Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Ing. Ondřej Ševeček MCSM:Directory | MVP:Enterprise Security | Certified Ethical Hacker | MCSE:SharePoint | Smart card.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Ing. Ondřej Ševeček MCSM:Directory | MVP:Enterprise Security | Certified Ethical Hacker | MCSE:SharePoint | Smart card."— Presentation transcript:

1 Ing. Ondřej Ševeček MCSM:Directory | MVP:Enterprise Security | Certified Ethical Hacker | MCSE:SharePoint ondrej@sevecek.com | www.sevecek.com Smart card logon

2 Motivation  Use certificates for logon  Random keys stronger than passwords –SHA-1 >> 12 character password  Passwords can be stolen in clear –Thursday, 10:30 :-)  Multifactor authentication with smart card –private key never leaves the card –must have the card to logon –simple PIN just to prevent an accidental loss

3 Technology  PC/SC chip + reader  Credit card format –transport in wallet or stripe –printed –RFID –requires separate reader  Token –attach to keys –no reader necessary –no printing –no RFID

4 Drivers  Reader driver –USB CCID compatible built-in –many other built-in  Chip driver –Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) SafeSign, CryptPlus, Schlumberger, … –minidriver for Microsoft Base Smart Card CSP –CERTUTIL -csplist

5 Vendors  Card + reader ~ 1000 CZK  Gemalto –.NET v2 ~ IDPrime IM v2 ~ IDPrime.NET ~ IPPrime IM v3 ~ Axalto Cryptoflex.NET –the only mini-driver built-in  Monet+ –Czech vendor –mini-driver installable  Aladin, … –require full CSP $$$

6 Card management  CERTUTIL -scinfo  Excel :-)  third-party tools

7 CA hierarchy?  Trust maintenance –may be expensive to be trusted –may be even more expensive to revoke root –risk analysis  Revocation of subordinates  Distributed administration –Qualified subordination  CRL (Certificate Revocation List)  OSCP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) 7

8 CA hierarchy? GOPAS Root CA GOPAS London CA GOPAS Paris CA GOPAS Prague CA Leaf certificate

9 CA hierarchy? GOPAS Root London CA GOPAS Root Paris CA GOPAS Root Prague CA Leaf certificate

10 Where the nonsense leads  Offline root –OS license –hardware –physical access to publish CRLs  Degenerate CRL publishing –once several months –or only once!

11 Trust maintenance in Windows domain

12 Risk assessment in Windows domain  Risk of AD Domain Controller single DC compromised = whole forest compromised  Online AD integrated enterprise PKI cannot have higher risks than any DC  NTAuth CAs have the same level of risk as any DC

13 CA hierarchy?

14 Algorithms  SHA-1 –well compatible with XP, 2003 –stronger than 12 character passwords  SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 –requires XP SP3 –requires manual download update KB938397 for 2003 –requires manual download update KB968730 for auto-enrollment on XP SP3 and 2003 –no problem with the card hardware  RSA 2048 –well supported by card hardware –only 112 bit strength  RSA 4096 –stronger, but limited support by card hardware  ECDH –bad application and no card hardware support

15 Comparable Algorithm Strengths (SP800-57) StrengthSymetricRSAECDSASHA 80 bit2TDEARSA 1024ECDSA 160SHA-1 112 bit3TDEARSA 2048ECDSA 224SHA-224 128 bitAES-128RSA 3072ECDSA 256SHA-256 192 bitAES-192RSA 7680ECDSA 384SHA-384 256 bitAES-256RSA 15360ECDSA 512SHA-512

16 Domain SC User with RSA ExtensionValue SubjectCommon Name or Distinguished Name SANUPN or AD mapped subject (Windows 6.0+) Exporatable Keyno? Archive Keyno, transport encryption only Key TypeSignature (AllowSignatureOnlyKeys GPO on Windows 6.0+) Encryption (required on 2000+, more secure) Key UsageDigital Signature CSPSmart Card compatible provider EKUSmart Card Logon 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2 can be empty on Windows 6.0+, but if present, must contain Smart Card Logon EKU Autoenrollmentno? Publish in ADno

17 Certificate mapping  altSecurityIdentities  all reverted  Subject and Issuer fields X509: DC=virtual,DC=gopas,CN=GOPAS Root CA CN=kamil  Subject DN X509: CN=kamil  Subject Key Identifier X509: ddde2ca4b86db8a908b95c6cbcc8bb1ac7a09a41  Issuer, and Serial Number X509: DC=gopas,DC=virtual,CN=GOPAS Root CA 32000000000003bde810  SHA1 Hash X509: ed913fa41377dbfb8eac2bc6fcae71ecd4a974fd  RFC822 name X509: kamil@gopas.cz

18 Kurzy Počítačové školy Gopas na www.gopas.cz GOC170 - AD Monitoring with SCOM and ACS GOC171 - Active Directory Troubleshooting GOC172 - Kerberos Troubleshooting GOC173 - Enterprise PKI GOC174 - SharePoint Architecture and Troubleshooting GOC175 - Advanced Security GOC169 - Auditing ISO/IEC 2700x Získejte tričko TechEd 2014 za vyplněný hodnotící dotazník.


Download ppt "Ing. Ondřej Ševeček MCSM:Directory | MVP:Enterprise Security | Certified Ethical Hacker | MCSE:SharePoint | Smart card."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google