1. Lecture 3: Criticisms of Positivism; and the Interpretivist Approach
Research Methods
Lecture 3: Criticisms of Positivism; and the Interpretivist Approach

2. Introduction In the previous lecture we examined positivism
Positivism has had considerable influence; but it is subject to many strong criticisms
In this lecture we examine some of the criticisms, which also imply a completely different approach to social science: interpretivism

3. Miscellaneous Criticisms of Positivism
Kuhnian criticisms of notion of rational scientific progress; e.g. K controversy
Is scientific method practiced at all?
Duhem-Quine problem suggests crucial tests are impossible
Dow (1996): complexity of world makes positivist precision impossible/undesirable

4. Miscellaneous Criticisms of Positivism
Apparent failure of social science to find ‘laws’
Science/non-science distinction reflects historical power
Truth, observations and ‘facts’ are contestable
Key distinctions: fact/value, observation/theory, fact/theory dubious

5. Observation or Fact/Theory Distinction
Is a worker being exploited or paid fairly? Impossible to decide w/o using some theory
All observations reflect some existing theoretical framework: e.g. ‘that cat is red’
Observed behaviour can be interpreted differently according to theory/context (e.g. woman dying of CO poisoning (H&S: 120))
Acts are complex: neutrality = lose richness

6. Fact/Value Distinction
Smith was a moral philosopher!
NB title of Ricardo (1817)
In Mill, economics is a moral science
Weber: choice of research topics reflects values
Bhaskar: standards of inquiry  values
Influential account by Myrdal (1954)

7. Myrdal’s Criticisms
Utilitarianism/natural law philosophy plays (unacknowledged) role in neo-classicism
Language of economics implicitly values entities (e.g. use of ‘principle,’ ‘function’)
Conscious and unconscious motivations affect interpretations; must admit biases in order to achieve objectivity

8. Related Criticisms on F/V
Significance of a cultural (social) event cannot be determined without recourse to evaluation (Weber)
Positivist accounts implicitly value certain things or are politically motivated (Robbins, 1932: 132, 135)
Policy makers/funders etc. put pressure on scientists – influence their findings

9. Interpretivism
Many of the above criticisms reflect ‘interpretivist’ philosophy of science
Idealism: Vico, Rousseau, Hegel
Society different from nature
Objective of inquiry is verstehen
Regularities result from rules

10. Verstehen
Translation of biblical texts: linguistic but also social exercise - need to understand social context (hermeneutics)
Problem of incommensurability
Dilthey: observer has to access cultural world through empathy
To understand the past, need to identify with it (H&S: 97)

11. Verstehen
Need to understand from the inside: not view people as if from the outside
Verstehen: attempting to reconstruct the subjective experience of actors without distorting the world itself (Weber)
Task of social science is to find meanings (Winch)
Starting point of social science is the observation of people’s behaviour or words

12. Rules versus Regularities
Any regs in society are not natural causal laws but result from reactions to rules
Example: traffic lights
Rickert: nomothetic vs. ideographic
Weber: social science - deeper study
Free will vs. determinism
Reasons are not causes

13. Implications Impossibility of social science? Find meanings; verstehen
Ideal types (Weber): abstracting from the real, emotional, irrational
Narrative emphasised
Quantitative methods unlikely to be useful
Use ethnographic methods

14. Conclusions
Interpretivism emerged from its own tradition and as a response to positivism
Objective observation of causal regularities impossible for various reasons
Objective of social inquiry is verstehen
Implies radically different research process
Interpretivism less influential in economics