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Absolute Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM)

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Presentation on theme: "Absolute Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM)"— Presentation transcript:

1 Absolute Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM)
Todd Walter Stanford University

2 Introduction GPS is an important component of today’s aviation navigation infrastructure Its role will continue to increase over the coming years Future GNSS constellations will also become important contributors However, their incorporation must be done with great care as the integrity requirements for aircraft guidance are very stringent Less than 10-7 probability of misleading information International standards define different types of GNSS augmentations to achieve this level of integrity

3 Integrity Monitoring Satellite-based and ground-based augmentation systems provide independent monitoring of the GPS signals through calibrated ground monitors Requires ground monitoring network communication channel to aircraft Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) compares redundant satellite range measurements against each other to identify and eliminate significant faults Requires a greater number of ranging measurements than SBAS or GBAS

4 ARAIM Protection Level

5 RAIM vs. ARAIM LNAV requirements are much less stringent than LPV
Alert limit measure in nautical miles Only real threat is a large clock error For LPV MI is hazardous (vs. major) Alert limit in tens of meters Many sources of potentially significant errors Two or more smaller errors may combine to cause a large enough error ARAIM needed to more carefully account for all threats

6 Interoperability of Integrity
Interoperability should be a goal not only for GNSS signals, but also for integrity provision Augmentation systems already internationally coordinated Open service signals should target performance comparable to or better than GPS L1 signals today Different service providers may make different design choices and different assurances However, it is important to establish a common understanding of how RAIM depends on GNSS performance and how signals from different services could be combined to improve RAIM Cooperation and transparency are essential

7 Benefits of Multi-Constellation RAIM
Combining signals from multiple constellations can provide significantly greater availability and higher performance levels than can be achieved individually Support for vertically guided approaches Potential to provide a safety of life service without requiring the GNSS service provider to certify each system to 10-7 integrity levels Creates a truly international solution All service providers contribute Not dependent on any single entity Coverage is global and seamless

8 Service Commitment Each service provider should provide documentation of their service commitment Encourage usage by other states Allows planning of combined service level Supports development of interface specifications and user algorithms Commitment should include details on: Accuracy, continuity, availability, fault modes, broadcast parameters, and other operating characteristics Assurances should be provided for minimum commitments

9 Specification of Faults
Perform a fault modes and effects analysis Understand and make transparent potential faults and their effects Assure low fault rates Of order 10-5/SV/Hour Assure low probability of simultaneous or common mode faults Ideally below 10-8/Constellation/Hour Assure a short time to alert Not longer than 6 hours Maintain independence from other service providers

10 Monitoring and Assurance
Methods for monitoring conformity of signal properties relative to provided assurances should be agreed upon mutually by service providers and approval authorities Require clear unambiguous evaluations of assurances May be made by any potential approval authority Desirable to have a means to resolve potential observations of non-conformity Long-term monitoring by each sovereign state is an important component of establishing reliability Each constellation still cross-checked by others in user avionics

11 Interface Specification
Each system may broadcast different parameters or provide different levels of assurance However, a common understanding of how each parameter is used must be reached The parameters must be combined into a single upper bound for the joint position estimate The upper bound must be safe regardless of which combinations of satellites are used Also able to account for potentially different properties Requires a more advanced form of RAIM than is used currently for LNAV Good candidates already exist

12 Summary RAIM allows for worldwide aviation navigation without requiring additional ground infrastructure Additional GNSS constellations can significantly improve performance and availability At a minimum, new GNSS constellations should assure that their open service signals support existing LNAV RAIM Should work together to specify a means to achieve multi-constellation RAIM for vertical guidance International cooperation and coordination will be essential to achieving this goal

13 Specification of Accuracy
The dominant error sources should be understood and characterized Satellite clock and ephemeris within constellation tied to clear, stable, global, reference frames Code and carrier signals coherently derived from a common source Well designed signals to reduce multipath, ionosphere, and distortion effects International coordination already well-established Document how the expected performance level is indicated to the user Should broadcast expected accuracy for a fault-free ranging source

14 Specification of Availability & Continuity
Description of constellation geometry Number of satellites, planes, spacing, etc. Assure minimum levels of operating satellites e.g probability of at least 20 primary slots occupied by satellites broadcasting valid signals Assure minimum levels of continuity e.g. less than probability of unscheduled interruption or fault of previously healthy signal Lesser minimums support multi-const. RAIM even if they cannot support stand-alone

15 Fault Tree and Probability of Hazardously Misleading Information (PHMI)
Courtesy: Juan Blanch Any mode causes HMI PHMIk PHMI0 PHMI1 No failures/ rare normal create HMI failure of sat 1 causes HMI failure of sat k causes HMI Mode prior probability = ~1 Mode prior prob-ability = ~1e-4 Mode prior prob-ability = ~1e-4 For each branch, a monitor mitigates the probability of HMI given the failure In ARAIM, the monitors are formed by comparing subset solutions

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