1. 1 Aristoteles und die vernetzte Welt Barry Smith http://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/faculty/smith

2. 2 JOBS FOR PHILOSOPHERS

3. 3 PUT YOUR PHILOSOPHY TRAINING TO USE IN THE HI-TECH WORLD ! “is looking for people who can organize information into carefully defined hierarchical categorization schemes. The information architecture model we employ is rather like an Aristotelian category schema in which information is grouped into genus-species relationships.” www.kanisa.com

4. 4 “We are looking for people with at least a Masters degree, Ph.D. preferred,in philosophy or a related field, e.g., linguistics.” Contact: richard.beatch@kanisa.com

5. 5 jobs@ontologyworks.com employment@bowstreet.com hr@yahoo-inc.com www.ontek.com

6. 6 What do ontological engineers do? They build catalogue systems for given domains of reality for example: meat.com... a catalogue system for an entire industry

7. 7... a catalogue system... designed to allow customers, suppliers, insurers, subcontractors, shippers, and so on to find their way about the world of meat... as readers find their way about the world of books in a library

8. 8 Varieties of information system ontology Business ontology Legal ontology Military ontology Art ontology Archeology ontology Image ontology...

9. 9 there are too many individuals...

10. 10 Therefore: catalogue systems must rest on general concepts

11. 11 able about account acid across act addition adjustment advertisement after again against agreement air awake all almost among amount amusement and angle angry animal answer ant any apparatus apple approval arch argument art arm army as at attach attempt attention attraction authority automatic baby back bad bag balance ball band base basin basket bath be beautiful bed because bee before behavior belief bell bent berry best between bird birth bit bite bitter black blade blood blow blue board boat body boiling bone book boot bottle box boy brain brake branch brass bread breath bridge brick bright broken brother brown brush bucket building bulb burn burst business but butter button by cake camera canvas card care carriage cart cat cause certain chain chalk chance change cheap cheese chemical chest chief chin church circle clean clear clock cloth cloud coal coat cold collar color comb come comfort committee common company comparison complete complex condition connection conscious control cook copper copy cord cork cotton cough country cover cow crack credit crime cruel cry cup curtain current curve cushion cut damage danger dark daughter day dead dear death debt decison deep degree delicate dependent design desire destruction detail development disease different digestion direction discovery discussion disgust distance distribution division dirty do dog door doubt down drain drawer dress drop dry drink driving dust ear early east earth edge education effect egg elastic electric end engine enough equal error even event ever every example exchange existence expansion experience expert eye face fact fall false family far farm fat father fear feather feeble feeling female fertile fiction field fight finger fish fire first fixed flag flame flat flight fly floor flower fold food foolish foot for force fork form forward fowl frame free frequent friend from front fruit full future garden general get girl give glass glove go goat gold good government grain grass great green grey grip group growth guide gun hair hammer hand hanging happy harbor hard harmony hat hate have he head healthy hearing heart heat help here high history hole hollow hook hope horn horse hospital hour house how humor i ice idea if ill important impulse in increase industry ink insect instrument insurance interest invention iron island jelly jewel join journey judge jump keep kettle key kick kind kiss knee knife knot knowledge land language last late laugh law lead leaf learning leather left leg let letter level library lift light like limit line linen lip liquid list little living lock long look loose loss loud love low machine make male man manager map mark market married mass match material may meal measure meat medical meeting memory metal middle military milk mind mine minute mist mixed moon money monkey month morning mother motion mountain mouth move much muscle music nail name narrow nation natural near necessary neck need needle nerve net new news night no noise normal north nose not note now number nut observation of off offer office oil old on only open operation opinion opposite or orange order organization ornament other out oven over owner page pain paint paper parallel parcel past paste part payment peace pen pencil person physical picture pig pin pipe place plane plant plate play please pleasure plough pocket point poison polish political poor porter position possible pot potato powder power present price print prison private probable process produce profit property prose protest public pull pump punishment purpose push put quality question quick quiet quite rail rain range rat rate ray reaction reading ready reason receipt record red regret regular relation religion request representative respect responsible reward rhythm rice right ring river road rod roll roof room rough round rub rule run rush sad safe sail salt same sand say scale school science scissors screw sea seat second secret secretary see seed seem selection self send sense separate serious servant sex shade shake shame sharp sheep shelf ship shirt shock shoe short shut side sign silk silver simple sister size skin skirt sky sleep slip slope slow small smash smell smile smoke smooth snake sneeze snow so soap society sock soft solid some son song sort sound soup south spring spoon sponge spade special space stage stamp star start statement station steam steel stem step stick sticky stiff still stitch stocking stomach stone stop store story straight strange street stretch strong structure square substance such sudden sugar suggestion summer sun support surprise sweet swim system table tail take talk tall taste tax teaching tendency test than that the then theory there thick thin thing There are too many general concepts

12. 12 Therefore: concepts/genera must be hierarchically organized

13. 13 Porphyrian Hierarchy

14. 14 Linnaean Hierarchy

15. 15 Desktop Hierarchy

16. 16 From Species to Genera canary animal bird

17. 17 From Species to Genera animal bird canary can sing is yellow has wings can fly has feathers has skin moves eats breathes species-genus hierarchy as inference machine

18. 18 From Species to Genera animal bird canary can sing is yellow has wings can fly has feathers has skin moves eats breathes fish has fins can swim has gills

19. 19 animal bird canary From Species to Genera can sing is yellow has skin moves eats breathes has wings can fly has feathers species-genus hierarchy as inference machine X

20. 20 Why are species-genus hierarchies good ways to represent our reasoning? 1. They capture the way the world is (Aristotelian realism) 2. They capture the natural ways we think (Kantianism)... species are concepts

21. 21 genus Species-genus trees can be represented also as map-like partitions

22. 22 From Species to Genera canary animal bird

23. 23 From Species to Genera animal bird canary

24. 24 Species Genera as Tree canary animal bird fish ostrich

25. 25 Species-Genera as Map/Partition animal bird canary ostrich fish canary

26. 26 Tree and Map/Partition

27. 27 genus Species-genus trees can be represented also as map-like partitions If Aristotelian realism is right, then such partitions are transparent to the reality beyond

28. 28 Alberti’s Grid c.1450

29. 29 Coarse-grained Partition

30. 30 Fine-Grained Partition

31. 31 Map of US Stocks by Category

32. 32 Map of US Stocks by Category

33. 33... a way of viewing the stock market as we might view other parts and dimensions of reality

34. 34 Artist’s Grid as through a transparent grid

35. 35 Aristoteles und die vernetzte Welt

36. 36 Net

37. 37 Partitions come with a labelling and an address system

38. 38 Periodic Table Die periodische Tabelle der chemischen Elemente

39. 39 Perspectivalism Different partitions may represent cuts through the same reality which are skew to each other

40. 40 Universe

41. 41 Universe/Periodic Table

42. 42 All veridical perspectives are equal Each veridical perspective (= transparent partition) captures some corresponding domain of objects

43. 43 Scientific partitions (like the periodic table) and database partitions (like the Dewey Decimal Classification System)... are transparent to the hierarchical order of an associated domain of objects

44. 44 Question: what other sorts of partitions have this feature of transparency? the partitions of common sense (folk biology, folk physics, folk psychology...) Answer:

45. 45 Aristotle the ontologist of common-sense reality Aristotle

46. 46 Die Welt des gesunden Menschenverstands = the world as apprehended via that conceptualization we call common sense = the normal environment (the niche) shared by children and adults in everyday perceiving and acting

47. 47 The world of mothers, milk, and mice...

48. 48 The Empty Mask (Magritte) mama mouse milk Mount Washington

49. 49 our common-sense partition of the world of common sense is transparent (common sense is true) mothers exist......but there is a problem

50. 50 Why are species-genus hierarchies good ways to represent our reasoning? Recall our question:

51. 51 From Species to Genera animal bird canary can sing is yellow has wings can fly has feathers has skin moves eats breathes fish has fins can swim has gills

52. 52 From Species to Genera animal bird canary can sing is yellow has wings can fly has feathers has skin moves eats breathes fish has fins can swim has gills ostrich has long thin legs is tall can‘t fly y

53. 53 From Species to Genera animal bird canary can sing is yellow has wings can fly has feathers has skin moves eats breathes fish has fins can swim has gills ostrich has long thin legs is tall can’t fly y

54. 54 Theory of vagueness How can -based conceptualizations be transparent, if the world is shaped like this ?

55. 55 no such problems arise for the closed worlds constructed in information systems hierarchies as reasoning tools work very well for the closed worlds of database engineers

56. 56 whether a file is in a given folder on your hard-drive is completely determinate:

57. 57 Dewey Decimal Classification as Map

58. 58 Dewey Decimal Classification (Detail)

59. 59 No borderline cases in the closed world of a database Every book is assigned a determinate Dewey Classification Number at birth 111.560xxx this yields a classification that is completely crisp

60. 60 Kantianism There are no species-genus hierarchies in reality unless we put them there The world -- insofar as it is accessible to us through our concepts -- is a closed system tailored by us to fit

61. 61 Kantianism seems to work very well for the closed worlds of database environments (which are always finite)

62. 62 veiled reality or: Kantianism as Midas-touch epistemology

63. 63 hard vs. soft categories Kantianism: we constitute/shape (empirical) reality in such a way that it corresponds to our categories Aristotelianism: reality in itself is messy, but our categories fit nonetheless

64. 64 How ? because they are made up, not of crisp (hard), but of open (soft) genera and species

65. 65 that is: when we apply our categories to reality we are aware that we have to deal with an opposition... between standard or focal or prototypical instances... and non-standard or ‘fringe’ instances

66. 66 birds ostrich Natural categories have borderline cases sparrow

67. 67... they have a kernel/penumbra structure kernel of focal instances penumbra of borderline cases

68. 68 animal bird canary ostrich fish every cell in every common-sense partition is subject to this same kernel-penumbra structure:

69. 69 Dürer

70. 70 What is common-sense reality? the mesoscopic space of everyday human action and perception – a space centered on objects organized into hierarchies of species and genera... and subject to prototypicality

71. 71 but more:

72. 72 in addition to objects (substances), which pertain to what a thing is at all times at which it exists: cow man rock planet

73. 73 the common-sense world contains also accidents which pertain to how a thing is at some time at which it exists: red hot suntanned spinning

74. 74 An accident = what holds of a substance per accidens

75. 75 Accidents, too, instantiate genera and species Thus accidents, too, form trees

76. 76 quality color red scarlet R232, G54, B24

77. 77 and they are distinguished as between tokens and types (which is to say: between genera and species on the one hand,... and instances on the other)

78. 78 Accidents: Species and instances this individual accident of redness (this token redness – here, now) quality color red scarlet R232, G54, B24

79. 79 quid? substance quantum? quantity quale? quality ad quid? relation ubi? place quando? time in quo situ? status/context in quo habitu? habitus quid agit? action quid patitur? passion Nine Accidental Categories

80. 80 = relations of inherence (one-sided existential dependence) John hunger Substances are the bearers of accidents

81. 81 Aristotle 1.0 an ontology recognizing: substance tokens accident tokens substance types accident types

82. 82 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

83. 83 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

84. 84 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

85. 85 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

86. 86 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

87. 87 Alberti’s Grid c.1450

88. 88 Some philosophers accept only part of this ontology

89. 89 Standard Predicate Logic – F(a), R(a,b)... SubstantialAccidental Attributes F, G, R Individuals a, b, c this, that Universal Particular

90. 90 Bicategorial Nominalism SubstantialAccidental First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

91. 91 Process Metaphysics SubstantialAccidental Events Processes “Everything is flux” Universal Particular

92. 92 Aristotle 1.0 in fact however we need more than the ontological square What is missing from Aristotle 1.0 as an ontology of common-sense reality?

93. 93 Is everything in common- sense reality either a substance or an accident?

94. 94 well, what about artefacts ?

95. 95 Shoes

96. 96 Temple at Corinth

97. 97 Pipe

98. 98 Standard Aristotelian theory of artefacts: artefacts are mereological sums of substances

99. 99 Positive and negative parts positive part negative part or hole (made of matter) (not made of matter)

100. 100 Shoes

101. 101 Temple at Corinth

102. 102 Pipe

103. 103 Some entities consist entirely of negative parts places, spatial regions institutions laws, constitutions

104. 104 quid? substance quantum? quantity quale? quality ad quid? relation ubi? place quando? time in quo situ? status/context in quo habitu? habitus quid agit? action quid patitur? passion Nine Accidental Categories

105. 105 Places For Aristotle the place of a substance is the interior boundary of the surrounding body (for example the interior boundary of the surrounding water where it meets a fish’s skin)

106. 106 Places are holes

107. 107 Places are holes

108. 108 Places are holes

109. 109 Places are holes

110. 110 niches, environments are holes

111. 111 and holes can also be otherwise quite important

112. 112 and holes can also be otherwise quite important

113. 113 and holes can also be otherwise quite important

114. 114 and holes can also be otherwise quite important

115. 115 The metaphysics of holes

116. 116 A hole in the ground Solid physical boundaries at the floor and walls but with a lid that is not made of matter: hole

117. 117 Holes involve two kinds of boundaries bona fide boundaries which exist independently of our demarcating acts fiat boundaries which exist only because we put them there

118. 118 Examples of bona fide boundaries: an animal’s skin, the surface of the planet of fiat boundaries: the boundaries of postal districts and census tracts

119. 119 Mountain bona fide upper boundaries with a fiat base:

120. 120 Architects Plan for a House fiat upper boundaries with a bona fide base:

121. 121 where does the mountain start ?... a mountain is not a substance

122. 122 nose...and it’s not an accident, either

123. 123 Aristotle 1.5 an ontology of substances + accidents + holes (and other entities not made of matter) + fiat and bona fide boundaries + artefacts and environments is true

124. 124 it’s truthmaker = those parts and dimensions of reality which we call the common-sense world knowledge of this common-sense world is, in relation to prototypical instances of the relevant species and genera, quite easy to come by

125. 125 corrected partition

126. 126 folk biology Aristotelian folk biology, folk physics, folk psychology, etc., are true of the common-sense world as it currently exists (they have nothing to offer regarding its pre-history, its long term evolution, its position in the cosmos)

127. 127 reference vs. theory They have not much to offer, either, by way of good explanatory theories of the entities in their respective domains, but they are transparent to those domains nonetheless

128. 128 reference realism vs. theory realism this distinction applied not only to science (against T. S. Kuhn et al.) but also to common sense (against sceptics of various stripes) the sun exists, and has existed for a long time – the very same object

129. 129 Both scientific partitions and common-sense partitions are based on reference-systems which have survived rigorous empirical tests

130. 130 Criteria of quality of partitions serves communiction learnable (including via scientific training) sensitive to nuances serves prediction

131. 131 The $64000 Question How do those parts and dimensions of reality which we call the common-sense world... relate to those parts and dimensions of reality which are studied by science?

132. 132 Aristotle 2000

133. 133 Universe/Periodic Table animal bird canary ostrich fish folk biology partition of DNA space

134. 134 Universe/Periodic Table animal bird canary ostrich fish both are transparent partitions of one and the same reality

135. 135 many transparent partitions at different levels of granularity will operate with species-genus hierarchies and with an ontology of substances (objects) and accidents (attributes, processes) along the lines described by Aristotle

136. 136 relative hylomorphism substances and accidents reappear in the microscopic and macroscopic worlds of e.g. molecular biology and astronomy (Aristotelian ontological zooming)

137. 137 we do not assert that every level of granularity is structured in substance accident form -- perhaps there are pure process levels, perhaps there are levels structured as fields

138. 138 Perspectivalism Different partitions may represent cuts through the same reality which are skew to each other

139. 139 An organism is a totality of molecules An organism is a totality of cells An organism is a single unitary substance... all of these express veridical partitions An organism is a totality of atoms

140. 140 all express partitions which are transparent, at different levels of granularity, to the same reality beyond

141. 141 Coarse-grained Partition what happens when a fringe instance arises ?

142. 142 Coarse-grained Partition what happens when a fringe instance arises ? Aristotle 1.0: you shrug your shoulders

143. 143 Aristotle 2000: you go out to find a finer grained partition which will recognize the phenomenon in question as prototypical

144. 144 The advance of science is not an advance away from Aristotle towards something better. Provided Aristotle is interpreted aright, it is a rigorous demonstration of the correctness of his ontological approach

145. 145 It still remains the case, that: all sciences are perfect, to the extent that Aristotle treated of their subject- matters

146. 146 Kantianism there is some unknown x, beyond all that can be grasped by our partitions as our partitions get better and better they will approximate ever more closely to this x, but x itself will never be arrived at

147. 147 Summary of the argument against Kantianism each coarse-grained partition gives only a partial view (no complete map) but it is a partial view which is already transparent to reality: the objects themselves already fall within our grasp

148. 148 THE END 1

149. 149 Open problems how deal with ethical structures in the mesoscopic level -- to what do they correspond on the lower levels? can the granularity based theory of vagueness be made to work here? (Brogaard)

150. 150 Open Problems how deal with institutions, and other holistic structures on higher levels? mind-body problem freedom of the will

151. 151 Good conceptualizatons Philosophical ontologists are interested in: 1. transparent conceptualizations, veridical perspectives on reality 2. which are at the same time interesting = science, and what else

152. 152 Problem with process metaphysics arises only if it comes along with the claim to be complete

153. 153 Multitree

154. 154 Multitree any directed acyclical graph which satisfies: the descendants of any node form a tree

155. 155 two trees sharing the same set of leaves, for example the Dewey Decimal and the Library of Congress classification systems As Furnas and Zacks note, genealogies, although frequently called "family trees", are in fact multitrees. Multitrees offer a natural notion of context (displaying ancestors) and content (displaying descendants), and are therefore very well suited for reusing hierarchical structure.

156. 156 Aristotle 2000 closed, open universe -- different layers of partitions. relative hylomorphism, plus a load der/die/das)‚ multitrees

157. 157 there are too many individuals...

158. 158 siamese mammal cat organism substance species, genera animal instances frog

159. 159 Common nouns pekinese mammal cat organism substance animal common nouns proper names

160. 160 siamese mammal cat organism substance types animal tokens frog

161. 161 substance one substantial category John, man nine accidental categories hunger, your hunger, being hungry your sun-tan your being taller than Mary accidents

162. 162 substance place (in the Lyceum) time (yesterday) position (is sitting) possession (has shoes on) action (cuts) passion (is cut) quantity (two feet long) quality (white) relation (taller than) John accidents

163. 163 substance Substances are the bearers of accidents accidents Bearers

164. 164 substance Substances are the bearers of accidents accidents John = relations of inherence (one-sided existential dependence) Bearers hunger

165. 165 s substance

166. 166 Aristotelian Ontology of Weather Substance = earth Accidents = wind, thunder

167. 167 substanceaccidents Substance + Accident = State of Affairs States of Affairs

168. 168 Substance + Accident = State of Affairs setting into relief States of Affair s

169. 169 Not in a Subject Substantial In a Subject Accidental Said of a Subject Universal, General, Type Second Substances man, horse, mammal Non-substantial Universals whiteness, knowledge Not said of a Subject Particular, Individual, Token First Substances this individual man, this horse this mind, this body Individual Accidents this individual whiteness, knowledge of grammar Aristotle’s Ontological Square (full)

170. 170 Lake Tahoe Land Cover

171. 171 Lake Tahoe Land Cover

172. 172 Cerebral Cortex

173. 173 Mouse Chromosome 5

174. 174 Constitutions of 158 States world’s first database

175. 175 Prototypicality among sub-categories some sub-categories of a given category are more typical, standard, than others canary is more typical than ostrich

176. 176 instances Prototypicality among instances too albino frog

177. 177 What is missing from Aristotle? Gibson: affordances niches geometry of surface layout

178. 178 Places For Aristotle a place is a hole filled by a substance The place occupied by you is the boundary of the surrounding air where it meets your body

179. 179 Varieties of Controlled Airspace

180. 180 Question: Are mountains bona fide or fiat objects? Did mountains exist before human cognitive agents came along?

181. 181 Filled Holes

182. 182 Superficial Objects?

183. 183

184. 184 Fields

185. 185 Cognition imposes upon fields a division into objects Are all objects fiat objects

186. 186 Aggregates

187. 187 Der Bevölkerung

188. 188 Dem Deutschen Volke

189. 189 Dem Deutschen Volke

190. 190 Business Objects

191. 191 Summer Forms, Winter Forms

192. 192 Alps

193. 193 Alps

194. 194 Alps

195. 195 Alps

196. 196 Mountain is the most prominent kind of geographic thing in the common-sense ontology. But it is absent from the scientific ontology as a kind of thing. Scientific ontology = topography as a field, represented by sampled values and interpolation functions, or by simple geometric forms such as triangles. The scientific ontology includes slope steepness and direction at every point, but even hillslopes are represented as fields.

197. 197 Process vs. Form in Geomorphology with thanks to Bernard Bauer The interest of geomorphologists in processes is motivated by attempts to understand form (morphe = Greek ‘form’) Form has to do with boundary conditions Forms = mountain, river, valley, bay, etc.

198. 198 Process vs. Form in Geomorphology Hypothesis: 1. Processes occur at small scales (examples: entrainment and transport of sediments, groundwater effluxes, weathering, etc.) 2. Eventually they manifest themselves as forms (which exist at larger scales and change much more slowly through time)

199. 199 Process vs. Form in Geomorphology Question: Is the dynamics of how a particular form changes through time (e.g., how a meander bend shifts or how a hillslope degrades) to be considered ‘process’?

200. 200 Process vs. Form in Geomorphology We can after all interpret sedimentary strata and make inferences about changing meandering patterns and flood sequences – floods are then the 'processes' that lead to the form known as a floodplain Form and process at different levels of granularity

201. 201 Process vs. Form in Geomorphology Microprocesses (erosion) involving Microforms (gravel) Macroprocesses (flooding) involving Macroforms (rivers)

202. 202 Process vs. Form in Geomorphology ObjectProcess floodplain valley delta flood glacial motion sedimentation this floodplain this valley this delta this flood this glacial motion this sediment transport Token Type

203. 203 Different ways of slicing up reality Fields vs. Objects 1.landscapes are continuous (fields) – view of contemporary geomorphology 2.landscapes consist of assemblages of objects falling under natural kinds – view of ordinary cognitive agent What is the relation between these two ?

204. 204 Cognitive Contexts: language-communities organizations sciences religions information systems business firms

205. 205 = a system of concepts pertaining to a given domain... concepts that are more or less coherently specified Each involves a certain conceptualization

206. 206 ‘An ontology is a specification of a conceptualization’ (Tom Gruber, SRI) Tom Gruber’s Definition... designed to provide a stable forum for translation and interoperability as between different conceptualizations Ontolingua = Esperanto for Information Systems

207. 207 Ontology, for Gruber, starts with our conceptualizations, and sees how far we can push through from there to a description of a corresponding domain of objects conceptualizations are associated with: stories, sciences, organizations, etc.

208. 208 Ontology, for Gruber, deals with surrogate created worlds with ‘models’... with the generated correlates of both good and bad conceptualizations

209. 209 Two sorts of conceptualizations bad = those which relate merely to a created, surrogate world good = those which are transparent to some independent reality beyond

210. 210 Not all conceptualizations are equal Bad conceptualizations:... lying, story-telling, dreaming, astrology, metaphysical error... Good conceptualizations: science what else?

211. 211 Scientific conceptualizations = those based on reference-systems which have survived rigorous empirical tests Referential realism vs. Theory realism

212. 212 Are there transparent conceptualizations outside science?

213. 213 The Empty Mask (Magritte)

214. 214 Good conceptualizatons Philosophical ontologists are interested in: 1. transparent conceptualizations, veridical perspectives on reality 2. which are at the same time interesting = science, and what else

215. 215 Internet Ontology Die Welt löst sich auf in unseren Datentabellen. Welt und elektronische Erfassung sind untrennbar. Die Medien der e-Erkenntnis sind undurchsichtig

216. 216 Kantian Idealism Die Welt löst sich auf in unseren Bewußtseinsakten. Welt und Erfahrung sind untrennbar. Die Medien der Erkenntnis sind undurchsichtig (die Wirklichkeit ist verschleiert)

217. 217 hard vs. soft categories Kant: wir prügeln die Wirklichkeit, bis sie unseren Kategorien entspricht Aristoteles: Die Kategorien in der Welt sind offene (sanfte) Kategorien, d.h., sie werden auch Grenzfällen gerecht

218. 218 But what about science ?

219. 219... are our scientific partitions truly transparent to an independent reality ? (second Kantian argument)

220. 220 D’Espagnat: Die verschleierte Wirklichkeit die Heisenberg’sche Unschärferelation (die Medien der Erkenntnis sind im Grundbereich der Physik undurchsichtig...)

221. 221 There are no veridical (transparent) partitions at the quantum level

222. 222 concepts vs. categories on the Kantian reading species are concepts on the Aristotelian reading the world itself exhibits a species-genus structure independently of how we conceive it