1. Behavioral Network Science Networked Life CIS 112 Spring 2009 Prof. Michael Kearns

2. Background and Motivation Network Science: Structure, Dynamics and Behavior –sociology, economics, computer science, biology… –network universals and generative models –empirical studies: network is given, hard to explore alternatives Navigation and the Six Degrees –Travers & Milgram  Watts, Kleinberg –distributed all-pairs shortest paths –what about other problems? Behavioral Economics and Game Theory –human rationality in the lab –typically subjects in pairs

3. Overview Human-subject experiments at the intersection of CS, economics, and network science Subjects simultaneously participate in groups of ~ 36 people Subjects sit at networked workstations Each subject controls some simple property of a single vertex in some underlying network Subjects have only* local views of the activity: state of their own and neighboring vertices Subjects have (real) financial incentive to solve their “piece” of a collective (global) problem Simple example: graph coloring –choose a color for your vertex from fixed set –paid iff your color differs from all neighbors when time expires –max welfare solutions = optimal colorings Across many experiments, have deliberately varied network structure and problem/game –networks: inspired by models from network science (small worlds, preferential attachment, etc.) –problems: chosen for diversity (cooperative v. competitive) and (centralized) computational difficulty

4. Experiments to Date Graph Coloring (Jan 2006; Feb 2007) –player controls: color of vertex; number of choices = chromatic number –payoffs: $2 if different color from all neighbors, else 0 –max welfare states: optimal colorings –centralized computation: hard even if approximations are allowed Consensus (Feb 2007) –player controls: color of vertex from 9 choices –payoffs: $2 if same color as all neighbors, else 0 –max welfare states: global consensus of color –centralized computation: trivial Independent Set (Mar 2007) –player controls: decision to be a “King” or a “Pawn”; variant with King side payments allowed –payoffs: $1/minute for Solo King; $0.50/minute for Pawn; 0 for Conflicted King; continuous accumulation –max welfare states: maximum independent sets –centralized computation: hard even if approximations are allowed Exchange Economy (Apr 2007) –player controls: limit orders offering to exchange goods –payoffs: proportional to the amount of the other good obtained –max welfare states: market clearing equilibrium –centralized computation: at the limit of tractability (LP used as a subroutine) Biased Voting (May 2008) –player controls: color of vertex, red or blue –payoffs: only paid if global consensus reached; competing incentives in population –max welfare states: all-red or all-blue –centralized computation: trivial March/April 2009…

5. Graph Coloring January 2006

6. (Behavioral) Graph Coloring Undirected graph; imagine a person “playing” each vertex Finite vocabulary of colors; each person picks a color Goal: no pair connected by an edge have the same color Computationally well-understood and challenging… –no efficient centralized algorithm known (exponential scaling) –strong evidence for computational intractability (NP-hard) –even extremely weak approximations are just as hard …Yet simple and locally verifiable solved not solved

7. The Experiments: Overview Designed and built a system for distributed graph coloring Designed specific sequence of experiments Obtained human subjects review (IRB) approval Recruited human subjects (n = 38, two sessions) Ran experiments! Analyzed findings

8. Experimental Design Variables Network Structure –six different topologies –inspired by recent generative models Information View –three different views Incentive Scheme –two different mechanisms Design space: 6 x 3 x 2 = 36 combinations Ran all 36 of them (+2)

9. Research Questions Can large groups of people solve these problems at all? What role does network structure play? –information view, incentives? What behavioral heuristics do individuals adopt? Can we do collective modeling and prediction? –some interesting machine learning challenges

10. Choices of Network Structure

11. Small Worlds Family Simple Cycle5-Chord Cycle20-Chord Cycle Leader Cycle Preferential Attachment, = 2 Preferential Attachment,  = 3

12. Choices of Information Views

16. Choices of Incentive Schemes

17. Collective incentives: –all 38 participants paid if and only if entire graph is properly colored –payment: $5 per person for each properly colored graph –a “team” mechanism Individual incentives –each participant paid if they have no conflicts at the end of an experiment –payment: $5 per person per graph –a “selfish” mechanism Minimum payout per subject per session: $0 Maximum: 19*5 = $95

18. The Experiments: Some Details 5 minute (300 second) time limit for each experiment Population demographics: Penn CSE 112 students Handout and intro lecture to establish understanding Intro and exit surveys No communication allowed except through system Experiments performed Jan 24 & 25, 2006 –Spring 2005: CSE 112 paper & pencil face-to-face experiments –Sep 2005: system launch, first controlled experiments Jan 24 session: collective incentives; Jan 25 session: individual incentives Randomized order of 18 experiments within each session First experiment repeated as last to give 19 total per session

20. The Results: Overview

21. 31 of 38 experiments solved mean completion time of solved = 82s median = 44s exceeded subject expectations (52 of 76)

22. Effects of Network Structure

23. Science 11 August 2006: Vol. 313. no. 5788, pp. 824 - 827 DOI: 10.1126/science.1127207 PrevPrev | Table of Contents | NextTable of ContentsNext Graph statisticsAvg. experiment duration (s) and fraction solved Colors required Min. degree Max. degree Avg. degree S.D.Avg. distance Avg. duration & fraction solved Distributed heuristic Simple cycle 222209.76144.175/6378 5-chord cycle 2242.260.605.63121.147/7687 20-chord cycle 2273.051.013.3465.676/68265 Leader cycle 23193.843.622.3140.867/78797 Pref. att., newlinks=2 32133.842.442.63219.672/61744 Pref. att., newlinks=3 43225.684.222.08154.834/64703 smaller diameter  better performance preferential attachment much harder than cycle-based distributed heuristic gives reverse ordering

24. Small Worlds Family Simple Cycle5-Chord Cycle20-Chord Cycle Leader Cycle Preferential Attachment, = 2 Preferential Attachment,  = 3

26. Effects of Information View

29. Effects of Incentive Scheme

31. Towards Behavioral Modeling

32. Prioritize color matches to high degree nodes. That is, I tried to arrange it so that the high degree nodes had to change colors the least often. So if I was connected to a very high degree node I would always change to avoid a conflict, and vice versa, if I was higher degree than the others I was connected to I would usually stay put and avoid changing colors. [many similar comments] Strategies in the local view: I would wait a little before changing my color to be sure that the nodes in my neighborhood were certain to stay with their color. I would sometimes toggle my colors impatiently (to get the attention of other nodes) if we were stuck in an unresolved graph and no one was changing their color. Strategies in the global view: I would look outside my local area to find spots of conflict that were affecting the choices around me. I would be more patient in choices because I could see what was going on beyond the neighborhood. I tried to solve my color before my neighbors did. I tried to turn myself the color that would have the least conflict with my neighbors (if the choices were green, blue, red and my neighbors were 2 red, 3 green, 1 blue I would turn blue). I also tried to get people to change colors by "signaling" that I was in conflict by changing back and forth. If we seemed to have reached a period of stasis in our progress, I would change color and create conflicts in my area in an attempt to find new solutions to the problem. When I had two or three neighbors all of whom had the same color, I would go back and forth between the two unused colors in order to inform my neighbors that they could use either one if they had to. Algorithmic Introspection (Sep 2005 comments)

33. (Sep 2005 data)

34. signaling behaviors

35. Graph Coloring and Consensus February 2007

37. Network Formation Model Single parameter p (a probability) p=0: a chain of 6 cliques of size 6 each (see figure) p>0: each intra-clique edge is “rewired” with probability p: –first flip p-biased coin to decide whether to rewire –if rewiring, choose one of the endpoints to “keep” the edge –then choose new random destination vertex from entire graph Values of p used: 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 1.0 Three trials for each value of p; different random network for each trial Move from “clan” topology to random graphs

38. Summary of Events Held 18 coloring and 18 consensus experiments All 18 coloring experiments globally solved –average duration ~ 35 seconds 17/18 consensus experiments globally solved –average duration ~ 62 seconds Recall (worst-case) status of problems for centralized computation –seems it is easier to get people to disagree than to agree…

39. large p: easier for consensus large p: harder for coloring (cf. Jan 2006 experiments) small-p vs large-p performance statistically significant Influence of Structure

40. Art by Consensus (small p)

41. Independent Set (a.k.a. “Kings and Pawns”) March 2007

42. without side payments with side payments

43. Chain of 6-CliquesIsolated PairsRewired ChainP.A. Tree Dense P.A.Erdos-RenyiBipartite

44. Sharing the Wealth

46. Biased Voting in Networks: The “Democratic Primary Game” May 2008

47. Democratic Primary Game Cosmetically similar to consensus, with a crucial strategic difference Deliberately introduce a tension between: –individual preferences –desire for collective unity Only two color choices; challenge comes from competing incentives If everyone converges to same color, everyone gets some payoff But different players receive different amounts –each player has payoffs for their preferred and non-preferred color –e.g. $1.50 red/$0.50 blue vs. $0.50 red/$1.50 blue –can have symmetric and asymmetric payoffs (e.g. $1.50/$0.50 vs. $0.75/$1.25) High-level experimental design: –choice of network structures –arrangement of types (red/blue prefs) & strengths of incentives –most interesting to coordinate network structure and types

49. Cohesion: Erdos-RenyiCohesion: Preferential AttachmentMinority Power: Preferential Attachment

50. Cohesion: Erdos-Renyi Cohesion: Preferential Attachment Minority Power: Preferential Attachment

51. Summary of Findings 55/81 experiments reached global consensus in 1 minute allowed –mean of successful ~ 44s Effects of network structure: –Cohesion harder than Minority Power: 31/54 Cohesion, 24/27 Minority Power –all 24 successful Minority Powers converge to minority preference! –Cohesion P.A. (20/27) easier than Cohesion E-R (11/27) –overall, P.A. easier than E-R (contrast w/coloring) –within Cohesion, increased inter-group communication helps some notable exceptions… Effects of incentives: –asymmetric beats weak symmetric beats strong symmetric –the value of “extremists” Remarks on “obviousness” in hindsight

52. Cohesion: Erdos-Renyi Cohesion: Preferential Attachment Minority Power: Preferential Attachment

53. Summarizing the Dynamics

54. Effects of “Personality” value fraction < value no player infinitely stubborn: acquiesced 28 to 40 times of 55 only 30 total instances of defying all neighbors as time expired in 26 failures social virtue of “tasteful” stubbornness

55. Behavioral Modeling model: play color c with probability ~ payoff(c) x fraction in neighborhood playing c

56. “Entertainment Science”: Barack and Hillary (defect) (loyal) Replaced red/blue by Hillary/Barack Subjects first asked to indicate their “true” preference Stated preferences define “real” choices Loyal/Defect: e.g. if you preferred Hillary: Loyal = Hillary, Defect = Barack Neighbors’ choices appear to you as Hillary/Barack, but actually indicate Loyal/Defect a neighbor loyal to their preference appears as Hillary to you a neighbor defecting from their preference appears as Barack to you Subjects gradually offered higher payoffs for Defecting: Loyal/Defect: $1.00/$1.00, $1.00/$1.10, $1.00/$1.20,…

57. How Much Does A Vote Cost? blue: no choice; green: Loyal; crimson: Defect Loyal/Defect = 1/1: 2.7 seconds to Loyal Loyal/Defect = 1/1.10: no convergence Loyal/Defect = 1/1.20: 4.7 seconds to Defect Answer: 20 cents.