1. Comments on Teacher Incentive Papers: Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (Kenya) Muralidharan and Sundararaman (India) Bruns, Ferraz and Rangel (Brazil) By Paul Glewwe (U. of Minnesota)

2. Types of Teacher Incentives 1.Input Based/Attendance (Regular Teachers) Cameras (India), Principal Check (Kenya) 2. Output Based (Regular Teachers) Test Scores (India, Kenya, Brazil) On Time Promotion (Brazil) 3. Contract Teachers (India, Kenya) 4. Indirect (Information Provision, Parent Committees, Vouchers)

3. There Are Many Variants of Each: Example: Test Score Based Incentives Group/School Average or Teacher Specific “Tournament” or Contract/Formula Accounting (or not) for Initial Test Scores Size of Rewards (Brazil & Israel Very High) Tests Used (is “teaching to the test” possible?) Updating of Standards Over Time Scoring for Pupils who Do not Take Test

4. Findings: Input Based Incentives 1.Cameras in India (Duflo, Hanna & Ryan) Worked well, perhaps because the “monitoring agent” was far from the teachers. 2. Principals Monitoring Teachers in Kenya (Kremer & Chen). Did not work, perhaps because principals had insufficient incentive to “dock” teacher pay.

5. Findings: Output Based Incentives 1.Group Based Incentives Had Little Effect in Kenya (Glewwe, Kremer & Ilias) Possible Explanations: a) Size of Incentives Too Small b) Relatively Easy to “Teach to the Test” c) Used Group, not Individual, Incentives d) Sample Size Too Small

6. Findings: Output Based Incentives 2. Group & Individual Incentives Seem to Have Worked in India (Muralidharan & Sundaraman) Possible Explanations: a) Used Specially Designed Test b) Larger Sample Size c) Individual Incentives BUT: No Post-Program Measurements.

7. Findings: Contract Teachers 1. Raised Test Scores & Teacher Attendance in Kenya (Duflo, Dupas & Kremer) But Note the Following: a) These contract teachers had similar qualifications as regular teachers. b) These contract teachers were likely to get “regular” positions if the did well. c) Can’t separate result from policy that contract teachers taught all subjects.

8. Findings: Contract Teachers 2. Raised Test Scores and Teacher Attendance in India (Muralidharan & Sundaraman) Some Things to Note: a) These teachers had lower qualifications than regular teachers b) Not clear if they expected to become regular teachers c) Regular teachers may have helped them

9. Some Comments on Bruns, Ferraz and Rangel Size of teacher incentives almost 10 times higher than in Kenya and India. Incentives appear to give most of the rewards to schools that already do well. Not clear how well group incentives will work, since presumably these schools are large and so will have free rider problems.

10. Future Research Issues 1.Little evidence on whether teacher incentives lead more talented people to become teachers (hard to do with RCTs). 2.With so many dimensions of teacher incentives we may need hundreds of studies to see what designs are best. 3.Cost of teacher incentives can vary widely (could reduce salaries of weak teachers). 4.Need an organizing framework, based in part on behavioral economic theory.