1. Outline  Comparison 1: Posted-Bid versus Oral-Bid auctions: Plott and Smith (1978)  Smith (1964)  Williams (1973)  Comparison 2: Posted-offer versus Double-Auction Pricing Mechanisms: Ketcham, Arlington, and Williams (1984)  Comparison 3: Nonbinding Price Controls  A Double Auction Market: Smith and Williams (1981)  A Posted-Offer Market: Coursey and Smith (1983)

2. Laboratory Market Trading Institutions

3. Smith (1964): Oral Auction Seller BuyerSeller-Buyer

4. Oral-Bid Auction (Buyer) Market Organization The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for a trading period ( a trading “day”). The period last for 5 minutes. Any buyer is free at any time during the period, to raise his hand and make a verbal bid to buy one unit of the commodity at a specified price. Any seller is free to accept or not accept the bid of any buyer but sellers cannot make counter offers. If a bid is accepted a binding contract has been closed for a single unit between the buyer and seller will record the contract price to be included in their earnings. Any ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by a random choice of buyer or seller. Except for the bids and their acceptance you are not to speak to any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you are free to keep trying, and as a buyer or a seller you are free to make as much profit as you can. Are there any questions?

5. Smith (1964)

6. Williams (1973): Posted Auction

7. Posted-Bid Auction Market Organization The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for each trading day. Each buyer decides on a purchase price which he will write on one of the cards provided. The buyers will be given two minutes to submit their prices. The cards will be collected and the prices written on the blackboard. Sellers will then be free to make offers to sell whatever quantities they desire and to specify the buyer to whom they wish to sell. Offers will be made as follow: a seller will be chosen using random numbers, and will state the quantity he wishes to sell and the buyer to whom he wishes to sell. The buyer will then accept any part of the seller’s offer by stating the quantity he wishes to buy. However, when a buyer posts a price, he must be prepared to buy at least one unit. If the first buyer will not purchase all units the seller wants to sell, the seller is free to choose a second buyer, and so on.

8. Smith (1964) versus Williams (1973)

9. Experimental Design  4 sessions; each session has 4 buyers and 4 sellers  Two buyers (sellers) received D 1 (S 1 )  Two buyers (sellers) received D 2 (S 2 )

10. Demand and Supply Schedules

11. Posted-Bid vs. Oral-Bid General This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which some of you will be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, labeled Buyer or Seller, which describes the value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information. Specific Instructions for Buyers During each market period you are free to purchase from any seller or sellers as many units as you might want. For the first unit that you buy during a trading period you will receive the amount listed in row (1) marked 1 st unit redemption value; if you buy a second unit you will receive the additional amount listed in row (5) marked 2 nd unit redemption value; etc. The profits from each purchase (which are yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the redemption value and purchase price of the unit bought. Under no conditions may you buy a unit for a price which exceeds the redemption value. In addition to this profit you will receive a 5 cent commission for each purchases. That is [your earnings = (redemption value) – (purchase price) + 0.05 commission].

12. Posted-Bid vs. Oral-Bid Suppose for example that you buy two units and that your redemption value for the first unit is $200 and for the second unit is $180. If you pay $150 for your first unit and $160 for the second unit, your earnings are: $ earnings from 1 st = 200 – 150 + 0.05 = 50.05 $ earnings from 2 nd = 180 – 160 + 0.05 = 20.05 total $ earnings = 50.05 + 20.05 = 70.10 The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The purchase price of the first unit you buy during the first period should be recorded on row (2) at the time of purchase. You should then record the profits on this purchase as directed on rows (3) and (4). At the end of the period record the total of profits and commissions on the last row (41) on the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly. Specific Instructions for Sellers During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer or buyers as many units as you might want. The first unit that you sell during a trading period you obtain at a cost of the amount listed on the attached sheet in the row (2) marked cost of 1 st unit; if you sell a second unit you incur the cost listed in the row (6) marked cost of the 2 nd unit; etc. The profits from each sale (which are yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the price at which you sold the unit and the cost of the unit. Under no conditions may you sell a unit at a price below the cost of the unit. In addition to this profit you will receive a 5 cent commission for each sale. That is [your earnings = (sale price of unit) – (cost of unit) + (0.05 commission)].

13. Posted-Bid vs. Oral-Bid Your total profits and commissions for a trading period, which are yours to keep, are computed by adding up the profit and commissions on sales made during the trading period. Suppose, for example, your cost of the first unit is $140 and your cost of the second unit is $160. For illustrative purposes we will consider only a two-unit case. If you sell the first unit at $200 and the second unit at $190, your earnings are: $ earnings from 1 st = 200 – 140 + 0.05 = 60.05 $ earnings from 2 nd = 190 – 160 + 0.05 = 30.05 total $ earnings = 60.05 + 30.05 = 90.10 The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The sale price of the first unit you sell during the 1 st period should be recorded on row (1) at the time of sale. You should then record the profits on this sale as directed on rows (3) and (4). At the end of the period record the total of profits and commissions on the last row (41) on the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly. Market Organization (included in instructions for Exp. 3 but not Exp. 4) The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for each trading day. Each buyer decides on a purchase price which he will write on one of the cards provided. The buyers will be given two minutes to submit their prices. The cards will be collected and the prices written on the blackboard. Sellers will then be free to make offers to sell whatever quantities they desire and to specify the buyer to whom they wish to sell. Offers will be made as follow: a seller will be chosen using random numbers, and will state the quantity he wishes to sell and the buyer to whom he wishes to sell. The buyer will then accept any part of the seller’s offer by stating the quantity he wishes to buy. However, when a buyer posts a price, he must be prepared to buy at least one unit. If the first buyer will not purchase all units the seller wants to sell, the seller is free to choose a second buyer, and so on.

14. Posted-bid vs. Oral-bid When the first seller has made all his contracts, another seller will be selected at random and he will make his desired purchases. The process will be continued until there are no offers to sell. This completes the trading day. We will reopen the market for a new trading day by having buyers submit new prices and the process will be repeated. Except for the offers and their acceptance you are not to speak to any other subject. You are free to make as much profit as you can. Are there any questions? Market Organization ( included in instructions for Exp. 4 but not Exp. 3) The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for a trading period ( a trading “day”). The period last for 5 minutes. Any buyer is free at any time during the period, to raise his hand and make a verbal bid to buy one unit of the commodity at a specified price. Any seller is free to accept or not accept the bid of any buyer but sellers cannot make counter offers. If a bid is accepted a binding contract has been closed for a single unit between the buyer and seller will record the contract price to be included in their earnings. Any ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by a random choice of buyer or seller. Except for the bids and their acceptance you are not to speak to any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you are free to keep trying, and as a buyer or a seller you are free to make as much profit as you can. Are there any questions?

15. Experimental Results  Experiments 1 and 3  The average prices are below equilibrium  Prices appear to be converging to equilibrium from below  The quantity exchanged also tends to be below equilibrium  Experiments 2 and 4  Average prices tend to be above the prices in the posted-bid institutions  There is a tendency to rise towards and above equilibrium prices

16. Results: Experiments 1 and 2

17. Results: Experiments 3 and 4

18. Efficiency and Subject Payments  Volume in the oral-bid auction is always greater than in the posted-bid case. This suggests that no all gains from trade are exhausted in the posted-bid institution  These markets are perfectly efficient if and only if the maximum amount of dollars is extracted by the participants from the experimenter.  Experiments 1 and 2 : $7.12  Experiments 3 and 4: $9.12

19. Conditions for Efficiency (when commissions are paid)  All buyers (sellers) exchange all units with redemption values (marginal costs) above (below) the competitive equilibrium price. These are called the intra-marginal demand (supply) units.  All buyers (sellers) exchange all units with redemption value (marginal cost) equal to the competitive equilibrium price. These are called the marginal demand (supply) units.  No buyers (sellers) exchange any units with redemption value (marginal costs) below (above) the competitive equilibrium price. These are called the extra-marginal demand (supply) units.

20. Observed Efficiency: Posted-Bid Auction Without Commission With Commission

21. Observed Efficiency: Oral-Bid Auction Without Commission With Commission

22. Summary  Price bias in one-sided oral auction affects income distribution but not resource allocation  The importance of commission (experiments 3+ 4 versus 1+2)  Why efficiency of posted-bid auction is less than 100% ? (see example)

23. Why efficiency <100% in Posted-bid auctions

24. Price Adjustment: Oral-Bid Auction

26. Price Adjustment: Experiment 3

27. Price Adjustment: Experiment 4

28. Summary  In oral-bid auctions, price rise to levels that are to the disadvantage of buyers.  In posted-bid auctions, price falls to levels that are advantageous to buyers.  Oral-bid auctions: Unaccepted bids  Overshoot behavior  Posted-bid auctions: The high (low) bidder in period t lowers (raises) his bid in period t+1.

29. Experiments 1 and 2 General This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for the conduct of this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash after the experiment. In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which some of you will be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Two kinds of sheets will now be distributed— information for buyers and information for sellers. The sheets are identified and numbered. The number is only for data-collecting purposes. If you have received sellers’ information, you will function only as a seller in this market. Similarly, if you have received buyers’ information, you will function only as a buyer in this market. The information you have received is for your own private use. Do not reveal it to anyone. This is a one commodity market in which there is no product differentiation. That is, each seller produces a product which is similar in all respects to the products offered by the other seller. A seller is free to sell to any buyer or buyers. Likewise, a buyer may purchase from any seller of sellers. Specific Instructions for Sellers During each market period you are free to produce and sell any of the amounts listed on your information sheet. Assume that you produce only for immediate sale—there are no inventories. The dollar amounts listed in column 2 on your information sheet are your costs of producing that quantity. Your payoffs are computed as follows: At the beginning of the experiment you will receive starting capital of $0.30. If you are able to make any sales, you will receive the difference between your sales revenue and your cost. For example, if you were to sell two units at $100 each, total revenue would be $200. Suppose your information sheet indicated that the cost of producing two units was $190. Your total profit would then be $200 - $190 = $10 for the trading period. If you sold two units for less than $190 you would incur a loss. Column 3 will be useful to a seller in deciding at any time during a given trading period whether to sell a second unit. If the additional cost of producing the second unit is $10, then he will lose money on that unit if he sells it at any price below $10.

30. Experiments 1 and 2 Obviously, these figures are illustrative only and should not be assumed to apply to the actual sellers in this experiment. All of your profits will be added to your starting capital, and any losses you might incur will be subtracted. Your total payoffs will be accumulated over several trading periods and the total amount will be paid to you after the experiment. Specific Instructions for Buyers During each market period you are free to purchase any of the quantities listed on your information sheet. Assume that you are buying this commodity for the purpose of reselling it in an entirely different market. The dollar amounts listed beside each quantity are the total value of that quantity. That is, they are the amounts you can sell that quantity for in the other market. Your payoffs are computed as follows: You will receive starting capital of $0.30. If you are able to make any purchases, you will receive the difference between the total value as shown on your information sheet and the total amount you paid for the purchases. For example, if you were to purchase one unit for $105 and another for $95, you would obviously have paid a total of $200 for the two units. Suppose your information sheet indicated that the revenue from two units was $210. Your profit for the market period would then be $210 - $200 = $10. If you had paid more than $210 for the two units, you would have incurred a loss. Column 3 will be useful to a buyer in deciding at any time during a given period whether to buy an additional unit. Suppose a buyer has already bought two units at a profit, and wants to know if he should buy a third unit. If the additional revenue he gets from the third unit is $7, then he will lose money on that unit if he buys it at any price above $7. Obviously, these figures are illustrative only and should not be assumed to apply to the actual buyers in this experiment. All of your profits will be added to your starting capital, and any losses you might incur will be subtracted. Your total payoffs will be accumulated over several trading periods and the total amount will be paid to you after the experiment.

31. Experiments 1 and 2 Market Organization (included in Exp. 1 instructions but not Exp. 2) The market for this commodity is organized as follow: we open the market for each trading day. Each buyer decides on a purchase price which he will write on one of the cards provided. The buyers will be given two minutes to submit their prices. The cards will be collected and the prices written on the blackboard. Sellers will then be free to make offers to sell whatever quantities they desire and to specify the buyer to whom they wish to sell. Offers will be made as follows: a seller selected at random, will state the quantity he wishes to sell and the buyer to whom he wishes to sell. The buyer will then accept any part of the seller’s offer by stating the quantity he wishes to buy. However, when a buyer posts a price, he must be prepared to buy at least one unit if any seller wishes to sell to him. If the first buyer will not purchase all units the seller wants to sell, the seller is free to make contracts with another buyer or buyers. When the first seller has made all his contracts, another seller will be selected at random and he will make his desired purchases. The process will be continued until there are no offers to sell. This completes the trading day. We will reopen the market for a new trading day by having buyers submit new prices and the process will be repeated. Are there any questions?

32. Experiments 1 and 2 Market Organization (included in Exp. 2 instructions but not Exp. 1) The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for a trading day. Any buyer is free at any time to raise his hand and make a verbal bid to buy one unit of the commodity at a specified price. Any seller is free to accept or not accept the bid of any buyer but sellers cannot make counter offers. If a bid is accepted a binding contract has been closed for a single unit between that buyer and seller. This process continues for a period of time. You will be warned in advance before the market closes and more bids will be called for before actually closing. This completes a market “day”. We will then reopen the market for a new trading period. The cost and revenue tables apply to each new trading period, and represent cost or revenue per period. Are there any questions?

33. Outline  Comparison 1: Posted-Bid versus Oral-Bid auctions: Plott and Smith (1978)  Smith (1964)  Williams (1973)  Comparison 2: Posted-offer versus Double-Auction Pricing Mechanisms: Ketcham, Arlington, and Williams (1984)  Comparison 3: Nonbinding Price Controls  A Double Auction Market: Smith and Williams (1981)  A Posted-Offer Market: Coursey and Smith (1983)

34. Laboratory Market Trading Institutions

35. Key Results: Prices in posted-offer auctions are consistently higher than double-auctions. Why?

36. Main Goal: Stress Test  Twenty-five trading periods to see “steady state” behavior  Experience manipulated  Sellers in posted-offer auctions have complete information on all price offers  Both posted-offer and double auctions were run on PLATO (a computerized system)

37. Posted-Offer Auction: Seller

38. Posted-Offer Auction - Buyer

39. Demand and Supply Schedules + constant to shift schedules

40. Demand and Supply Schedule: Design 1

41. Demand and Supply Schedule: Design 2

42. Competitive Equilibrium & Nash Equilibrium  Competitive equilibrium prices are not Nash equilibria in posted-offer markets  Competitive equilibrium prices are Nash equilibria in double auction markets  In Design 2, there is a Nash equilibrium near the limit-price level of 4.75. (4.73, 4.74, 4.76) (PO5i)

43. Nash Equilibrium

44. Experimental Design  Design I  Double Auction (DA)  Inexperienced Subjects: Three experiments (2DA17, 2DA21, 2DA24)  Experienced Subjects: Three experiments (2DA20x, 2DA47x, 2DA53x)  Posted-offer (PO)  Inexperienced Subjects: Three experiments (PO7i, PO12i, PO19i)  Experienced Subjects: Three experiments (PO27ix, PO32ix, PO17ixs)  Design II  Double Auction (DA)  Inexperienced Subjects: Three experiments (3DA16, 3DA18, 3DA19)  Experienced Subjects: Three experiments (3DA28x, 3DA32x, 3DA36x)  Posted-offer (PO)  Inexperienced Subjects: Three experiments (PO4i, PO5i, PO11i, PO22i)  Experienced Subjects: Three experiments (PO14ix, PO25ix)

45. DA: Design I

46. PO: Design I

47. Mean Deviation: Design I

48. PO: Design II

50. Mean Deviation: Design II

51. Price Convergence: RMSE

52. Price Convergence: Other Measures

53. Price Convergence: Results

54. Price Convergence: Treatment Variables

56. Outline  Comparison 1: Posted-Bid versus Oral-Bid auctions: Plott and Smith (1978)  Smith (1964)  Williams (1973)  Comparison 2: Posted-offer versus Double-Auction Pricing Mechanisms: Ketcham, Arlington, and Williams (1984)  Comparison 3: Nonbinding Price Controls  A Double Auction Market: Smith and Williams (1981)  A Posted-Offer Market: Coursey and Smith (1983)

57. Assess the effects of price controls in Double Auction (DA) market Hypotheses? Do non-binding ceilings favor buyers or sellers? Will sellers use ceiling as focal point for tacit collusion?

58. DA Experiment Design  Use PLATO  Experienced subjects (in prior experiments without price controls)  Values and costs assigned to subjects specify a supply and demand schedule so that efficiency is sensitive to non binding price control  Subjects received announcement that price control is in effect when appropriate  Each experiment consists of three “weeks” of trading, with each week consisting of five or four periods  Total of 16 experiments

59. DA Experiment Design: Example Values and Costs + constant shift at the beginning of new “week” and rerandomized among subjects

60. DA Experiment Design: Example Supply and Demand Schedules

61. DA Experiment Design: Treatment Groups

62. DA Experiment: Summary of Results Ceiling  lower prices Floor  higher prices

63. With Price ControlWithout Price Control Results: An Example

64. Linear model for isolating the impact of various factors  i   i 

65. Transfers of Earnings: The impact of price controls Floor transfers $2.02 per period from buyers to sellers In week 2 Ceiling transfers 46 cents per period from sellers to buyers in Week 2 t-values

66. Assess the effects of price controls in Double Auction market  Non-binding price ceilings (floors) did not appear to serve as focal point  Non-binding ceilings lower the contract prices (ceilings favor buyers)  Non-binding floors raise the contract prices (floors favor sellers)

67. Assess the effects of price controls (could be binding) in Posted-Offer (PO) market Hypotheses? Are the above results sensitive to market institution?

68. Price Controls in Posted-offer Auctions  Use PLATO  Experienced subjects (in experiments without price controls)  Subjects received announcement that price control is in effect when appropriate  Four buyers each capable of purchasing three units from four sellers each capable of selling three units  Each experiment has 20 periods: either first 10 has price control or the second 10  Total of 13 experiments

69. Results: Example Similar to results obtained in DA in non-binding cases

70. PO Experiment Design: Results

71. Summary  Similar to those results in DA for non-binding price controls  The removal of either a binding or a non-binding price ceiling produces a jump in contract prices  After the initial increase in prices, following the lifting of a control, the market tends to converge toward the CE price.

72. Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards By Chrostopher Knittel and Victor Stango We test whether a nonbinding price ceiling may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, using data from the credit card market during the 1980’s. Our empirical model can distinguish instances when firms match a binding ceiling from instances when firms tacitly collude at a nonbinding ceiling. The results suggest that tacit collusion at nonbinding state-level ceilings was prevalent during the early 1980s but that national integration of the market reduced the sustainability of tacit collusion by the end of the decade.