1. Macroeconomic Policy in the Eurozone: Are There Alternatives to Slow Growth and High Unemployment? Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director Center for Economic and Policy Research September 24, 2011

2. Europe’s crisis, stagnation, and unemployment are not the result of unsustainable borrowing

3. It is the result of bad macroeconomic policies from the European authorities:

4. Europe’s crisis, stagnation, and unemployment are not the result of unsustainable borrowing It is the result of bad macroeconomic policies from the European authorities: The “Troika” – European Central Bank, European Commission, IMF

5. Three most important macroeconomic policies: Fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate

6. Not helping, or actively causing damage, in troubled eurozone economies (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy)

7. Troika, especially ECB has played game of brinksmanship with troubled economies since early 2010

8. Repeatedly pushing Europe, and now much of the world economy, to the edge of serious crisis

9. Troika, especially ECB has played game of brinksmanship with troubled economies since early 2010 Repeatedly pushing Europe, and now much of the world economy, to the edge of serious crisis Why?

10. What policy failure looks like

11. Italy Real GDP (Index: 2008=100) Trend vs. Actual and Projected GDP (percent)

12. Ireland Real GDP (Index: 2008=100) Trend vs. Actual and Projected GDP (percent)

13. Greece Real GDP (Index: 2008=100) Trend vs. Actual and Projected GDP (percent)

14. Portugal Real GDP (Index: 2008=100) Trend vs. Actual and Projected GDP (percent)

15. Spain Real GDP (Index: 2008=100) Trend vs. Actual and Projected GDP (percent)

16. Argentina Real GDP (Index: 1998=100) Trend vs. Actual GDP (percent)

17. Lessons from Argentina:

18. Despite chaotic default, financial collapse, and no outside help, Argentine economy begins to recover just one quarter after default

19. Lessons from Argentina: Despite chaotic default, financial collapse, and no outside help, Argentine economy begins to recover just one quarter after default Argentina reaches pre-recession GDP within 3 years, despite much deeper recession – compare to more than a decade in Greece.

20. Passes trend GDP in 2006 (compare to eurozone – when?)

21. Real GDP growth more than 90 percent 2002-2011

22. Passes trend GDP in 2006 (compare to eurozone – when?) Real GDP growth more than 90 percent 2002-2011 There are ALWAYS alternatives to the years of recession, stagnation, and high unemployment that the Troika is offering to the troubled eurozone economies

23. The human cost of economic mismanagement

24. Ireland Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adjusted) Source: Eurostat (percent)

25. Greece Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adjusted) Source: Eurostat (percent)

26. Italy Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adjusted) Source: Eurostat (percent)

27. Portugal Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adjusted) Source: Eurostat (percent)

28. Spain Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adjusted) Source: Eurostat (percent)

29. Low inflation implies there is plenty of room for expansionary monetary and fiscal policies – but eurozone countries that need it can’t implement these policies

30. Ireland Inflation (Seasonally-Adjusted, year over year) Source: Eurostat (percent)

31. Greece Source: Eurostat (percent) Inflation (Seasonally-Adjusted, year over year)

32. Spain Source: Eurostat (percent) Inflation (Seasonally-Adjusted, year over year)

33. Italy Source: Eurostat (percent) Inflation (Seasonally-Adjusted, year over year)

34. Portugal Source: Eurostat (percent) Inflation (Seasonally-Adjusted, year over year)

35. “Internal Devaluation” doesn’t work

36. Real Effective Exchange Rate (Based on Unit Labor Costs of 27 Trading Partners) Source: Eurostat (Index: 2008QI=100)

37. More fiscal consolidation

38. Primary Balance 2011 (percent of GDP) Source: IMF

39. Total Projected Fiscal Consolidation 2010-2016 (percentage points of GDP) Source: IMF *Note: 2010 overall balance in Ireland excludes 21% of GDP in financial sector assistance.

40. Projected Net Interest Payments (% of GDP) Source: IMF Greece (% of GDP)

41. Euro zone crisis primarily a result of wrong macroeconomic policies Conclusion

42. Euro zone crisis primarily a result of wrong macroeconomic policies European authorities will probably resolve current crisis with bigger EFSF or other rescue mechanisms, interventions in bond markets, bank bailouts, even Greek debt restructuring Conclusion

43. But continued wrong macroeconomic policies will cause unnecessary unemployment and suffering; cuts to health care, pensions, education; trillions of dollars in lost output, and possibly more crises Conclusion