Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Brussels, 9th November 2007 Constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions in Poland – the Banking Investigative Committee case Piotr Chybalski Chancellery.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Brussels, 9th November 2007 Constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions in Poland – the Banking Investigative Committee case Piotr Chybalski Chancellery."— Presentation transcript:

1 Brussels, 9th November 2007 Constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions in Poland – the Banking Investigative Committee case Piotr Chybalski Chancellery of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland

2 Contents 1.Evolution of constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions 2.Analysis of the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22nd Sept. 2006 on the so called Banking Investigative Committee judgment (Ref. No. U 4/06)

3 Evolution of constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions (1) Before 1992/1993 parliamentary resolutions were considered incapable of being reviewed by the CT: a)Closed catalogue of sources of universally binding law in Poland (did not include resolutions), b)the principle of parliamentary autonomy, c)„old” mentality (the Sejm still considered a supreme State organ).

4 Evolution of constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions (2) Constitutional Tribunal’s judgments of 1992 and 1993 (U 6/92, U 10/92, U 14/92): Article 1 Para 2 of the CT Act of 1985 – the CT may control „normative acts” issued by „supreme and central State organs”, Admissibility of constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions, if they are „normative”, i.e. create abstract and general legal norms, Admissibility of constitutional review of parliamentary rules of procedure.

5 The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (1) Article 95 Para. 2 of the Constitution of 1997: The Sejm shall exercise control over the activities of the Council of Ministers within the scope specified by the provisions of the Constitution and statutes. Article 111 Para. 1 of the Constitution of 1997: The Sejm may appoint an investigative committee to examine a particular matter. Act of 21st January 1999 on Sejm Investigative Committees (Dz.U. No. 35, item 321, with amendments)

6 The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (2) Resolution of the Sejm of 24th March 2006 on the appointment of the Investigative Committee to examine decisions concerning capital and ownership transformations in the banking sector, and the activities of banking supervision authorities from 4th June 1989 to 19th March 2006, Four Articles (creation of the committtee, scope of activity, number of members of the committee, entering of the resolution into force), Group of Deputies to the Sejm applied to the CT for a review of Articles 1 and 2.

7 The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (3) Review of Article 1of the resolution: Creation of the investigative committee, An act establishing a new organ shall be the act of applying, as opposed to creating, the law. Thus, acts appointing Sejm committees, including extraordinary ones cannot be the subject of review by the Constitutional Tribunal, Discontinuation of proceedings by the CT.

8 The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (4) Review of Article 2 of the resolution (scope of activity of the committee): The article is „an element of a legal norm” (together with Article 7 Para. 1 of the Act of Sejm Investigative Committees), The norm is general (defines the addressee by indicating their generic features) and abstract (regulates repeatable behaviours that may be defined in a generic manner), Conclusion – Article 2 is „normative”, so its constitutional review is admissible.

9 The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (5) Review of Article 2 of the resolution (scope of activity of the committee): The scope of activity was generally too broad and too general, An investigative committee may not control the National Bank of Poland and the Committee for Banking Supervision, An investigative committee may not violate the autonomy of private persons and entrepreneurs.

10 The Banking Investigative Committee judgment (6) Conclusions: -It is admissible for the CT to review parliamentary resolutions even if only some of their provisions are „normative”, -It is admissible for the CT to review provisions of parliamentary resolutions even if they do not constitute „complete” general and abstract legal norms, but only „elements” of such norms.

11 Thank You for Your attention


Download ppt "Brussels, 9th November 2007 Constitutional review of parliamentary resolutions in Poland – the Banking Investigative Committee case Piotr Chybalski Chancellery."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google