1. STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA Dr. Monika Chansoria

2. OUTLINE Chinese WMD transfers to Pakistan Collaboration in realm of military hardware Further lowering N-threshold in South Asia [NASR/TNWs] India’s Strategic Restraint in a “two-front” scenario

3. C HINA ’ S N UCLEAR AND M ISSILE T RANSFERS TO P AKISTAN Geo-political and geo-strategic setting Drawing heavily from tumultuous historical past Including wars, territorial/boundary disputes Heavily militarized borders China-Pakistan nuclear, missile collaboration well acknowledged and amply documented Direct nuclear assistance to Pakistan beginning in the 80s, and Indirect missile transfers through North Korea

4. C ONTINUING INVOLVEMENT Continuing contacts btw PRC entities & those associated with Pakistan’s NWs program Chashma N-plant [2 Chinese companies involved in construction] Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation China Nuclear Engineering Huaxing Construction Co. Ltd. – a Chinese government- owned company December 2012; Huaxing pled guilty in a US criminal case Illegal export of high-performance epoxy coatings for Chashma 2 reactor

5. MILITARY HARDWARE T RANSFERS Nearly 50% of China’s surplus arms exported to Pakistan at ‘subsidized’ prices Red Arrow-8 Anti-tank missile (Baktar Shikan) QW-1 Vanguard Portable Surface-to-Air Missile (Anza 2) Type-90-2/ Main Battle Tank (Al Khalid /P-90 version) JF-17 Thunder lightweight multi-role combat aircraft C-801/C-802 (CSS-N-8) Anti-ship missile for JF-17 combat aircraft/Azmat Fast Attack F-22 Frigate (Zulfiquar) K-8 Karakorum-8 lightweight trainer/attack jets A-100 300 mm Self-propelled MRL multiple rocket launcher Type-041/Yuan Submarine, designation still uncertain

6. B ATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH A SIA Pakistan’s first-use N policy and posture, now in addition has... Battlefield N-weapons including smaller bombs, short-range missiles Are inherently destabilizing; further lower nuclear threshold Mounting N-warheads on extremely short-range, forward-deployed ballistic missiles Requiring pre-delegation of the authority to launch – Early release of custody of the warhead to launcher batteries Thus increasing risk of inadvertent/unauthorized use Pre-delegation to battlefield commanders Stationed close to border/on the battlefield Putting C2 & physical security of the weapon under immense strain Especially in crises/conflict situations Notwithstanding C2 structures in place, delegation of authority to the field itself creates grave risks and potential escalation thereafter

7. L OWERING NUCLEAR THRESHOLD Hatf IX (NASR), 60-km Short-Range Surface-to- Surface Missile Carrier vehicle: AR1A / A100-E multiple launch rocket system A100-E chassis with modified launching tube system -- adapted for launching NASR, procured by China

8. I NDIA ’ S N-P OLICY AND P OSTURING India: NWs were, and continue to remain, a political instrument Not an instrument of war-fighting Sole purpose to deter the use, and threat of use, of NWs Remain strictly limited in scope & operational readiness Warheads, delivery systems with key subcomponents... not deployed in anyway Verified in forms of force structures, alert levels, de-mated systems

9. C LASSIFYING TNW S ????? Yield / mode of delivery often used as the criteria for classifying NWs as “tactical” Any NW, of any quality, mode of delivery, yield, used against any type of target, will result in an impact that will be strategic India’s N-doctrine does not differentiate between a “tactical” and a “strategic” N-weapon strike label remains irrelevant The label on a NW, used for attacking India, i.e., strategic/tactical/battlefield, remains irrelevant from an Indian perspective

10. “T WO - FRONT ” SCENARIO Sino-Pak nuclear commerce remains politically, strategically driven China’s growing and permanent strategic presence in PoK Presence of PLA’s Construction Corps in PoK Pakistan’s strategic posturing coupled with involvement in terrorist activities directed against India Dec 2009, General Deepak Kapoor, at Army Training Command Doctrine Seminar “Indian Armed Forces must prepare for a two-front war”

11. C HINA -P AKISTAN E CONOMIC C ORRIDOR CPEC route starts from Kashgar (Xinjiang province) Enters Pakistan through the 1,300 km KKH Includes reconstruction, upgrading of Karakorum Highway Running across Pakistan Finally reaching Gwadar Sea-Port (South of Baluchistan) For China, PoK serves strategic, politico- diplomatic objectives Provides quasi-diplomatic support to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir

12. IN CONCLUSION … India has displayed immense strategic restraint Threshold of India’s tolerance being severely tested A terrorist strike causing substantial casualties in future… With proven evidence of state involvement …..