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Electronic Warfare Countermeasures – exploit an adversary’s own activity as a means of determining his intentions or reducing his effectiveness. EW has.

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Presentation on theme: "Electronic Warfare Countermeasures – exploit an adversary’s own activity as a means of determining his intentions or reducing his effectiveness. EW has."— Presentation transcript:

1 Electronic Warfare Countermeasures – exploit an adversary’s own activity as a means of determining his intentions or reducing his effectiveness. EW has brought revolutionary changes into the field of warfare = What are the capabilities, limitations, and applications? The greatest advancement in technology in recent history has been in the area of electronics. Practically every facet of modern military operations, from weapons control to communications, has become dependent upon systems that operate in the electromagnetic spectrum. This has led to the terminology the Modern Electronic Battlefield. Because of the remoteness and unmanned aspects of space operations, there is a heavy dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum for command, control, and sensor operations. As military operations expand in the space environment, an even greater dependency on the electromagnetic environment is inevitable. The experiences in the recent Persian Gulf War have shown the importance of satellites for navigation and communications. These experiences have also shown the advantages gained by a combat commander that has a well developed and executable capability to control the electromagnetic environment on the battlefield. The most recent examples of the employment of EW document the advantage a combat force has over an adversary when control of the electromagnetic environment is gained. This advantage presents itself in the form of surprise, and improved survivability.

2 EW Intro EW is a component of Command & Control Warfare (C2W)
C2W: Military strategy which implements Information Warfare (IW). C2W includes integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOPS, EW, and physical destruction. C2W is based on the philosophy that preventing an enemy’s use of its forces may be just as good as defeating that force.

3 Electronic Support (ES) *ESM Electronic Attack (EA) *ECM
Three Components of EW Electronic Support (ES) *ESM Electronic Attack (EA) *ECM Electronic Protection (EP) *ECCM Old School Terminology ESM – Electronic Support Measures ECM – Electronic Counter Measures ECCM – Electronic Counter-counter Measures ES: Surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum for immediate threat recognition and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, homing, and targeting. EA: The use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. EP: The protection of friendly combat capability against undesirable effects of friendly or enemy employment of EW.

4 Increasing Importance of EW:
Increased reliance on radar OTH targeting Increased use of Communications Tactical Data Systems (TDS) Increased speed of missiles and weapons systems High-speed detection and tracking Active-homing or passive-homing long-range missiles give little warning Don’t see our enemy anymore. On a sub, they launch thier tomahawks, then eat lobster. -RISK Game – Big Picture versus little picture the NTDS was developed by the U.S. Navy as a command tool for commanders in tactical combat situations Combat data is collected, processed, and composed into a picture of the overall tactical situation that enables the force commander to make rapid, accurate evaluations and decisions.

5 Electronic Support (ES)
Surveillance of EM spectrum Immediate threat recognition Threat avoidance Homing and targeting. Passive EW Electronic Intelligence (ELINT): Info derived from foreign non-communications EM information, particularly radar. Communications Intelligence (COMINT): Info derived from foreign communications. We get ELINT and COMINT in many ways. EP-3

6 Threat Warning and Avoidance Direction Finding
ES Subdivisions: Threat Warning and Avoidance Direction Finding Target Homing and Tracking When, Where, and what type of EM are you detecting

7 ES Receiver Design Requirements
Wide spectrum surveillance Wide dynamic range Unwanted signal rejection Angle-of-Arrival measurement Signal Analysis capability Display Recording System Goal: to obtain raw data, analyze it, and determine the enemy threat. AN/SLQ-32 versions 1-5 version 1: not used anymore version 2: older ships (ie. DD) version 3: upgraded version 2 with jamming capability version 4: upgraded even more, newer ships (ie. DDG, CVN) version 5: FFG only, some jamming capibility Wider the better – Wide bandwidth capability (lots of frequencies – do not know frequency of enemy radar beforehand.). But may need multiple receivers (What is your mission) Wide dynamic range – be able to receive both very weak and very strong signals. Loud doesn’t mean close – if it’s a strong signal, do not want the signal to interfere with the analysis? P-3 tracking submarines Unwanted Signal Rejection – Filter/discriminate unwanted signals Angle of Arrival – takes bearings at different times, plots them on a chart, and locates a transmitter by triangulation. Signal Analysis capability –determine wave characteristics – classify target Display – ex. Warning light, audio tone (old school), complex signal analysis scopes Recording System – magnetic tape records emissions for further analysis for intelligence centers

8 Signal Collection Process
Signal Warning Alerts to presence of a signal Signal Sorting Uses frequency to sort out signals of immediate interest/action required Signal Analysis Determines specific capabilities for immediate and future actions

9 Electronic Attack (EA)
Use of EM or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment. Active and Passive EW EA – long-range passive detectors Long range early warning radars; fighter intercept radar; electronic bombing equipment Purpose: interfere with the operation of the sensors of the air/surface defense system. The greater the defense uncertainty, the more effective the EA. Effectiveness: Determined by the radar and the system that uses the radar. Example: Mono-track system – one target at a time – use conical scan or monopulse radar to align itself to the target = EA can then deny range to the target and even direction if correctly employed. Track –While –Scan System – the EA operator doesn’t know if he’s being tracked because it does so periodically = His countermeasure may or may not be useful. So if a defense system is using track while scan – How can we attack – Timing is everything. Just waiting too long could be your death.

10 Non-Destructive EA Confusion: Mask or hide real targets by cluttering the radar display. Jamming Noise Jamming Spot Jamming Barrage Jamming Sweep Jamming Chaff Infrared flares (Torch) 3 fundamental ways to employ defense interference. Effectiveness of jamming depends on the transmitters power density. Noise: saturate a receiver with a continuous random signal Spot: all the power output of the jammer is concentrated in a very narrow bandwith that is idendical to the bandwith of the radar Barrage and Sweep: spread their energy over a bandwidth wider than that of the radar signal. BURNTHROUGH – Energy pulse return is greater than jamming signal, the range at which the strength of the radar echo becomes equal or greater than the EA signal. As range decreases this can occur due to the return energy equation See page 334 Tan text

11 Spot, Barrage, and Sweep Jamming
Freq Barrage Noise Jamming – Noise is a continuous random signal and is dissimilar to the radar signal. Spot jamming – used against a specific radar – but you need a panoramic receiver to know which frequency to match Sweep and Barrage – Just need to know that there is a radar present Barrage: uses an amplitude-modulated signal Sweep: uses a frequency-modulated signal, sweeps back and forth over a wide bandwidth effective Spot Pulse echos Ineffective Ampl Time

12 Spot and Barrage Jamming
Rcvr BW Power Spot Jamming What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of each type of Jamming? Power consumption. Range, etc.. Disadvantages = Requires large average power (Size constraints) Aircraft Also, identifies a hostile contact. On a radar screen a solid line will form. Last if burnout occurs it can give range. Advantages – Can’t detect range, usually Barrage Jamming Frequency

13 Effective Jamming PW Rcvd Signal Amp. PRT Ineffective Jamming time
The average amplitude of the noise must be at least as great as the average amplitude of the radar echo to be concealed. Or, the average power of the jammer must have the same effect as the peak power of the radar echo. Or, the Noise-to-Signal ratio at the input is raised to a level beyond which the receiver can extract intelligence. time

14 Non-Destructive EA (cont.)
Deception: Create a false image or change the image on the enemy’s radar display. Repeaters: Create false echo by delaying rcvd radar signals & retransmitting at later time. Transponders: Create false signal by playing back a stored replica of the radar signal. Chaff Radar Decoys Blip Enhancers Radar Cross-Section (RCS) Modification Repeaters – sophisticated circuitry to delay, amplify and modulate the signal received then return Transponders – almost like repeaters except amplification is usually not used. Radar decoys – deception repeater. Slowly increase time delay of each successive return pulse. Target appears further away than actual. BLIP - Radar reflectors – Enlarges the retransmitted pulse in order to make a small radar target (DDG) appear as a large aircraft carrier. Chaff – small metallic (aluminum) dipoles that are designed to resonate at the radar frequency. Thousands are compressed into a small package then injected into the aircraft slipstream (Burst open and form a radar reflective cloud) size of an additional aircraft p.344 Can also be used by ships – useful in defending slow systems (ships); the chaff clutter moves slowly – not much difference from a ship. Idea is to have the chaff package burst within the field of a weapon’s RF seeker, creating an alternative target. RCS – RAM make it λ/4 Therefore the return is λ/ out of phase DESRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE

15 EA-6B Prowler

16 Destructive EA Anti-Radiation Missiles SLAM HARM Sidewinder
Directed Energy The AIM-9 Sidewinder is a heat-seeking, short-range, air-to-air missile carried by fighter aircraft The Sidewinder is the most widely used air-to-air missile in the West, with more than 110,000 missiles produced for 27 nations excluding the United States. The AIM-9 is one of the oldest, least expensive and most successful missiles in the entire U.S. weapons inventory. The AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-radiation Missile (HARM) is an air-to-surface tactical missile designed to seek out and destroy enemy radar-equipped air defense systems.

17 Directed Energy Weapons Electronic CounterMeasures
Interceptors Kinetic Kill Destroy satellite by direct impact. Conventional Explosive Destroy satellite by explosion of chemical payload within lethal radius of satellite. Nuclear Explosive Destroy satellite by nuclear radiation from explosion within lethal radius of satellite. Directed Energy Weapons High Power Microwave Induce permanent damage to electronic circuits by over-stressing components with EM radiation, or thermally inducing structural damage. High Energy Laser Thermally induce structural, electronic, or sensor damage through irradiation. Neutral Particle Beam Electronic CounterMeasures Temporarily interfere with normal operation of electronic circuits. Noise Jamming Intentional transmission of interfering EM noise. Deception Jamming Intentional transmission of interfering signals to manipulate target systems. . Radio Frequency Directed-Energy Weapons High-power radio frequency (HPRF) DE systems can be categorized by frequency bandwidth or power level. Narrowband systems are commonly referred to as HPM, while the wideband are referred to as wideband or UWB. As DEWs, RF systems are intended to defeat, degrade, or destroy electronic equipment. The effects can range from temporary upsets in performance to permanent circuit deterioration to burnout or destruction. As modern weapons systems become more dependent on sophisticated electronics, they also become more vulnerable to DE RF radiation. One of the highest Army priorities is to assess potential vulnerabilities of U.S. systems to unintentional fratricide by our own emissions, as well as intentional irradiation by enemy systems. Hardening technology is being developed to protect against both of these threats. Particular areas of improvement include developing and testing HPM sources and interference modulation, hardening MMIC circuits against RF, and developing broadband, high-gain antennas. One promising technology is the use of silicon carbide for hardening devices. Technical challenges primarily relate to making the RF generators smaller, lighter, and more fuel efficient. In addition, modulators and antennas must also be improved. Some of the required developments in RF weapons involve very sensitive areas as mentioned in the above sections. Certain areas, however, involve technology of a more general dual-use nature, which offer potential for cooperative development. France is a leading producer of HPM tubes. Significant RF source development efforts also exist in the U.K.. Several other countries have limited research efforts in this area: Germany, Switzerland, China,Japan, and to a lesser extent, Sweden, Israel, and Australia. In addition, Russia and Ukraine both have significant capabilities in RF weapons. The FSU was considered the world leader in HPM at the time of its disintegration. The Russians have concentrated on development of HPRF generators such as various types of gyrotrons and klystron amplifiers. e. Laser Directed-Energy Weapons Compact, high-efficiency lasers are critical for EO countermeasures, IRCM, and DEW applications. As diode-pumped lasers, nonlinear frequency conversion, and laser designs have matured, it has become feasible to incorporate these devices into tactical vehicles and aircraft for self-protection and missile defense. The main challenge is to demonstrate the required power levels in a compact package and to develop the ability to scale the power level up to higher levels to meet future needs. Lightweight, wavelength-diverse diode pumped lasers for the mid-IR are currently being developed, as are sophisticated active tracker systems to provide precision pointing and atmospheric compensation. Remaining technical challenges relate to packaging of higher power devices and cost reduction of laser diode arrays. Compact solid-state lasers with sufficient power for standoff DEW applications represent a longer term challenge. Semiconductor laser diodes are expected to have a major impact on future battlefield laser systems because of their compact size, ruggedness, and efficiency. Japan is the leading producer of laser diodes, especially low-to-medium power devices and diode arrays, which are beginning to appear in a number of industrial and medical lasers. The U.K., France, and Russia also have significant capabilities in most areas of laser technology. Russia has special capabilities in free electron laser (FEL) and other high-energy lasers (HELs). Diode-pumped solid-state lasers operating directly at visible wavelengths offer significant potential in optical countermeasure systems for the visible spectral region. They offer much higher efficiency than can be achieved by frequency shifting from existing lasers. The technical challenge is to develop improved materials (gain media). Two foreign groups are among the world leaders in the development of such materials: a research group at the Université de Lyon in France and a group at Universitat Hamburg in Germany. Both groups have the expertise and infrastructure to make valuable progress in the identification and development of the needed materials. Existing agreements with both countries offer potential vehicles to pursue cooperative efforts.

18 SLAM ER Stand-off Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response
The Standoff Land Attack Missile - Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), an evolutionary upgrade to the combat-proven SLAM, is a day/night, adverse weather over-the-horizon, precision strike missile. Primary Function: long range, air-launched precision land attack cruise missile Contractor: The Boeing Company Power Plant: Teledyne Turbojet and solid propellant booster for surface and submarine launch. Thrust: greater than 600 pounds (greater than kg) Length:14 feet 4 inches (4.36 meters) Weight:1,400 pounds ( kg) Diameter: 13.5 inches (34.29 centimeters) Wing Span: feet ( meters) Range: Over-the-horizon, in excess of 150 nautical miles ( km) Speed: High Subsonic Guidance: ring laser gyro Inertial Navigation System (INS) with multi-channel GPS; infrared seeker for terminal guidance with Man-in-the-Loop control data link from the controlling aircraft. Upgraded missiles will incorporate Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA) Unit Cost: $500,000 Date Deployed: mid 1999 employed by F/A-18 and A-6 aircrews in Desert Storm

19 HARM High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile Colors on ordnance?
Yellow: high-explosive Brown: low-explosive or booster Blue: training round or inert

20 HARM Results Portable Radar Site In Serbia

21 AIM-9 Sidewinder

22 Electronic Protection (EP)
The protection of friendly combat capability against undesirable effect of friendly or enemy employment EW. Formerly, ECCM: Electronic Counter-Counter Measures

23 Electronic Protection (EP)
Three primary ways to defend ourselves from enemy EW Modify our radar - make it more complex and harder to jam Modify the Medium - Chaff and Torch Modify the platform How do we destroy a target? TWS then send threat targets to a mono-track radar (FC Radar) => then we use the radar to feed info to the weapon and destroy the target. Therefore, if we can use ESM to detect a tracking radar, use EA to deceive the detection radar we should be OK. However, if it’s too late must use EP (Reactive) Proactive perspective – design your asset to protect itself while searching using ESM.

24 EP: Radar Design Power Frequency PRF PW Pulse Shape Antenna Design
Scan Pattern Basic: The better you know your enemy’s capability the better you can counter it’s affect. Radar Design: Power - Fundamental parameter, the battle becomes one of power. - Affects Burnthrough distance. Frequency Change - If your radar is frequency agile it is harder to jam. PRF Changing the PRF in a random fashion is an effective counter to deception. EA depends on the predictability of radar. Pulse length - Increase the pulse length requires more power. Can use pulse compression to compensate for range resolution and minimum range. Antenna Design - Reduce the amount and size of side lobes makes it more difficult to jam from various axis. Scan Pattern - influence amount of energy directed towards the radar target.

25 EP Factors Burnthrough: Increase signal strength to overpower jammer noise Emission Control (EMCON) Alpha Bravo Charlie Delta Operator Training Burnthrough - More power in the air at the contact! EMCON - Alpha through Delta, Alpha silent Bravo Charlie Delta essentials only – Normal steaming configuration Operator Training - recognize jamming and counter it!

26 U.S. Shipboard EW Capabilities
SLQ-32 “Sidekick” - on all combatants Radar warning, detection and jamming Uses an internal library to auto detect & categorize Infrared Flares - “Torch” Formally on all combatants Chaff - on all combatants GPS Information and Navigation Tool Flares used to fool the seeker head on Infra red-guided missiles Russian Hot Brick jammer carried most probably on IAF MiG 27 MLs and Mi 24 Hinds. The infrared jammer can generate highly controlled high intensity bursts of energy, which saturate the seeker, and confuse it. This jams the guidance of the incoming IR missiles In May 1987, the USS STARK (FFG 31) was attacked in the Persian Gulf by two Exocet missiles fired from an Iraqi Mirage fighter. After the USS STARK incident, an urgent requirement was established to provide an electronic attack capability on FFG 7s equipped with the electronic-support-only AN/SLQ-32A(V)2 Electronic Warfare (EW) system. A Rapid Development Capability project was started and in six months SIDEKICK was fielded.


28 U.S. Shipboard EW Capabilities
SSQ-108 “Outboard” - on some Spruance class, DDG, CG, LHA, LHD Any ship with SSES real-time, over-the-horizon passive detection, localization, and targeting SLQ-39 Chaff Buoy - on Arleigh Burke class Rubber Duck – looks like a life boat container SSES – Shipboard Signals Exploitation Space IS, CT, maybe EW’s and a Crypto Officer.

29 U.S. Airborne EW Capabilities
ALQ ES system on SH-60 Seahawk ALQ EW system on EA-6B Prowler Mimics radar signals (Deception) ALQ EA jamming system on F-14 & F/A 18 ALQ EA jamming system on F/A-18 ALR ES detection system on S-3 Viking ALR ES detection system on E-2 Hawkeye Chaff on SH-60 Seahawk ALQ-142: Detection, identification, location ALQ-99: Detection, identification, tracking Communication, data link, and radar jamming ALR-47: Detection, identification, location ALR-73: Detection, direction-finding, signal data collection

30 Questions?


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