IPB in Counterinsurgency

IPB in Counterinsurgency
(Part III Threat Analysis- Insurgency Fundamentals)

References FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency
Draft ST Counter Urban Insurgency Planning Guide FM Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations Official Manual 208 Iraqi Counter-insurgency Warfare Manual Official Manual No. 779 Iraqi Guerrilla Warfare Manual

IPB 3 1 3 2 Define the Operational Environment Describe the
Visualize the specific groups that defines the limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical and human geography using ASCOPE (overlay). Identify each specific community or group. 1 Define the Operational Environment Describe the Environment's Effects Evaluate the Threat 3 2 Assess the insurgent’s strategy and forecast his MD/MP COA (add to IPB I-II overlay to visualize and the enemy’s campaign plan and how he gains passive/active support of the population) Visualize the 3 x Root Causes by community or specific group depicted in the Overlay from IPB I

IPB 3 1 1 3 3 2 2 Communities + Grievances Insurgent Strategy
= Passive / Active Support IPB 3 Isolate groups, communities, or neighborhoods. 1 1 Determine Threat Courses of Action Define the Operational Environment The PEOPLE Describe the Environment's Effects Evaluate the Threat The ENEMY Their ISSUES 3 3 2 2 Isolate the insurgent’s strategy. Isolate each community’s grievances.

Begin to Develop Insurgent Campaign Plan
4 4 1 1 The PEOPLE Begin to Develop Insurgent Campaign Plan The ENEMY Their ISSUES 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes Assess: Strategy Forecast: Operational OBJs across: 3 3 2 2 Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2. Lack of Leadership 3. Ineffective Government Political Military Social Economic COAs COAs COAs

Insurgent Campaign Plan
Specific weakness in the movement to exploit Insurgent Dynamics Strategy Capabilities Decision Cycle Operations Tactics and OB Insurgent Dynamics Strategy Capabilities Insurgent Campaign Plan What is needed? Population Decision Cycle (Discuss this slide but don’t cover DIME, etc… unless asked the questions.) Here’s the house structure in a diagram. This is how we do the top down purpose driven analysis. (Click) At the top is the enemy’s desired endstate (strategic). (Click) (Use this slide to cover the model but don’t get into DIME and such unless you’re asked the question.) The next line is operationally how they’re going to do it. We use Political, Military, Social, and Economic (PMSE) blocks in our model. These are what we call the Lines of Operation (LOO) of the enemy. Many here believe in different lines of operation. Some like the DIME method, others PMSEII, some use Gen Casey’s, and others develop their own. Those are fine but remember that these are the ENEMY’s LOO. Therefore, they will not conflict with your LOO’s, as you choose them. These LOO’s can be derived from any society- political, strategic (military), social, and economic pillars. The LOO’s are derived from societal norms, whether that society lives at the state level or non state level. (Instructor: There are some contrasting examples and explanations that support the use of PMSE vice DIME, PMSEII, and others. Don’t use this unless it helps the students understand.) This enemy does not worry about diplomatic infrastructure, etc…. Thus we go back to using the basic societal pillars as TRIGGERS that allow us to analyze how they may try to achieve their endstate. The enemy does use information operation (psychological) but it is not a separate line. The psychological operations (I/O campaign) will exist in every facet of their four main lines of operation. In future slides we will demonstrate how they do this. In this example, we see that based on their political endstate, their lines of operation may look like this (use chart on slide or wall): politically they will disrupt elections; or militarily they will interdict MNF-I forces moving on MSR Tampa; or socially they will instigate tribal conflicts; or economically they will attack infrastructure. From here we move to COIN COG analysis. Each one of these operations will have one COG for both FRIENDLY and ENEMY. This chart may demonstrate multiple COG’s but what you are seeing is the overall campaign, i.e... different battles that they fight over a span of time. That is why it may appear that there is more than one center of gravity. Like in the conventional every major battle will have a COG, each of these lines can also be seen as separate battles. Therefore, there is really one center of gravity per battle, but multiple battles. Now, how do we determine the enemy’s most probable or most dangerous courses of action? Well, what are their capabilities? This is where we must understand the insurgents and their organization, phases, nature, and in the end, their strategy. We can draw some conclusions if we can place their movement based on models or strategies. (Instructor: use wall chart with various insurgent models.) For example: if we determine that they are using Urban Terror, or a Foco strategy it will be impractical to assume that one of their most probable or dangerous courses of action is developing a political wing. They don’t have the resources or inclination. If we determine that they are Protracted or Subversive, it is more likely that they will interdict reconstruction effort, form a political wing, or strengthen one we haven’t seen yet, and infiltrate local government IP and IA. They are in this for the long haul. Operations How to get or maintain population? Root Causes Tactics and OB

Insurgent Doctrine Note on Doctrine: Insurgents do not follow one specific doctrinal model or theory (Mao, Guevara, Marighella, or Fanon) but aspects of these theories exist among various insurgencies. These theories assist us as a basic guideline and common frame of reference. There are two types of political revolution: - Complete change from one constitution to another - Modification of an existing constitution ~ Aristotle

Threat Analysis 1. Leadership 2. Ideology 3. Objectives
4. Environment and geography 5. External support 6. Internal Support 7. Phasing and timing 8. Organizational and operational patterns Leadership. Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. Ideology. To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains what is wrong with society and justifies its insurgent actions. It must promise great improvements after the government is overthrown. The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal. Objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpretation of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgent’s desired end state; that is, how the insurgent will use the power once he has it. The replacement of the government in power is only one step along this path; however, it will likely be the initial focus of efforts. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It may be the only clearly defined goal the movement presents. Operational objectives are those the insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts; for example, the dissemination of PSYOP products or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives that lead to operational goals. Tactical objectives can be psychological as well as physical in nature. For example, legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Legitimacy is largely a product of perception; consequently, it can be the principal consideration in the selection and attainment of tactical objectives. Environment and Geography. Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. External Support. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. There are four types of external support: Moral: Acknowledgement of the insurgent as just and admirable. Political: Active promotion of the insurgents’ strategic goals in international forums. Resources: Money, weapons, food, advisors, and training. Sanctuary: Secure training plus operational and logistical bases. Phasing and Timing. Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is certainly not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return. Organizational and Operational Patterns. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors. As a result each insurgency organization is unique. However, knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques that may be employed against the supported government.

7 Dynamics of the Insurgency
1. Leadership: Provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organization 2. Ideology: The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal 3. Objectives: Strategic - Insurgent’s desired end state Operational – Sustained operations to support end state. Tactical - Immediate aims of insurgent acts 4. Environment and geography: Also, Operating within the physical and human environment. 5. External support: These include (Moral, Political, Resources, Sanctuary) 6. Internal support: These include Passive and Active Support 7. Phasing and timing: Passing forward and backward into different phases of an insurgency depending on situation. 8. Organizational and operational patterns: How the insurgency or movement is organized (wings, cells, guerrilla, auxiliaries, leadership, underground, level of decentralization) Leadership. Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. Ideology. To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains what is wrong with society and justifies its insurgent actions. It must promise great improvements after the government is overthrown. The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal. Objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpretation of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgent’s desired end state; that is, how the insurgent will use the power once he has it. The replacement of the government in power is only one step along this path; however, it will likely be the initial focus of efforts. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It may be the only clearly defined goal the movement presents. Operational objectives are those the insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts; for example, the dissemination of PSYOP products or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives that lead to operational goals. Tactical objectives can be psychological as well as physical in nature. For example, legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Legitimacy is largely a product of perception; consequently, it can be the principal consideration in the selection and attainment of tactical objectives. Environment and Geography. Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. External Support. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. There are four types of external support: Moral: Acknowledgement of the insurgent as just and admirable. Political: Active promotion of the insurgents’ strategic goals in international forums. Resources: Money, weapons, food, advisors, and training. Sanctuary: Secure training plus operational and logistical bases. Phasing and Timing. Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is certainly not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return. Organizational and Operational Patterns. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors. As a result each insurgency organization is unique. However, knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques that may be employed against the supported government.

Leadership - Indicator
INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators Basic Advanced Yes/No UKN 1. LEADERSHIP Disciplined leadership (well indoctrinated to support Higher’s goal vs. impulsive) Is the leadership effective in controlling the people? 2. IDEOLOGY Well indoctrinated Leaders (cell leaders) Is the I/O message regarding ideology focused and believable by the local population? 3. OBJECTIVE Attempting to build or strengthen illegal Political Wing Operation objectives each have specific I/O message 4. ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY Insurgents understand and effectively use the local culture to gain support Insurgents have infiltrated, manipulated, or control local economic community 5. EXTERNAL SUPPORT Resources tied to a legitimate government Political wing attempted to or has entered elections 6. INTERNAL SUPPORT Insurgents have passive support of the local population Insurgents have active support of the local population 7. PHASES AND TIMING Ability to shift to other Phases to capitalize on the current situation Recruiting efforts expand as the people lose faith in the established authority 8. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS Presence of an Underground Skilled Intelligence Gathering Leadership - Indicator Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Leadership Addresses 2nd Root Cause – Lack of Leadership
Can be a person or ideal How important is the localize or movement leader? - Tactician/Strategist - Charismatic, cultural, spiritual, symbolic, pre-martyr status - Is the leader insignificant or even harmful to the cause? Determine amount of resources to use against target Doctor

Leadership Senior staff Spokesman Political wing leader
Guerrilla leader Auxiliary leader Underground leader Cell leaders Doctor

Leadership Signature Characteristics
- Rely on decentralized operations - Use of covert/clandestine communications (low and high tech) - Mindset: Do not resemble western or conventional leadership Characteristics - Educated - Skillful communicator Doctor

INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT) Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators to assess strategy, fracture points (FP) and weak points (WP) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Basic Advanced Yes / No UKN 1. LEADERSHIP FP Disciplined leadership support higher’s goals X N Leader was selected by external force ? Leadership effective in controlling the people? How? Y Well articulate/motivating speaker Has risen to level of mystical; his death will rally the people WP Uses coercion, extortion, and/or provides security from rivals Leaders inspires subordinates to become effective leaders Insurgent leader is also a leader in the community? Leadership provide an aspect of government to the people? Does the leadership take credit for reconstruction, services, basic needs, provided by to government forces? Command and control: clandestine communications and well indoctrinated and decentralized cells? Leadership - Indicator

Leadership (Person) “The Cincinnatus of the West.” Lord Byron
“If he does that, he will be the greatest man in the world.” George III of England, upon hearing of Washington's impending retirement as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army (1783)

“Lion of Panjshir” and "Martyred Commander”
Leadership (Person) Ahmad Shah Massoud Northern Alliance “Lion of Panjshir” and "Martyred Commander” - Engineering student turned Afghan military leader who played a leading role in driving the Soviet army out of Afghanistan. - Defense Minister in the early 1990s under President Burhanuddin Rabbani. Military leader of United Islamic Front following the collapse of Rabbani's government and the rise of the Taliban regime. - In September 2001 Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda agents.

Leadership (Person) FMLN – El Salvador Joaquín Villalobos
Oxford Grad/teacher (after war) Consultant on peacekeeping maters for: Colombia Mexico Sri Lanka Philippines Bosnia Northern Ireland

Leadership (Person) “Washington's is the mightiest name on earth… On that name no eulogy is expected. It cannot be. To add brightness to the sun, or glory to the name of Washington, is alike impossible. Let none attempt it. In solemn awe pronounce the name, and in its naked deathless splendor leave it shining on.” Abraham Lincoln “Posterity will talk of Washington as the founder of a great empire, when my name shall be lost in the vortex of revolution.” Napoleon Bonaparte

Professional Soldier/Scholar/Writer
Leadership (Person) Professional Soldier/Scholar/Writer

Leadership (Ideal) al-Qaeda

Leadership (Person) Simón Bolívar José de San Martín

Manuel Marulanda Vélez"Tirofijo"
Leadership (Ideal) Commander Military Wing FARC-EP Leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez"Tirofijo" Jorge Briceño Suárez “Mono Jojoy” Raúl Reyes Spokesman I/O Officer

Leadership (???) Muqtada al-Sadr

Ideology Ability to address root causes
What is wrong with government and how they will fix it Used to justify actions Ideology guides the insurgents in offering society a goal The insurgents’ plans must be vague enough for broad appeal and specific enough to address important issues Ability to address root causes (IPB II – Effects): Provide for vulnerable Population Provide leadership for direction Provide Government control

Ideology Are there competing or conflicting ideologies or strategic objectives within a group? Ideology greatly influences the insurgent’s perception of his environment which in turn shapes the movement’s organization and methods. Message = Land reform Possible targets = Contact peasant groups Attack land reform program Rob banks that own titles Kidnap wealthy land owners

Nature (Type) of Insurgency vs. Strategy of Insurgency
Ideology Nature (Type) of Insurgency vs. Strategy of Insurgency Shi’a Theocracy Extremist Kurdish PKK Autonomy Sunni Return to power Al Qaeda Rid Muslim World of Western Influence Coalition Forces (out) Coalition Forces (stay) Urban Terrorist Strategy “Foco” Strategy Protracted War Strategy Subversive Strategy

INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT) Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators to assess strategy, fracture points (FP) and weak points (WP) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Basic Advanced Yes / No UKN 2. IDEOLOGY Is there conflicting ideology within the movement? Y Do insurgent targets reflect the insurgent’s ideology Does the insurgency collaborate with rival insurgents or criminals to achieve their goals? ? Overall , well indoctrinated cell? X N - Guerrilla cells? - Auxiliary cells? Message sufficient to justify insurgent violence? Insurgent message focused and believable by the locals? Are captured insurgents highly resistant to interrogation? Does the insurgent’s message or actions accurately address immediate grievances and complaints ? Does the insurgent’s message or actions accurately address the underlying issue? Leadership - Indicator

Ideology Doctor Doctor Castro - Lawyer

Librarian (academic/scholar)
Ideology Mao Tse-Tung Librarian (academic/scholar)

Ideology Algeria Uruguay Tupamaros Raul Sendic Frantz Fanon Lawyer
Physiologist/writer

Objective Strategic: Overall political goal
Operational: Continuous operations nationally, regionally, or locally in support of the strategic goal. The objectives span the following types: Political Military Social Economic Tactical: are immediate actions designed to support the operational process. These can be both physical and psychological.

Objectives Insurgencies normally seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country (impetus to a revolution) They may also seek to— Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution. (Former Regime Element - FRE). Establish an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state. (Kurdish PKK). Cause the withdrawal of an occupying power. (FRE, Sadr, AS/AI, JAM) Extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent means. (Sadr)

INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT) Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators to assess strategy, fracture points (FP) and weak points (WP) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Basic Advanced Yes / No UKN 3. OBJECTIVE Attempting to build or strengthen illegal political wing? Attempting to legitimize illegal Political Wing? Insurgent operations each have a specific message? Insurgents effectively draw out government forces? Provide services to population after collateral damage from CF/HN combat ops ? Insurgents know CF/HN sectors, patches, vehicle markings? Able to spark sectarian violence for specific goals? Insurgents appear to learn rapidly from their opponent’s mistakes? Conduct complex and coordinated attacks? Insurgents conduct simultaneous efforts to maximize the psychological impact making it appear they are far stronger than estimated? Leadership - Indicator

Insurgent’s Desired Political End state
2nd Bn/Bde (US) / 1st BN/Bde (HN) Insurgent’s Desired Political End state Strategic Objective Insurgent Lines POLITICAL MILITARY SOCIAL ECONOMIC Operational OBJ Operational OBJ Infiltrate Political Leadership Wing Harassing Rockets Mortars Interdict MSRs Infiltrate HNSF Disrupt Elections Tribal Class Division Religious Influence Education Interdict Power lines Disrupt Construct. Effort Black Market (Discuss this slide but don’t cover DIME, etc… unless asked the questions.) Here’s the house structure in a diagram. This is how we do the top down purpose driven analysis. (Click) At the top is the enemy’s desired endstate (strategic). (Click) (Use this slide to cover the model but don’t get into DIME and such unless you’re asked the question.) The next line is operationally how they’re going to do it. We use Political, Military, Social, and Economic (PMSE) blocks in our model. These are what we call the Lines of Operation (LOO) of the enemy. Many here believe in different lines of operation. Some like the DIME method, others PMSEII, some use Gen Casey’s, and others develop their own. Those are fine but remember that these are the ENEMY’s LOO. Therefore, they will not conflict with your LOO’s, as you choose them. These LOO’s can be derived from any society- political, strategic (military), social, and economic pillars. The LOO’s are derived from societal norms, whether that society lives at the state level or non state level. (Instructor: There are some contrasting examples and explanations that support the use of PMSE vice DIME, PMSEII, and others. Don’t use this unless it helps the students understand.) This enemy does not worry about diplomatic infrastructure, etc…. Thus we go back to using the basic societal pillars as TRIGGERS that allow us to analyze how they may try to achieve their endstate. The enemy does use information operation (psychological) but it is not a separate line. The psychological operations (I/O campaign) will exist in every facet of their four main lines of operation. In future slides we will demonstrate how they do this. In this example, we see that based on their political endstate, their lines of operation may look like this (use chart on slide or wall): politically they will disrupt elections; or militarily they will interdict MNF-I forces moving on MSR Tampa; or socially they will instigate tribal conflicts; or economically they will attack infrastructure. From here we move to COIN COG analysis. Each one of these operations will have one COG for both FRIENDLY and ENEMY. This chart may demonstrate multiple COG’s but what you are seeing is the overall campaign, i.e... different battles that they fight over a span of time. That is why it may appear that there is more than one center of gravity. Like in the conventional every major battle will have a COG, each of these lines can also be seen as separate battles. Therefore, there is really one center of gravity per battle, but multiple battles. Now, how do we determine the enemy’s most probable or most dangerous courses of action? Well, what are their capabilities? This is where we must understand the insurgents and their organization, phases, nature, and in the end, their strategy. We can draw some conclusions if we can place their movement based on models or strategies. (Instructor: use wall chart with various insurgent models.) For example: if we determine that they are using Urban Terror, or a Foco strategy it will be impractical to assume that one of their most probable or dangerous courses of action is developing a political wing. They don’t have the resources or inclination. If we determine that they are Protracted or Subversive, it is more likely that they will interdict reconstruction effort, form a political wing, or strengthen one we haven’t seen yet, and infiltrate local government IP and IA. They are in this for the long haul. Insurgents capabilities and likely actions in support of their strategic objective Conducting now (that we know of)? Conducting now (we don’t know of)? Will conduct in the future? = Capabilities Most probable and most dangerous course of action

Environment and Geography
Physical and Human “terrain” and weather. How does the insurgents utilize, blend in, exploit, etc the environment and geography? Are their shortcomings something we can use to identify members of the insurgency, movement trends, upcoming operations Look at “large picture” as well: - seasons - border regions, mountain ranges, major terrain features well outside the AO

Environment/Effects Vulnerable Population Leadership
Government Control Environment/Effects Root Causes V L G V L G V L G V L G V L G V L G

INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT) Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators to assess strategy, fracture points (FP) and weak points (WP) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Basic Advanced Yes / No UKN 4. ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY Insurgency utilizes terrain effectively (rural or urban)? Insurgents conduct resupply or movements at night? Insurgents effectively conduct combat operations at night? Insurgents operate in all weather and light conditions? Exploit CF/HN weaknesses during adverse light/weather? Insurgent’s resources/recruits based seasonal conditions? Insurgents, are skilled survivalist that can live off the land? Insurgents effectively draw counterinsurgents to rugged and remote terrain or weather that diminishes their strengths? Draw counterinsurgents to densely populated urban areas that give the advantage to insurgents? Effectively use the local culture to gain support? Are the insurgents able to adapt to changing or adverse weather? Leadership - Indicator

External Support Most Dangerous
Resources: Money, weapons, food, advisors, and training. So What? Ans. Advisors can increase abilities, AA weapons, ATGM, EFPs Sanctuary: Secure training and operational or logistics bases. So What? Ans: Consolidate and Reorganize, physical/psych outlet, protect resources Moral: Acknowledgement of the insurgents as just and admirable. So What? Ans: Morale, gain recruits, resources, sanctuary Political: Provide direction and guidance to group. Active promotion of the insurgents’ strategic goals in international forums. So What? Ans: Political wing becomes legitimate and we can’t touch them (Muqtada al-Sadr, Yasser Arafat, Sinn Féin, Hezbollah, Hamas Most Dangerous

INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT) Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators to assess strategy, fracture points (FP) and weak points (WP) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Basic Advanced Yes / No UKN 5. EXTERNAL SUPPORT Enjoy political and/or moral support from external actor? Dependent on external support for basic weapons/equipment? Receive external resources of advanced weapons/equipment?. Presence of foreign advisors, trainers, or representatives? Training, operational, or logistics bases externally? Can insurgents cross international borders at will? Insurgent group or their political wing is trying to meet with coalition forces or host nation (cease fire, open dialog, etc.)? Political wing has denounced violence and is trying to separate itself from the militant wing publically? Insurgent political wing has a media element for political messages operating legally or openly in external countries? External actor provide movement with direction and guidance? Demonstrations/riots in foreign country(s) to show support ? Leadership - Indicator

Internal Support Passive Support: Freedom of Movement
Active Support: Active participation to assist the insurgent movement. Add to population control, aid and comfort to insurgency, riots and demonstration, pass propaganda, provide information. Internal: - Resources - Sanctuary - Moral - Political Internal and local

INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT)
Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators to assess strategy, fracture points (FP) and weak points (WP) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Basic Advanced Yes / No UKN 6. INTERNAL SUPPORT People provide freedom of movement primarily out of fear? Freedom of movement due to enemy addressing root causes? Insurgents employ dedicated members for Population and Resource Control (PRC)? High quality and volume of tips/walk-ins from the community? Do insurgents acquire resources, recruits, information from local population through force, terrorism, and threats? Do the insurgent enjoy the active support of the local population to a degree that enhances their capabilities? Do the local members of the community provide early warning to insurgents on counterinsurgency activity? Do insurgents provide support to families of jailed personnel with the expectation of recruitment, assistance, or loyalty? Insurgents utilize the “invisible” aspects of the populations?

Phases of an Insurgency

From captured Official Manual 208 Iraqi Counter-insurgency Warfare Manual – Three Phase of the Insurgency 1. Preliminary Stage (AKA Latent and incipient) 2. The Equilibrium Stage (AKA Guerrilla Warfare) 3. Final Stage (AKA War of Movement) An insurgency movement begins with minor acts of sabotage, passes through the phase of small armed guerrilla groups, and reaches the final stage of civil war. Insurgency is a long-term issue that normally progresses through a preliminary stage, a stage of equilibrium, and then the final stage. Preliminary Stage Insurgency movement begins to crystallize, gaining popular support and momentum because people are discontented and the government is weak. Intelligence network is established at the same time as the insurgents' organization. Acts of sabotage and infiltration into the ranks of security forces and the intelligence network are carried out. The insurgents organize themselves into small bands of guerrillas engaging in combat to establish and maintain their presence. The basic problem at this stage is political. It can be resolved by a strong, effective government able to isolate hostiles from the populace supporting them. This is a formative period in which the movement changes from being a potential threat to carrying out organized acts of sabotage. It activities include the following: A. Political and Organizational 1. Recruiting members loyal to the objective. 2. Establishing a cell-type organization. 3. Strengthening and expanding the leadership and political organization. 4. Expanding opposition control to untroubled areas. 5. Strengthening control over previously captured areas to remove government influence and create secure sites for headquarters, camps, and bases in the area. 6. Destroying lines of communication and government institutions. 7. Forcing security forces to deploy across a wide front. B. Control of the Population 1. Use of propaganda. 2. Setting up a parallel government and issuing orders. 3. Distorting the government's reputation. 4. Eliminating opposition through threats, intimidation, and selected acts of terrorism. C. Hostile Operations. These take the following forms: 1. Attacks on villages loyal to the government. 2. Sabotaging communications and institutions. 3. Operations of deceit to avoid clashes with security forces. 4. Establishing a command structure. 5. Mobilizing popular support through political and psychological propaganda. 6. Categorizing the population into elements: Active supporters, sympathizers, passives, and hostiles. 7. Establishing bases and sources of equipment. 8. Seeking and obtaining external support. The indicators of the preliminary phase are as follows: A. Growing activity hostile to the government. B. Strikes, riots, and disturbances among the populace. C. Propaganda designed to distort the reputation of the civil administration and police. D. Political robberies, assassinations, and troubles among ethnic and regional minorities. E. Gathering and hiding food in small caches. F. Emergence of a parallel government made up of bands of guerrillas. G. Infiltration of agents into the government's civil administration. H. Plundering of arms and ammunition. I. Increased applications for weapons permits. The Equilibrium Stage Hostiles adopt guerrilla tactics in their operations and try to create a feeling of hopelessness among security forces. Insurgents resort to swift attacks followed by a quick withdrawal, and will not enter deliberate battles. They try to acquire the reputation of invincibility by using hit and run tactics and to show that security forces have failed to protect the public. The political and military objectives of this stage are as follows: A. Destruction of administrative apparatus by offensive means. B. Preparations for area operations. This includes carrying out the following activities: 1. Storing weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food in selected locations. 2. Conducting intelligence surveys of security force capabilities in proposed operations areas. 3. Preparing secret routes for ingress and egress. Final Stage Lengthy battles between security forces and well-organized insurgent forces take place during this stage. The insurgency movement may last for years before this stage is reached, at which time it becomes primarily a military problem. Victory will only be achieved through traditional military operations. One may say that this stage has been reached when the following conditions exist: A. Support and following of the majority of the population has been attained. B. Civilian administration has collapsed. C. The battle area is fully prepared. D. Government intelligence agencies have been neutralized and are unable to control hostile intelligence agencies. E. A stage is reached where the government is forced to react the way the hostiles wish. F. When security forces are in a position in the battle area whereby their destruction would lead to total loss of the area. G. Security forces outside the area are unable to save those inside. H. Opposing forces possess a superior force for achieving their objectives. There is no clear dividing line between stages: one may dissolve into the next. The method of warfare at every stage depends on support of the masses. Recruits, organizes, and trains cadres. • Infiltrates key government organizations and civilian groups. • Establishes cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks. • Organizes or develops cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities. • Solicits and obtains funds. • Develops sources for external support.

3 x Root Causes Mobilized Population
Phase I Latent and Incipient Phase II Guerrilla War Phase III War of Movement Popular support Propaganda Intelligence network Sabotage + infiltration Organize cells Recruiting + training Political organization Disrupt LOCs Demonstration/riots Terrorism External support Robberies Assassinations Logistics Regular guerrilla ops Disrupt government Hit and run attacks Avoid deliberate battle Inability to protect populace Prep AO Stockpile logistics Improve intelligence Prepare ingress and egress routes Force HNSF across wide front Seize urban areas Prepare remote areas Support of majority (pop.) Decisive battles Conventional tactics Collapse of civil admin. Gov. Intel destroyed Gov. react as insurgents wish Infiltrate government Linked to legitimate organizations External political support Phase Shift Phase Shift

By Neighborhood Reduced action Tall Afar Mosul Same Action How can phases help us detect the presence of the insurgency? Phase II Increased Insurgent action (Guerrilla) Same Insurgent action (Guerrilla) An insurgency movement begins with minor acts of sabotage, passes through the phase of small armed guerrilla groups, and reaches the final stage of civil war. Insurgency is a long-term issue that normally progresses through a preliminary stage, a stage of equilibrium, and then the final stage. Preliminary Stage Insurgency movement begins to crystallize, gaining popular support and momentum because people are discontented and the government is weak. Intelligence network is established at the same time as the insurgents' organization. Acts of sabotage and infiltration into the ranks of security forces and the intelligence network are carried out. The insurgents organize themselves into small bands of guerrillas engaging in combat to establish and maintain their presence. The basic problem at this stage is political. It can be resolved by a strong, effective government able to isolate hostiles from the populace supporting them. This is a formative period in which the movement changes from being a potential threat to carrying out organized acts of sabotage. It activities include the following: A. Political and Organizational 1. Recruiting members loyal to the objective. 2. Establishing a cell-type organization. 3. Strengthening and expanding the leadership and political organization. 4. Expanding opposition control to untroubled areas. 5. Strengthening control over previously captured areas to remove government influence and create secure sites for headquarters, camps, and bases in the area. 6. Destroying lines of communication and government institutions. 7. Forcing security forces to deploy across a wide front. B. Control of the Population 1. Use of propaganda. 2. Setting up a parallel government and issuing orders. 3. Distorting the government's reputation. 4. Eliminating opposition through threats, intimidation, and selected acts of terrorism. C. Hostile Operations. These take the following forms: 1. Attacks on villages loyal to the government. 2. Sabotaging communications and institutions. 3. Operations of deceit to avoid clashes with security forces. 4. Establishing a command structure. 5. Mobilizing popular support through political and psychological propaganda. 6. Categorizing the population into elements: Active supporters, sympathizers, passives, and hostiles. 7. Establishing bases and sources of equipment. 8. Seeking and obtaining external support. The indicators of the preliminary phase are as follows: A. Growing activity hostile to the government. B. Strikes, riots, and disturbances among the populace. C. Propaganda designed to distort the reputation of the civil administration and police. D. Political robberies, assassinations, and troubles among ethnic and regional minorities. E. Gathering and hiding food in small caches. F. Emergence of a parallel government made up of bands of guerrillas. G. Infiltration of agents into the government's civil administration. H. Plundering of arms and ammunition. I. Increased applications for weapons permits. The Equilibrium Stage Hostiles adopt guerrilla tactics in their operations and try to create a feeling of hopelessness among security forces. Insurgents resort to swift attacks followed by a quick withdrawal, and will not enter deliberate battles. They try to acquire the reputation of invincibility by using hit and run tactics and to show that security forces have failed to protect the public. The political and military objectives of this stage are as follows: A. Destruction of administrative apparatus by offensive means. B. Preparations for area operations. This includes carrying out the following activities: 1. Storing weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food in selected locations. 2. Conducting intelligence surveys of security force capabilities in proposed operations areas. 3. Preparing secret routes for ingress and egress. Final Stage Lengthy battles between security forces and well-organized insurgent forces take place during this stage. The insurgency movement may last for years before this stage is reached, at which time it becomes primarily a military problem. Victory will only be achieved through traditional military operations. One may say that this stage has been reached when the following conditions exist: A. Support and following of the majority of the population has been attained. B. Civilian administration has collapsed. C. The battle area is fully prepared. D. Government intelligence agencies have been neutralized and are unable to control hostile intelligence agencies. E. A stage is reached where the government is forced to react the way the hostiles wish. F. When security forces are in a position in the battle area whereby their destruction would lead to total loss of the area. G. Security forces outside the area are unable to save those inside. H. Opposing forces possess a superior force for achieving their objectives. There is no clear dividing line between stages: one may dissolve into the next. The method of warfare at every stage depends on support of the masses. Recruits, organizes, and trains cadres. • Infiltrates key government organizations and civilian groups. • Establishes cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks. • Organizes or develops cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities. • Solicits and obtains funds. • Develops sources for external support. By Neighborhood Reduced action Reduced insurgent action Same Action Phase III Increased Action Phase III Increased Insurgent action (Force on force) MNF-I

INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT) Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators to assess strategy, fracture points (FP) and weak points (WP) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Basic Advanced Yes / No UKN 7. PHASES AND TIMING Is the insurgency using phase I to strengthening and expanding their military and political organizations? Insurgent propaganda is being used to prepare the population to resist with demonstrations, riots, boycotts, or sabotage? Insurgents are conducting armed propaganda? Insurgents setting up parallel government and issuing orders? Insurgents actively target government institutions (police stations, town halls, government buildings)? Propaganda aimed at create feeling of hopelessness of CFs? Increased cache activities to support transition to phase II? Insurgents are stepping up intelligence collection efforts? Insurgents massing against outposts or government facilities? Insurgents control terrain, neighborhoods, town, rural area ? Ability to shift phases to capitalize on the current situation.? Leadership - Indicator

Insurgency Guerrillas Auxiliary Leadership Security Intelligence
Counter Intelligence Logistics Control over the Civilians PsyOps (I/O) Recruitment Aid Desertion of COIN personnel Guerrillas Raids Ambush Terrorism Kidnapping Assassination Propaganda Recruitment Leadership

Organization Command Group: Composed of the resistance commander and reps. of the guerrilla forces in the area. (Cmd & Staff) Guerrilla unit: each cell consists of persons, and is divided into two or three sub-cells, each of 5-6 persons. (Combat Arms) Auxiliary forces: (members of the population) typically provide to the Command Group and Guerrillas (Combat Support & Combat Service Support) - Logistics Control over the Civilians - Intelligence/Counter Intelligence - Recruitment/screening - Conduct Deception Operations - Information Operations - Transportation systems - Medical Support - Promote/facilitate desertion of Security Forces - Inner and Outer Security Zones and Early Warning - Manufacture/maintenance of equipment and weapons (IEDs) Underground: Clandestine, covert, overt operations (Special Operations Forces) - Political Wing members - Intelligence/Counter Intelligence - I/O/Psychological Warfare Maintain safe houses - Sabotage, assassination and subversion - Command Group. The command group is composed of the authorized resistance commander and representatives of the guerrilla forces in the area. This group organizes a staff if necessary. The command group is usually located with the guerrilla group, so that it can exercise optimal control of the resistance movement. Guerrilla unit: each unit consists of persons, and is divided into two or three sub-units, each of 5-6 persons. Auxiliary forces. a. The active support from a sector of the civilian population. These include sympathizers, "fence sitters", the paid off, the coerced, those directed by tribal or religious leaders, etc. They are a very important combat multiplier for the guerrilla operations, just as combat support and combat service support are a vital element of US/Coalition armed forces. Auxiliary forces typically provide: 1. Security and Warning for guerrilla forces. 2. Intelligence. Provide active and passive intelligence of troop movements, record movement, location, and schedules of HVTs, 3. Counter Intelligence. Watching for those that enter areas and neighborhoods that aren't locals. Possibly MNF HUMINT and/or their assets. 4. Logistics. Transportation, food, equipment, clothes, documents, medical aid to wounded guerrillas, hide AIFs. 5. Recruitment/screening of guerrilla forces to prevent infiltrators and replenish WIA/KIA guerrillas 6. Psychological Warfare. (Extremely important) Distribute propaganda, newsletters, rumors to energize population and/or mislead enemy. 7. Control over the Civilians. Law and order, control black market, intimidate, bribe, extort, give impression of guerrilla control 8. Deception and Desertion. Promote and assist ISF deserters. * Failure to factor in the Auxiliary (generally the bulk of the force) is analogous to disregarding a military’s CS & CSS in strength and as a combat multiplier. * This list is not exhaustive. It is a vital part of the insurgencies and should not be dismissed since they are not "trigger pullers." Secret Element: Those elements that act unilaterally in areas where joint guerrillas/auxiliary activities are nonpermissible or outside the normal reach of the insurgent AO. These operations tend to be covert in sense that no responsibility is claimed in order to cause confusion while still supporting broader insurgent goals. These missions are specifically tasked organized depending on the mission.

Organization Triangular *Political (lead) – Military – mass base (popular control) Dual A legal overt political party controls the activity of an illegal covert military organization. Cellular Small, decentralized groups operate independently of each other. A cellular organization may be combined with any of the other organizational structures to enhance security. Ethnic This organization is organized along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines. It perceives that government has denied rights of their group. Cellular. Small, decentralized groups operate independently of each other. A cellular organization may be combined with any of the other organizational structures to enhance security. Political. Extensive complex political structure develops before military actions are initiated. Military. Armed insurgents serve as a catalyst for mobilizing opposition against existing regime. Ethnic. This organization is organized along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines. It perceives that government has denied rights of their group.

Auxiliary Cell Auxiliary Leader
Maintain a permanent residence in the denied sector or AO and have identifiable and legitimate means of livelihood. People who are simply coerced or duped into supporting the resistance are not considered auxiliary members. Auxiliary components in a sector or AO are normally satellites of local guerrilla forces, following the guidance of tribal or religious leaders. Auxiliary Cell Leader Auxiliary Cell Leader Auxiliary Cell Leader Members Members Members

Underground Intelligence Cell
Covert and clandestine intelligence/counter intelligence operations. Move/hide personnel, materials, and classified documents. Uses “safe houses”, selected routes, special concealment containers/vehicles. Commits acts of deception to steal bonafide documents (identification [ID] cards), passes, money, and passports) and use them under false pretenses. Branch Ldr Cutout Cell Ldr Cutout Cutout Cutout Member Member Member

Underground Operations Cell
Branch Ldr Conduct covert, overt and clandestine operation in support of insurgency’s goals. Effect political, military, economic, and/or social change through subversion and force of arms. Cutout Cell Ldr Member Member

INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT) Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators to assess strategy, fracture points (FP) and weak points (WP) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Basic Advanced Yes / No UKN 8. OPERATIONAL/ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN Cells and elements effectively compartmentalized? Insurgency has effective underground – (covert/clandestine)? Insurgency has effective auxiliary cells? Guerrilla cells augment themselves only with skilled, trained, and indoctrinated recruits? The insurgents have a separate and dedicated propaganda or media element? Guerrilla cells are trained and used for specific mission (kidnapping cells, raids, ambushes, sniper, indirect fire)? Guerrilla cells conducting sabotage are skilled in attacking key nodes of infrastructure? Insurgent leaders and subordinates use of clandestine communication methods? Is there an existence of a political wing that actually gives direction and not symbolic (sometimes hard to see)? Leadership - Indicator

INSURGENCY STRATEGY ASSESSMENT TOOL (ISAT) Mission Analyses - Facts and Assumptions Insurgent Dynamics and Indicators Basic Advanced Yes/No UKN 1. LEADERSHIP Disciplined leadership (well indoctrinated to support Higher’s goal vs. impulsive) Is the leadership effective in controlling the people? 2. IDEOLOGY Well indoctrinated Leaders (cell leaders) Is the I/O message regarding ideology focused and believable by the local population? 3. OBJECTIVE Attempting to build or strengthen illegal Political Wing Operation objectives each have specific I/O message 4. ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY Insurgents understand and effectively use the local culture to gain support Insurgents have infiltrated, manipulated, or control local economic community 5. EXTERNAL SUPPORT Resources tied to a legitimate government Political wing attempted to or has entered elections 6. INTERNAL SUPPORT Insurgents have passive support of the local population Insurgents have active support of the local population 7. PHASES AND TIMING Ability to shift to other Phases to capitalize on the current situation Recruiting efforts expand as the people lose faith in the established authority 8. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS Presence of an Underground Skilled Intelligence Gathering Leadership - Indicator Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Insurgent Strategies Note: Graphics depict highlights. Several strategies have aspects that overlap (e.g. I/O campaign, political wings, infrastructure attacks). See supporting notes, handouts, and reference slide for additional information

Urban (terrorist) Strategy
Enemy attacks Government Enemy want Government to overreact against population (suspend rights, curfews, searches, imprisonment, torture, “disappeared”) to pursue Insurgents People Enraged Urban (terrorist) strategy: This strategy employs terrorism within urban areas. The object is to create instability and crisis in both the government's ability to react and attacks the government’s credibility directly. In this case the insurgents are counting on the government’s overly harsh treatment of the people (search, imprisonment, torture, death, etc) in their attempt to defeat the insurgents to support the Enemy. The strategy exploits the complexity and anonymity of urban areas. On the other hand, guerilla operations in urban areas are less independent than those in rural areas because the governments vigilance is greater and the possibilities of betrayal and government reprisals greater. * This strategy is the easiest to initiate, requires less organization, and popular support. People Enraged

Foco Strategy - (Delegitimize Government)
Enemy attacks Government Enemy wants Government to lose legitimacy and inspire a vulnerable population to join the insurgents against the government Foco (Cuban “Che Guevara”) Strategy: this focal point is an armed organization or nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents build new institutions and establish control based on that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed, government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The foco must mature at the same time the government loses legitimacy and before any alternative appears. Relies on pristine conditions to succeed. Commonly insurgencies begin as Foco and mature into a more protracted/political type Subversive and Mass-oriented * Note: Since the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolution Che Guevara’s “foco” strategy has been tried over 200 times. None have succeeded. People Enraged Encourage

Protracted Strategy External Enemy attacks Government
Enemy attacks rivals Infrastructure I/O Campaign (Propaganda) Mass-Oriented (Protracted Popular War) Strategy: Achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Create a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. Challenge the system and then destroy or supplant it. Patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas and construct a base of active and passive political supporters. Protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. Political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Normally establishes a parallel government that openly proclaims its own legitimacy. Insurgents have a well-developed ideology and choose their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action. Protracted Popular War External Military Wing Political Wing

Subversive Strategy Enemy attacks Government Enemy attacks rivals
Infrastructure Political Wing openly denounces violence to gain legitimacy Political Wing Legitimacy Illegitimacy Military Wing Political Wing

Subversive Strategy Enemy attacks Government Enemy attacks rivals
Sunni Infrastructure I/O Campaign External Supporters Subversive: Penetrate the political structure to control it and use it for their own purposes (Legitimate Political Wing with a Illegitimate Military Wing) They seek elective and appointed offices. They employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, and disrupt and discredit the government. Violence shows the system to be incompetent. It may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response—which further undermines its legitimacy. A highly compartmented armed element normally carries out insurgent violence. A political element guides the armed element and also maneuvers for control of the existing political structure. A subversive insurgency most often appears in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law. Subversive insurgences can quickly shift to the foco strategy when conditions dictate. Avoid alienating public, who is against violence, and foreign support who is reluctant to openly back illegal insurgents. Use the political wing to send message while military wing coerces local leaders, destroys resources (infrastructure) to damage government legitimacy, assassinates political opponents, etc. Political Wing openly denounces violence to gain legitimacy Political Wing Legitimacy Illegitimacy Military Wing

Shifting Strategy/Phases
Insurgencies are at their weakest while the shift Indicators of the shift (Dynamics) Forecast the (Operational and Tactical) Why do they occur? - Time - External Support - Change in Leadership - Counterinsurgent action (Political, Military, Social, Economic) Note: These shifts are like crossing danger areas. They will happen fast and if we aren’t watching we can’t detect and exploit.

Phases of an Insurgency Latent and incipient insurgency
Example Phases of an Insurgency Phase III: War of movement Clear Phase II: Guerrilla warfare Foco OR Urban Terrorist Foco OR Urban Terrorist Phase II: Guerrilla warfare Foco OR Urban Terrorist Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency

Target Infrastructure
Example Phase III: War of movement OR Protracted Subversive Target Infrastructure Electric/Oil Water Bridges LOCs Form Alliances Rival groups Disenfranchised Criminal Org. Tribal/Religious External actors Phase II: Guerrilla warfare Consolidate Reorganize Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency

Target Infrastructure
Example Hide Phase III: War of movement OR Protracted Subversive Target Infrastructure Electric/Oil Water Bridges LOCs Form Alliances Rival groups Disenfranchised Criminal Org. Tribal/Religious External actors Phase II: Guerrilla warfare Consolidate Reorganize Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency Successes and losses of insurgents is not be measured in a linear fashion as groups move from one phase to another. Moving “down” a phase may cause them to move laterally to change strategy, embrace protracted war strategy + mentality, larger emphasis on I/O, destroy infrastructure to undermined MNF/ISF reconstruction efforts, harder to locate enemy, form alliances (move away from unilateral action, form “legit” political wings)

Insurgent Strategy Urban Terrorist Strat. “Foco” Strategy Protracted War Strategy Subversive Strategy Urban Terrorist Strat. “Foco” Strategy Protracted War Strat. Subversive Strat. “Foco” Strat. Urban Terrorist Strat. Protracted War Strat. Subversive Strat. Enemy can operate using (based on political, social, economic, geographic, and security pressures AND/OR to supporting strategic and operational objectives): in Different strategies in Different Phases in Different areas

Insurgent Strategy Hide
“Protracted” and “Subversive” are the most dangerous forms of insurgency. Efforts to limit its development and progress must be with understanding doctrinal concept and subtle indicators. Urban Terrorist Strat. “Foco” Strategy Protracted War Strategy Subversive Strategy Urban Terrorist Strat. “Foco” Strategy Protracted War Strat. Subversive Strat. “Foco” Strat. Urban Terrorist Strat. Protracted War Strat. Subversive Strat. Enemy can operate using (based on political, social, economic, geographic, and military pressures AND/OR to supporting strategic and operational objectives): Different strategies in Different Phases in Different areas Generally most insurgencies do end up “protracted and subversive” after a less than successful “Foco” and “Urban Terrorist” type approach.

Conclusion “If you know yourself but not the enemy, for
every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.” - Sun Tzu

Questions?

Appendix

Phases and Timing US Doctrinal Model 5-Stage Urban Model Phase I
Latent and incipient insurgency Stage 1 Violent Propaganda (Gain Support) Stage 2 Growth (Establish infrastructure, gain limited control) Stage 3 Guerrilla Offensive (Offense against REAL targets) Stage 4 Mobilization of the Masses (Create Popular Movement) Stage 5 Urban Uprising (Take over / form rival Government) Phase II Guerrilla warfare Phase III War of movement

Phase I: (Iraqi) Preliminary Stage or (US) Latent and incipient insurgency. Activity in this phase ranges from I/O to organization to limited subversive activity. The guerrilla force does not conduct continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism. (Key Tasks: I/O, organization/structure, training, limited strikes) Phase II: (Iraqi) Equilibrium Stage or (US) Guerrilla warfare. This phase is reached when the insurgent movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized continuous guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. (Key Tasks: Coordinated strikes, higher tempo of directed violence, able to resupply, conduct intel/CI/training/commo, maintain semi-permissive environment) Phase III: (Iraqi) Final Stage or (US) War of movement. When the guerrilla attains the force structure and capability to directly engage MNF/ISF in decisive combat, continuing to progressive towards conventional tactics. He may also begin to conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase to protect the areas he controls. (Key Tasks: Establish non-permissive environment for MNF/ISF forces, higher sustainment of forces, foothold in the political system [if applicable to mass-oriented or subversive type strategy] Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency. Activity in this phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a potential threat to situations in which frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. The guerrilla force does not conduct continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism. Phase II: Guerrilla warfare. This phase is reached when the insurgent movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized continuous guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. Phase III: War of movement. When the guerrilla attains the force structure and capability to directly engage government forces in decisive combat, then he will progressively begin to use more conventional tactics and may obtain combat forces from an external source. He may also begin to conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase to protect the areas he controls.

Urban (terrorist) strategy
Enemy attacks Government Enemy wants Government to overreact against population (suspend rights, curfews, searches, imprisonment, torture, “disappeared”) to pursue Insurgents Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Urban (terrorist) strategy: This strategy employs terrorism within urban areas. The object is to create instability and crisis in both the government's ability to react and attacks the government’s credibility directly. In this case the insurgents are counting on the government’s overly harsh treatment of the people (search, imprisonment, torture, death, etc) in their attempt to defeat the insurgents to support the Enemy. The strategy exploits the complexity and anonymity of urban areas. On the other hand, guerilla operations in urban areas are less independent than those in rural areas because the governments vigilance is greater and the possibilities of betrayal and government reprisals greater. * This strategy is the easiest to initiate, requires less organization, and popular support. People Enraged This strategy is the among the easiest to initiate; requires less organization and popular support

Foco (Che Guevara) Strategy
Enemy attacks Government Enemy want Government to lose legitimacy and inspire a vulnerable population to join the insurgents against the government Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Foco (Cuban “Che Guevara”) Strategy: this focal point is an armed organization or nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents build new institutions and establish control based on that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed, government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The foco must mature at the same time the government loses legitimacy and before any alternative appears. Relies on pristine conditions to succeed. Commonly insurgencies begin as Foco and mature into a more protracted/political type Subversive and Mass-oriented * Note: Since the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolution Che Guevara’s “foco” strategy has been tried over 200 times. None have succeeded. People Enraged Encourage This strategy is the among the easiest to initiate; requires less organization and popular support

Protracted Strategy External I/O Campaign (Propaganda) Enemy attacks
Government Shi’a Sunni Infrastructure I/O Campaign (Propaganda) Mass-Oriented (Protracted Popular War) Strategy: Achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Create a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. Challenge the system and then destroy or supplant it. Patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas and construct a base of active and passive political supporters. Protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. Political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Normally establishes a parallel government that openly proclaims its own legitimacy. Insurgents have a well-developed ideology and choose their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action. Protracted Popular War External Military Wing Political Wing

Subversive Strategy (Part I) Enemy attacks Shi’a Government Sunni
Infrastructure Political Wing openly denounces violence to gain legitimacy I/O Campaign External Supporters Political Wing Legitimacy Legitimacy Illegitimacy Illegitimacy Military Wing Political Wing

Subversive Strategy (Part II) Enemy attacks Shi’a Government Sunni
Infrastructure Political Wing Political Wing openly denounces violence to gain legitimacy Political Wing Legitimacy Legitimacy Illegitimacy Illegitimacy Military Wing

Combining Phases and Strategy

IPB in Counterinsurgency

Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "IPB in Counterinsurgency"— Presentation transcript:

Similar presentations

About project

Feedback

Log in

Auth with social network:

IPB in Counterinsurgency

Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "IPB in Counterinsurgency"— Presentation transcript:

Similar presentations

About project

Feedback