14-3 Chapter Outline THE PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE FIRMS SHORT-RUN DEMAND FOR LABOUR THE PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE FIRMS LONG-RUN DEMAND FOR LABOUR THE MARKET DEMAND CURVE FOR LABOUR AN IMPERFECT COMPETITORS DEMAND FOR LABOUR THE SUPPLY OF LABOUR THE NON-ECONOMISTS REACTION TO THE LABOUR SUPPLY MODEL THE MARKET SUPPLY CURVE MONOPSONY MINIMUM WAGE LAWS LABOUR UNIONS DISCRIMINATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION THE INTERNAL WAGE STRUCTURE WINNER-TAKE-ALL MARKETS
14-4 Value Of The Marginal Product Of Labour Value of marginal product (VMP): the value, at current market price, of the extra output produced by an additional unit of input. The hiring rule for the firm is to choose that amount of labour for which the wage rate is equal to the VMP
14-5 Figure 12.1: The Competitive Firm s Short- Run Demand for Labour 0 0 Value of marginal product (R/unit of labour) Marginal product of labour (units of output/unit of labour) Optimal quantity of labour when w = 120 160 W = 120 80
14-6 Labour Demand in the Long-run The firms demand for labour will tend to be more elastic the more elastic the demand is for its product. The firms demand for labour will tend to be more elastic the more it is able to substitute the services of labour for those of other inputs.
14-7 Figure 12.2: Short and Long-Run Demand Curves for Labour 0 Short-run demand for labour Long-run demand for labour Labour (person-hr/day) Wage (R/day)
14-8 Figure 12.3: The Market Demand Curve for Labour 0 R/L
14-9 Marginal Revenue Product Of Labor Marginal revenue product (MRP): the amount by which total revenue increases with the employment of an additional unit of input. The firm will hire that quantity for which the wage rate and MRP L are equal.
14-10 Figure 12.4: The Optimal Choice of Leisure and Income Income (R/day) 0 24 w 0 = 2 400 (24 – h*)w 0 = 900
14-11 Figure 12.5: Optimal Leisure Choices for Different Wage Rates Income (R/day) 0 24(140) = 3 360 24(100) = 2 400 24(40) = 960 W = 140 W = 100 W = 40
14-12 The Supply Of Labour Leisure activities: which here include play, sleep, eating, and any other activity besides paid work in the labour market. The choice is between two goods we may call income and leisure. As in the standard consumer choice problem, the individual is assumed to have preferences over the two goods that can be summarized in the form of an indifference map.
14-13 Figure 12.6: The Labor Supply Curve for the ith Worker 140 Wage (R/hr) 100 40 0 is labour supply (hr/day)
14-14 Figure 12.7: Substitution and Income effects of a Wage Increase 0 Hours of leisure Income (Rand /day) 3 360 2 480 W = R100 W = R140 R C A B Q P 12241715 Substitution effect Income effect
14-15 Figure 12.8: The Labour Supply Curve for a Worker Seeking a Target Level of Income 200 400
14-16 Figure 12.9: When Leisure and Income are Perfect Complements Income (R/day) 4 800 1 600 M = 4 800 – 200h M = 100h
14-17 Figure 12.10: An Increase in Demand by One Category of Employer 000 Q U2 Q U1 DuDu DuDu DuDu
14-18 Monopsony Average factor cost (AFC): another name for the supply curve for an input. Total factor cost (TFC): the product of the employment level of an input and its average factor cost. Marginal factor cost (MFC): the amount by which total factor cost changes with the employment of an additional unit of input.
14-19 Monopsony The optimal level of employment for a monopsonist is the level for which MFC and the demand for labour are equal. – For the monopsony firm wages will be lower than under competition.
14-20 Figure 12.11: Average and Marginal Factor Cost 0 141 41 40 R/L
14-21 Figure 12.12: The Profit-Maximizing Wage and Employment Levels for a Monopsonist 0 R/L
14-22 Figure 12.13: Comparing Monopsony and Competition in the Labor Market 0 R/L
14-23 Minimum Wage Laws Labour Relations Act 97 of 1995 Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 Whether the net effect of the minimum wage is to increase the amount of income earned by unskilled workers depends on the elasticity of demand for that category of labour.
14-25 Figure 12.15: The Minimum Wage Law in the Case of Monopsony R/L
14-26 Labour/Trade Unions Labour movements are very active in South Africa and about 30% of all workers are members of a trade union. – Unionized workers bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of employment. – Unions may also facilitate communication between labour and management.
14-27 Figure 12.16: The Allocative Effects of Collective Bargaining 0 0 Non-union sector
14-28 Figure 12.17: The Minimum Wage Law in the Case of Monopsony 0 Wage Per worker Labour W1W1 W2W2 W3W3 L3L3 L2L2 L1L1 L* MR MR 1 DLDL SLSL A
14-29 Discrimination In The Labour Market From any individual employers point of view examples of different wages across various population groups are examples of non- market discrimination effects that lower productivity before job applicants even make contact with the employer.
14-30 Discrimination In The Labour Market Customer discrimination: the firms customers do not wish to deal with minority employees. Co-worker discrimination: when some type of worker (i.e white workers) feel uneasy about working with other type of workers (i.e. blacks) and may prefer employment in firms that hire only their type. Employer discrimination: wage differentials that arise from an arbitrary preference by the employer for one group of worker over another.
14-31 Statistical Discrimination Statistical discrimination is the result, not the cause, of average productivity differences between groups. Its sole effect is to reduce wage variation within each group.
14-32 Figure 12.18: A Hypothetical Uniform Productivity Distribution (R/hr) 100400300200
14-33 Figure 12.19: Productivity Distributions for Two Groups 400300200100 (R/hr)
14-34 The Internal Wage Structure The wage structure within many private firms seems much more egalitarian than would be warranted under our marginal productivity theory of wages. 1.Most people prefer high-ranked to low-ranked positions among their co-workers; 2.No one can be forced to remain in a firm against his wishes.
14-35 Figure 12.20: The Wage Structure when Local Status Matters
14-36 Figure 12.21: Wage Schedules and the Intensity of Interaction 0