1. 1 MVE 6030 The Good Society and its Educated Citizens Topic 3-A (Lecture 4 & 5) Communitarian’s Idea of Good Society

2. 2 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zRawls’ deontological liberalism Michael Sandel published a book entitled Liberalism and the Limits of Justice in 1982. The book is a direct critique on Rawls’ work A Theory of Justice (1971). The focus of Sandel’s critique is on the assumption on which Rawls has built his theory of justice. Sandel characterizes the assumption as deontological liberalism.

4. 4 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zRawls’ deontological liberalism… yBy deontological liberalism, according to Sandel’s interpretation, it refers to Rawls’ stance of assigning liberalism such a deontological and significant status that it becomes the Categorical Imperative of all ethical concerns. This can be evident in the following two theses stipulated by Rawls.

5. 5 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zThe thesis of the priority of the right over the good: yAccording to the two principles stipulated by Rawls, fair distribution of primary goods among members of a given polity is “the first virtue of social institutions”. (Rawls, 1971, P.3) yDefinition of primary social goods: Rawls suggests that “the primary social goods, to give them in broad categories, are rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth.”

6. 6 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zThe thesis of the priority of the right over the good: … yRawls’ “theory of the good”: Rawls further specifies that rights, liberty and opportunities are considered to be primary because they could provide “reasonably favorable circumstances” for rational individuals to carry out and fulfil their “rational long- term plan of life.” These specifications presupposed that “each individual has a rational plan of life drawn up subject to the conditions that confront him” and “a man is happy when he is more or less successfully in the way of carry out this plan.” (Rawls, 1971, P. 93)

7. 7 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zThe thesis of the priority of the right over the good: … y….. In contrast with utilitarian’s theory of the good, which assumes that utilities generated from material goods are considered to be primary because they are capable of satisfying human desire, Rawls’ liberal theory of the good assumes that since “men’s rational plans do have different final ends” (P. 93), as a result even identical goods may generate total different degree of utility or satisfaction for them. ……

8. 8 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zThe thesis of the priority of the right over the good: … y….. ……Hence material goods and the utility generated from them are not “primary” in a sense that they are not universally taken to be valuable or useful to every individuals. Instead, rights to basic liberties and opportunities to power and wealth will provide each individual will the “primary” means to pursue their rational plan of life of his own choice.

9. 9 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zThe thesis of the priority of liberty: yAccording to the lexical order that Rawls has assigned to the two principles of justice, we can see that between the primary goods defined by Rawls, it is the basic liberties (specified in the first principle) which have priority over the opportunities to power and wealth (stipulated in the second). yThe ground for the priority of liberty: The ground of Rawls’ assignment of priority to basic liberty rests primarily on the Kantian conceptions of “autonomy” and “will” of human agents. Immanuel Kant writes …

10. 10 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zThe thesis of the priority of liberty: y….. “Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his ideas of laws ― that is, in accordance with principles ― and only so has he a will. Since reason is required in order to derive actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then in a being of this kind the actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary ― that is to say, the will is then a power to choose only that which reason independently of inclination recognizes to be practically necessary, that is, to be good.” (Kant, 2008[1785], P.5)

11. 11 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zThe thesis of the priority of liberty: yBased on the Kantian conceptions of autonomy and will of human agent, Rawls assumes that “as free and equal rational beings”, each of us will see “themselves as primarily moral persons with an equal right to choose their mode of life.” In order to pursue their own rational plan of life to the full, they are inclined (if not bounded) to set “their fundamental interest in liberty” and simultaneously they have to endorse their fellow agents with their liberty in “fair” terms. As a result and in the long run Rawls confidently asserts that free and equal agent they would “acknowledge the two principles of justice and their ranked serial orders.” (Rawls, 1971, P. 563)

12. 12 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zSandel’s communitarian critiques on Rawls’ deontological liberalism yRawls’ flaws on the conception of the person xVoluntaristic connection between a person’s plans of life and the self: On Rawls’ conception of the person, one can always voluntaristically make choices among plans of life and conceptions of good. However, to the communitarians, “establishing one’s own end is not a matter of choosing from a menu of available possibilities, but one of discovering what one’s end really are or ought to be.” (Mulhall and Swift, 1996, P. 50) And this discovery process is deeply embedded in the sociocultural milieu which one is born with and/or has to live with.

13. 13 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zSandel’s communitarian critiques on Rawls’ deontological liberalism yRawls’ flaws on the conception of the person xDisconnection between a person’s plans of life and identity: In connection to Rawls’ voluntaristic conception of choices of one’s end and/or plan of life, such choices can hardly be a constitutive part of one identity, that is, these ends and plans of life could not have been owned permanently and continuously by oneself because they are subject to changes in accordance with one’s preferences or desires. …

14. 14 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zSandel’s communitarian critiques on Rawls’ deontological liberalism yRawls’ flaws on the conception of the person xDisconnection between a person’s plans of life and identity: … However, to Sandel or communitarians in general, the process of personal identification is in essence a social interacting process. It is a balance, negotiation or even conflict between one’s self-aspirations and the social obligation to family, tribe, social class, nation, or any social bondage to which one belong.

15. 15 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zSandel’s communitarian critiques on Rawls’ deontological liberalism yRawls’ flaws on the conception of the person xDisconnection between personal identity and sense of community and common good: Accordingly, “Rawls’ conception of the self commits him to an impoverished understanding of political community. …On Rawls’ view a sense of community describe a possible aim of antecedently individuated selves, not an ingredient of their identity. Essentially communal goods thereby find their place only as one type of contender amongst many.” (Mulhall and Swift, 1996, P. 52) To the communitarians, a community can be conceived as a home in which one can attach one’s sense of belonging, attribute one’s vocation for life and one’s meaning of existence.

16. 16 Michael Sandel’s Critique on Rawls’ Deontological Liberalism zSandel’s communitarian critiques on Rawls’ deontological liberalism yRawls’ flaws on the conception of community xA society is but a field of cooperation between antecedently individuated rational choosers of ends based primarily on their independent preferences and personal desires. xThe value of society is defined simply by its capacity to guarantee individual freedom in realization of personal preferences and desires xApart from the fulfillment of individual freedom, a society is excluded from any possibility of constituting any forms of common good, such as fraternity or common good and care.

17. 17 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre published his work After Virtue in 1981. It is a work of not focused specifically Rawls’ A Theory of Justice but a comprehensive critique on liberalism espoused from the project of the Enlightenment. And the work presents a comprehensive thesis on moral philosophy from the communitarian perspective.

19. 19 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre begins his thesis by criticizing the moral doctrine, which he calls emotivism. To MacIntyre, “emotivism is the doctrines that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character. …But moral judgment, being expression of attitude or feeling, are neither true nor false; and agreement in moral judgment is not to be secured by any rational method, for there are none. …..

20. 20 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre begins his thesis by criticizing the moral doctrine, which he calls emotivism. To MacIntyre, …. “…..It is to be secured, if at all, by producing certain non-rational effects on the emotions or attitudes of those who disagree with one. We use moral judgments not only to express our own feelings attitudes, but also precisely to produce such effects in others.” (MacIntyre, 2007[1981], P. 11-12)

21. 21 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre then traces this emotivistic orientation prevailing in current moral debates back to of current contemporary back to the Enlightenment project and more specifically to moral philosophies of “Kierkegaard, Kant, Hume, Smith and their contemporaries” of the Enlightenment. (P.51)

22. 22 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre traces this emotivistic orientation… yKant’s motto of the Enlightenment: "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude (Dare to know)! 'Have courage to use your own reason!' - that is the motto of enlightenment." (Kant, 1996/1784)

23. 23 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre traces this emotivistic orientation… yAccompany with the historical events of Reformation and Scientific Revolution, moral philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Immanuel Kant endowed humans with the capacity to reason practically and morally of their plan of life, ends of life or in MacIntyre’s words “human telos”. xAs a result, the moral issue of human telos confronting modern man had practically changed from the project of “man-as-he-could-be-if-he realized-his-essential nature” to that of “man-as-he-happen-to-be”. (2007, P. 52) x….

24. 24 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre traces this emotivistic orientation… y… xFurthermore, the whole project of ethics, which was supposed “to enable man to pass from his present state (or untutored human nature) to his true end (or notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he realized-his-telos)” was left in disarray since the Classical characters of human telos were replaced with the enlightened minds of free-will and autonomy, who could make choices on “man-as-he- happen-to-be” or even “man-as-he-feel-happy-to-be).

25. 25 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre’s project of After Virtue yConfronted with the prevailing emotivism in current moral discourse or more specifically the modern mobile psyches endowed with free-will and autonomy but striped off the human telos; MacIntyre set out to the pursuit after the long lost concept of virtue, which can trace back to Aristotle writings.

26. 26 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre’s project of After Virtue … yTo begin with, MacIntyre underlines in retrospect that “we have at least three very different conceptions of a virtue to confront: a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to discharge his or her social role (Homer); a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to move towards the achievement of the specifically human telos, whether natural or supernatural (Aristotle, the New Testament and Aquinas); a virtue is quality which has utility in achievement earthly and heavenly success.” (P. 185)

27. 27 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre’s project of After Virtue … yMacIntyre suggests that “the complex, historical, multi-layered character of the core concept of virtue” can be logically developed in three stages.

28. 28 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism zMacIntyre’s project of After Virtue … y“The first stage requires a background account of what I shall call a practice, the second an account of what I have …characterized as the narrative order of a single human life and the third an account …of what constitutes a moral tradition. Each latter stage presupposes the earlier, but not vice versa. Each earlier stage is both modified by and reinterpreted in the light of, but also provides an essential constituent of each later stage. The progress in the development of the concept is closely related, although it does not recapitulate in any straightforward way, the history of the tradition of which it forms the core.” (Pp. 186-87)

29. 29 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of practice x“By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involve, are systematically extended. …The game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is. So are enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the historian, and so are painting and music.” (P.187) So are practices of modern professions such as doctors, lawyers and teachers.

30. 30 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of practice xTaken professional practices in Anglo-American societies as examples, a ‘practice’ embodies a number of definitive features The notion of “goods internal to the practice”: It is suggested that participants in a ‘practice’ will more or less experience intrinsic meaning and reward, i.e. internal good, from the cooperative activities and practice. Hence, participants are supposedly motivated not by some material rewards or value external to the activities themselves. Authority of the standards and paradigms operative in the practice: There are definitive standards and paradigms developed and accumulated within a practice. And an authority of assessing such standards and paradigms will be established and universally recognized by practitioners within a practice.

31. 31 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of practice x… a ‘practice’ embodies a number of definitive features… A framework of reasoning: A framework of due course handling disputes among practitioners on standards or/and paradigms of a practice will develop and be observed by its members. A form of life and vocation: Accordingly, members of a practice may develop a communal form of life and a sense of vocation among themselves.

32. 32 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of practice xVirtue of practice: By locating the notion of virtue with the context of practice. MacIntyre proposes following tentative definition of a virtue: “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 191)

33. 33 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of practice xVirtue of practice: … These internal goods to a “practice” include Truthfulness and trust: It refers to the disposition and capacity of remain truthful to the definitive standard and paradigm established with a practice. At the same time, it expects the practitioners to trust their fellow practitioners, as well as the prevailing authority and reasoning framework within a practice. Finally, the practitioners of a professional practice are also required to be truthful and trustworthy to their clients as well as the general public.

34. 34 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of practice xVirtue of practice: … These internal goods to a “practice” include… Justice: “Justice requires that we treat others in respect of merit or desert according to uniform and impersonal standards: to depart from the standards of justice in some particular instance defines our relationship with the relevant person as in some way special or distinctive.” (P. 192)

35. 35 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of practice xVirtue of practice: … These internal goods to a “practice” include… Courage: “We hold courage to be a virtue because the care and concern for individuals, communities and causes which is so crucial to so much in practices requires the existence of such a virtue. If someone says that he cares for some individual, community or cause, but is unwilling to risk harm or danger on his, her or its own behalf, he puts in question the genuineness of his care and concern. Courage, the capacity to risk harm or danger to oneself, has its role to human life because of this connection with care and concern.” (P. 192)

36. 36 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of practice xThe relativity of virtue to code of practice: “I take it then that from the standpoint of those types of relationship without which practices cannot be sustained trustfulness, justice and courage ― and perhaps some others ― are genuine excellences, are virtues in the light of which we have to characterize ourselves and others, whatever our private moral standpoint or our society’s particular codes may be. For this recognition that we cannot escape the definition of our relationships in terms of such goods is perfectly compatible with the acknowledgement that different societies have and have had different codes of truthfulness, justice and courage.” (p. 192)

37. 37 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yConcept of narrative: xAfter virtue in practical pluralism in modern society: By locating his conception of virtue in terms of practices within the context of modern society, which are filled with varieties of value orientations, codes of practices and forms of life, MacIntyre underlines that it is practically implausible to maintain a comprehensive virtue for one’s life as a whole, as the Aristotelians pledge. MacIntyre characterizes this modern situation in three ways: “Multiplicity of goods”, “too many conflict and too much arbitrariness” in modern society (P. 201) “Without an overriding conception of the telos of a whole human life, conceived as unitary, …individual virtues remain partial and incomplete.” (P. 202) Inability to maintain the virtue of integrity and one’s identity in consistency and continuity

38. 38 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yConcept of narrative: xTo reconcile this modern-man dilemma of “liquidation of the self into a set of demarcated areas of role-playing”, (P. 205) MacIntyre suggests that modern men or more specifically “modern agents” have to constitute and impute the “narrative” to all those multiplicity of goods, variety of telos of life, conflicts of role expectations and to integrate them as much as possible into an intelligible, meaningful or even morally defensible whole, i.e. a storyline.

39. 39 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yConcept of narrative: xA narrative is therefore a literal device invited by human beings to organize all the discrete incidents in life into a sequential (chronological), intelligible and accountable whole, i.e. a storyline. As MacIntyre underlines, “Man is in his action and practice…essentially a story- telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for man is not about their own authorship; I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society …with one or more imputed characters …and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how other respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construct.” (P. 216)

40. 40 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yConcept of narrative: xIt is only in this process of construction of one’ own narrative that a man can practically become an “agent” that is, in Jerome Bruner’s terms, the "empowered protagonist" (1987, P. 19) who possess both the will and ability to set the course of actions and to fulfill the plan of life for oneself. In an article entitle “Life as Narrative” Bruner stipulates that "stories are about the vicissitudes of human intention." (1987, P.18) And "story structure (especially self narrative) is …composed of …an Agent, an Action, a Goal, a setting, an Instrument―and Trouble. Trouble is what drives the drama, and it is generated by a mismatch between two or more of the five constituents." (p. 18)

41. 41 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yConcept of narrative: xIn analytical narrative studies, a number of constituting devices commonly used by narrators have been identified. They include Selective appropriations of events (Somers, 1994) Temporal and chronological sequence (White, 1987; Somers, 1994) Emplotment (White, 1987; Somers, 1994; Ricouer, 1991a, 1991b) The closure (White, 1987)

42. 42 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yConcept of narrative: xIn a process of self narrative, though one cannot be the author of the story but one can never the least be the narrator and the main character or even hero of the storyline. In other words, he can narrate one’s life-story in a way to make it an intelligible and accountable unity. An in fact, MacIntyre underlines that unity, intelligibility and accountability are three of the essential constituents of a narrative.

43. 43 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yConcept of narrative: xThe end result of all these narrating efforts according to MacIntyre is the emergence as well as constitution of the personal identity. In his own words, “the concepts of narrative, intelligibility, and accountability presuppose the applicability of the concept of personal identity, just as it presupposes their applicability and just as indeed each of these three presupposes the applicability of the other two. The relationship is one of mutual presuppositions.” (P. 218) “Unity of human life is the unity of a narrative quest. …The only criteria for success or failure in a human life as a whole are the criteria of success or failure in narrated or to-be-narrated quest.”

44. 44 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yConcept of narrative: xAccordingly, MacIntyre provide a second definition of his concept of virtue. “The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good.” (P. 219)

45. 45 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of tradition: xThe contextuality of virtue: Building on the concepts of practice and narrative, MacIntyre proceed to the third stage of his quest for virtue. He emphasizes that such a quest and constitution of one’s own virtue could never take place in a individuated and asocial context. In MacIntyre’s own words,

46. 46 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of tradition: xThe contextuality of virtue: … “I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtue only qua individual. This is partly because what is to live the good life concretely varies from circumstance to circumstance even when it is one and the same conception of good life and the same set of virtues which are being embodies in a human life. …It is not just that different individuals live in different social circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own circumstance as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given for my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity.” (MacIntyre, 2007, P. 220)

47. 47 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of tradition: xHistoricity of the social identity and moral self: Having located the quest for virtue within particular contexts and role-sets, MacIntyre further his pursuit by injecting the historical dimension into the quest for virtue.

48. 48 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of tradition: xHistoricity of the social identity and moral self: … “I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide. …Notice also that the fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as those of the family, the neighborhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularities of those forms of community. Without those moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists. Yet particularity can never be simply left behind and obliterated.” (2007, P. 221)

49. 49 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of tradition: xIdentity, virtue and tradition: Apart from the contetxuality and historicity, the concept of self identity and moral self are also essentially embedded in the notion of tradition. “What I am, therefore, is in the key part what I inherit, a specific past that is present to some degree in my present. I find myself part of a history …whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a tradition. It was important …to notice that practices always have histories and that at any given moment what a practice is depends on a mode of understanding it which has been transmitted often through many generations. And thus, insofar as the virtue sustains the relationships required for practices, they have to sustain relationship to the past ― and to the future ― as well as in the present.” (2007, P.221)

50. 50 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique on Liberalism yThe concept of tradition: xConcept of a living tradition: In contrast to the liberals’ conception of tradition which is an embodiment of conservativism and stifling to reasoning and progress, MacIntyre underlines the concept of living tradition: “A living tradition…is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about goods which constitute that tradition. Within a tradition the pursuit of goods extends through generations, sometime through many generations. Hence the individual’s search for his or her good is generally and characteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which the individual’s life is part, and this is true both of those goods which are internal to practice and of the goods of a single life.” (P. 222)

51. NarrativeTradition Practice Virtue Truthfulness & Trust Justice Courage (Care & Concern) Unity, Intelligibility, accountability Integrity Living Arguments (Communal level) (Individual level)(Historical level)

52. NarrativeTradition Practice Virtue Truthfulness & Trust Justice Courage (Care & Concern) Unity, Intelligibility, accountability Integrity Living Arguments (Communal level) (Individual level)(Historical level) Conception of Good Codes of Practices Personal Identity & Form of Life Social, Historical & Moral identity

53. 53 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zIn 1993, twenty-two years after the publication of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls published his second major work entitled Political Liberalism. It is a collection of revised articles, which Rawls produced through the years in respond to critiques in different occasions.

54. (1921-2002)

55. 55 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zIn comparison with his stance taken in A Theory of Justice, John Rawls has simply revised his conception just to be a “political conception of justice”. (Rawls, 1993, P. 223) In his own words,

56. 56 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism z“In saying a conception of justice is political I…mean three things: (i) that it is framed to apply solely to the basic structure of society, its main political, social and economic institutions as a unified scheme of social cooperation; (ii) that it is presented independently of any wider comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine; and (iii) that it is elaborated in terms of fundamental political ideas viewed as implicit in the public political culture of democratic society.” (Rawls, 1993, 223, my numbering; see also Rawls, 1993, Pp. 11- 15)

57. 57 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zThe conception of public justifiability and political constructivism yThe essence of the elaboration of the conception of justice as political is that Rawls has made a number of concessions in his original theory of justice xThe sphere of deliberation is no longer covering the society as a whole, but it only confines to public or more specifically political sphere. xThe participants in the deliberation are no long free and equal choosers in all aspects of their lives, but confine to the role of citizens in civil democratic polity.

58. 58 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zThe conception of public justifiability and political constructivism yThe essence of the elaboration … xThe subjects to be deliberated are also confined to public goods and their distributions among citizens of a given polity.

59. 59 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zThe conception of.. political constructivism… yAccordingly, Rawls has also located his theory of justice within particular institutional and cultural contexts, namely the political institution of constitutional and liberal democracy and the political culture of a “reasonable” public who can come to a “stable” “overlapping consensus”.

60. 60 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zThe conception of.. political constructivism… yThe conception of political construtivism: In connection to these concessions, Rawls suggests that “Justice as fairness is best presented in two stages. In the first stage it is worked out as a freestanding political (but of course moral) conception for the basic structure of society. Only with this done and its content ― its principles of justice and ideals ― provisionally on hand do we take up, in the second stage, the problem whether justice as fairness is sufficiently stable.” (Pp.140-41)

61. 61 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zThe conception of.. political constructivism… yReplacement of the original position with the constructivism of the political culture of public reasonability: This two-stage conception of political constructivism may be construed in the context of criticism on Rawls hypothetical conception of original position and veil of ignorance. It serves as the precondition of the deliberation of the theory of justice as fairness.

62. 62 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zThe conception of.. political constructivism… y“Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, citizens cannot agree on any moral authority, whether a sacred text, or institution. Nor do they agree about the order of moral values, or the dictates of what some regard as natural law. We adopt, then, a constructivist view to specify the fair terms of social cooperation as given by the principles of justice agreed to by the representativeness of free and equal citizens when fairly situated. The bases of this view lie in fundamental ideas of the political culture as well as in citizens’ shared principles and conceptions of practice reason. …….

63. 63 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zThe conception of.. political constructivism… y“…….Thus, if the procedure can be correctly formulated, citizens should be able to accept its principles and conceptions along with their reasonable comprehensive doctrine. The political conception of justice can then serve as the focus of an overlapping consensus.” (P. 97)

64. 64 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zRawls become a communitarian liberal yTaken together all the concessions and reformulations Rawls has made in Political Liberalism, we may conclude that his political liberalism stipulated in his two principles of justice have been embedded into a concrete political community within which xthe institutional practices of public reasonability of a constitutional-liberal democracy have been firmly in place; xthe narrative of citizenship of civil-constitutional democracy has been commonly shared by its citizens xthe culture of democratic reasonability from which overlapping consensuses have been reached from generation to generation and has been a tradition.

65. 65 John Rawls’ “Political Conception of Justice”: A Response to Criticism zRawls become a communitarian liberal yAs a result, we may query: Has John Rawls has become a communitarian himself?

66. 66 MVE 6030 The Good Society and its Educated Citizens Topic 3-B (Lecture 4 & 5) Liberals’ Reformulations of A Theory of Justice

67. 67 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality zRonald Dworkin, one the prominent scholars in political philosophy and jurisprudence (the philosophy of law), has formulated a liberal theory of justice, which differs substantively from Rawls’s. He aims to constitute an ethical foundation for comprehensive conception of justice for the liberals, whom he has characterized as ethical liberal.

68. 68 1931-2013

69. 69 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality zDworkin’s critiques on Rawls’ contractarianism: Dworkin first of all points to Rawls’ liberal theory of justice lacking any ethical foundation.

70. 70 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yDworkin’s critique on Rawls’s strategy of discontinuity: He disagrees with Rawls’s compromise suggested in Political Liberalism that his idea of justice is but a “political conception”, that is, the idea of justice “is presented independently of any wider comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine.” (Rawls, 1993, P. 233) Dworkin accurses Rawls of adopting a kind of “strategy of discontinuity”, which separate the political conception of justice from “personal perspective of our ethical ideal”. (Dworkin, 1995, Pp. 199-209) Rawls’ two principles of justice are confined to be applicable only within the political domain; as a result, Rawls’ theory of justice is voided of any ethical foundation or conception of good live.

71. 71 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yDworkin’s critique on Rawls’s contractarianism: Dworkin further criticizes that if we follow Rawls formulation of justice as political conception and understand the idea of justice “as constructed just for politics, in the way a contract is constructed for some special commercial occasion, then no question can arise about the consistency of that political perspective with anyone ‘s personal ethical perspective. Someone can agree to occupy an artificial, purpose-built political perspective without subscribing to its principles as his own, just as he can agree to be bound by a contract without accepting that its terms are perfectly fair or even reasonable.” (Dworkin, 1995, P. 204)

72. 72 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yDworkin’s critique on Rawls’ contractarianism of ignorance: Finally, Dworkin also underlines that “In Rawls’s version of the social contract…each party negotiates to advance the interest of people he represents, by of whose actual concrete interests he is nearly wholly ignorant.” (Dworkin, 1995, P. 278) In other words, persons under Rawls contractarianism of veil of ignorance are striped off any capacity of ethical reasoning and reflectivity.

73. 73 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality zDworkin’s models of “critical ethical value” inquiry (value inquiry) yDistinction between volitional and critical well-beings: To Dworkin, ethical value enquiry is the effort to address the question: “what kind of goodness does a good life have?” (Dworkin, 1995 P.229) Dworkin makes a distinction of two types of “well-being” i.e. good life.

74. 74 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yThey are the volitional and critical well-being xVolitional well-being: “Someone’s volitional well-being is improved and just for that reason, when he has or achieves what in fact he wants.” Hence, volitional interests are concerned with getting what one wants. And fulfillments of one’s wants and/or desires are the sole interest of the volitional well-being. xCritical well-being: It involves taking into consideration not only what one wants but critically reflecting whether the wants in point and their fulfillments are ethically and morally right. Improvement of critical well-being will entail statement such as “my life is not worse life to have lived―I have nothing to regret, still least to take shame in.” (P. 230) In other words, critical well-being involves one’s inner self, self-worth, self- respect, dignity, self- guilt, and self-shame.

75. 75 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yIn light of this distinction, Dworkin underlines that “our project of finding a liberal ethics as a foundation for liberal politics must concentrate on critical as distinct from volitional well-being. We need an account of what people’s critical interests are that will show why people who accept that account and care about their own and other people’s critical well-being will be led naturally toward some form of liberal polity and practice.” (Dworkin, 1995, P.233).

76. 76 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yIn light of this distinction, Dworkin underlines that “our project of finding a liberal ethics as a foundation for liberal politics must concentrate on critical as distinct from volitional well-being. We need an account of what people’s critical interests are that will show why people who accept that account and care about their own and other people’s critical well-being will be led naturally toward some form of liberal polity and practice.” (Dworkin, 1995, P.233).

77. 77 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality y“Ethnics studies how people best manage their responsibility to live well, and personal morality what each as an individual owes other people. Political morality, in contrast, studies what we all together owe others as individuals when we act in and on behalf of that artificial collective person.” (Dworkin, 2011, Pp. 327-8)

78. 78 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yThe components of critical-ethical-value inquiry According to Dworkin, persons adhere to critical well-being are confronted by a series of “puzzles”. In order to resolve the critical question of whether one’s life is intrinsically good, a human agent has to inquire into each of them. The puzzles includes xSignificance: Thinking of one’s critical well-being, a person has to first of all attribute some meaning, meaningfulness, or even importance to his daily living or even his life. One must inquire into questions: “In what sense of from what perspective could that be important? How can it matter what happens in the absurdly tiny space and time of a single human life? Or even in the tiny episode of all sentient life taken together? ….How can we reconcile these two ideas: that life is nothing and that how we live is everything?” (Dworkin, 1995, P. 234-5)

79. 79 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yThe components of critical-ethical-value inquiry… xTranscendent or indexed? Having identified the significance and importance of one’ critical well-being, a person then has to decide whether these “ethical values are transcendent, that is, that the components of a good life are always and everywhere the same.” Conversely, one may opt for the ethical stance that “there is no such things as the single good life for everyone, that ethical standards are in some way indexed to culture and ability and resource and other aspect of one’s circumstance, so that the best life for a person in one situation may be very different from the best life for someone else in another.” (Dworkin, 1995, P.235)

80. 80 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yThe components of critical-ethical-value inquiry… xEthics and morality (limitations and parameters): Have addressed the dilemma between transcendent or indexed, the third puzzle is “what is the connection between self-interest and morality?” (Dworkin, 1995, P.235) Or more specifically, what is ethical value relate to moral value? Dworkin in his more recent work has made the distinction between ethics and morality as follow “I use the term ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ in what might seem a special way. Moral standard prescribe how we ought to treat others; ethical standard, how we ought to live ourselves. …But we would then have to recognize the distinction I draw …in order to ask whether our desire to lead good lives for ourselves provides a justifying reason for our concern with what we owe to others.” (Dworkin, 2011, P.191)

81. 81 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yThe components of critical-ethical-value inquiry… xEthics and morality (limitations and parameters): …. In other words, in pursuing one’s well-being (either critical or volitional) should one solely consider one’s own interests or take into account of other fellow human’s interests? More generally, in pursuing one's well-being, should the circumstances (including moral as well as physical circumstances) in which one find himself be taken as limitation or parameters?

82. 82 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yThe components of critical-ethical-value inquiry… xAdditive or constitutive? The fourth component of critical value inquiry elevates our inquiry to the level on how and on what ground should we judge whether some else’s life is a good and decent life. According to Dworkin, there are two ways answer this question. One way is simply ask whether some desirable attributes, which we count as components of a good life, have been found manifested in the behaviors and/or relationship of someone whom we are to pass our judgments. Dworkin has characterized this way of evaluating good life as additive, that is, we are simply looking for some explicit, objective and additive attributes of good life demonstrated by someone in his behaviors or relationship. ….

83. 83 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yThe components of critical-ethical-value inquiry… xAdditive or constitutive? …… The second way is ask further whether the good deed or decent relationship demonstrated are consciously endorsed and actively pursued by the person under evaluation. Dworkin called this evaluation constitutive, that is, the good deed and decent relationship have to be a constitutive part of one’s ethical and moral consciousness and not just some explicit and objective acts one happen to engage accidentally.

84. 84 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yThe components of critical-ethical-value inquiry… xEthics and community: Dworkin suggests that “the final set of puzzles … raise the question of the unit of ethical value, that is, of the entity whose life ethnics aims to make good.” (Dworkin, 1995, P. 238) Once again, Dworkin has suggested two distinct way to in inquire into this issue. On the one hand, we can reside our critical well- being and ethics in general entirely on oneself, that is, “each of us has ultimate responsibility for deciding what kind of life is right for him.” (Dworkin, 1995, P. 238) Hence the unit of ethical evaluation is entirely personal. ….

85. 85 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yThe components of critical-ethical-value inquiry… xEthics and community: …. One the other hand, we can identify that “the most fundamental ethical unit is collective not individual, that the question of whether my life is going well is subordinate to the question whether, for some group of which I am a member, our life is going well. …This supposes that a community has an ethical life of its own and that the critical success of any individual’s life depends to some degree on the critical success of the life of his community. …Some people …feel a personal failure when their own nation acts unjustly and wickedly, even when they have played no part in the injustice and have even tried to prevent it.” (Dworkin, 1995, P. 239)

86. 86 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yModels of critical ethical value: Having posited these five puzzles and worries about the ethical life and well-being of human beings, Dworkin juxtapose two different ways to resolve these ethical puzzles. He categorizes these two models of critical value as “model of impact” and “model of challenge”.

87. 87 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yModels of critical ethical value: … xModel of impact: The model “holds that the value of good life consists in its product, that is its consequences for the rest of the world.” (Dworkin, 1995, P. 240) Accordingly, a life can be evaluated by the value it brings to the objective states of affairs of the world. “A life can achieve more or less value …not because it is intrinsically more valuable to live one’s life rather than another, but because living in one way can have better consequences.” (Dworkin, 1993, P. 242) Dworkin’s model of impact may be conceived as similar to consequentialist model of ethics, or more specifically, closely related utilitarianism, which bases its ethic value on the amount of utility that a life could bring to the material world.

88. 88 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yModels of critical ethical value: … xModel of challenge: The model “argues that the value of good life lies in the inherent value of a skillful performance of living.” (Dworkin, 1995, P. 241) It basically adopts Aristotle’s and MacIntyre’s concept of virtue and views “a good life has the inherent value of skillful performance. So it holds that events and achievements and experiences can have ethical value even when they have no impact beyond the life in which they occur. …Living a life is itself a performance that demands skill, that is the most comprehensive and important challenge we face, and that our critical interests consist in the achievements, events, and experiences that mean that we have met the challenge well.” (Dworkin, 1995, P. 244)

89. 89 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yGuiding framework for inquiry of critical ethical values: By juxtaposing the two models of ethical values against the five constituent issues in critical value inquiry, Dworkin has construct a framework guiding the inquiry of critical ethical values: (see Table I)

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94. Prisoner B stays silent (cooperates) Prisoner B betrays (defects) Prisoner A stays silent (cooperates) Each serves 1 year Prisoner A: 3 years Prisoner B: goes free Prisoner A betrays (defects) Prisoner A: goes free Prisoner B: 3 years Each serves 2 years Game Theory: Prisoners’ dilemma

95. 95 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality zJustice as parameter in the model of challenge: Set off from the model of challenge, Dworkin’s approach to the humans’ pursuit of their critical well-being takes on the idea of justice one of the prominent parameter that a human agent must account for along his course of challenge.

96. 96 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality zJustice as parameter in the model of challenge: yTwo internal problems of Rawls’ Second Principle of Justice (the Different Principle): The precedent criticisms of Rawls theory of Justice waged by communitarians mainly concentrate on the external problems of the theory, i.e. its ontological and communal assumptions. However, Dworkin has revealed two internal problems of the theory within the tradition of liberalism. (see also Kymlicka 2002, Ch. 3).

97. 97 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality zJustice as parameter in the model of challenge: yTwo internal problems of Rawls’ Second Principle of Justice (the Different Principle): y….. According to the Second Principle of justice, inequality of primary goods should only be distributed unequally to the benefits of the least advantaged, however, Rawls has failed to address the causes contributing to the state of least advantaged and least well-off which people found themselves. Dworkin has made three distinctive causes of the least well-off.

98. 98 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yTwo internal problems of Rawls’ Second Principle : … xPeople are least well-off because of unequal share of natural endowments, such as talent, heath, physical ability, etc. Dworkin characterizes them as personal resources. xPeople are least well-off because of unequal share of socioeconomic endowments, such as socioeconomic backgrounds, cultural-linguistic background, or even racial and/or ethnical backgrounds, which are disadvantageous in a given society. Dworkin called them impersonal resources. xGiven equal shares in resources, people may end up being least well-off because of costly or even unwise choice, such as gambling or wasteful life-styles; or voluntary choice, such as religious belief.

99. 99 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yInjustice in the Second Principle: In Rawls’ Second Principle, there is no distinction to these three types of least well-off. And they are given indiscriminating compensation to their amount of primary goods. xFor Type (i) least disadvantaged, a blanket and non- discriminating compensations with the other types of least well- off is itself unjust. Given their disadvantages in natural endowments, they may need more compensation in order to be able to develop and research to the similar level of well-being as those having average level of natural endowments.

100. 100 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality yInjustice in the Second Principle: … xApart from the amount of compensation, to Type (i) least disadvantaged, the content of the compensation is also essential. In Rawls’ Second Principle compensation only comes as welfare (i.e. end result in the form of primary goods) but numbers of political philosophers have argued that they should also come at the commencing stage of their developments, as resources (Dworkin, 1995), as capacity (Sen, 1995) and as Access (Cohen, 2011). xFor Type (ii) least advantaged, they should of course be compensated in the form of both as resource and as welfare.

101. 101 Ronald Dworkin’s Search for the Foundation of Liberal Equality zDworkin’s theory of justice of liberal equality: To address the internal problems of Rawls’ Second Principle, Dworkin construct his theory of justice in a series of articles. (1995, see also 1981a & b, 1987a &b, 1989)They theory can presented diagrammatically as follow.

102. 102 LibertyEquality Community ORIGINDESTINATION PROCESS: In pursuit of one’s own critical well-being It refers to the idea of equality of endowment s & resources at the commencing stage of the pursuit. These resources are of two distinctive types: It refers to the idea that people are endowed with the liberty and autonomy to choose their own versions of critical well- being. As a result they bear full responsibility of their choice & decisions. Personal resources/ natural endowments Impersonal resources/ socioeconomic endowments Insurance mechanism in form of taxation & transfer payment to compensate inequality of personal resources Auction mechanism as devices to determine the amount of equal share in impersonal resources & amount of compensations if need be No compensation for costly &/or unwise choice Just Distribution #3Just Distribution #2 Just Distribution #1 Various forms of just distributions have to be worked out and sediment overtime within a given community of reasonable citizens, i.e. institutionalization

103. 103 LibertyEquality Community ORIGINDESTINATION PROCESS: In pursuit of one’s own critical well-being It refers to the idea of equality of endowment s & resources at the commencing stage of the pursuit. These resources are of two distinctive types: It refers to the idea that people are endowed with the liberty and autonomy to choose their own versions of critical well- being. As a result they bear full responsibility of their choice & decisions. Personal resources/ natural endowments Impersonal resources/ socioeconomic endowments Insurance mechanism in form of taxation & transfer payment to compensate inequality of personal resources Auction mechanism as devices to determine the amount of equal share in impersonal resources & amount of compensations if need be No compensation for costly &/or unwise choice Just Distribution #3Just Distribution #2 Just Distribution #1 Various forms of just distributions have to be worked out and sediment overtime within a given community of reasonable citizens, i.e. institutionalization “Liberal equality represents equality, liberty and community as fused together in an overall political ideal.” (Rowkin, 1995, P. 226)

104. 104 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zAmartya Sen, and Indian economist and philosopher, the Nobel Laureate in economic sciences in 1998, and an internationally renowned philosopher, has published extensively on the concept of justice. He has summarized his decades long contributions to the discourse of the theory of justice in his recent book The Idea of Justice (2009),

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106. 106 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zTwo of the main theses of Sen’s idea of the justice are generated from two of the fundamental critiques on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. They are yReplacement of distributive justice of “primary goods” with distributive justice of “capabilities”; and yReplacement of “transcendental institutionalism” with “realization-focused comparison” in the perspectives of justice studies.

107. 107 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: ySen begins his critique on Rawls’ theory of justice by taking issue with Rawls’ focusing his two principles of justice solely on fair distributions of primary goods. In a lecture delivered in 1979 entitled “Equality of What?” Sen argues that “there is, in fact, an element of ‘fetishism’ in the Rawlsian framework. Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of advantage.” Sen underlines that “judging advantage purely in terms of primary goods leads to a partially blind morality.” (Sen, 1980, P. 216)

108. 108 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: y… critique on Rawls’ theory of justice …. xIn relation to Rawls’ first principle of justice, which sets priority to the fair distribution of basic liberty, Sen writes recently that “it has argue that the total priority of liberty is too extreme. Why should we regard hunger, starvation and medical neglect to be invariably less important that the violation of any kind of personal liberty? …It is indeed possible to accept that liberty must have some kind of priority, but total unrestrained priority is almost certainly an overkill. There are, for example, many different types of weighting schemes that can give partial priority to one concern over another.” (Sen, 2009, P. 65)

109. 109 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: y… critique on Rawls’ theory of justice …. xAs in connection with the second principle of justice and more specifically difference principle, Rawls’ problem of focusing mainly on the fair distribution outcomes of primary goods for the benefits of the least advantaged is much more evident. Sen suggests that “in the difference principle, Rawls judges the opportunities that people have through the means they possess, without taking into account the wide variations they have in being able to convert primary goods into good living. For example, a disable person can do far less with the same level of income and other primary goods than can an able bodied human being. A pregnant woman needs, among other things, more nutritional support than another person who is not bearing a child. ….

110. 110 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: y… critique on Rawls’ theory of justice …. x…. The conversion of primary goods into the capacity to do various things that a person may value doing can vary enormously with differing inborn characteristics (for example, propensities to suffer from some inherited diseases), as well as disparate acquired features or the divergent effects of varying environmental surroundings (for example, living in a neighbourhood with endemic presence, or frequent outbreaks, of infectious diseases). There is, thus, a strong case for moving from focusing on primary goods to actual assessment of freedoms and capabilities.” (Sen, 2009, P. 65-66)

111. 111 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yConceptualization of capability: xA shift of the informational focus of studies of justice: Sen begins his construction of the capability approach to justice with his conception of “informational focus”. He suggests that “ Any substantive theory of ethics and political philosophy, particularly any theory of justice, has to choose an informational focus, that is, it has to decide which features of the world we should concentrate on in judging a society and in assessing justice and in justice.” (Sen, 2009, P. 231) Sen points out that there have been various informational focuses at work in the studies of justice, for examples utilitarianism focuses on utility and its entailed satisfaction, Rawls focuses on the holdings of primary goods, and Dworkin focuses on resource holdings with reference to “liberal equality”, etc. (Sen, 1993, p. 30) Instead, Sen bases his theory of justice on the informational focus of capabilities and freedoms.

112. 112 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yConceptualization of capability: xThe conception of “functioning”: Sen underlines that the most primitive notion in the capability approach is the idea of “functionings”. He conceptualizes that “functionings represent parts of the state of a person─in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. …Some functionings are very elementary, such as being adequately nourished, being in good health, etc., and may be strongly valued by all, for obvious reasons. Others may be more complex, but still widely valued, such as achieving self or being socially integrated. Individual may, however, differ a good deal from each other in the weights they attach to these different functionings.” (Sen, 1993, P. 31)

113. 113 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yConceptualization of capability: xThe conception of capability: Accordingly, “the capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of fuctionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she choose one collection.” (Sen, 1993, P. 31) In short, “capability is our ability to achieve various combinations of functionings that we can compare and judge against each other in terms of what we have reason to value.” (Sen, 2009, P. 233)

114. 114 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yConceptualization of capability: xDistinction between well-being and agency: One of the important features of the capability approach to justice is to focus not on the quantity of utility or primary goods to be distributed but on the ability to achieve “things we may value doing or being”. That is, the assessment of justice is basically rested on the fair distribution of capabilities through which members of a society can achieve “what we have reason to value.” Furthermore, these “things we value doing or being” can analytically be differentiated into two categories: (1) “the promotion of the person’s well-being”, and (2) “the pursuit of the person’s overall agency goals.” (Sen, 1993, P. 35)

115. 115 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yConceptualization of capability: xDistinction between well-being and agency: …. Accordingly, the idea of capability can be conceptualized into capability of “agency achievement” and capability of “well-being achievement” (Sen, 1993, P. 37) Sen has specifically given priority to the former over the latter. It is because “overall agency goals” would usually include promotion of one’s well- being. Moreover, in some critical situations, human agents may choose the achievement of their agency goals at the expanses of their well-beings. For example, under foreign invasion, civil soldiers may willing to risk their lives in defending their country. Hence, to provide the freedom and capability for a person to achieve his or her agency goal is more fundamental than providing him or her the capability of maintaining his or her well- being.

116. 116 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yConceptualization of capability: xDistinction between achievement and freedom to achieve: Sen has further conceptualized the idea of capability with another conceptual distinction, that is, the distinction between the capability of actually attain something and the capability of being free to attain the thing valued. (Sen 2009, P. 235-238) Once again has assigned the priority to the latter over the former. Sen underlines that such a distinction and prioritization is important to the capability approach because “it is oriented towards freedom and opportunities, that is, the actual ability of people to chose to live different kinds of lives within their reach, rather than confining attention only to what may be described as the culmination─or aftermath─of choice.” (Sen, 2009, P. 237)

117. 117 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yConceptualization of capability: xIn summary, the conceptualization of the idea of capability in Sen capability approach to justice can be presented in the follow table.

118. 118 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yConceptualization of capability: xIn summary, the conceptualization of the idea of capability in Sen capability approach to justice can be presented in the follow table. …… Obviously, within Sen’s capability approach to justice the concept of capability is focused on primarily “agency- freedom” conceptualization rather than the other three alternatives.

119. 119 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yCapability, society and public reasoning: Having rested the concept of capability on the “agency- freedom” footing, Sen further points out the dilemma between the individualism and communitarianism built in his concept of capability. That is, within the “agency-freedom” based concept of capability, we have to decide whether the capability should rest primarily on individual or on community. To resolve this dilemma, Sen has provided the following two additional qualifications to his capability approach to justice.

120. 120 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yCapability, society and public reasoning: … xCapability and society: Sen has specifically underlines that “identifying the capability approach as methodological individualism would be significant mistake.” (Sen, 2009, P. 244) He goes on indicating that “It is hard…to envision cogently how persons in society can think, choose or act without being influenced in one way or another by the nature and working of the world around them. …To note the role of ‘thinking, choosing and doing’ by individuals is just the beginning of recognizing what actually does happen, …but we cannot end there without an appreciation of the deep and pervasive influence of society on our ‘thinking, choosing and doing’.

121. 121 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yCapability, society and public reasoning: … xCapability and society: …When someone thinks and chooses and does something, it is, for sure, that person─and not someone else─who is doing these things. But it would be hard to understand why and how he or she undertakes these activities without some comprehension of his or her societal relations.” (Sen, 2009, P. 245) Hence, Sen has explicated at length how the concept of capability should be construed in correspondence with the concept of identity, which in Sen’s conceptualization is pluralistic, multiple and diverse in nature. (Sen, 2009, P. 247; Sen, 2006)

122. 122 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yCapability, society and public reasoning: … xCapability and public reasoning: Having located the concept capacity at the social rather than individual level, Sen are facing yet another problem. That is can a consensus be researched by a society at a given point in time the conception of capabilities and their ranking? Though Sen has categorically refuted to work out “some fixed list of relevant capabilities,” (Sen, 2009, P. 242) yet he does compromise that “the approach of capability is entirely consistent with a reliance on partial rankings and on limited agreements. …The main task is to get things right on the comparative judgements that can be reached through personal and public reasoning, rather than to feel compelled to opine on every possible comparison that could be considered.” (Sen, 2009, P. 243) ….

123. 123 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zThe capability approach to justice: yCapability, society and public reasoning: … xCapability and public reasoning: …. Hence, Sen believes that it is only through what he called “interactive public reasoning” that we may be able to obtain “a better understanding of the role, reach, and significance of particular functionings and their combination.” (Sen, 2009, P. 242)

124. 124 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zPerspective of realization-focused comparison in the studies of justice: In his book The Idea of Justice (2009), Sen writes in the introductory chapter, “There are two basic, and divergent, lines of reasoning about justice among leading philosophy.” (P.5) “The distance between the two approaches, transcendental institutionalism, on the one hand, and realization-focused comparison, on the other, is quite momentous.” (P. 7)

125. 125 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zPerspective of realization-focused comparison … yBy Transcendental institutionalism, it refers to the approach in political philosophy “led by the work of Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, and followed in different ways by such outstanding thinkers as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, concentrated on identifying just institutional arrangements for society. This approach…has two distinct features.” (Sen, 2009, P. 5)

126. 126 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zPerspective of realization-focused comparison … yBy Transcendental institutionalism, …. x“First, it concentrates its attention on what it identifies as perfect justice, rather than on relative comparisons of justice and injustice. …The inquiry is aimed at identifying the nature of ‘the just’, rather than finding some criteria for an alternative being ‘less unjust’ than another.” (PP. 5-6)

127. 127 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zPerspective of realization-focused comparison … yBy Transcendental institutionalism, …. x“Second, in searching for perfection, transcendental institutionalism concentrate primary on getting the institutions right, and it is not directly focused on actual societies that would ultimately emerge. …It is important …to note here that transcendental institutionalists in search of perfectly just institutions have sometime also presented deeply illuminating analyses of moral and political imperative regarding socially appropriate behavior. This applies particularly to Immanuel Kant and John Rawls, both of whom have participated in transcendental institutional investigation, but have also provide far-reaching analyses of requirements of behavioural norms.” (P. 6-7)

128. 128 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zPerspective of realization-focused comparison … yRealization—focused comparison: It refer to “comparative approaches that were concerned with social realization (resulting from actual institutions, actual behavior and other influences). …They were all involved in comparisons of societies that already existed or could feasibly emerge, rather than confining their analyses on transcendental searches for a perfectly just society. Those focusing on realization- focused comparisons were often interested primarily in the removal of manifest injustice from the world that they saw.” (Sen, 2009, P. 7)

129. 129 Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Theoretical Discourse of Justice zPerspective of realization-focused comparison … ySen has categorically alleged his work with the perspective of realization-based comparison. In his own words, “this book (i.e. The Idea of Justice) is an attempt to investigate realization-based comparisons that focus on the advancement or retreat of justice. It is, in this respect, not in line with the strong and more philosophically celeborated tradition of transcendental institutionalism that emerged in the Enlightenment period (led by Hobbes and developed by Locke, Rousseau and Kant, among others), but more the ‘other’ tradition that also took shape in about the same period or just after (pursued in various way by Smith, Condorcet, Wollstonecraft, Bentham, Marx, Mill, among others) (Sen, 2009, P. 8-9)

130. 130 Michael Walzer’s Concepts of Complex Equality & Spheres of Justice: zMichael Walzer, a prominent political philosopher in the US, published a book entitle Spheres of Justice in 1983, to criticize Rawls’ ambition to construct a, if not the, theory of justice and at the same time outline his theory of complex equality and spheres of justice.

132. 132 Michael Walzer’s Concepts of Complex Equality & Spheres of Justice: zPluralistic conception of distributive justice: yWalzer begins with the argument that “to search for unity is to misunderstand the subject matter of distributive justice.” (Walzer 1983, P. 4)

133. 133 Michael Walzer’s Concepts of Complex Equality & Spheres of Justice: zPluralistic conception of distributive justice: yInstead he underlines, “Different political arrangements enforce, and different ideologies justifiy, different distributions of membership, power, honor, ritual eminence, divine grace, kinship and love, knowledge, wealth, physical security, work and leisure, rewards and punishments, and a host of goods more narrowly and materially conceived―food, shelter, clothing, transportation, medical care, commodities of every sort, and the odd things (printings, rare books, postage stamps) that human beings collect. And this multiplicity of goods is matched by a multiplicity of distributive procedures, agents, and criteria.” (Walzer, 1983, P. 3)

134. 134 Michael Walzer’s Concepts of Complex Equality & Spheres of Justice: zMembership of distributive community: According to Walzer’s formulation distribution could only take place within definitive community and distribution could also be undertaken among eligible and entitled members. yIn his own words, “human society is a distributive community. …It is important that: we come together to share, divide, and exchange. We also come together to make the things that are shared, divided, and exchanged; but that very making―work itself―is distributed among us in a division of labor.” (Walzer, 1983, P. 3)

135. 135 Michael Walzer’s Concepts of Complex Equality & Spheres of Justice: zMembership of distributive community: …. yAccordingly, the first and most important question in distributive justice is: How is the distributive community is constituted? Who are members who are entitled to share, divide, and exchange? Who are the non-members who are excluded from the distributive game? In short, how membership is defined?

136. 136 Michael Walzer’s Concepts of Complex Equality & Spheres of Justice: zMembership of distributive community: …. yWalzer has listed of matrix of membership commonly found in human society for our reference. xenemy, xstranger, xrefugee, xguest worker, xresident in a territory, xcitizen of a sovereign state, xnational of a nation, xmember of ethnic group, xneighbor, xclansman, xfamily member, etc. They Group We Group

137. 137 Michael Walzer’s Concepts of Complex Equality & Spheres of Justice: zMembership of distributive community: …. yWalzer underlines that “the distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the constraints of justice.” (Walzer, 1983, P. 61) In fact, throughout human history, we have witnessed numerous arbitrary and accidental assignments of membership among socioeconomic, political and cultural communities.

138. 138 Michael Walzer’s Concepts of Complex Equality & Spheres of Justice: zMembership of distributive community: …. yIn conclusion, we can see that Walzer is basically in line with Sen in the approach to the studies justice, which are pluralistic, multiple and diverse in perspective, incrementally comparative in method, and historical and sociocultural in context. Such a perspective is of course less attractive, encompassing and deontological as the transcendental institutionalism appeal to offer. Nevertheless, it treat the idea of justice as something attainable, manageable and closed to human live rather than some metaphysical utopian concept.

139. 139 MVE 6030 The Good Society and its Educated Citizens Topic 3-C From Distributive Justice to Realtional (Difference-Recognition) Justice

140. 140 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zIn 1990, Iris Young published her work entitled Justice and the Politics of Difference, in which she criticizes that the theoretical discourse about justice has been dominated by the distributive paradigm. Instead she puts forth her theory of relational justice.

141. (1949-2006)

142. 142 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice z“Contemporary theories of justice are dominated by a distributive paradigm, which tends to focus on the possession of material goods and social positions. This distributive focus, however, obscures other issues of institutional organization at the same time that it often particular institutional and practices as given.” (Young, 1990, P. 8)

143. 143 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice z“Justice should refer not only to distribution, but also to the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation. Under the conception of justice, injustice refers primarily to two forms of disabling constraints, oppression and domination. While these constraints include distributive patterns, they also involve matters which cannot easily be assimilated to the logic of distribution: decision-making procedures, division of labor, and culture.” (Young 1990, P. 39)

144. 144 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice z……Hence, the concept of justice should also apply to the social relational domain, which strives for social relations guaranteeing ySelf-development: It refers to value of “developing and exercising one’s capabilities and expressing one’s experiences (Young, 1990, P. 37). Conversely, it stands against the injustice manifested in the form of “oppression, the institutional constraint on self-development” (ibid) ySelf-determination: It refers to value of “participating in determining one’s action and the conditions of one’s action” (Young, 1990, P. 37) Conversely, it stands against the injustice of “domination, the institutional constraint on self-determination. (ibid)

145. 145 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zOppression as injustice (Self-development) y“Oppression consists in systematic institutional processes which prevent some people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings, or institutionalized social processes which inhibit people’s ability to play and communicate with others or to express their feelings and perspectives on social life in contexts where others can listen.” (Young, 1990, P. 38) Accordingly, young has specified five “faces of oppression” (Pp. 39-65)

146. 146 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zOppression as injustice yExploitation: “The injustice of exploitation consists in social processes that bring about a transfer of energies from one group to another to produce unequal distributions, and in the way in which social institutions enable a few to accumulate while they constraint many more.” (Young, 1990, p.53) These exploitation social institution may appears in class, gender and/or racial relation.

147. 147 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zOppression as injustice yMarginalization: “Marginalization is perhaps the most dangerous form of oppression. A whole category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even extermination.” (p. 53) “Even if marginals were provided a comfortable material life within institutions that respected their freedom and dignity, injustices of marginality would remain in the form of uselessness, boredom, and lack of self-respect.” (p.55)

148. 148 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zOppression as injustice yPowerless: It is a status in which “the powerless lack the authority, status, and sense of self.” (p.57) As a result, they will experience “inhibition in the development of one’s capacities, lack of decisionmaking power in one’s working life, and exposure to disrespectful treatment because of the status one occupies.” (p.58)

149. 149 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zOppression as injustice yCultural imperialism: “Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a group’s experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm. Some groups have exclusive or primary access to … the means of interpretation and communication in a society. … This, then, is the injustice of cultural imperialism: that the oppressed group’s own experience and interpretation of social life finds little expression that touches the domanint culture, while that same culture imposes on the oppressed group its experience and interpretation of social life.” (p.59- 60)

150. 150 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zOppression as injustice yViolence: “Members of some groups live with the knowledge that they must fear random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or property, which have no motive but to damage, humiliate, or destroy the person. (p.61)

151. 151 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zDomination as injustice (Self-determination) yDomination consists in institutional condition which inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions. Persons live within structures of domination if other persons or groups can determine without reciprocation the conditions of their action, either directly or by virtue of the structural consequences of their action. Thorough social and political democracy is the opposite of domination.” (Young, 1990, P. 38)

152. 152 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zDomination as injustice  “Justice…requires…participation in public discussion and process of democratic decisionamking. All persons should have the right and opportunity to participate in the deliberation and decisionmaking of the institutions to which their actions contribute or which directly affect their actions. …Democracy is both an element and a condition of social justice. …Democracy is also a condition for a public’s arriving at decisions whose substance and implications best promote substantively just outcomes. …The argument for this claim relies on Habermas’s conception of communicative ethnics.” (Pp. 91-92)

153. (1929- )

154. 154 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zDomination as injustice yHabermas’ communicative rationality and ethics xCommunicative rationality “An assertion can be called rational if the speakers satisfies the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about something in the world with at least one other participant in communication.”(Habermas, 1984, P.11) Definition of communicative rationality: “Concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotation based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective view and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld.”(Habermas, 1984, P.10)

155. 155 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zDomination as injustice yHabermas’ communicative rationality and ethics xCommunicative ethics (also termed argumentative ethics or discourse ethics): It refers to the principles that communicatively rational participants in an argument are willing to observe in conducting their argumentative claims with the aim of arriving at a mutually acceptable consensus on the subject matter under discussion or even dispute. Habermas suggests that these communicative ethics are the normative bases for the constitution of the ideal communicative situation in which unrestrained communications can be conducted and mutually acceptable consensuses are to be researched.

156. 156 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zDomination as injustice yHabermas’ communicative rationality and ethics x… These principles include (Habermas, 1979, P.68; Habermas, 1988, P.23; Forester, 1989) Truth and efficacy: This set of principles applies primarily to statements or argumentative claims relate to the validity of cognitive propositions or instrumental plans of actions. It requires speakers engaging in a discourse to put forth cognitive propositions concerning the natural world that are true and the instrumental (mean-end) plans of actions that are practical efficacious Rightness: This principle applies mainly to argumentative claims relate to the validity of moral and practical prescriptions. It requires speakers in discourse to yield statements that are in compliance with the general norms of the community in which the discourse takes place or refers to.

157. 157 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zDomination as injustice yHabermas’ communicative rationality and ethics x… These principles include (Habermas, 1979, P.68; Habermas, 1988, P.23; Forester, 1989) Relevancy and/or legitimacy: This set of principles applies specifically to argumentative claims made in evaluative and more specifically public evaluative context, such as evaluation on public policy discourse. It requires its respective speakers to make evaluative statements based on standards of value, which are relevant and/or legitimate to the issues under evaluation. Truthfulness and sincerity: This set of principles applies to the internal and expressive positions of the speakers themselves. It restricts the speakers from put forth deceptive and illusive utterances and to only utter statements that are truthful and sincere.

158. 158 Iris Young’s Theory of Relational Justice zDomination as injustice yHabermas’ communicative rationality and ethics x… These principles include (Habermas, 1979, P.68; Habermas, 1988, P.23; Forester, 1989) Comprehensible: This last principle applies to the linguistic and discursive situation itself. It requires all parties engaged in the discourse are speaking a common language and rendering statements and utterances that are structured in mutually comprehensible format.

159. 159 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zIris Young’s conception of politics of difference yBuilt on her theory of oppression and domination, Young has formulated the conception of “the politics of difference” as the remedy to unjust relationship of oppression and domination. Chronically, the politics of difference may be differentiated into two forms. xOriginally, it refers to struggles against all kinds of stigmatization and denigration of the cultural representations and social identities of specific collectivities which are different from the dominant cultural and social collectivity of a given society. One typical example is the cultural struggles of the colonized against the conception of the superiority the colonizers’ cultures.

160. 160 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zIris Young’s conception of politics of difference y… the politics of difference may be differentiated into two forms. x. … xMore recently, it refers to struggles against the universal- liberal policies of equalization, which promote a kind of “color- blind”, “gender-blind”, ethnicity-blind”, etc. treatments to all citizens. Instead, politics of difference advocates the policy orientations, which are “sensitive” to different forms of life and identities. For example, within the Black movement of the US, it has shift from struggle for equal treatment and desegregation to assertion of the distinctiveness and meaningfulness of the Afro-American culture. And in feminist movement in the US, the struggle has also shifted from equal voting right and “equal wages” to pregnancy right and child-caring right.

161. 161 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zIris Young’s conception of politics of difference y… Taken together, politics of difference can be taken as a type of “emancipatory movements asserting a positive sense of group difference. …In the version the good society does not eliminate or transcend group difference. Rather, there is equality among socially and culturally differentiated groups, who mutually respect one another and affirm one another in their differences.” (Young, 1990, P. 163).

162. 162 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zFrom the politics of difference to the politics of recognition yIris Young’s formulation of the politics of difference has met with severe criticisms, most notably from Nancy Fraser (1997). In a review of Young’s book, Fraser points out that Young’s global strategy of applying her politics of difference to all oppressed groups may prove to be counterproductive in some cases. Fraser specifically underlines that the politics of difference will inevitably lead to a kind of political orientations which are separatistic and fractious in nature and are harmful to the solidarity-building for the struggle of the oppressed as a whole.

163. 163

164. 164 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zFrom the politics of difference to the politics of recognition…. yInstead, Fraser suggests that “there are different kinds of differences” (Fraser, 1997, Pp. 204) within the project of identity struggles of the oppressed. Accordingly, she proposes four different types of “differences”: (Fraser, 1997, Pp. 203-4) xType 1 difference: It refers to the identity of difference arbitrarily and artificially imposed upon the oppressed by the oppressors, such as the culturally inferior identity of the colonized. The political strategy to this type of identities is to abolish and eliminate them.

165. 165 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zFrom the politics of difference to the politics of recognition…. y….four different types of “differences”: xType 2 difference: It refers to the self-imposed difference constructed by members of the oppressed groups in order to invoke “their cultural superiority over their oppressors”. (P. 203) For examples, within feminist movement in the US, there emerges the “gynocentism”, and within antiracist politics, there invokes the “Afrocentricism” (P. 203) Fraser suggests that the political orientation towards this type of difference should not be celebrated ethnocentrically but should be universalized and extended to all the oppressed groups.

166. 166 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zFrom the politics of difference to the politics of recognition…. y….four different types of “differences”: xType 3 difference: “This is the view that the differences manifested by members of different groups are neither superiorities nor inferiorities. They should neither be eliminated nor universalized but rather affirmed difference; they are valuable as expression of human diversity.” (Fraser, 1997, Pp. 203-4)

167. 167 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zFrom the politics of difference to the politics of recognition…. y….four different types of “differences”: xType 4 difference and the politics of recognition: Given all these different types of differences in identities, Fraser proposes we should adopt a more sensitive approach to the kind of differences found in various situations in the politics of difference. Instead of adopting a “wholesale and undifferentiated” approach to different cultural and identity situations of various oppressed groups, “we can make judgment about which differences fall into which categories.” In other words, we should adopt a more “differentiated view of difference”. Therefore, Fraser proposes that we could call this new and more inclusive perspective “the politics of recognition”.

168. 168 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zFrom the politics of difference to the politics of recognition…. yThe politics of recognition: Accordingly to Nancy Fraser’s formulation, the politics of recognition, as a perspective in the studies of social justice, aims primarily at rectifying the injustice “rooted in representation, interpretation and communication” found mainly in the socio-cultural domain in modern society. “Examples include

169. 169 Politics of Difference and Recognition: Remedies to Relational Injustice zFrom the politics of difference to the politics of recognition…. yThe politics of recognition: … “Examples include xcultural domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and /or hostile to one’s own); xnonrecognition (being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative practices of one’s culture); and xdisrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in everyday life interaction).” (Fraser, 1998, P. 7; the numberings are mine)

170. 170 Conceptual Integration of Redistribution and Recognition zNancy Fraser’s contribution to the studies of social justice is not confined in the clarification and reformulation of the concept of relational justice. She has also proposed a conceptual integration of the paradigms of distribution and recognition.

171. 171 Conceptual Integration of Redistribution and Recognition zFraser takes issue with the “truncated” or even “mutually exclusive” perspective in the conception of social justice. Instead she proposes a kind of “perspectival dualism” (Fraser, 1998, P. 42) in the understanding of social justice. That is, both the redistribution and recognition paradigms are institutionally and practically intertwined with each other…..

172. 172 Conceptual Integration of Redistribution and Recognition z….. For example the “less advantaged” identified by John Rawls for more favorable redistribution of primary goods may most probably be labeled as stigmatized as the “unproductive”, “free- riders” or “unworthy”. On the other hand, the cultural minorities of a society may need redistributive assistance and economic relieves simply because they suffer cultural and/or linguistic disadvantages in both economic and cultural domains in a given society at large.

173. 173 Conceptual Integration of Redistribution and Recognition zParity of participation: Fraser proposes that both the redistribution and recognition paradigm can conceptually as well as practically be integrated with the notion of “parity of participation”.

174. 174 Conceptual Integration of Redistribution and Recognition zParity of participation: … yBivalent conception of justice: Fraser asserts that we “should adopt …a ‘bivalent’ conception of justice. A bivalent conception of justice encompasses both distribution and recognition without reducing either one of them to the other. Thus, it does not treat recognition as a good to be distributed, nor distribution as an recognition as an expression of recognition. Rather, a bivalent conception of treats distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and dimensions of, justice, while at the same time encompassing both of them within a broader, overarching framework.” (Fraser, 1998, P. 30)

175. 175 Conceptual Integration of Redistribution and Recognition zParity of participation: … yThe framework of parity of participation: The broader and overarching framework that Fraser in mind is what she called the notion of parity of participation. She proposes. “According to this norm, justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers. For participatory parity to be possible, I claim, it is necessary but not sufficient to establish standard forms of formal legal equality. Over and above that requirement, at least two additions must be satisfied.

176. 176 Conceptual Integration of Redistribution and Recognition zParity of participation: … yThe framework of parity of participation: … x“First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants’ independence and ‘voice’. This I call the ‘objective’ precondition of participatory parity. x“The second additional condition for participatory parity I call ‘intersubjectivite’. It requires that institutionalized cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving self esteem. This condition precludes cultural patterns that systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities associated with them.” (Fraser, 1998, P. 30-1; the numberings are mind)

177. 177 Relational Justice Distributive Justice Liberalism Communitarianism

178. 178 Topic 3 END

179. 179 Relational Justice Distributive Justice Rawls fair distribution of Primary goods Dworkin’s liberal equality of Resources Sen’s fair distribution of Capabilities Sen’s faie distribution of Capabilities