1. Liquid and Gas Pipeline Advisory Committees
Briefing on Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Automatic Shutdown and Remote Control Valve Study
Liquid and Gas Pipeline Advisory Committees
December 11 and 13, 2012
Patrick Landon, P.E.
Engineer - Office of Pipeline Safety

2. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)
Established in 1943 as an integral part of the Manhattan Project
Department of Energy's largest science and energy laboratory
Managed by a limited liability partnership between the University of Tennessee and Battelle Memorial Institute known as UT-Battelle
ORNL operates nine user facilities that draw thousands of research scientists and visitors each year
In March 2012 PHMSA contracted ORNL to conduct the automatic shutdown (ASV) and remote controlled (RCV) valve study

3. Background ORNL’s Study
Requirements of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Section 4 – Automatic/Remote-Controlled Shut-off Valves:
Requires that the Secretary mandate, by regulation, ASV/RCV be installed on newly constructed or entirely replaced natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission pipelines 2 years after the act was issued
Requires the Comptroller General to conduct a study on the ability of liquid and gas transmission pipeline operators to respond to a release within an HCA
NTSB Recommendation P (San Bruno):
Directly require that automatic shutoff valves (ASV) or remote control valves (RCV) be installed in high consequence areas and in Class 3 and 4 locations and spaced at intervals that consider population factors listed in regulations for gas transmission pipelines.

4. Background ORNL’s Study
March 28, 2012 Understanding the Application of Automatic Control and Remote Control Valves Workshop conducted
Federal and State regulators, transmission line operators, and the public discussed the practical considerations involved with installing, operating and maintaining ASV/RCV
Information obtained through the workshop was used by ORNL within their study
Meeting Website, including Summary Report:
Comments were submitted in request to address the scope of ORNL’s study
Federal Register Comments on commissioned valve study PHMSA :

5. Background ORNL’s Study
July 18 and 19, 2012 Government/Industry Pipeline Research and Development (R&D) Forum
Working group indicated a technology gap in the reliability of the operation of ASV
Based on the R&D forum recommendations a project is sought to study more accurate line break detection systems to minimize unintended valve closures
Forum Summary Report and Presentations:
Research Announcement:
Solicitation closed, white papers currently being reviewed

6. Comments on ORNL’s Draft Study
On October 5th, 2012 ORNL presented in a webinar their draft study Comments were received from October 5 to October 26, 2012 on ORNL’s draft report There were seven commenters ORNL determined there were 42 technically substantive comments. Some of which resulted in a changes by ORNL to ORNL’s Study ORNL’s draft final report and comments to the ORNL study can be found on the meeting website:

7. Changes Made to ORNL’s Study
Comment
ORNL’s response
Inadvertent valve closures not addressed in ORNL’s study
Section of ORNL’s study now discusses these consequences
Hazardous Liquid case studies 7&8 numbers are inaccurate
Release after 90 minute shutdown for case study 8a not a realistic number
Model was adjusted to § Worst case discharge methodology, estimated release volume is now consistent with § (b)(1) methodology of calculation
Use of the word leak should be changed to rupture where the high rate of mass releases associated with pipeline failure are appropriate
Clarification was added to ORNL’s study in section 1.3

8. Changes Made to ORNL’s Study
Comment
ORNL’s response
Use of the word “detect” should expand beyond CPM and SCADA detection
Change made to ORNL’s study in the description of the Detection Phase for both Natural Gas and Hazardous Liquids
Flow rate on hazardous liquid lines can exceed normal pipeline follow immediately following a rupture.
Changes in ORNL’s study’s Analytical Approach and Computational Models have been made to address this comment
The proposed hazard zone model is based on an extremely conservative and inappropriate approach to pipeline outflow estimation and a fire radiation model that ignores significant sources of conservatism inherent in using a point-source radiation model
These models are not intended to be exact solutions to these complex engineering problems. To further address this comment, the text in Section of ORNL’s study was modified to clarify this concern and to minimize any possible confusion or misunderstanding in the application of these models.

9. ORNL ASV/RCV Study
Analyzed the response of rapid block valve closure on
Gas transmission lines with ignition of product
Hazardous liquid transmission lines with ignition of product
Hazardous liquid transmission lines without ignition of product
Technical, operational, and economic feasibility were evaluated for ASV/RCVs
Fire modeling was used to establish metrics for analyzing response time for transmission lines with ignition
Basic Oil Spill Cost Estimation Model (BOSCEM) used by EPA on oil spill was used to model response time for HL transmission lines without ignition

10. ORNL’s Study Observations
ASVs/RCVs installation on newly constructed/fully replaced gas and liquid transmission lines are technically, operationally, and economically feasible (positive cost benefit). Decreasing the total volume of released product reduces overall impacts on public and environmental safety. Installing ASVs/RCVs can potentially be an effective strategy to mitigate consequences of unintended pipeline releases. Block valve closure swiftness is most effective in mitigating damage resulting from a pipeline release (and subsequent fire) when damaged pipeline segment is isolated and thermal radiation produced by fire declines in time to enable emergency responders to safely start fire fighting activities immediately upon arrival.

11. ORNL’s Study Observations
Positive effects of rapid block valve closure are only realized through combined efforts of pipeline operators and emergency responders.
Similarly, the avoided cost of socioeconomic and environmental damage for hazardous liquid pipeline releases without ignition increase as time required to isolate the damaged pipeline segment decreases.
The modeling is dependent on a case-by-case analysis of each pipeline system due to complexity of location, response capabilities, pipeline configuration, and resources

12. Thank you