1. Consequences of consensus democracy

2. Structure The impact of consensus and majoritarian democracies
Lijphart Patterns of Democracy Yale 1999
The effects of electoral systems
Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering CUP 2004
Next class Monday: discussion exercise:
Use Lijphart’s theory to evaluate the new constitution and electoral system in Afghanistan.

3. I: Impact of consensus v. majoritarian democracies
Is majoritarian democracy better at government and consensus democracy better at representation? Lijphart’s indicators…
Performance (Table 15.1)
Macroeconomic performance
Control of violence/riots/deaths
Representation (Table 16.1)
Women’s inclusion
Voter Turnout
Satisfaction with democracy
Public policy outcomes

4. Impact on stability & performance
Mean
Majoritarian
Consensus
Riots
1.96
3.17
Political deaths
6.86
2.41
Economic growth
3.4
3.5
Inflation
7.5
6.3
Unemployment
6.1
4.4
Income top 20% 1988
42.9
39.0

5. II. Impact of electoral systems
Proportionality of votes to seats (fair outcomes)
Party competition
Electoral turnout
Parliamentary representation
Women & ethno-political minorities
Strength of cleavage politics
Constituency service
What criteria do you regard as most important? Why?

6. Recap: Classification of systems
Adversarial Majoritarian

7. Evidence Aggregate effects Individual-level effects
Classify electoral systems worldwide
Analyze results in elections for lower house in 143 nations
Individual-level effects
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
30 nations – survey battery

8. 1. Impact on proportionality
Proportionality of votes to seats
Winning party
Perfect proportionality
20%
2nd party, 3rd etc
Seat share
20%
Vote share

9. Proportionality Regressions of % Votes to % Seats per party

10. Measures of proportionality
Loosemore-Hanby Index (D)
D =__1__ Σ (vi – si) 2
Sums absolute difference between
Vote percentage (vi)
Seat percentage (si)
Divided by 2
(Slightly exaggerates disproportionality of systems with many small parties)
(Index was standardized to 100-point scale by Rose)

11. Proportionality Standardized Loosemore-Hanby Index

12. Proportionality influenced by:
Number of parties in the electorate
Geographical distribution of the vote
District magnitude (members per district)
Legal vote thresholds
The type of electoral formulae eg d’Hondt etc

13. 2. Impact on parties: Duverger’s laws
(1) “The plurality single-ballot rule tends to party dualism.”
(2)“The double-ballot system and proportional representation tend to multipartyism.”
Maurice Duverger Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.

14. Effect on parties All Majoritarian 5.22 3.33 54.5 56.8 All Combined
Mean N of parl parties (1 seat)
Mean N of relevant parl parties (3%+ seats)
% Vote for party 1st
% Seats for party 1st
Number of countries
All Majoritarian
5.22
3.33
54.5
56.8 83
Alternative Vote
9.00
3.00
40.3
45.3 1
Block vote
5.60
4.57
52.9
56.2 10
2nd Ballot
6.00
3.20
54.8
57.8 23
FPTP
4.78
3.09
55.1 49
All Combined
8.85
4.52
46.8
49.5 26
Independent
8.89
3.94
51.7
53.9 19
Dependent
8.71
6.17
33.9
36.9 7
ALL Proportional
9.52
4.74
43.8 61
STV
5.00
2.50
50.1 2
Party List
9.68
4.82
44.5
43.6 59
TOTAL
7.05
4.12
48.7
50.0
143
Ref: Pippa Norris ‘Institutions Matter’ CUP 2003

15. ENPP by Electoral System
Ref: Pippa Norris ‘Electoral Engineering’ CUP 2004

16. “A 5% increase in disproportionality reduces the ENPP by half a party” Lijphart p168

17. 3. Effect on Turnout Ref: Pippa Norris 2002. Democratic Phoenix Ch 4.
Type of Electoral System
Mean Vote/VAP 1990s N.
MAJORITARIAN
Alternative Vote
65.5 2
2nd Ballot
58.5 21
First-Past-The-Post
61.2 43
Single Non-Transferable Vote
52.6
Block Vote
56.5 9
All majoritarian
60.4 77
COMBINED
Combined-Dependent
66.6 7
Combined-Independent
63.5 19
All combined
64.0 26
PROPORTIONAL
List PR
70.0 59
Single Transferable Vote
83.4
All PR Systems 68
All
65.0
164

18. But also impact of compulsory voting
Vote/VAP
Vote/Reg
N. of Nations
Older democracies
Compulsory
79.4
86.9 7
Non-Compulsory
71.7
72.7 32
Difference
+7.7
+14.2 39
Newer democracies
67.7
75.8 9
69.3
73.9 31
-1.6
+1.9 40
Semi-democracies
53.9
60.6 5
56.6
67.0
-2.7
-6.4 45
Non-democracies
40.9
70.6 2
61.8
67.8 38
-20.9
+2.8
All
65.9
75.4 23
64.2
70.0
140
+5.4
163

19. 4. Impact on women
“As a simple rule, women proved twice as likely to be elected under PR than majoritarian electoral systems.
Women were 10.8 percent of MPs in majoritarian systems, 15.1 percent in mixed or semi-proportional systems, and 19.8 percent of members in PR systems.”
P.Norris in R.Rose Encyclopedia of Elections (CQ 2001)

20. FPTP
Mixed PR

21. But also other rules matter…
Political culture
&
societal development
Demand by selectors
Demand by voters
Electoral laws
1.Electoral system
2.Legal gender quotas
3.Reserved seats
Candidate selection process within parties
4.Voluntary gender quotas
Pool of parliamentary candidates
Elected members
Supply of candidates
Equal opportunities in education, home and work

22. Legal gender quotas Country Date % Quota % Before % After Change
Argentina
1991 30 6 27
+21
Ecuador
1997 20 4 15
+11
Paraguay
1996 11 18 +7
Peru
Venezuela
1998 13
Belgium
1994 33 23 +5
Costa Rica 40 14 19
Dominican Rep 25 12 16 +4
Panama 8 10 +2 9
France
1999 50 +1
Bolivia
Mexico 3
Brazil 7 -1 17
Average
Note: Legal gender quotas for the lower house of national parliaments: laws which specify that each party must include a minimum proportion of women on party lists of candidates. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering Table 8.5

23. 5. Impact on cleavage politics
Majoritarian
Combined PR
Pippa Norris ‘Electoral Engineering’ CUP 2004

24. 6. Impact on constituency service?
% With contact
Type of Districts
Iceland 31 PR
New Zealand 24
Combined
Canada 22
Majoritarian
Denmark 20
Open PR
Switzerland
Thailand 17
Australia 16
Israel
Closed PR
Korean Rep
Lithuania 15
Norway
Britain 13
Chile 12
USA
Germany 11
Sweden
Mexico 10
Belarus 9
Peru
Czech Republic 8
Japan
Taiwan
Ukraine
Hungary 7
Romania
Poland 6
Portugal
Netherlands 5
Russia 3
Spain
ALL
% With contact with elected member in last 12 months
Ref: Pippa Norris ‘Electoral engineering’ CUP 2004

25. Effects of electoral systems
Proportionality of votes to seats 
Party competition 
Electoral turnout 
Parliamentary representation
Women 
Ethno-political minorities (?)
Strength of cleavage politics 
Constituency service ?

26. Next class Monday Case study application
Apply Lijphart’s theory to evaluate the new Afghanistan electoral system
What evaluative criteria are most important in this case?
Stability? Policy effectiveness? Gender? Ethnicity?
What does the new constitution propose?
How has the electoral system worked?
What are the consequences of the constitutional choices?