1. Nuclear Fuel Delivery By: Adam Gable Christian Seymour Jesse Nesbitt

2. Nuclear Fuel Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) <20% U235 High Enriched Uranium (HEU) 90% U235

3. Enrichment to Fuel Fabrication USEC Areva Westinghouse GE

4. Nuclear Fuel Transport IAEA projects continued growth US NRC – Protection from radiation – minimizing the time exposed to radioactive materials – maximizing the distance from the source of radiation – shielding from external exposure and inhaling radioactive material.

5. Threats to Nuclear Fuel Transport Terrorists Crude radiological dispersion device (RDD) Fear and Panic Economic impact/Decontamination efforts Accidents Improper shielding of radioactive material Collisions Rely on local law enforcement Government is responsible US NRC

6. Current Nuclear Power Reactors Areva (A) Westinghouse (W) General Electric (GE)

7. Westinghouse Nuclear Fuel U.S. Customer Base = W PWR Site = BWR Site = CE PWR Site http://www.energy.sc.gov/

8. Contract between GE and Columbia ( Total distance = 2631 Miles) Columbia GE

9. Areva only 11 miles from Columbia Columbia Areva

10. Problem Description Currently, the 3 fabrication facilities have contracts with the 61 power plants. These contracts are not driven by distance of transport.

11. Problem Formulation Uranium Enrichment Facility A 61 Nuclear Facilities W GE

12. Assumptions Modeling generic fuel rod – Everyone Produces and Consumes the same fuel rod Number of deliveries to each power plant is based on number of reactors. – 3 reactors : Requires 3 deliveries Route used is Shortest Google Map distance Supply from the 3 Producers is based on current market share not capacity

13. Min-Total Model

14. Do we only care about minimizing the total distance? NO – Lets look at a multi- commodity flow problem

15. Areva Max Distance Route

16. GE Max Distance Route

17. Westinghouse Max Distance Route

18. Min-Route Model Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

19. Min-Route Flow Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

20. Does the loss of a Producer increase the distance(RISK) of the multi-commodity solution? Yes – Lets Look at the multi-commodity flow problem with the loss of a producer.

21. Min-Route Model: Loss of Producer Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

22. What if a new Producer was built in a more centralized location? – We chose Kentucky next to the enrichment plant What better place, because you also decrease the transport distance of the LEU to the producer

23. Min-Route Model – Including New Producer OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

24. Min-Route Model – Including New Producer OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery

25. What if we had projected increases in demand for existing plants and for new plants being built through 2025? We do, lets see the min- cost flow with the new demand and original Producers.

26. 5/8/2013 Projected Nuclear Power Reactors by 2025

27. Min-Total Model with 2025 Projected demand

28. Min-Route Model with 2025 Projected Demand

30. Conclusions Current LEU procurement process has shows little concern for transport risk. “Transport of nuclear cargo is part of nuclear life cycle most vulnerable to violent, forcible theft, since it’s impossible to protect with thick walls and many minutes of delay when its is on the road” Securing the Bomb 2010 Harvard Review Our research shows that significant decreases in distance can be obtained which has the potential to reduce risk. – Government policy decisions

31. Expanding Detailed transportation model Region specific model/global network model Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route HEU medical/other purpose transportation route Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

32. Expanding Detailed transportation model Region specific model/global network model Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route HEU medical/other purpose transportation route Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

33. Expanding Detailed transportation model Region specific model/global network model Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route LEU medical/other purpose transportation route Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

34. Expanding Detailed transportation model Region specific model/global network model Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route LEU medical/other purpose transportation route Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

35. Expanding Detailed transportation model Region specific model/global network model Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route LEU medical/other purpose transportation route Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov)

36. Expanding Detailed transportation model Region specific model/global network model Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route LEU medical/other purpose transportation route Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford Foster (USN) Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors (Dimitrov) Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites

37. Questions