher the leaders rank, the more authoritative the statement is 3. Renmin Ribao Editorials 4.Renmin Ribao Commentator Articles 5. Signed articles in Renmin Ribaolevel of authoritativeness depends on who signs them 33

34. LEVELS OF AUTHORITATIVENESSPUBLIC DOCUMENTS Government statements Foreign Ministry statements Statements by Foreign Ministry spokesman, other government spokespersons 34

35. COMPARISON OF MEDIA FORMULAS AND PATTERS Basic point: Never take anything at face value PRC controlled media tends to be formulaic Comparison of changes in formulas over time can provide insight into changing PRC policy priorities and views Applies not only to language used in PRC media, but to images, patterns of TV coverage, and placement in a media outlet 35

36. CHINAS CHANGING DESCRIPTIONS OF ITS TIES WITH NORTH KOREA 36 Closer than lips and teeth ( 1950s-early 1990s) Brotherly Countries ( 2000) Friendly neighbors (July 2006) Normal State-to State relations (April 2009)

37. CHANGING MEDIA PATTERNS 37 China Daily website, cartoon in Chinese on North Korean missile launch, entitled Unrealistic Forward Movement, 14 April 2012

38. DECODING MESSAGES AIMED AT SPECIFIC AUDIENCES The PRC sometimes uses media outlets aimed at specific audiences to send policy signals to those audiences Chinas official English-language newspaper China Daily Xinhuas English-language service 38

39. IDENTIFYING SIGNS OF POLICY DEBATE Lower-level, less authoritative media sometimes provide signs of debate These media are not controlled as rigorously as central media But because all PRC media are controlled to some extent, views would not appear without some degree of official support, especially in government-affiliated think-tank journals CAVEAT: While these articles may reflect thinking in some officials circles, they do not speak for the Chinese Government or represent its official, consensus position 39

40. IDENTIFYING SIGNS OF POLICY DEBATE Some specialized publications allowed greater scope for debate Mainly on economic issues Also some foreign policy issuesrelations with Japan, DPRK, Chinas role in the world 40

41. ROLE OF PRC-OWNED HONG KONG MEDIA Beijing sometimes uses this media to air issues, send signals it deems too sensitive to discuss in domestic media Early signs of tougher line toward DPRK Early signs of opening to the KMT 41

42. ROLE OF PRC-OWNED HONG KONG MEDIA WARNING: Not everything in PRC-owned Hong Kong media is a policy signal from Beijing or a sign of debate Articles are more likely to be signals if they: Quote or are authored by a well-connected PRC scholar Are picked up by other PRC-owned Hong Kong media outlets Are picked up or quoted in lower-level mainland media 42

43. SUMMING UP 1.When reading PRC central media, always remember: Not all media are created equalpay attention to authoritativeness Never take anything at face value 2.Media environments are dynamic and constantly changing Never take anything for granted 43

44. Marcella B Northeast Asia Program, Senior Analyst MarcellB@rccb.osis.gov Jonathan L Northeast Asia Program, Open Source Officer JonathaL@rccb.osis.gov 44