1. The Hard Problem of Consciousness

2. Easy Problems

3. Easy Problems
the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli
the integration of information by a cognitive system
the reportability of mental states
the ability of a system to access its own internal states
the focus of attention
the deliberate control of behavior
the difference between wakefulness and sleep

4. Not Particularly Easy
““easy” is a relative term. Getting the details right will probably take a century or two of diffi cult empirical work. Still, there is every reason to believe that the methods of cognitive science and neuroscience will succeed.” p. 5

5. The Important Sense
“In this central sense of “consciousness,” an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state.” p. 5

6. “The easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a mechanism that can perform the function.”

7. Minimal Consciousness
Someone is minimally conscious if there is something happening in their mind.

8. Perceptual Consciousness
A person is perceptually conscious if she is aware of her environment and the things happening to her and around her.

9. Introspective Consciousness
Armstrong thinks that in addition to “outer sense” (perception) and bodily sense (proprioception) we also have a sense that detects our inner mental lives, an “inner sense.” You’re perceptually conscious when you exercise your outer sense, and you’re introspectively conscious when you exercise your inner sense.

10. “To explain internal access, we need to explain how a system could be appropriately affected by its internal states and use information about them in directing later processes.” – Chalmers, p. 6.

11. Functional Types
A functional type is a type of something that performs a certain task, does a particular job, or plays a certain role. Any object that performs that task, does that job, or plays that role is a token of that type.

12. Functionalism
Functionalism is simply the claim that mental states are the realizers of certain distinctive functional roles.

13. Example: Beliefs and Desires

14. Functionalism
Stimulus
Response
Other Mental States

15. Functionally Definable
The things we’re asked to explain in the easy problem are “functionally definable.” The ability to report one’s own mental states is a functional role. So functionalist explanations will obviously work.

16. Functional properties and reductionism

17. Vitalism
“Vitalism” was associated with testable scientific claims. For example:
No organic material can be made from only inorganic components.
Certain processes (e.g. respiration, fermentation) require living organisms to take place.

18. The Wöhler Synthesis
In 1828, German chemist Friedrich Wöhler synthesized the organic chemical urea from inorganic materials. (Now we know how to synthesize them all.)

19. Biological ↓ Chemical Physical
Reductions
Biological ↓ Chemical Physical

20. Mental? Moral? Modal? ↓? Biological ↓ Chemical Physical
Reductions
Mental? Moral? Modal? ↓? Biological ↓ Chemical Physical

21. Reductive Explanation Requires Functional Properties
“To explain life, we ultimately need to explain how a system can reproduce, adapt to its environment, metabolize, and so on. All of these are questions about the performance of functions and so are well suited to reductive explanation.” p. 7 “Throughout the higher-level sciences, reductive explanation works in just this way.” p. 7

22. Functionalism’s Success
Chalmers is happy to say that all of these problems involving mental states are easy and will be solved by the physicalist/ functionalist:
Learning
Perception
Memory
Language

23. The Explanatory Gap
“Why doesn’t all of this information processing go on ‘in the dark,’ free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, the discrimination and categorization are experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery.”

24. Extra ingredients

26. Chaotic Dynamics
“from dynamics, one only gets more dynamics. The question about experience here is as mysterious as ever.” p. 14

27. Quantum Mechanics
“Quantum phenomena have some remarkable functional properties, such as nondeterminism and nonlocality. It is natural to speculate that these properties may play some role in the explanation of cognitive functions, such as random choice and the integration of information… [however] The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is entirely unanswered.”

29. “At the end of the day, the same criticism applies to any purely physical account of consciousness. For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: why should this process give rise to experience?” p. 14

30. “The vital spirit was presented as an explanatory posit in order to explain the relevant functions and could therefore be discarded when those functions were explained without it. Experience is not an explanatory posit but an explanandum in its own right and so is not a candidate for this sort of elimination.”

31. Nonreductive explanation

32. Fundamental Properties
Science frequently tries to “unify” phenomena. We have, for example, discovered that electricity and magnetism are the same thing. But sometimes unification fails. Electromagnetism is not the same thing as gravity (though some once thought so). It is its own thing. It is fundamental.

33. Fundamental Properties
“I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental… we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time.” p. 17

34. Outline of the theory

35. Naturalistic Dualism New fundamental entities: conscious experiences.
Psychophysical laws that “will not interfere with physical laws.” p. 18 [Epiphenomenalism]
Laws will be like the ones in physics and not biology – they will be simple, elegant, beautiful.

36. Psychophysical Principles
“these principles should tell us what sort of physical systems will have associated experiences, and for the systems that do, they should tell us what sort of physical properties are relevant to the emergence of experience and just what sort of experience we should expect any given physical system to yield.” p. 20

37. Principle of Structural Coherence
The Principle of Structural Coherence says that there is an “isomorphism between the structures of consciousness and awareness.” p. 22

38. Awareness
“awareness [is] direct availability for global control. To a first approximation, the contents of awareness are the contents that are directly accessible and potentially reportable, at least in a language-using system.” It is a “purely functional notion.” p. 21

39. General Idea
How many different color experiences we can have is determined by the number of colors we can be aware of (our color-processing machinery). Someone just like you in terms of color-processing machinery will have the same structure of appearance.

40. Inverted Spectra

41. The Principle of Organizational Invariance
“any two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. If the causal patterns of neural organization were duplicated in silicon, for example, with a silicon chip for every neuron and the same patterns of interaction, then the same experiences would arise.” p. 23

42. Argument
Imagine slowly replacing each neuron with a silicon ship that does the same thing. If POI is false, and silicon chips give rise to different qualia, then there should be a point at which your experience switches. In fact, we can make it switch back and forth: dancing qualia. But you wouldn’t notice!

43. Difference between Chalmers & Functionalism
For Chalmers, inverted spectra and dancing qualia are not physically possible. For the functionalist, they are not logically possible.

44. The double aspect theory of information

45. Information
“we can see information as physically embodied when there is a space of distinct physical states, the differences between which can be transmitted down some causal pathway… physical information is a difference that makes a difference.” p. 25

46. An Observation
“we can note that the differences between phenomenal states have a structure that corresponds directly to the differences embedded in physical processes; in particular, to those differences that make a difference down certain causal pathways implicated in global availability and control.” p. 26

47. The Double Aspect Theory
“information (or at least some information) has two basic aspects, a physical aspect and a phenomenal aspect.” p. 26 “right now it is more of an idea than a theory.” p. 28