1. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MECHANICS

2. The Franchise: 1789
Under the original constitution, who had the right to vote?
for U.S. House?
for U.S. Senate?
for Presidential electors?
for state and local officials?

3. The Franchise: 1789 (cont.)
Voter qualifications (including for U.S. House and Presidential electors) were set entirely by state law
Proviso: The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifica-tions requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. [Article 1, Section 2]
Property-owning/tax-paying qualifications were common, and
often scaled to level of office
Perhaps 50% of adult white males were eligible to vote in early elections,
plus some free blacks (and even some women) were eligible to vote in some elections in some states.

4. The Franchise: 1830s “Jacksonian Revolution”:
Almost all adult white males got the right to vote
All Presidential electors were popularly elected (except in SC)
Voter mobilization campaigns by competing (Democratic and Whig) political parties greatly increased voting turnout, i.e.,
the proportion of eligible voters who actually cast votes.
But non-whites (and most or all women) lost the right to vote (in so far as they previously had that right).

5. 14th Amendment
Section 1. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; ...; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. [IMPLICATION FOR ELECTORAL COLLEGE]

6. 15th Amendment
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

7. The Franchise: Turn of the 20th Century
The “Jim Crow” regime was established in the South.
“Jim Crow” had two main elements:
de jure segregation; and
de facto disenfranchisement (poll tax, literacy test, grandfather clause, “white primary,” intimidation)
Blacks remain enfranchised outside the South (but relatively few lived outside the South until WWI and WWII)
Women gained the right to vote in some states (especially in the West) in late 19th/early 20th centuries.
Caused dramatic “apportionment effects” in Electoral College:
E.g., 1916 State Electoral Vote Popular Vote
IL ,192,707
NY ,706,305
PA ,297,189
19th Amendment (1920)
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.

8. The Franchise: 20th Century
23rd Amendment (1963)
The District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct a number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous state; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.
24th Amendment (1964)
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
Voting Rights Act (1965)
26th Amendment (1971)
The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age.

9. The Franchise: Continuing Issues
Failed 27th Amendment
Section 1. For purposes of representation in the Congress, election of the President and Vice President, and article V of this Constitution, the District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall be treated as though it were a State.
Felon disenfranchisement:
State laws vary
Voter ID laws, etc.
Presumably the franchise should be uniform across all states and DC if the Electoral College were replaced by a direct national popular vote through a constitutional amendment.
Apportionment of electoral votes is based on total population,
including non-citizens and illegal immigrants (in so far as counted by census)

10. Voter Registration
Prior to the late 19th century, only informal voter registration systems exists:
probably a lot of fraudulent voting
“vote early and vote often”
States adopted voter registration laws in the late 19th century,
which produced an evident decline in total turnout.
Voter registration systems undoubtedly
reduced fraudulent voting, but also
may have had the effect of “vote suppression.”
Typically, people who are eligible to vote have to take some initiative to get themselves registered.
Moreover, registration list were periodically purged of non-voters.
Mid to latter part of 20th century, general liberalization of registration laws (by states, by courts, and by Congress)
“Motor Voter” Act (1993)
Help America Vote Act (2002) [provisional ballots]
Voter registration evidently remains something of a mess in many states and localities.
“deadwood” problem
There is uncertainty (and passionate academic dispute) concerning the typical turnout rate among registered voters.

11. Voting Turnout “Total actual vote”/ “Total potential vote”
In the U.S., voting turnout in Presidential elections is usually calculated as
total recorded vote for President,
divided by the census estimate of the voting age population (VAP)
However, such turnout is often (mistakenly) characterized as the percent of eligible (or even registered) voters who actually voted.
Election workers who report “high” turnout on election night are looking at the number of voters who showed up as a percent of registered voters on their lists.

12. Problems with PV / VAP Numerator misses Denominator spoiled ballots
Presidential abstentions
Denominator
includes
(legal and illegal) immigrants
institutionalized population (generally ineligible or unlikely to vote)
felons perhaps not eligible to vote
but excludes eligible voters overseas.

16. Some Reasons for National Differences in Turnout
Some countries have compulsory voting.
Some countries make election day a holiday.
Most countries have (national) voter enrollment (vs. state voter registration) systems,
in which case, about 90-95% of eligible voters are enrolled, and
turnout denominator is (usually) the number of enrolled voters [not VAP].
U.S has unusually frequent elections with many offices/propositions at stake in each (“long-ballot”):
federal/state/local offices
separate executive and legislative (and often judicial) elections (sometimes with runoffs)
referendums
plus primaries (sometimes with runoffs)

17. TURNOUT IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1960-2005

18. TURNOUT DECLINE IN ALL OEDC COUNTRIES (1960-2000)

19. Ballot Types and Ballot Access
Early voting was informal, perhaps oral, otherwise voters had to create own ballots, hardly secret
Mass party competition (1830s on) led to party ballots
printed by parties
listing only party candidates
distribution to party supporters
hardly secret (differently colored paper)
Implications:
No “ballot access” problem
Hard for voters to “split ticket”
Enhanced influence of party leaders
Easy to arrange (even on election eve) “fusion” between (major or minor) parties

20. “Australian Ballot” Reform (~1890)
Government election authority prints ballots
all voters receive same ballot at polling place
ballots list all candidates for all offices
secures secret ballot
Implications:
“Ballot access” must be regulated
filing fee, deposit, petition, etc.
It becomes much easier for voters to cast “split ticket” ballots.
It reduces the influence of party leaders and organizations.
It becomes harder to “fuse” party tickets.
In fact, “fusion” may be prohibited.
Partisan vs. non-partisan [Australian] ballots
U.K. vs. U.S. example
what information listed for each candidate?

21. Fundamental Implication of a Partisan Australian Ballot
Which candidate is entitled to be listed on the ballot under a given party label?
This produces government [in U.S., state government] regulation of party organization and nominating procedures,
in particular, in the U.S. it led to primary elections,
by which a candidate is entitled to be identified on the ballot as a party nominee by virtue of winning a government-run election.

22. Two Formats for U.S. [Australian Ballots]: Party-Column/Line Ballot vs. Office Block Ballot
This distinction is relevant only if
the ballot is partisan, and
two or more offices are at stake in a single election; and
it is especially relevant if many offices are at stake [“long ballot”]
Party-Column/Line Ballot:
Such a ballot is set up so that all candidates of a given party appear in the same column or line.
In effect, it is several party ballots placed together on the same page.
It encourages “straight ticket” voting.
It may provide for a “straight party” vote.
It raises the question of party order on the ballot.
Office-Block Ballot:
Such a ballot groups together all candidates for a given office.
It encourages “split ticket” voting,
though it can (but usually does not) provide a “straight party” vote.
It raises the question of candidate order in each block.

23. A Party-
Column
Ballot
(Indiana, 1956)

24. An Office-Block Ballot (Massachusetts 1956)

25. An Office Block Ballot
With a Straight Party Option
[Missouri]

26. The Notorious Butterfly Ballot

28. Presidential Election Ballots
Does the ballot make any reference to Presidential electors? [Today, usually but not always]
Does ballot list Presidential elector candidates individually? [Today, usually not]
Does ballot allow or require voters to vote for electors individually? [Today, never]
If voters are required to vote for electors individually, does the ballot indicate the candidates to whom the elector candidates are pledged? [Today, not relevant]
Does state law allow “fusion” of elector candidate slates? [NY does]

29. Kansas
(1960)

30. Vermont: 1960 vs. 2012

31. New York (1960) [allows “fusion”]

32. Hawaii
(1960)

33. Alabama (1960)

34. Maryland (Baltimore Co.)
2008
No mention
of electors
But they actually exist =>

36. Election Administration
Prescribed by state law (with increasing but still secondary federal regulation)
Administered by counties, often with in ballot technology etc. variation from county to county.
Episodic tasks, heavily dependent on more or less volunteer labor
Historically party organizations were involved
Checks and balances?

37. Voting Technology Paper ballots used universally into 20th century
1930s onwards: automated technology becomes available
1930s: lever machines
e.g., New York, Alabama
1950s: punch cards machines
1960: optical scan machines
2000s: touch-screen (“ATM”) machines

39. Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project
Assessment of reliability of different voting technologies
Rate of apparently spoiled ballots
residual votes = # names checked off minus votes for particular office
undervotes vs. overvotes
does voter get feedback?
Reliability, Security, and Verifiability
Paper
Optical
Lever
Punch card
Touch-screen

40. Experimental study of reliability of alternative voting technologies
Brookings Institution, 2008

42. Why does the U.S have bigger voting technology problems than other countries?
“Long ballot”
Federal system
Multiple offices (plus propositions, etc.)
Overlapping districts
Need rapid counting at precinct level
U.K. vs. typical U.S. election cycle
UK: MP, local councillor [MEP, MSP etc.]
Where combined, separate ballots for each office, ballot pooled for counting
US: President, US Senate, US House, Governor etc.; state Senator; state House; county executive or mayor, county &/or city council, school board, state &/or local judges etc; other offices; bond issues; propositions; initiatives [and primary &/or runoff elections]

43. Other Administrative Issues
Absentee ballots
excused vs. unexcused
Early Voting
Mail ballots (Oregon)

44. House Size, Apportionment, and Districting
Each of these factors, which pertain directly to House elections, is also relevant to Presidential elections.
House size and apportionment determine how many electoral votes state get (beyond the guaranteed floor of 3).
The Maine/Nebraska (Modified District) system of awarding electoral voters is based on Congressional Districts.
House size is not fixed by the Constitution, except that “the number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one Representative.”

45. Implications of Increasing House Size for Electoral Votes
Increasing the number of House seats allows a more precise apportionment among the states.
Increasing the number of House seats reduces the impact of the 3-electoral vote floor relative to the total number of electoral votes.
On both counts, increasing the size of the House increases proportionality in the allocation of Electoral Votes and, in particular, reduces the small state advantage.
Changing House size can change the outcome of Presidential elections (all else equal).

46. House Size and the 2000 Election
In 2000, Bush carried 30 states and Gore 21 (including DC), so
on the basis of “House” Electoral Votes only, Gore would have beaten Bush:
Bush: 271 – 60 = 212
Gore: 267 – 42 = 225
2000 was the first time since 1916 that an electoral vote victory turned on “Senatorial” electoral votes.
And it was the first time since 1876 that a popular vote loser became an electoral vote winner on the basis of “Senatorial” electoral votes.
As a result, a larger House size could have given Gore an overall [House + Senatorial] Electoral Vote victory.
But, perhaps surprisingly, the relationship between increasing House size and Gore’s electoral college advantage was not “monotonic.”
See M. G. Neubauer and J. Zeitlin, “Outcomes of Presidential Elections and House Size,” PS: Politics and Political Science, October 2003

48. The Apportionment Clause
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3
Representatives [and direct Taxes] shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers [which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons]. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every sub-sequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.

49. The Apportionment Problem
But the Constitution does not specify a mathematical formula by which this apportionment would be calculated.
When Congress took up the first Apportionment Bill in 1790, it discovered that solving this problem was not straightforward.
The apportionment problem is a standard problem in applied mathematics (e.g., MATH 100).
Two rival apportionment formulas were proposed:
Hamilton proposed a quota system;
Jefferson proposed a divisor system.

50. Hamilton’s Method [Largest Remainders]
Fix the size of the House, e.g., at 105.
Determine each state’s proportion of the apportionment population.
For example, New York had % of the population. Given a House of 105 members, NY would ideally have % x 105 = seats (NY’s quota).
But NY and every state must have a whole number of House seats.
The most obvious remedy is to round off quotas in the normal manner (giving NY 10 seats); but such rounded whole numbers may not add to 105.
Hamilton’s method: round all quotas down, then allocate remaining seats to states according to the size of their “remainders.”

51. Hamilton’s Method (cont.)
Hamilton’s Method obviously “stays in quota,”
i.e., it gives every state its quota rounded either up or down.
But Hamilton’s method is subject to a number of “paradoxes.”
The Alabama Paradox: increasing the size of the House can reduce a state’s seats.
The Population Paradox: even if state A’s population grows faster than state B’s, A can lose seats to B in the later apportionment.
The New State Paradox: admitting a new state, even while expanding the size of the House so that the “old” states together have the same number seats as before, can redistribute those seats among the “old” states.

52. Divisor Methods
All divisor methods award House seats sequentially to states on the basis of their “priority” for an additional seat.
Initially, every state’s priority is determined by its population, so the first seat is awarded to the largest state.
Thereafter, a state’s priority is determined by its population divided by some function of n, where n is the number of seats it has already been awarded.
Different divisor methods use different functions of n.
Alternate characterization:
Select a divisor approximately equal to the total population of all states divided by the total number of House seats, i.e., the average CD population.
Divide each state’s population by this divisor and round off the resulting quotient by some rule to produce an provisional apportionment.
Different divisor methods use different rounding rules.
Adjust the divisor up or down until the required number of seats has been apportioned.

53. Jefferson’s Method [Greatest Divisor]
Fix the size of the House, e.g., at 105.
House seats are awarded sequentially.
The first House seat is awarded to the largest state.
The second House seat is also awarded to the largest state if its population divided by 2 is greater than the population of the second largest state; otherwise it is awarded to the second largest state.
In general, each additional seat is awarded to the state with the “strongest claim” to the seat, where this claim is determined by the population of the state divided by the number of seats it has already been awarded plus one, i.e., n+1

54. Jefferson’s Method (cont.)
With respect to the alternate characterization, Jefferson’s rounding rule is to round all quotients down to the nearest integer.
Jefferson’s method (like other divisor methods) is not subject to the Alabama, Population, or New State Paradox.
But Jefferson’s method (like other divisor methods) does not stay in quota. In particular (for Jefferson),
a big state may get more than its quota rounded up, and
a small state may get less than its quota rounded down.
Put otherwise, Jefferson’s Method exhibits bias (to the advantage of big states and disadvantage of small states).

55. Other Divisor Methods
John Adams advocated the divisor rule that rounds all quotients up to the nearest integer.
It is the divisor rule most favorable to small states.
Daniel Webster advocated the divisor rule at the midpoint between Jefferson and Adams, i.e., that rounds all quotients up or down to the nearest integer in the normal manner.
It is the divisor rule least biased toward either big or small states.
The Hill-Huntington divisor method is the apportionment method now in effect.
It is slightly biased toward small states.

56. Apportionment Legislation
When it first passed the 1790 Apportionment Bill, Congress used the Hamilton Method.
Washington rejected the bill (on Jefferson’s urging), exercising the first Presidential veto in history.
Congress failed to override the veto and passed a new Apportionment Bill based on Jefferson’s method.
Throughout the 19th Century, in each Apportionment Bill Congress always changed (and usually always increased) the House size and often changed the apportionment method.
Congress discovered the Alabama Paradox while debating 1870 bill and never used Hamilton Method thereafter.

57. Apportionment Legislation (cont.)
Congress established a “permanent” House size of 435 in 1913.
Congress prescribed a “permanent” apportionment method (the Hill-Huntington “Method of Equal Proportions” in the 1940 Apportionment Bill.
Thus, since 1940, apportionment has been on “automatic pilot” and Congress no longer passes a new Apportionment Bill each decade.
The definitive work on this subject is by M. Balinski and H. P. Young, Fair Representation.
The authors argue that the optimal apportionment formula is the divisor method proposed by Daniel Webster.

58. Other Variations on Election 2000
Using the actual (Hill-Huntington) apportionment formula on the 1990 Census:
Bush Gore 267
Using Jefferson’s apportionment formula on the 1990 Census:
Bush Gore 272
Using Hill-Huntington on the 2000 Census:
Bush Gore 258
Using Jefferson on the 2000 Census:
Bush Gore 261
Under all variations above, Gore wins on the basis of “House” electoral votes only, because Bush has an 18 vote advantage based on “Senate” electoral votes only.

59. Districting Article I, Section 4, Clause 1
The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.
Since 1967 (and at various earlier times as well) Congress has pre-scribed that the “manner” of holding elections for Representative shall be by Single-Member Districts (SMDs), thereby producing “single-winner” elections in each district.
All states with two or more Representatives are therefore required to divide themselves into a number Congressional Districts (CDs) equal to their House seat apportionment.
Districting is either done by the state legislature or by another body prescribed by state law (or by courts when legal issues arise).

60. Districting (cont.)
In Maine and Nebraska, Presidential electors are elected by district, rather than statewide.
Any state is free to adopt such a system and several other states (including Florida) have considered the district system.
Under the Maine/Nebraska system, the two “Senatorial” electors are elected statewide, while the remaining “House” electors are elected from CDs (on an SMD basis).
Thus creating CDs is relevant to Presidential selection in Maine and Nebraska and potentially in other states as well.
Since 1964 Supreme Court rulings have required that CDs within each state have (virtually) equal populations.
District boundaries must cut across natural and jurisdictional boundaries to comply with these court rulings.
Computer technology and geographic information systems make it possible to readily determine the likely political effects of alternative districting plans.
As a result, district boundaries have been drawn in increasing weird ways.

61. Such “gerrymandering” can produce undoubtedly weirdly shaped districts

62. Closer to home

63. Gerrymandering
It is commonly claimed that such “gerrymandering” produces districts that are safe for one or other party and therefore non-competitive.
If this is true, and if CDs were used to elect Presidential electors, then presidential election campaigns would focus on a relatively few “battleground” CD.
However, CDs are not nearly as safe for one party or the other as the outcomes in House elections seem to suggest.
House elections vs. Presidential vote by CD