1. possible lessons on the sourcing, framing and delivery of scientific and technical advice the OPCW experience smallwood@unicri.it

3. “on tap but not on top”

4. POLICY-BASED -BASED POLICY

6. delivering advice on S&T the multilateral context Legitimisation Politicisation Scientisation Mistrust Polarisation

7. A permanent BWC review structure Will be loosely structured or formal? How will membership be decided? What will its mandate be? What scope will it have (specific or wide)? Who will set/guard the agenda? Who will protect its independence? Will it be independent? How will it maintain its legitimacy/authority? Will there be any oversight? Who will it report to? Should it operate by consensus? What is scientific consensus? Is it compatible with political consensus? Who is an expert? How regular will reviews be? How to avoid S&T fatigue….? Avoiding political capture? $$$$$$$$$

8. Scientific Advisory Board Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 25 independent individuals Appointed on the basis of their expertise but… Frequency of meetings dependent on funding OCPW budget provides for one meeting per year Operates through SAB and Temporary Working Groups

9. Mandate of the CWC Institutional support (CSP, EC, TS) Technical Secretariat 500 staff

10. Scientific Advisory Board categories of advice on S&T Developments in science and technology relevant to the CWC Amendments to the schedules of chemicals and other technical amendments? Technical interpretations of the Convention Assess the merits of present or new technologies/equipment for use by the OPCW Coordinate the TWGs

11. CWC Article VIII, paragraph 21(h) “… direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts appointed in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference”

12. Article VIII, paragraph 4 “The Director General shall, in consultation with States Parties, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board…”

13. Terms of reference, p. 2 “when directed by the Conference acting in accordance with paragraph 22 of Article VIII, provide advice and make recommendations taking into account any relevant scientific and technological developments for the purpose of assisting the Conference in its review of the operation of the Convention”

14. SAB Director-General Conference of the States Parties Technical Secretariat States Parties Civil societyAssociations Industry Executive Council

15. getting the right people involved engaging the life sciences What is relevant expertise? Weapons? Regulatory science? Public health? biodefence? Pure science? Social scientists? A mix? Limitations of a permanent membership Imbalances of info on Conventions Peripheral expertise… Semantics: “of concern”, “threats”…or… “of relevance to”, “potential consequences for”.. One off vs long-term interest (generational?)

16. straddling divides science and politics Routes onto the agenda Erosion in the credibility of advisory committees takes place when their recommendations become associated with political positions Political expediency, the long grass

17. straddling divides dissent versus consensus Audience(s) (linked to purpose…are we trying to educate the BWC policymakers? Scientists? Both?) Scientific versus political consensus Reporting dissent (write it out or acknowledge it?) and producing pluralistic and conditional advice (not popular) Who shouts the loudest / unhappiness with process?

18. Delivery of reports to DG Note from the DG Opportunities….? Policy translations (BWC?) Executive Council ==>CSP / Review Conferences Managing expectations (the ivory tower) straddling divides talking science to policy

19. setting boundaries by framing questions to the Board “requested the SAB to study all relevant aspects of the applicable concentration limits for mixtures of chemicals containing Schedule 2A and 2A* chemicals” (Report of the Fourth Session of the Scientific Advisory Board, 2001) policy/political debate (weapons significant quantities of PFIB..)

20. (Report of the Second Session of the Scientific Advisory Board, 1998) “address, solely from a scientific and technical aspect, the qualitative and quantitative implications of this issue in relation to their impact on declarations and inspections and, without making any recommendations or in any way prejudging the nature of any future decision on the issue, to report its findings to the Director-General.”

21. setting boundaries by maintaining independence of science Independence of experts Differing relationships with delegation Mistrust Independence of the agenda Avoiding political capture (from any regional group) ‘government expert groups’ and government oversight (cf. second CWC RevCon)?

22. advisory boards are tasked with political issues presented as technical problems states appropriate technical arguments to legitimise policy states claim that issues have been ‘fudged’ advisory structures are asked to make technically complex decisions about threats and risk

23. divisions of labour Temporary Working Groups Meet independently Chaired by a member of the SAB Enable the Board to tap into pools of expertise Reports usually technical and forwarded to SAB for ‘policy translation’ An intro to the CWC Popular Ideal for focused, technical discussions Possibility for states to sponsor themes

24. Science advice is not diplomacy (at least not entirely…) Preparation for meetings Background papers and documents Avoiding repetition SAB not immune to memory loss divisions of labour intersessional work

25. “political decisions are seldom purely scientific. They involve ethics, economics and social policies as well. And in domains beyond their special expertise, scientists speak just as citizens.” - Lord Rees, May 2010 -

26. …some lessons Set a clear mandate & reporting structure Insist on independence (private/state) from members A purely scientific approach to its tasks, incl. responsibility for framing Advisory structures must have a politically neutral ‘protector’ (cf. DG/TS) Enable the flexibility to accommodate very different types of expertise Communicating with different audiences Accept the limitations of science Ensure the commitment and motivation of members Develop a clear intersessional plan of work Structure meetings to maximise the use of time and money Establish a clear division of labour esp. if there are various mandates

27. Synthetic Biology and Nanobiotechnology Risk and Response Assessment Assessment of the biosecurity implications of advances in biotechnology ‘Horizon scanning’ for developments in the technology fields of synthetic biology and nanobiotechnology that may place dangerous capabilities at the disposal of groups or individuals that want to cause harm to society Final report as a result of two expert workshops held in 2010 For more information or a copy of the final report, please contact Sergio Bonin, UNICRI Project Officer, bonin@unicri.itbonin@unicri.it