1. CONFIDENTIAL | Best Practices for Building a High Performance Board 1 May 26, 2011 Singapore Pascal N. Levensohn

2. CONFIDENTIAL | Levensohn Venture Partners (LVP) Background  LVP is an early stage technology VC based in San Francisco with total assets under management of $200M across three funds.  Strong past performance and promising future – $440.2 million returned (realized) to investors to date (2.3x total capital called – a rare accomplishment); additional unrealized value remains – Top quartile performance in Fund I (1996) and Fund II (2000) – Fund III (2004) deep in J-Curve– work in process with promising outlook

3. CONFIDENTIAL | Agenda  Setting the context: VC in transition  The ‘Founder’s Dilemma’ and the important role of the VC board  Sources of conflict and tools for conflict resolution on VC boards  The importance of CEO evaluation  Review of director duties  Characteristics of effective and ineffective boards  Best governance practices adopted by leading Chinese SOE venture capital funds  Understanding fiduciary duty 3

4. CONFIDENTIAL | Setting the Context--the Current U.S. VC Market is in Major Transition  In general, many investor syndicates remain stressed as funds run low on reserves. – Attracting new investors into companies is more challenging as all investors focus on capital efficiency.  Breakthrough innovation is needed to fuel a new secular growth cycle in technology. – Much of the current technology market is dominated by “incremental improvement” technologies.  U.S. capital markets continue to lose IPO ground internationally – US share of global IPO activity fell to 14.9% in ‘10 from 28.7% avg ‘96-’06 (also down from 16.9% in ‘09) (Source: Committee on Capital Markets Regulation) – 79% of US Global IPO activity in’10 from 144A market rather than public market (Source: Committee on Capital Markets Regulation) – Across all US exchanges, as of February 2011 the number of listed companies has fallen 42% since 1997 peak (Source: Grant Thornton)

5. CONFIDENTIAL | Understanding the ‘Founder’s Dilemma’ in Venture Capital  Every founder of a company must decide whether they want to be ‘Rich’ or whether they want to be ‘King’  This dilemma has been developed into a body of academic work by Professor Noam Wasserman of Harvard Business School and has been published in China by the Peking University Review  CEO’s who want to be King are typically self-reliant and value maintaining their personal control of the board above the financial success of the company– this typically leads to a weak board that makes minimal contributions to the success of the company.  CEO’s who seek to be Rich typically have greater self awareness of their personal limitations, are willing to take direction from their board, and will seek strong board members who have more experience and wisdom in different areas from the CEO’s core strengths  Very few entrepreneurs succeed in being both Rich and King 5

6. CONFIDENTIAL | Why Should CEO’s Care about the Quality and Composition of their Boards?  Startup companies in China may differ from U.S. startups in many respects due to cultural and geographical differences, but most successful high growth companies share the common trait of having high performing boards  Why? Because good governance is good for business  Unless the CEO owns a majority of the company’s equity and controls the board, the CEO works for the Board.  CEO’s must make their Boards work for them, too.  A bad board, or a single bad Director, can set in motion a chain of events that can ruin a company.  A good Board can bring direction, resources, connections and valuable experience that will help the CEO do a better job. A strong CEO adds far more value to a company than the Board, but a dysfunctional or misaligned Board can bring an entire company to its knees, quickly…

7. CONFIDENTIAL | Why Are Many Boards Ineffective? A wide variance exists in the application of best practices in board governance, particularly in the venture capital industry.  Some boards are very effective  Some boards are dysfunctional  Most boards are not as effective as they could be The presumption of board consensus when it does not, in fact, exist! What is the most common mistake made by boards of directors?

8. CONFIDENTIAL | Most Common Conflicts Between Board and CEO Source: Dow Jones VentureOne/NVCA (2006) Very different perspectives… Venture Capitalists Venture CapitalistsCEOs Personality27%0% Burn Rate0%22% Exit Strategy22%18% Management Changes21%16% Valuations18%24% Sales & Market Strategy12%20%

9. CONFIDENTIAL | Early Warning Signs in the Board - CEO Relationship 1.Staying the wrong course: Rejection of board input 2.Offsite and out of touch: Disengaging from daily operations 3.Indignation: Emotional and combative behavior 4.The silent treatment: Cutting off information flow to the board 5.Buck-passing: Ignorance of key details and blaming other executives for unexpected shortfalls 6.Pulling up the drawbridge: Directing his or her management team to deflect board inquiries

10. CONFIDENTIAL | Best Practices for a Constructive Relationship Between Board & CEO Set explicit expectations with periodic review  Identify a fair and aggressive corrective plan  Implement metrics for director accountability  Honestly ask & answer the difficult questions – How is the company operating? – Is it truly on a success path? – Are the CEO’s skills contributing to the company’s success? – Is the CEO largely operating from strength or weakness?

11. CONFIDENTIAL | Annual CEO Evaluation – This is a MUST HAVE  VCs do not allow CEO’s to refresh options or pay bonuses to the executive team without reviewing the team  Why is the CEO the least reviewed executive in the company?  It is the board’s responsibility to evaluate the CEO every year.  Institute a process to make this happen  Combine CEO review by the board with a 360 from CEO’s direct reports −Use a written questionnaire −Designate a board member to aggregate confidential responses from the other non-management directors −Designate head of HR or outside consultant to conduct anonymous, but not confidential, 360 from direct reports −Deliver consolidated report orally AND in writing to CEO

12. CONFIDENTIAL | Annual CEO Evaluation – This is a “MUST HAVE” June 2010 NVCA/SpencerStuart study reports that only 25% of VC-backed companies conduct formal, ongoing management assessments of the CEO after the hire

13. CONFIDENTIAL | Misalignment Economic In VC backed companies, different preferences can make for strange alliances.In VC backed companies, different preferences can make for strange alliances. Fiduciary Violations of fiduciary duty.Violations of fiduciary duty. Strategic How do you spell independent?How do you spell independent? Ego Too often emotion clouds decision making.Too often emotion clouds decision making. Types of Board Misalignment

14. CONFIDENTIAL | Defining the Board’s Essential Role  Maximize shareholder value for all of the company’s shareholders  Attract, recruit, and retain talented management team and board members  Mentor, task, and measure the executive team  Provide a level of insight, business perspective, and expertise that is otherwise unavailable to the company’s management team  Oversee and promote fiscal, legal, and ethical governance standards

15. CONFIDENTIAL | Duties and Responsibilities of Directors Include …  Serving as fiduciaries for all shareholders  Hiring and firing the CEO, ratifying officer selection and seeking continuity and strengthening the Board  Reviewing and confirming basic company objectives and business strategy  Overseeing company performance and inquiring into performance deficiencies  Identifying barriers to company progress and proactively sensing timing for change

16. CONFIDENTIAL | Effective Boards…  Establish a clear and mutual understanding of expectations between the Directors and the CEO  Conduct a formal annual performance evaluation of the CEO  Have routine executive sessions among non-executive board members only  Have directors who work as a team and want to get together  Encourage open/honest communications  Resolve differences of opinion constructively and quickly  Have directors who are accountable to each other

17. CONFIDENTIAL | Effective Directors…  Know and understand their responsibilities as directors  Are informed when they arrive at the board meeting, know the industry, and know the company’s context in it  Do not attack the CEO or other board members when he/she answers their questions.  Participate in free and easy communication outside of the boardroom  Are willing to give an outlier perspective as an individual member of the group

18. CONFIDENTIAL | Ineffective Boards…  Fail to communicate– both in and out of the boardroom  Suffer from Denial Syndrome—they fail to act and make decisions.  Fail to reconcile diverging viewpoints.  Avoid conflict  Regularly hold excessively long board meetings (over three hours without a strategic planning or other extraordinary agenda)  Allow the use of Smartphones and computers during a board meeting

19. CONFIDENTIAL | Ineffective Directors…  Feel compelled to say something and to be heard, disregarding relevancy or effectiveness of comments.  Become disengaged because they no longer feel that their opinion matters—this could be over a strategic disagreement.  Fail to resolve disagreements quickly and constructively  Do not maintain regular board meeting attendance.  Deliver inconsistent messages between the actual meeting and their post-meeting behavior— Passive-Aggressive syndrome.  Succumb to lead investors who discourage constructive discussion from the rest of the board – In VC, smaller firms in particular are afraid to break ranks with the lead investor for fear of not getting into future deals.

20. CONFIDENTIAL | Best Board Practices– United States  Process, process, process…  Ask, and answer, the hard questions early  Be realistic about your operating forecasts and be prepared to revise them – up or down  Put yourself in the other directors’ shoes  Be open to working with outside consultants to address team and other management issues  Be creative when considering solutions

21. CONFIDENTIAL | Best Governance Practices Adopted by Leading Chinese SOE Venture Capital Funds  Utilize Both Eastern and Western assets and resources, allocating responsibilities among the combined professional team – Example: The successful strategic alliance between Shenzhen Capital Group and PNV of Israel, creating the CIVC Fund in 2006, led to the Strategic Alliance with Pitango of Israel, creating Red Earth - CIVC Fund in 2011  Putting complementary experiences, cultures and infrastructure to work, prior to and post the actual investment.

22. CONFIDENTIAL | Best Chinese VC Practices Pre-Investment: CIVC Example  SCGC sources deals from SCGC’s China-wide 40 provincial JV Funds and 6 regional offices (over 1500 deals sourced during 2010).  (SCGC + CIVC/Red Earth – CIVC) Jointly decide on which of the opportunities to continue the due diligence process.  Joint teams assigned for due diligence in investment prospects.  SCGC usually does most of the potential invested company’s management personal due diligence, utilizing Chinese personal & local networks.  Legal, Accounting, Business Plan & Model as well as financial due diligence are all done together. (For JV companies or off-shore, the team may use both Chinese accountants and legal advisers as well as US GAAP accounting teams and off-shore legal teams working on the deal together).  Investment decisions are made separately by each fund. 22

23. CONFIDENTIAL | Best Chinese VC Practices Post-Investment: CIVC Example  Jointly implement Corporate Governance: Board of Directors meetings, reporting, Board of Advisors, etc.  Business development joint efforts, where the Chinese fund’s partners support the China focused companies and the international fund’s partners support the off-shore Business Development efforts.  Jointly support the portfolio companies in their business strategy, growth management, markets expansion, and other management issues.  Capital markets preparation – joint team’s efforts in preparing the portfolio company for an IPO in China and/or for an Off-Shore IPO.  Jointly support the selection of local and off-shore bankers and research teams to lead the IPO and the coverage post IPO.  Post lock-up period, divestment decisions are determined separately by the two funds. 23

24. CONFIDENTIAL | Best Practice for all VCs: Remain Flexible in Working with Your Board  Personal dynamics will largely determine the extent of harmony or dysfunction on your board.  At a minimum, in order to perform adequately as a director, you must know your legal obligations and what your colleagues expect of you as your business service obligations at the outset of your board service.  Great companies need passionate CEO’s, high functioning management teams, and empowered boards all working together to optimize the outcome for all of the shareholders– this takes conscious effort to achieve.

25. CONFIDENTIAL | What Does it Mean to be A Fiduciary? US Legal Requirements  Duty of Care  Duty of Loyalty  Duty of Good Faith  Duty of Confidentiality  Duty of Disclosure  Enforcing the business judgment rule

26. CONFIDENTIAL | Duty Of Care  Requires a director to act with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances  Requires directors to – Make informed decisions – Obtain information they believe is reasonably necessary to make a decision – Make due inquiry.

27. CONFIDENTIAL | Duty of Loyalty  Requires a director to act in the best interests of the corporation and not in the interest of the director or a related party  Issues often arise where the director has a conflict of interest – Where the director or a related party has a personal financial interest in a transaction with the company – Where the director usurps a “corporate opportunity” that properly belongs to the company  Generally, corporate laws have procedures for handling interested transactions and corporate opportunities, such as by requiring full disclosure and disinterested director approval.

28. CONFIDENTIAL | Duty of Good Faith  A separate duty of good faith has emerged in some jurisdictions such as Delaware where a director has engaged in such egregious behavior as to not have acted in good faith.  Examples of not acting in good faith – Consciously or recklessly not devoting sufficient time to required duties – Disregarding known risks – Failing to exercise oversight on a sustained basis.  Failure to meet the duty of good faith can have serious adverse consequences to a director, such as being exposed to personal liability for breaches of the duty of care or losing coverage under indemnification or insurance policies.

29. CONFIDENTIAL | Confidentiality and Disclosure  Duty of Confidentiality. A subset of the duty of loyalty. Requires a director to maintain the confidentiality of non-public information about the company.  Duty of Disclosure. Requires a director pursuant to the duties of care and loyalty to take reasonable steps to ensure that a company provides its stockholders with all material information relating to a matter for which stockholder action is sought.

30. CONFIDENTIAL | Business Judgment Rule  Creates a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a company acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.  The business judgment rule helps protect a director from personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duties by essentially shifting the burden of proof to a plaintiff alleging that the director did not satisfy his/her fiduciary duties.

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