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Economics, Density Dependence and the Efficacy of Marine Reserves Crow White Ph.D. Chapter.

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Presentation on theme: "Economics, Density Dependence and the Efficacy of Marine Reserves Crow White Ph.D. Chapter."— Presentation transcript:

1 Economics, Density Dependence and the Efficacy of Marine Reserves Crow White Ph.D. Chapter

2 Spatially and Temporally Explicit Integrodifference Model Settlers at x = R = proportion of settlers that successfully recruit into the local population

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4 For coastal fish species: Myers & Cadigan 1993 Botsford & Hobbs 1995 Carr et al. 1995 Caley et al. 1996 Fokvord 1997 Hixon & Webster 2002 Webster 2003 Skajaa et al. In Prep. Cod Dungeness & rock crabs Rockfish

5 Even when fishing is expensive reserves can enhance fishery profit Equivalence White et al. 2008 Ecology Letters

6 Cohort of juvenile chromis (Baja California, Mexico)

7 Settler

8 Non-fishery species: Gobies, damselfish and other small reef fish (Forrester, Steele, Osenberg and Schmitt/Holbrook laboratories)

9 Settler Fishery species: Kelp bass (White and Caselle 2008) Rockfish (Johnson 2006) Non-fishery species: Gobies, damselfish and other small reef fish (Forrester, Steele, Osenberg and Schmitt/Holbrook laboratories)

10 POPULATION REGULATION Density dependent larval recruitment  Inter-cohort: Adults compete with larvae for space and food, as well as eat them.  Intra-cohort: Larvae compete amongst themselves for space and food.

11 Across the recruitment period: Larva settles time → Mature, legal-to-fish adult

12 Across the recruitment period: Larva settles Mature, legal-to-fish adult time → Inter-cohort density dependence Intra-cohort density dependence 1. Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence -Adults and settlers interact across entire recruitment period -Settlers compete amongst themselves for resources (food, shelter) across the entire recruitment period

13 Across the recruitment period: Larva settles time → Inter-cohort density dependence Intra-cohort density dependence 2. Sequential: inter-cohort then intra-cohort density dependence - Adults only affect mortality early in recruitment period (e.g. when settlers are small and most vulnerable to predation) - Settlers only compete for resources later in recruitment period (e.g. when they are sub-adults and have larger resource requirements) Mature, legal-to-fish adult

14 Across the recruitment period: Larva settles time → Inter-cohort density dependence Intra-cohort density dependence 2. Sequential: intra-cohort then inter-cohort density dependence - Larvae settle to micro-habitat (shallow water zones, kelp forest canopy) different than where adults reside, thus delaying inter- cohort interactions. Mature, legal-to-fish adult

15 Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence Inter-cohort Intra-cohort S = # settlers N = #adults (constant) a & b = coefficients (Verhurlst 1838)

16 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort S = # settlers N = #adults (constant) a & b = coefficients R = proportion settlers that recruit So = #initial settlers Alpha = a*t Beta = b/a = relative strength of the two density dependent processes [0-infinity] Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence

17 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort S = # settlers N = #adults (constant) a & b = coefficients R = proportion settlers that recruit So = #initial settlers Alpha = a*t Beta = b/a = relative strength of the two density dependent processes [0-infinity] Given Beta = b = 0 (i.e. 100% inter-cohort DD) Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence

18 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort S = # settlers N = #adults (constant) a & b = coefficients R = proportion settlers that recruit So = #initial settlers Alpha = a*t Beta = b/a = relative strength of the two density dependent processes [0-infinity] Given Beta = b = 0 (i.e. 100% inter-cohort DD): Ricker formulation Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence

19 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort S = # settlers N = #adults (constant) a & b = coefficients R = proportion settlers that recruit So = #initial settlers Alpha = a*t Beta = b/a = relative strength of the two density dependent processes [0-infinity] Given a = 0 (i.e. 100% intra-cohort DD) Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence

20 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort S = # settlers N = #adults (constant) a & b = coefficients R = proportion settlers that recruit So = #initial settlers Alpha = a*t Beta = b/a = relative strength of the two density dependent processes [0-infinity] Given a = 0 (i.e. 100% intra-cohort DD) Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence

21 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort S = #settlers N = #adults (constant) a & b = coefficients R = proportion settlers that recruit So = #initial settlers Alpha = a*t Beta = b/a = relative strength of the two density dependent processes [0-infinity] Gamma = b*t Given a = 0 (i.e. 100% intra-cohort DD): Beverton-Holt formulation Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence

22 Functional representations of density dependent processes Inter-cohort: Ricker. Over-compensatory due to additive effects of competition and (possibly aggregative) predation. Intra-cohort: Beverton-Holt. Compensatory due to contest- competition for food and refugia.

23 Sequential: intra- then inter-cohort density dependence g = overall strength of density dependence D = relative strength of two density dependent processes D = 0 100% inter-cohort D = 1100% intra-cohort Intra-cohort (Beverton-Holt) Inter-cohort (Ricker)

24 Sequential: intra- then inter-cohort density dependence g = overall strength of density dependence D = relative strength of two density dependent processes D = 0 100% inter-cohort D = 1100% intra-cohort

25 Sequential: inter- then intra-cohort density dependence g = overall strength of density dependence D = relative strength of two density dependent processes D = 0 100% inter-cohort D = 1100% intra-cohort Inter-cohort (Ricker) Intra-cohort (Beverton-Holt) # Settlers left after inter-cohort density dependent mortality

26 Sequential: inter- then intra-cohort density dependence g = overall strength of density dependence D = relative strength of two density dependent processes D = 0 100% inter-cohort D = 1100% intra-cohort

27 Relative strengths of inter- versus intra-cohort density dependence Value when… ModelParameter100% inter-cohort100% intra-cohort SequentialD01 SimultaneousBeta0Infinity

28 Relative strengths of inter- versus intra-cohort density dependence Value when… ModelParameter100% inter-cohort100% intra-cohort SequentialD01 SimultaneousBeta0Infinity Transformation D = Beta / (1 + Beta) Beta = D / (1 – D)

29 Relative strengths of inter- versus intra-cohort density dependence Value when… ModelParameter100% inter-cohort100% intra-cohort SequentialD01 SimultaneousBeta0Infinity Transformation D = Beta / (1 + Beta) Beta = D / (1 – D) Demographic density dependence independent variable

30 FISHING COSTS MONEY… Cost of catching a fish increases as you harvest down the population

31 PROFIT = Pre-harvest Fishery yield at location x during time step t Revenue Post- harvest

32 PROFIT = Pre-harvest Fishery yield at location x during time step t Revenue - Cost Post- harvest integrate

33 Marginal cost = Fish density θ θ = 10 Stock Effect (Clark 1990)

34 Marginal cost = Fish density θ Stock Effect (Clark 1990)

35 Marginal cost = Fish density θ Economic density dependence independent variable

36 Given the relative strength of inter- versus intra-cohort density dependent recruitment (D) and the intrinsic cost-of-harvest of the fishery species (θ) can reserves increase fishery profit?

37 Parameter/variableValues evaluatedDescription A eq [H = 0]100Equilibrium virgin population density (fish per km), where H = harvest M0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3Natural adult mortality probability P1, 2, 3Adult per capita production of larvae that survive to settlement α, γ, gSolved for R = M/P, given H = 0 Density dependent recruitment coefficient, where R = proportion settlers that recruit DdDd 10, 100, 200Mean larval dispersal distance (km) for calculating K x-x’. Only one value (100 km) was simulated (see Methods) p1Price ($ per fish) = marginal revenue θ0, 1, 2… 20Stock effect coefficient ($ * km -1 ) D0, 0.05, 0.1… 1Inter- versus intra-cohort density dependent recruitment scaling parameter (A x – H x )/(A eq [H = 0])0.01, 0.02, 0.03…0.9Escapement Frac(x[H x = 0])0, 0.05, 0.1… 0.75Proportion coast in reserves 7,064,820Total number of scenarios simulated

38 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort

39 Hastings and Botsford 1999 White et al. 2008 Gaylord et al. 2006, White & Kendall 2007 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort

40 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort

41 Inter-cohort Intra-cohort

42 Demographic density dependence Simultaneous inter-cohort 1 st intra-cohort 1 st

43 What is this model missing? Factor [Effect on profit with reserves] Age/stage structure (BOFFs)+ (Gaylord et al. 2005) Environmental stochasticity or management uncertainty + (Armsworth & Roughgarden 2003, Stefansson & Rosenberg 2005, 2006, Costello and Polasky In Press) Heterogeneity in habitat conditions or fishing pressure + (Sanchirico et al. 2006, Ralston & O’Farrell 2008) Adult movement (spill-over)~, + when compared with over-exploited (Kellner et al. 2007)

44 Hastings and Botsford 1999 White et al. 2008 Gaylord et al. 2006, White & Kendall 2007 GENERAL MESSAGE: OPTIMISTIC, PESSIMISTIC OR “IT DEPENDS”?? Inter-cohort Intra-cohort

45 Policy: P6 = A priori constant % MPA and flexible escapement

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56 Hastings and Botsford 1999 White et al. 2008 Gaylord et al. 2006, White & Kendall 2007 GENERAL MESSAGE: OPTIMISTIC, PESSIMISTIC OR “IT DEPENDS”?? Inter-cohort Intra-cohort

57 Relative strengths of inter- versus intra-cohort density dependence 0D10D1 100% inter- cohort 100% intra- cohort Good Reserves? Bad

58 Relative strengths of inter- versus intra-cohort density dependence Linking D-values to species (some ideas): 0D10D1 100% inter- cohort 100% intra- cohort Good Reserves? Bad

59 Relative strengths of inter- versus intra-cohort density dependence 0D10D1 100% inter- cohort 100% intra- cohort Good Reserves? Bad Linking D-values to species (some ideas): 1.Non-predatory, bottom-dwellers (e.g. urchins, abalone) - Adults only affect settlers via competition - Reduced inter-cohort density dependence - Resource habitat reduced to 2-dimensions (horizontal) - Enhanced intra-cohort density dependence

60 Relative strengths of inter- versus intra-cohort density dependence Linking D-values to species (some ideas): 2. Cannibalistic (e.g. cod, kelp bass, rock crabs) - Enhanced inter-cohort predation 0D10D1 100% inter- cohort 100% intra- cohort Good Reserves? Bad

61 Relative strengths of inter- versus intra-cohort density dependence Linking D-values to species (some ideas): 2. Cannibalistic (e.g. cod, kelp bass, rock crabs) - Enhanced inter-cohort predation - Also adults are territorial (rockfish?) - Enhanced inter-cohort competition 0D10D1 100% inter- cohort 100% intra- cohort Good Reserves? Bad

62 Cost of fishing 0Theta20 Harvest with perfect efficiency Harvests costs exorbitant Good Reserves? Bad Linking Theta-values to fisheries (some ideas):

63 Cost of fishing 0Theta20 Harvest with perfect efficiency Harvests costs exorbitant Good Reserves? Bad time Linking Theta-values to fisheries (some ideas): 1. Technology can improve harvesting efficiency

64 Cost of fishing 0Theta20 Harvest with perfect efficiency Harvests costs exorbitant Good Reserves? Bad time Linking Theta-values to fisheries (some ideas): 1. Technology can improve harvesting efficiency 2. Personnel-intensive fishery (urchin diving) costly - But what about price?

65 Cost of fishing Linking Theta-values to fisheries (some ideas): 1. Technology can improve harvesting efficiency 2. Personnel-intensive fishery (urchin diving) costly - But what about price? 3. Open-access (“race to fish”) fisheries filled to over- capacity are inefficient 4. Limited-entry, dedicated access fisheries (with ITQs, TURFs) are efficient 0Theta20 Harvest with perfect efficiency Harvests costs exorbitant Good Reserves? Bad time Open- access ITQs, TURFs

66 Are reserves good or bad?? 1.Good for dedicated-access fisheries targeting predatory species 2.Bad for open-access fisheries targeting benthic grazers 3.Will get better over time as harvesting efficiency improves 4.In general, better than this study indicates due to simplifying assumptions of the model

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68 FISHERY PROFIT UNDER OPTIMAL RESERVE VS. CONVENTIONAL MANAGEMENT Ricker P = 1 m = 0.1

69 FISHERY PROFIT UNDER OPTIMAL RESERVE VS. CONVENTIONAL MANAGEMENT Hastings & Botsford 1999 Gaylord et al. 2005 White & Kendall 2007 Costello & Ward In Prep. White et al. In Review

70 Density Dependent Marginal Cost of Harvest

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72  Resolution of analysis  Proportion coast in reserves: 5%  Escapement level: 1%

73 Stock Effect (Clark 1990) Marginal cost = Fish density θ θ = 10

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75 Modeling both inter- and intra-cohort density dependence Across the recruitment period (age at settlement to age when mature, legal-to-fish adult)…

76 Modeling both inter- and intra-cohort density dependence Across the recruitment period (age at settlement to age when mature, legal-to-fish adult)… 1. Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence - Adults and settlers interact across entire recruitment period

77 Modeling both inter- and intra-cohort density dependence Across the recruitment period (age at settlement to age when mature, legal-to-fish adult)… 1. Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence - Adults and settlers interact across entire recruitment period 2. Sequential: inter-cohort then intra-cohort density dependence - Adults only affect mortality early in recruitment period (e.g. when settlers are small and most vulnerable to predation); and/or settlers only compete for resources later in recruitment period (e.g. when they are sub-adults and have larger resource requirements)

78 Modeling both inter- and intra-cohort density dependence Across the recruitment period (age at settlement to age when mature, legal-to-fish adult)… 1. Simultaneous inter- and intra-cohort density dependence - Adults and settlers interact across entire recruitment period 2. Sequential: inter-cohort then intra-cohort density dependence - Adults only affect mortality early in recruitment period (e.g. when settlers are small and most vulnerable to predation); and/or settlers only compete for resources later in recruitment period (e.g. when they are sub-adults and have larger resource requirements) 3. Sequential: intra-cohort then inter-cohort density dependence - Larvae settle to micro-habitat (shallow water zones, kelp forest canopy) different than where adults reside, thus delaying inter-cohort interactions.


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