1. Group 11 LB 602 Intellectual Property Law Faculty of Law,Thammasat University, (LL.M.)English Program 1 st Semester, Academic Year 2012 Benjaporn Srimontien 5401040067 Benjaporn Srimontien 5401040067 Pimkamol Sermnara 5401040448 Pimkamol Sermnara 5401040448 SasipiN Sinsawat 5401040554 SasipiN Sinsawat 5401040554 Patchara Thowatanapun 5401040380 Patchara Thowatanapun 5401040380 Nawarat Tiawattananon 5401040299 Nawarat Tiawattananon 5401040299

2. ***Thank you Photo from the www.google.com

3. Fact The plaintiff in this case, Viacom International, Inc., is a large media conglomerate whose major brands include Paramount Pictures Corporation, BET Networks, and MTV. ***Thank you Photo from the www.google.com

4. Fact The defendant, Youtube, Inc., which is owned by Google, operates a website where users can upload video files free of charge and the videos are subsequently made available for the public to view on Youtube’s website. ***Thank you Photo from the www.google.com

5. Fact Youtube users have uploaded videos onto Youtube’s website that infringed Viacom’s copyrights. YouTube had infringed on its copyrights by performing, displaying, and reproducing Viacom's copyrighted works and including promoting and inducing.

6. The complaint stated that over 150,000 unauthorized clips of Viacom's programming eg. SpongeBob, SquarePants,and The Daily Show, had been made available on YouTube.

7. However, infringing clips continued to be uploaded by Youtube users. So, Viacom sued Youtube for direct, contributory, vicarious and inducement of copyright infringement.

8. Viacom notified Youtube of approximately 100,000 potentially infringing video clips and Youtube removed them within a day. Youtube claimed protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s “safe harbor” provisions in section 512.

9. District Court ruling Judge Stanton ruled in Google's favor in a motion for summary judgment, holding that Google was protected by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ’s “safe harbor” provisions. The judge held that while the company undeniably had general knowledge that some copyrighted material had been uploaded by users, it did not know which clips had been uploaded with permission and which had not.

10. Appellate Court ruling The “safe harbor” provision protects online companies like YouTube from liability as long as they promptly remove infringing content upon notification.

11. Question Did the defendant, Youtube, fall within the scope of Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (DMCA) safe harbor provisions section 512 (c) or not?

12. “Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act” (OCILLA) of The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) Section 512 Limitations on liability relating to material online (Applied in case where a service provider is found to be liable under existing principles of copyright law)

13. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA)

14. Four categories of Conduct by online service provider benefiting from limitations on liability for copyright infringement: Conduct Section 512 (a) – (d) 1.Transitory Digital Network Communications; 2.System Caching; 3.Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users; and 4.Information Location Tools liability means monetary relief, i.e. damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other form of monetary payment. injunctive or other equitable relief (except as provided in subsection (j)). infringement of copyright by reason of conduct qualified in each safe harbor protection.

15. Online Service Provider Meaning according to Section 512 (k) (A)As particularly used in Section 512 (a) Transitory Digital Network Communications “Service provider” means - an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received. (B)As used in this Section 512, other than section 512 (a) “Service provider” means - a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in Transitory Digital Network Communications (subparagraph (A)).

16. Section 512 (c) - Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users (1) In general, this provision limits liability of a service provider for infringement material on their system or network such as websites or other information repositories controlled or operated by or for the service provider and applied to storage at the direction of a user when the conditions determined in this Section 512 (c) are met.

17. Legislative History / Objective: Despite encouragement of copyrightable work creativity and copyright owner protection, the U.S. desires the copyrighted work quickly and conveniently available and distributed to on-line global marketplace. There have been several case relevant to service provider liability for copyright infringement. Most have approach to issue from the standpoint of contributory and vicarious ability. The Senate Committee decided to create a series of safe harbors for certain common activities of service providers. A service provider which qualifies for a safe harbor receives the benefit of limited liability. (The Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report, S.Rep. No. 105-190 (1998))

18. Therefore, the U.S. requires to have service providers invest, expand and develop the speed and capacity of the internet systems so that various and quality services on the internet can be provided and distributed efficiently. However, to do so the service providers normally risk themselves in engaging in all kinds of acts that expose them to possibility of copyright infringement liability. Consequently, to reduce hesitation of service providers in operating in on-line systems and network, the fair relevant liability limitations must be given to the qualified service providers.

19. (i) The service provider does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; Legislative History / Objective: In general, the law does not demand a service provider to monitor its service or affirmatively seek facts specified infringing activity so as to claim the benefit of the liability limitation. However, the law requires the service provider to take some actions to stop accessing or remove the material pertinent to copyright infringement swiftly upon the service provider’s perception of actual knowledge of such infringement, otherwise it cannot use the protection of the safe harbor. Section 512 (c)(1) : Elements of the conditions (A) Standard of knowledge

20. Legislative History / Objective: The term “activity” refers to wrongful activity that is occurring at the site on the provider’s system or network at which the material resides, regardless of whether copyright infringement is technically deemed to occur at that site or at the location where the material is received. For example: The activity that a website offering audio may be unauthorized public performance of a sound recording rather than the creation of an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work.

21. Section 512 (c)(1) : Elements of the conditions (A) Standard of knowledge (ii) The service provider, in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or Legislative History / Objective: This provision means although a service provider does not really know that the material or an activity using the material residing on its system or network is infringing the copyright, if there is a ‘red flag’ or some facts or circumstances indicating apparent infringing activity which a reasonable person is supposed to aware of such infringing activity emerging to the service provider, the service provider is deemed to be aware of such infringing activity also and required to act expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material, otherwise, it will lose the limitation of liability.

22. (iii) The service provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; Legislative History / Objective: There is no specific uniform time limit for expeditious action for removing, or stopping the access to the infringing material since the reasonable quick time varies according to factual circumstances and technical parameters of each case. Section 512 (c)(1) : Elements of the conditions (A) Standard of knowledge

23. Issue 1: Youtube, Inc. had “actual knowledge” and were “aware of facts and circumstances” from which infringing activity was apparent but failed to expeditiously stop it or not?

24. To consider this point, apart from applicable standard of knowledge stipulated in Section 512 (c) (1) (A) (i) and (ii) required to understand as mentioned above, the significant principle is the criteria to judge whether the service provider is of ‘actual knowledge’ or ‘aware of facts and circumstances from which infringing activity was apparent ‘ or not.

25. red flag The principle has been established by the Courts that general awareness that a particular type of item may be easily infringed residing or generalized knowledge of prevalence of infringing activity on the site of the service provider is not sufficient to be regarded as actual knowledge or awareness of a red flag of the service provider.

26. Red Flag ***Thank you Photo from the www.youtube.com

27. Youtube page ***Thank you Photo from the www.youtube.com

30. Instead, for knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of particular items can be considered as actual knowledge or awareness of facts and circumstances from which infringing activity was apparent as the copyright law intends to protect any distinctive individual works; accordingly, the copyright owner must and should be able to prove the infringement of copyrighted work to the court.

31. Section 512 (c)(1) : Elements of the conditions (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and Legislative History / Objective: In consideration whether financial benefit directly earned from the infringing activity or not, the court will take a common-sense, fact- based approach to determine it. For example; Any service fees where the value of service lies in providing access to infringing material.

32. Generally, any benefit derived from a legitimate business conducted by a service provider would not be regarded as a received financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity if the infringer makes the same kind of payments as non-infringing users of the service provider.

33. Hence, receiving a one-time set-up fee, flat periodical payments, cover fees for service based on length of message or by connect time from an infringing person in exchange for service would not be receiving a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.

34. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. Plaintiffs are UMG Recordings and other components of Universal Music Group, the world’s largest music company. VEOH Networks, Inc. ("VEOH"), maintains an online service that allows users to share videos through its website or through a standalone application. Users upload videos after reading, and agreeing to, VEOH's "Publisher Terms and Conditions" and "Terms of Use," which grant VEOH:

35. 1.a license to "publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, distribute, copy, store, reproduce and/or provide" the uploaded video "through the VEOH Service, either in its original form, copy or in the form of an encoded work” 2. and a license "to use, reproduce, modify, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, publish and transmit" the video.

36. And provides that the users: 1. "may not submit [material]... that contains any... infringing... or illegal content“ 2. "expressly represent and warrant" that the users "have the necessary licenses, rights, consents, and permissions to use and authorize Veoh to use all... Copyrights or other proprietary rights in and to any and all uploaded material.”

37. Once a video is uploaded the VEOH system performs a number of automatic functions, including creating a Flash-formatted copy, creating copies comprised of smaller "chunks" of video, allowing users to access files via "streaming", and allowing users to access files by downloading them.

38. Holding First, UMG argues that the alleged infringing activities do not fall within the plain meaning of “infringement of copyright by reason of the storage [of material] at the direction of a user,” a threshold requirement under § 512(c)(1).  UMG argued that the automatic functions performed by the VEOH system, while admittedly facilitating user access to stored content, did not actually constitute "storage" at the direction of a user. Under its interpretation of the Act a service provider's infringing conduct must be "storage" and that storage must be "at the direction of a user" for the protection from liability to apply.

39.  VEOH's interpretation of the safe harbor provided under section 512(c) of the DMCA did not require all infringing conduct to constitute storage in its own right, only that the conduct "occur as a result of the storage." The District Court agreed with VEOH's interpretation and denied UMG's motion finding the automatic functions in question to be "narrowly directed toward providing access to material stored at the direction of users."

40. Second, UMG argues that genuine issues of fact remain about whether Veoh had “actual knowledge of infringement”, or was “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity [wa]s apparent” under § 512(c)(1)(A).

41.  The Court holds that merely hosting a category of copyrightable content, such as music videos, with the general knowledge that one’s services could be used to share infringing material, is insufficient to meet the actual knowledge requirement under § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). Whether a service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)  The district court’s conception of this “red flag test” properly followed our analysis in CCBill, which reiterated that the burden remains with the copyright holder rather than the service provider.

42.  The plaintiffs in CCBill argued that there were a number of red flags that made it apparent infringing activity was afoot, noting that the defendant hosted sites with names such as “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” as well as password hacking websites, which obviously infringe. The court disagreed that [materials] are actually illegal on a service provider,” and “impose no such investigative duties on service providers.”  For the same reasons, it held that Veoh’s general knowledge that it hosted copyrightable material and that its services could be used for infringement is insufficient to constitute a red flag.

43. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1108 (W.D.Wash.2004) 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1108 (W.D.Wash.2004) Fact Plaintiff, Corbis Corporation ("Corbis") is in the business of licensing art images and photographs, including those of celebrities. Corbis licenses both photographs in which it, and others, hold the copyright. Corbis identified 230 such photographs that were copied, displayed and sold by Vendors through their Amazon.com zShops sites without Corbis' permission. Corbis identified one additional copyrighted photograph which was displayed, again without its permission, in an advertisement found on IMDB.com, another website owned by Amazon. This ad was linked to the zShops site.

44. Defendant, Amazon operates a website at the URL Amazon.com. Amazon allows nonaffiliated third parties to sell products on its website through its zShops program. This program allows such third parties ("Vendors") to create web pages called "listings" advertising particular products.

45.  Court holds that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") immunizes Amazon.com, Inc. ("Amazon") from copyright infringement damage claims arising out of the sale by nonaffiliated vendors on Amazon.com of photographs in which plaintiff claims a copyright.  The Court also found that Amazon had neither actual nor apparent knowledge of the infringing activities in question. Amazon had no actual knowledge, in large part, because Corbis had elected to commence suit without giving Amazon prior notice of its claims of infringement. Holding

46.  To establish that Amazon had apparent knowledge of the infringing activity, Corbis had to show "as articulated by Congress … evidence that a service provider 'turned a blind eye to 'red flags' of obvious infringement.'" This required a showing similar to that necessary to show that the service provider tolerated flagrant infringement by its users, namely that the infringing nature of the vendor's activities was obvious from a cursory review of the vendor's site.

47.  A copyright owner could establish apparent knowledge if she could show that an online location at which her copyrighted material was available was clearly a "pirate site." Congress described the advertisement of illegal copyright activity through such slang words as a "red flag " of obvious infringement," and indicated that the infringing nature of sites containing such red flags would be apparent from even a "brief and casual viewing." Thus, once a service provider is aware of a site containing such "red flags," the service provider would have apparent knowledge of the infringing activity.

48.  Because the Vendor listings in question did not contain such 'red flags,' the Court held that Amazon had neither actual nor apparent knowledge of the infringing activity, and thus met the second requirement of 512(c).

49.  Finally, the Court held that Amazon met the third requirement of 512(c) because it did not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity. As explained by the Court, Amazon can satisfy this prong either if it does not have the ability to control the infringing activity or it does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to that activity. Here, the Court held that Amazon did not have the right and ability to control the infringing activity - namely, the posting on its website of offers by nonaffiliated vendors to sell infringing products.

50.  The Court noted that "the right and ability to control infringing activity 'as the concept is used in the DMCA, cannot simply mean the ability of a service provider to remove or block access to materials posted on its website or stored on its system." While Amazon does provide the platform through which its Vendors make their products available, it does not possess the goods sold by the Vendors, nor preview or edit the listings offering them for sale.

51. As a result, held the Court, Amazon had met the third requirement for protection under 512(c), and thus was entitled to dismissal of the damage claims asserted by Corbis under the Copyright Act.

52. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc (A similar recent decision of the Second Cercuit involved analogous claims of trademark infringement therefore did not involve the DMCA) Fact Tiffany is a high end jewelry company. eBay is a large (perhaps the largest) on-line auction provider/web- site. Tiffany sued eBay for trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and false advertising in connection with the activity of certain eBay sellers who had been selling counterfeit tiffany products as well as eBay’s advertising practices.

53. eBayTiffany sponsored links eBay advertised the fact Tiffany products were available from sellers posting on its site, even though it was on notice that some of its sellers were selling counterfeit goods. eBay also purchased sponsored links on other sites (e.g. Yahoo!)which triggered on the word “tiffany,” discontinued but after Tiffany complained, eBay discontinued directly purchasing sponsored links. However, the lower court did find that eBay had continued to indirectly purchase sponsored links via another, third party company.

54. eBay implemented a site-wide a fraud prevention program. eBay actively pursued Tiffany fraudsters and allowed Tiffany to post a warning to eBay customers in the “about me” page dedicated to Tiffany. The warning directed eBay customers to purchase tiffany products in a Tiffany store, rather than on eBay, to ensure their authenticity.

55. Holding  The lower court correctly concluded that eBay neither directly nor contributorially infringed on the Tiffany trademark by eBay used the Tiffany trademark in a nominative fashion.  The lower court correctly concluded that eBay did not dilute Tiffany’s trademark.  From the record, the lower court concluded that eBay’s advertising was not “likely to mislead or confuse” customers.

56. Case law MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd Fact The plaintiffs were a consortium of 28 of the largest entertainment companies (led by Metro- Goldwyn-Mayer studios). Grokster, LTD and StreamCast Network distributed free software that allowed the sharing of files in a “peer to peer” network. This avoided the need for central servers. Some of those files shared are movies and songs that MGM hold copyrights to.

57. Private users began sharing copyrighted music and video files without authorization. The files shared do not go to a central location so Grokster and StreamCast did not know when the files were being copied. MGM shows that some 90 percent of the files being shared where copyrighted files.

58. "Peer to Peer" In a P2P network, The "peers" are computer systems which are connected to each other via the Internet. Files can be shared directly between systems on the network without the need of a central server. The only requirements for a computer to join a peer-to-peer network are an Internet connection and P2P software.

59. The programs connect to a P2P network, such as Gnutella, which allows the computer to access thousands of other systems on the network. Once connected to the network, P2P software allows you to search for files on other people's computers. Meanwhile, other users on the network can search for files on your computer, but typically only within a single folder that you have designated to share. While P2P networking makes file sharing easy and convenient, is also has led to a lot of software piracy and illegal music downloads.

60. Other related rules Secondary liability can be classified into 2 forms: 1.Contributory infringement is “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a contributory infringer.” 2.Vicarious infringement is a person will be liable for vicarious infringement if he has the right and ability to supervise the direct infringer and also has a direct financial interest in his activities. Vicarious liability requires that you “control,” and receive “benefit” from, someone else’s infringing activity. The “benefit” element will be difficult to resist in many P2P cases (at least for commercial products)

61. Holding The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Grokster and Stream Case because although users of the software did infringe MGM’s property there was no proof there the distributors had actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement. The appeals court stated that since these distributors did not have actual knowledge, did not partake in, or monitor the file sharing they are not directly liable for the infringement.

62. The Supreme Court decision United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court unanimously held that defendant P2P file sharing companies Grokster and Streamcast (maker of Morpheus) could be sued for inducing copyright infringement for acts taken in the course of marketing file sharing software.

63. On November 7, 2005 Grokster announced that it would no longer offer its peer-to-peer file sharing service. The notice on their website said, "The United States Supreme Court unanimously confirmed that using this service to trade copyrighted material is illegal. Copying copyrighted motion picture and music files using unauthorized peer-to-peer services is illegal and is prosecuted by copyright owners."

64. Analysis for this case DMCA Section 512 “safe harbors” These safe harbors apply only to “online service providers,” and only to the extent that the infringement involves four functions as already mentioned. Congress did not anticipate P2P when it enacted the safe harbors, many P2P products may not fit within the four enumerated functions.

65. So, in case of making or distributing any copies of copyrighted works, may be held liable as a direct infringer. The court will not be interested in “control” or “knowledge” or “financial benefit” or “material contribution.” If you made or transmitted copies, you’re probably liable for infringement.

66. Issue 2: receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity ability to control Did Youtube, Inc. ‘receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity’ and ‘has the right and ability to control such activity’ or not ?

67. For Example: Io Group, inc v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d 1132,1148 (N.D.Cal.2008) : Veoh : “ Section : 512(c) should define “Broad” and already pretty clear. “By reason of” = “As a result of” or “Something that can attributed to”

68. So Copyrighted Display, it is “As a result of ” person uploaded the content to Veoh’s server to be access by other means. Hence, If this trigger liability without the possibility of DMCA immunity. Service providers would be greatly deterred from performing their basic, vital, salutary function-namely providing access to information and material for the public.

69. Viacom International Inc., v. Youtube Inc. Main arguments that may arise: (1) Is YouTube making money "directly attributable" to users' copyright infringement? (2) Does YouTube have "the right and ability to control" those users' behavior? *The Second Circuit didn't deal with the "directly attributable" question. *But it did have something to say about the second question: What does it mean for a website like YouTube to have "the right and ability to control"?

70. YouTube's Claim: we need to know exactly where it is like a URL for the infringing video in order to have ability to control. Hence, if YouTube doesn't know a particular video is sitting on its server, it can't be expected to take it down. Viacom’s Counterclaim: YouTube can delete any video whenever it wants, so it has the "right and ability to control," period. Second Circuit : didn't take to either suggestion.

71. Analysis : YouTube's argument may look seems reasonable enough – that you have to know about something in order to "control" it. But previous safe-harbor, § 512(c)(1)(A), already deals with this kind of "actual knowledge." Google's suggested interpretation of (c)(1)(B) may runs the risk of redundant with (c)(1)(A), But courts don't like to do that. So, Google's suggestion is out.

72. Analysis : Viacom's argument : ability to delete is under Youtube control, on the other hand, would swallow up the safe harbor ultimately, which it would mean that service provider have to constantly vigilant against any possibly- infringing material. While the whole objective of the safe harbor is to take that load off of the Internet industries by giving them cover up for any liability if they comply with some less-intrusive requirements. Thus, Viacom's interpretation was out.

73. Does 512(c)(1)(B) require actual knowledge as well ? If (c)(1)(B) doesn't require actual knowledge of the infringing activity, but does require something more than the bare technical ability to take down user-posted content, then what is that "something more"?

74. "something more" problem The Second Circuit points out to other significance cases to help demonstrate the "something more" problem, Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures. Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures Cybernet, closely involved in its member-sites' activities, it was likely to fail the (c)(1)(B) test. Basically, Cybernet seems oversaw a network of adult-picture sites by operating an age verification service. Such operations, Cybernet enforced a rules on member sites such as : - kind of pictures they could post - how often different sites could repeat the same pictures This has shown how Cybernet was so closely involved in its member-sites' activities, the court ruled, it was likely to fail the (c)(1)(B) test. So in citing Cybernet, the Second Circuit is suggesting that if you're too hands on about what your users post, you might be on the hook if you let copyrighted material through.

75. MGM v. Grokster The Grokster defendants "clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage infringement.“

76. The Second Circuit sums up : "Both of these examples involve a service provider exerting substantial influence on the activities of users, without necessarily – or even frequently – acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity." but the court doesn't directly say whether that it's the test lower courts should apply.

77. The Second Circuit’s decision The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that this "right and ability to control" language also requires specific knowledge of infringing activity, (Further fact finding on the issue of control still remaining.)

78. The Second Circuit, however, punted on the question of what it takes to have the ability to control. "something more" is required more than the ability to block access to or remove infringing materials from a website.

79. Apparently, it’s not how the district court will determine whether there is sufficient evidence to determine whether YouTube had the ability to control infringing activity as to what that something more is.

80. Section 512 (c)(1) : Elements of the conditions (C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. If the copyright owner or its agent notify a service provider of a claimed infringement, the service provider must quickly remove or disable access to that claimed infringing material residing on its system, in order to benefit from safe harbor provisions under section 512 (c).

81. Legislative History / Objective: From the Senate and House Reports, section 512 does not require use of the notice and take-down procedure. A service provider wishing to benefit from “safe harbor” under this section must “take down” the infringing material where it has actual knowledge or is aware of fact and circumstances even if the copyright owner does not notify it of a claimed infringement. On the other hand, a copyright owner is no obligated to give notification of claimed infringement in order to enforce their rights, but neither actual knowledge nor awareness of a red flag may be imputed to a service provider based on information from a copyright owner or its agent that does not comply with the notification provisions of section 512 (c)(3).

82. Issue 3: respond expeditiously Did Youtube respond expeditiously to remove or disable access to the copyright infringing material after receiving notification of claimed infringement from Viacom or not?

83. In this case, when Viacom over a period of months accumulated some 100,000 videos and then sent one mass take-down notice to Youtube, by the next business day Youtube had removed virtually all of them.

84. Although Viacom complain that Youtube removes only specific clips, and not other clips which infringe the same works, section 512 (c)(3)(A)(ii) state that if multiply copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, the notification must include a “representative list” that also requires specific description.

85. Therefore, the court considered that Youtube have met the requirements under section 512 (c)(1)(C).

86. Section 512 (c)(2): Designated agent The limitations on liability established in section 512 (c) apply to a service provider who has designated an agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement only.

87. The designated agent must be made available through the service provider’s service, including on its website, and the contact information of the agent must be provided to the Copyright Office in which a current directory of agents are maintain available to the public for inspection.

88. Section 512 (c)(3): Elements of notification To be effective under section 512 (c), a notification of claimed infringement must be a written communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider and must substantially comply with all requirements stated in section 512 (c)(3)(A),

89. which are: – A physical or electronic signature of a copyright owner or his agent – Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringe – Identification of the material claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity

90. —Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party —A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law —A statement that information in the notification is accurate and under penalty of perjury that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner

91. According to section 512 (c)(3)(B), notification that do not substantially comply with the requirements in section 512 (c)(3)(A) shall not be considered as evidence of whether the service provider has actual knowledge, or has received a notification for purposes of subsection (c)(1)(A).

92. However, a defective notice provided to the designated agent may be considered in evaluating the service provider’s knowledge or awareness of facts and circumstances if these two requirements are met: 1)The complaining party has provided the requisite information concerning the identification of the copyrighted work, identification of the allegedly infringing material, and information sufficient for the service provider to contact the complaining party.

93. The service provider does not promptly attempt to contact the person making the notification or take other reasonable steps to assist in the receipt of notification substantially complying with section 512 (c)(3)(B).

94. Conclusion of Court Analysis The court in this case found that a general knowledge of infringing activity allows a service provider to qualify for safe harbor protection, so the court granted Youtube summary judgment, holding that it is eligible for the limitation on liability under section 512 (c) of the Digital Millennium Act.

95. Our Group 11 Thinking and Solution We do support the court decision as it is obviously match with real life situation. Every people uploading or watching video everytime around the world so it could be impossible to screen all the video clips within little time. We do support the court decision as it is obviously match with real life situation. Every people uploading or watching video everytime around the world so it could be impossible to screen all the video clips within little time. Also no matter what youtube delete the clip or not it is just the tail of the problem. People still commit copyright infringement if not posing here a thousand way else still await. Also no matter what youtube delete the clip or not it is just the tail of the problem. People still commit copyright infringement if not posing here a thousand way else still await. Hence, we should educate people and bring the justice to all. In stead of firing the house, we should teach people in the house to be good and corporate with each other. Hence, we should educate people and bring the justice to all. In stead of firing the house, we should teach people in the house to be good and corporate with each other.

96. Endofpresentation Thank you !!!