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POLS 425 U.S. Foreign Policy Week 2: Major Worldviews Practice and Analytical Implications January 17, 2007 Week 2: Major Worldviews Practice and Analytical.

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Presentation on theme: "POLS 425 U.S. Foreign Policy Week 2: Major Worldviews Practice and Analytical Implications January 17, 2007 Week 2: Major Worldviews Practice and Analytical."— Presentation transcript:

1 POLS 425 U.S. Foreign Policy Week 2: Major Worldviews Practice and Analytical Implications January 17, 2007 Week 2: Major Worldviews Practice and Analytical Implications January 17, 2007

2 2 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Three Readings  Mearscheimer and Walt, “An Unncessary War”  RUPE, “Behind the War in Iraq”  Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Liberal Realism” Three Readings  Mearscheimer and Walt, “An Unncessary War”  RUPE, “Behind the War in Iraq”  Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Liberal Realism”

3 3 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications An Unnecessary War  Why was the U.S. war against Iraq unnecessary? An Unnecessary War  Why was the U.S. war against Iraq unnecessary? Professors John Mearscheimer and Stephen Walt

4 4 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why was the War Unnecessary?  The war was unnecessary because the justifications for the war were based on distorted history, and more importantly, faulty logic  The primary flaw in the argument for war was that Saddam, as the leader of sovereign state, was somehow immune to the laws of realism, that he was a fundamentally irrational and therefore undeterrable “madman” Why was the War Unnecessary?  The war was unnecessary because the justifications for the war were based on distorted history, and more importantly, faulty logic  The primary flaw in the argument for war was that Saddam, as the leader of sovereign state, was somehow immune to the laws of realism, that he was a fundamentally irrational and therefore undeterrable “madman”

5 5 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why was the War Unnecessary?  The logic of realism tells us that “madman” arguments are, on their face, almost always wrong! Why was the War Unnecessary?  The logic of realism tells us that “madman” arguments are, on their face, almost always wrong!

6 6 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why was the War Unnecessary?  Key assumptions and logic in Realism  Actors are presumed to be rational  Saddam, as a rational actor, was deterrable  The principle of deterrability means that Saddam did not represent a military threat to the United States Why was the War Unnecessary?  Key assumptions and logic in Realism  Actors are presumed to be rational  Saddam, as a rational actor, was deterrable  The principle of deterrability means that Saddam did not represent a military threat to the United States

7 7 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications "I acted because I was not about to leave the security of the American people in the hands of a madman. I was not about to stand by and wait and trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein ” - George W. Bush October 10, 2003 "I acted because I was not about to leave the security of the American people in the hands of a madman. I was not about to stand by and wait and trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein ” - George W. Bush October 10, 2003

8 8 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Was Saddam a Serial Aggressor?  A look at the evidence Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): The “First” Gulf War Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait Was Saddam a Serial Aggressor?  A look at the evidence Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): The “First” Gulf War Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait

9 9 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Iran-Iraq War  Iraq was threatened by the emergence of new, very hostile regime  Iran was diplomatically isolated  Iraq’s was supported by a “coalition of the willing” including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and France Iran-Iraq War  Iraq was threatened by the emergence of new, very hostile regime  Iran was diplomatically isolated  Iraq’s was supported by a “coalition of the willing” including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and France

10 10 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Iran-Iraq War U.S. support of Iraq: a critical point Realist logic: Washington feared the spread of Iran's theocratic, anti-Western ideology, which threatened American interests in the region With American support, Iraq’s capacity to achieve its strategic goal was very high Iran-Iraq War U.S. support of Iraq: a critical point Realist logic: Washington feared the spread of Iran's theocratic, anti-Western ideology, which threatened American interests in the region With American support, Iraq’s capacity to achieve its strategic goal was very high

11 11 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait The authors: “Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was primarily an attempt to deal with Iraq's continued vulnerability” Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait The authors: “Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was primarily an attempt to deal with Iraq's continued vulnerability”

12 12 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America” April Glaspie US Ambassador to Iraq Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America” April Glaspie US Ambassador to Iraq

13 13 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why didn’t Saddam Back Down? Wasn’t that irrational? Remember: Acting rationally does not mean you always make the right decision; sometimes you make a bad decision, but this is because actors generally do not have access to “perfect information” Why didn’t Saddam Back Down? Wasn’t that irrational? Remember: Acting rationally does not mean you always make the right decision; sometimes you make a bad decision, but this is because actors generally do not have access to “perfect information”

14 14 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why didn’t Saddam Back Down? Other points  Once the US response was unmistakable, Saddam tried to negotiate a diplomatic settlement  During the conflict, Iraq did not use chemical-biological weapons against the US or its allies; nor were “Scuds” used against Saudi Arabia Why didn’t Saddam Back Down? Other points  Once the US response was unmistakable, Saddam tried to negotiate a diplomatic settlement  During the conflict, Iraq did not use chemical-biological weapons against the US or its allies; nor were “Scuds” used against Saudi Arabia

15 15 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications What about a nuclear Iraq? Now that’s a clear threat, isn’t it?  Direct threat to the United States  Indirect threat, through “nuclear blackmail” What about a nuclear Iraq? Now that’s a clear threat, isn’t it?  Direct threat to the United States  Indirect threat, through “nuclear blackmail”

16 16 U.S. Foreign Policy Major Worldviews: Practice and Implications “The first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they [Iraqis] do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration” - Condoleeza Rice “The first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they [Iraqis] do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration” - Condoleeza Rice


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