1. Human Capital : Theory and Application
Sung Jun Jo

2. Who Are Workers? (Human Resources)
Cost?
Assets?
Business partner?

3. Agenda Introduction Schooling and Signaling On the Job Training
Application-Executive Pay Issue
Discussion

4. Introduction
Human capital refers to the knowledge and acquired skills a person has that increase his or her ability to conduct activities with economic value
Workers add to their stock of human capital throughout their lives, especially via education and job experience
Combination of …. (Fitz-enz, 2000)
traits brought into job
ability to learn
motivation to share

5. A Model of Human Capital Theory
Individual Input
(Investment)
Education
Outcomes
Productivity
Earnings
Social Input
(Investment)
Citizenship
Social
Efficacy
*Source : Swanson & Holton III, 2001, p.110

6. Evolution of Human Capital Theory
Foundations
A. Smith, J. S. Mill, A. Marshall
J. Mincer (1958) : Yrs of work forgone to pursue education were rationally compensated with high wage
S. Fabricant (1959) : Intangible assets
G. Becker (1960) : ROR of difference in education
T. Schultz (1961) : US income has been increased in higher rate than combined amount of land, working hours and capital used to produce
Nobel Prize Winners
T. Schultz, G. Becker,
M. Friedman, S. Kuznets, R. Solow

7. The Schooling Model
A person’s decision maximizes the present value of lifetime earnings
The rate of discount (r) plays a crucial role in determining whether a person chooses to go to school
Wage-Schooling Locus : salary for each level of schooling
Marginal Rate of Return to Schooling : How much earnings increase if a person stays in school 1 more year
Stopping rule : when it is optimal to quit school and enter job market (MRR=r)
기본가정=교육더 받으면 w를 더 많이 받음-경험적으로 증명
Schooling model = 얼마만큼 교육받을 것인가
2가지 접근법이 있음(present value 계산법 & stopping rule)
Rate of discount : 학비조달 비용, 경제적 여유, 시간에 대한 가치 (현재중시-높은r, 미래중시-낮은r)

8. Potential Earnings Streams

9. Schooling Decision
MRR r’ r

10. Factors That Lead Different Level of Schooling
Differences in the Rate of Discount
Different schooling decisions simply place them at different points of the common locus
Differences in Ability
Higher ability levels shift the MRR to the right, so, earnings gain resulting from an additional year of schooling outweighs the increase in forgone earning
정책결정시
개인별로 r의 차이밖에 없다면 그 효과를 분석하기 쉬움
Ability에 따른 wage-schooling locus의 차이를 실증적으로 분석하기는 힘듬 (능력있는 사람이 받을 수 있는 wage가 능력없는 사람의 것과는 다르기 때문에)
학력에 따른 차별임금이 r을 낮춤으로서만 해결될 수 있을까. 능력의 차를 고려해야 할 것

11. Signaling
Education does(needs) not increase productivity at all, but signal a worker’s qualifications to potential employers who do not have private information
Education increases earnings not because it increases productivity but because it certifies that the worker is cut out for smart worker
Self selection constraints
1. Level of education of signaling must be such that non-smart workers are unwilling or unable to attain it.
2. Achieving given level of education must be cheaper for the high smart workers than for non-smart worker

12. $ Self-Selection NSW’s edu cost curve SW’s edu cost curve W T1 T2
또다른 대안으로서는 deferred compensation이있음 T1 T2

13. On the Job Training
Training increases a worker’s productivity (HC stock) after training
Training is an investment with initial costs and expected future returns
The returns are lost in the event of a separation
Should the firm invest?
Not if the skills are easily portable (worker can leave)
Should the worker invest?
Not if the skills are firm-specific (firm can layoff)

14. Who Bears Costs of Firm Specific Training?
Since there is no commitment to stay on the part of the worker after training occurred firms will not want to bear the costs of training when skills are general
Since there is no certainty that the job will remain profitable in the future, the employee will not want to bear the costs of training for skills that can be valued only by the current employer (specific)

15. Transferable Human Capital
The employee will want to bear the full cost by accepting lower wage during training
VMP=W2 w1
Time
training

16. Firm-Specific Human Capital
The employer will want to bear the full cost by paying above the market value to reduce turnover
VMP w2
Vmp보다 많이 주면 안됨 (cost를 회수해야 하므로)
W1 보다는 높아야 함 w1
Time
training

17. Predictions of Human Capital
When skills are transferable…
Employees should be bearing the cost
Wages of trainees (compared to non trainees) should be lower during training
Employer can offer what the market pays for the new skills acquired after training
Given that training increases skills
Wages of trainees (compared to non trainees) should be greater after training at a given employer

18. Predictions of the Human Capital (Cont.)
To reduce transaction costs after firm-specific training
Workers should be paid above the market value of their transferable skills.
Paying above market should minimize transaction(search) cost.
But—if contracts can be renegotiated, the firm does not have to raise wages until faced with a potential quit (Beaudry and DiNardo ).

19. Mincer Equation (1994) log w = rs + β1t – β2t2 + other variables
The Mincer equation captures the important empirical regularities
1) increase in earnings with schooling
2) concavity of log earnings in experience
3) parallelism in log earnings experiences profiles for different education groups
*See the attached file for the further discussion

20. Executive Pay (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004)
Base salary and bonuses of Forbes 800 CEOs increased from $700,000 in 1970 to 2.2 million in 2000
In 1980, CEOs received about 42 times the average of workers. By 2000, they were paid 475 times the average workers (Milkovich & Newman,2002)

21. 20 Top-Paid CEOs in 2003

22. Possible Explanations on CEO Compensation
Social Comparison : relationship to others
Economic Approach : reward to success, depends on company size
Agency Theory : self-motivated behavior
Fat-Cat Theory : rent seeking
Human Capital Theory : increasing investment on human capital, type of required skill

23. Hiring Sources-Internal or External
*Source : Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004

24. Hiring from Outside Hiring from outside Demougin & Siow (1994)
foregoes valuable specific skills available only through internal promotions
able to hire from a larger opportunity set of managers
allows better matching of managers and firms
Demougin & Siow (1994)
Outside hires involve hiring and replacement costs which are assumed to be higher than the costs of training and promoting from within
Internal labor market with high value for firm-specific skills

25. Executives as Human Capital
As firm-specific capital becomes relatively less important, the benefit of better matching becomes large relative to the cost of (lost) specific capital
prevalence of outside hires will increase
higher wages for outside hires as the general component of skills becomes relatively more important than the firm-specific part of skills
Potential reason for increasing pay + increasing outside hire is the change in the composition of managerial skills toward more general (market valued) skills
CEOs skills are transferable across firms and industries
Greater breadth of knowledge helps management of any company
Any firm-specific information is more easily accessible than before (computerization)

26. Discussions
Is education really improving productivity or just signaling?
How can we measure the value of human capital?
What are the implications of human capital theories for HRD specialists?