1. Introducing metaethics Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. What is metaethics? Normative ethics: a theoretical account of which actions, motives and character traits are right or good –Intended to provide guidance on how to live Metaethics does not provide guidance, it asks what morality is, philosophically speaking

3. Metaethics Philosophy of language: what does moral language mean? –What is its function – to state facts, to influence people, to express disapproval? –Can moral judgments be true or false? Metaphysics: what kind of thing is morality? –Does moral judgments state objective (mind- independent) truths? –Do they state subjective (mind-dependent) truths?

4. Metaethics Epistemology: if there are moral truths, how can we discover them? –If there are no objective moral truths, how should moral reasoning or justification proceed? Philosophy of mind: what is it to hold a moral view? –Is it a kind of belief, desire, or some other state? –Is it a mental state that is motivating?

5. Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism Cognitivism: moral judgments, e.g. ‘Murder is wrong’ –Aim to describe how the world is –Can be true or false –Express beliefs that the claim is true Non-cognitivism: moral judgments –Do not aim to describe the world –Cannot be true or false –Express attitudes towards the world

6. Mental states and ‘direction of fit’ The two directions of fit: the shopping list Beliefs are mind-to-world –We change our beliefs to fit the world Desires are world-to-mind –We change the world to satisfy our desires Which direction of fit do moral views have?

7. Motivation Non-cognitivism: moral judgments are intrinsically motivating; beliefs are not intrinsically motivating; therefore, moral judgments don’t express beliefs –Why think beliefs don’t motivate? Because how can finding out how the world is (the facts) on its own engage us to care? Cognitivist reversal: moral judgments express beliefs; beliefs are not intrinsically motivating; therefore, moral judgments are not intrinsically motivating

8. Issues To non-cognitivism: morality isn’t a matter of taste. Will non-cognitivism become moral scepticism? To cognitivism: how can moral judgments be objectively true or false? How can there be objective moral properties? How can we discover them?