1. Chapter 2: Origins of Intelligence-Led Policing

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3. The new police
‘The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime: the next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. To these ends all the efforts of police must be directed’
Mayne, S.R. (1829) Instructions to “The new police of the Metropolis” (London: Metropolitan Police).

4. Drivers for change Complexity in policing and the performance culture
Managing internal risk
The demand gap
Limitations of the standard model of policing
Organised and transnational crime
Changes in technology

5. The growing paperwork burden
Police administrators demand greater internal accountability
In the ‘knowledge is power’ culture, police overproduce information to retain in case it might be useful
An obsession with reporting drives internal audits and monitoring systems
Redundancy in retaining paper and electronic records creates duplication and drains resources.
Ericson, R.V. and Haggerty, K.D. (1997) Policing the Risk Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

6. Lack of investigative innovation
“In many fundamental respects, the investigation process, though showing some advances, seems to have been relatively uninfluenced by significant changes in policing, the crime problem and technological advances made in the past thirty years. In the main, it is our view that progress in police criminal investigative efforts remains largely isolated from broader police efforts to respond more effectively, more efficiently and more resolutely to the crime problem in general.”
Horvath, F., Meesig, R.T. and Lee, Y.H. (2001) 'National Survey of Police Policies and Practices Regarding the Criminal Investigations Process: Twenty-Five Years After Rand' (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice). Page 9.

7. Demand gap (UK)

8. Demand gap (US)

9. US policing landscape Fragmented and uncoordinated organizations
Mistrust of the word ‘intelligence’
Community policing era
Slow emergence of problem-oriented policing
Rapid emergence of Compstat

10. Fragmented and uncoordinated
Type of agency
Number of agencies
Number of full-time sworn officers
Local police
12,766
446,974
Sheriff
3,067
175,018
State 49
58, 190
Special jurisdiction
1,481
49,398
Constable/Marshal
513
2,323
US non-federal police agencies and officer totals, 2004

11. Police departments per 1 million population

12. Fragmented and uncoordinated – solutions?
1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
Every department with 75 of more sworn officers should develop an intelligence capability
Led to development of the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) network, and
Criminal Intelligence System Operating Policies (28 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 23) – known as 28CFR23

13. Demonizing intelligence
House Committee on Un-American Activities
Some police kept dossiers on communists or communist sympathizers, and civil rights activists
FBI’s counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO), which ran from 1956 to 1971, rapidly moved from its original aims of targeting foreign intelligence agencies during the Cold War to spying on American citizens and dissident political bodies
“Many activists publicized their intelligence files as a badge of honor, often to the embarrassment of the police”
Carter, D.L. (2004) 'Law Enforcement Intelligence: A guide for State, Local, and Tribal Enforcement Agencies' (Washington DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services). Page 25.

14. Crime Commission of 1965
President Lyndon Johnson’s Crime Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
Started 1965, published report 1967
‘The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society’
Recommended that:
the police work especially hard in minority
communities,
they make attempts to regain legitimacy
and offset the unpopularity of the police through community relations programs.

15. Problem-Oriented Policing
Herman Goldstein and the Madison, Wisconsin police department
Newport News Police Department and SARA
Scan
Analyze
Respond
Assess
Eck, J.E. and Spelman, W. (1987) 'Problem solving: Problem-oriented policing in Newport News' (Washington DC: Police Executive Research Forum).

16. Compstat
Started in the Crime Control Strategy meetings of the New York City Police Department (NYPD)
January 1994
Police Commissioner William Bratton, newly hired from the city’s Transit Police by Mayor Rudy Giuliani

17. 9/11
After Sept 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the IACP held a Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit (spring 2002)
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) formed
Created the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan
Key theme that resonates throughout the plan is the need to overcome the ‘long-standing and substantial barriers that hinder intelligence sharing’
Also to use the plan as a ‘mechanism to promote intelligence-led policing’ (GIWG 2005: iv)

18. UK: New public management
New public management movement in the UK began in the early 1980s
1993 Sheehy Inquiry into Police Responsibilities
Police and Magistrates Courts Act
A focus on greater ‘efficiency, effectiveness and economy’
Sporadic emergence of problem-oriented policing

19. Further developments
Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively
Existing policing roles and the levels of accountability lacked integration and efficiency
The police were failing to make the best use of resources
Greater emphasis on tackling criminals would be more effective than focusing on crimes
Saw problems as:
insufficient interview training
forensic potential not utilized
scientific support under-resourced
pattern of activity highly reactive
intelligence work having low status and under-resourced
failure to exploit crime pattern analysis and informants

20. Policing with Intelligence (HIMC, 1997)
Policing with Intelligence: Criminal Intelligence – a Thematic Inspection on Good Practice
Key factors that HMIC considered to be vital in promoting intelligence-led policing:
enthusiastic and energetic leadership that endorses intelligence-led policing and promotes it through a Director of Intelligence;
a published strategy that sets the intelligence agenda for a force;
an integrated intelligence structure so that analysts can work at the hub of operational policing activities;
criteria to measure performance;
the forging of effective partnerships with local agencies that may be able to help police combat local crime and disorder problems

21. Mike Maguire and Tim John
Reviewed criminal intelligence systems in 8 UK forces. Concluded:
Major organizational reforms can only be implemented with wholehearted commitment from the senior officers in the force
It is vital that all officers understand overall purposes and expected benefits and their own contribution
The possible negative influence of broader ‘cultural’ factors should not be underestimated
System should be continually monitored and reviewed
Objectives and strategies should be reviewed at intervals, informed wherever possible by evaluations of outcomes
Access to resources, such as surveillance teams, should be seen to be equitable
Maguire, M. and John, T. (1995) 'Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: Integrated Approaches', Police Research Group: Crime Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 64.

22. National Intelligence Model
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), commissioned by Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), released National Intelligence Model (NIM) in 1999

23. Summary of main factors relevant to development of intelligence-led policing
Universal factors
Complexity in policing
Managing internal risk
The demand gap
Limitations of the standard model of policing
Organized and transnational crime
Changes in technology

24. Summary of main factors relevant to development of intelligence-led policing – country specific
US Policing landscape
UK Policing landscape
Fragmented and uncoordinated
New public managerialism and oversight
Demonizing ‘intelligence’
Sporadic emergence of POP
Community policing era
Helping with Enquiries
Slow emergence of POP
Policing with Intelligence
Rapid emergence of Compstat
National Intelligence Model
9/11 and homeland security