1. Regional Seminar Series of the Int. Law Association (British Branch) Suspending Intellectual Property Protection – a Viable and Legal Remedy for Developing Countries in WTO Trade Disputes? Dr Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property-, Competition- and Tax Law, Munich

2. Placing the Topic in WTO Context „By bringing into being the World Trade Organization today, we are enshrining the rule of law in international economic and trade relations, thus setting universal rules and disciplines over temptations of unilateralism and the law of the jungle” Speech of King Hassan II of Morocco for the host government of the April 1994 Marrakech Ministerial Meeting to conclude the Uruguay Round and establish the WTO

3. Placing the Topic in WTO Context  Need for common reliable rules, not only on sub- stantive level but also for settlement of disputes Rule Based System of Dispute Settlement as key achievement of Uruguay Round DSU establishes obligation to remove inconsis- tencies with WTO Law and to comply with DSB rulings (Art.3.7, 19.1, 21.1, 22.1 DSU) Generally, DSU is perceived to have ‚teeth‘ – to be able to secure compliance (e.g. IP being brought into WTO mainly to secure enforcability)

4. Placing the Topic in WTO Context How does the DSU ensure compliance? Generally, DSU builds on a system where as last resort the affected Member has the right to retaliate against the non-complying Member But: “in essence, sanctions, just like compliance, must come from sovereign actions of the WTO’s Members.” (Rufus Yerxa, Dep DG of WTO)  Do DSU rules offer equal chances for all to enforce WTO compliance?... Given the power and trade assymetries, does retaliation by sus- pending TRIPS offer a chance for small DCs?

5. Outline Rationale for Suspending TRIPS: The US – Gambling Dispute as case study Conditions for Suspending IP Obligations under DSU Rules Conflicts with International Agreements Economic feasibility of Suspending Obligations under TRIPS Conclusions

6. The US – Gambling Dispute Panels and AB found US measures effectively prohibiting cross border supply of gambling services from Antigua inconsistent with US commit-ments under ist GATS schedule While US could justify this by relying on the public morals exception in Art.XIV:a GATS, the AB was not convinced that US applied its measures in a non-discriminatory way US continues not to comply with the DSB ruling, confirmed by a Art.21.5 Panel in March 2007

7. The US – Gambling Dispute In June 2007, Antigua requested authorisation to retaliate by suspending TRIPS obligations As the US objected against the level and type of retaliation (Art.22.3&4 DSU), the matter was referred to arbitration under Art.22.6 DSU On 21 December 2007, the arbitrators granted Antigua the right to request authorisation to suspend protection of various IP rights under TRIPS at a level of US$21 million annually (Antigua had asked for US$ 3.443 billion - the US had argued for US$ 500,000)

8. The US – Gambling Dispute US move to modify its GATS commitments In May 2007, the US announced its intention to modify its commitments relating to gambling services under Art.XXI GATS procedures  Instead of complying with its Int. obligations, the US is modifing these WTO obligations to bring them in compliance with its national laws – as a alternative way to resolve the ongoing US – Gambling Dispute 8 WTO Members (incl. EC, Canada, India, Ja- pan, Australia) filed requests for compensation

9. The US – Gambling Dispute While US reported agreement with EC, Japan and Canada, on 28 January 2008, Antigua and Costa Rica filed arbitration requests under Art.XXI:3 a) GATS para.13 S/L/80: arbitration focuses on compensatory adjustments and aims to maintain an equivalent level of mutually advantageous commitments If US does not comply with arbitrator‘s findings, the requesting Members can withdraw sub- stantially equivalent (GATS) commitments

10. The US – Gambling Dispute Impact on US – Gambling Dispute As soon as US has validly withdrawn its commit- ments on cross-border gambling services, it has removed its violation of WTO obligations Antigua thus cannot rely on the DSB rulings any- more and may not retaliate to induce compliance  “you loose the game, so you change the rules“ However, unless the Art.XXI GATS procedures are completed, Antigua can pursue retaliation under Art.22 DSU (no ‘sequencing‘ analogy) since the original commitments remain valid

11. Rationale for IP Suspension 1) Inadequacy of Traditional Retaliation Antigua has neglegible natural resources, needs to import to supply consumers and businesses Imports: 50% from US = 0.02% of US exports Higher tariffs on US exports lead to higher do- mestic prices but has no impact on US exports  Asymmetry in market size often makes suspending tariff concessions ineffective  Traditional retaliation favours large economies  No equal option to enforce WTO obligations

12. Rationale for IP Suspension 2) Ratio for Retaliating under TRIPS IP protection under TRIPS crucial for most industrialised countries (e.g. software-, music-, entertainment-, pharma-industry, brand names) Suspending TRIPS likely to inflict significant harm on these countries’ key industries – thus creating an incentive to comply Further potential welfare effects for the reta- liating Member (technology transfer, boosting nat. industry, access to drugs): general ability to tailor IP protection to domestic needs!

13. Requirements under the DSU Overview on Retaliation under the DSU: Unless agreement on compensation, “suspension of concessions or other obligations” as the last resort to remove WTO inconsistency, Art.22 general principle that the retaliating Member should first retaliate in same sector / same agreement of WTO inconsistency, Art.22.3 (a) Retaliating country must ensure equivalence between the level of obligations suspended and the level of nullification or impairment of benefits, Art.22:4 Arbitration to test consistency with Art.22.3, 22.4

14. Requirements under the DSU Cross-Retaliation under Art.22.3 requires: Retaliating in the same sector/agreement must be not practicable (= negative effect on own economy) or not effective (= no real impact on non-complying country); Circumstances must be „serious enough“: Importance of affected trade sector and impact of non-compliance on that sector & on the economy  All small economies, when strongly affected by WTO violations, can meet these conditions

15. Conflicts with International Agreements Compliance with the DSU is however unlikely to be sufficient – as suspending IP protection can conflict with distinct international obligations to protect IP: Potential conflicts may arise from: –The incorporation of key substantive provisions on IP protection of the RBC, PC (etc.) into TRIPS –Several Multilateral Agreements on IP protection outside the WTO with overlapping or additional obligations (such as the WCT, WPPT, UPOV) –Bilateral FTAs with TRIPS-plus obligations (which must be extended to all WTO Members under MFN)

16. Conflicts with International Agreements Ways to achieve coherence? No conflict with obligations under PC, RBC incorporated into TRIPS: Art.2 (2) TRIPS (-) as its obligation does not extend to dispute settlement (Part V TRIPS); see EC-Bananas III Conflict with Independent obligations deriving from multilateral IP Agreements – resolved by: –Art.30 VC (-) as TRIPS is no ‘successive treaty’ to other int. IP Agreements; does not address (hierarchy of) suspending obligations –Art.60 VC (-) as it only authorises suspending obliga- tions relating to the treaty that has been breached

17. Conflicts with International Agreements  Can Conflicts be resolved under the Counter-measures doctrine (Art.49-55)? Applicability of & no lex specialis to the ASR? Is the addressee of IP suspension the non- complying state (since IP protection grants private rights to private entities), Art.49 (1)?C Countermeasures must be proportional, Art.51 Need to exhaust remedies under the relevant Int. IP Agreement?

18. Conflicts with International Agreements IP obligations under bilateral FTAs: If bound to ‘TRIPS-plus‘ FTAs, suspending TRIPS does not make any sense… Again potential justification of extending the TRIPS suspension to FTA obligations only under the counter-measures (reprisal) doctrine: –Direct Effect of FTA protection for right holders? –Need to exhaust FTA dispute settlement remedies in case initial breach also a violation of the FTA? –In cases of TRIPS-plus rights, equivalence test (Art.22.4 DSU) does not guarantee proportionality

19. Economic Feasibility Domestic Market Size Territoriality of IP protection: The existence and scope of IP protection depends on the domestic law; is in general limited to the domestic territory Suspension equally limited: Only justifies unauthorised domestic use  Generally no exports of goods produced under IP suspension (see also Art.51 TRIPS);  Also in case of IP suspension economic impact depends generally on sufficient size of domestic market and consumer demand

20. Economic Feasibility Options to extend Economic Impact beyond Domestic Market Exports of goods produced under Suspension:  If no IP protection applies in Importing Country  If Importing country considers production under IP suspension as international exhaustion? (see Art.6; Art.51 & fn.13; TRIPS)  In cases of multiple complainants which adopt a joint enforcement strategy to trade goods produced under suspension

21. Economic Feasibility Antigua‘s idea to achieve Global Economic Impact via the Internet: Can Antigua suspend protection for copyrighted movies/music to be offered online?  Difficulty of ensuring equivalence, Art.22.4: How to determine the economic value of a download?  Would Antigua be held liable for further acts of exploitation by the users around the world?  Must Antigua rely on TPMs or DRMs to avoid further copying/distribution of the copyrighted material?

22. Economic Feasibility Further Determining Factors: Technological Capability: Often lack of domes- tic production facilities for high-tech goods in DCs – imports only from countries with no IPR grant (Private) Producers need certainty/security in order to invest in production... But retaliation has to end as soon as non-compliance ends...  Not only ability to induce compliance, but also Welfare effects equally dependent on technolo- gical capacity & willingness of local producers

23. Implementing IP Cross-retaliation General remarks: Need to modify nat. IP laws to allow for suspension mechanism Suspension should be subject to discretion Need to ensure that only nationals (Art.1 (3) TRIPS) of the non-complying state are targeted Awareness that products/services are often co- vered by several distinct layers of IP protection Difficulty to ensure ‘equivalence of harms‘

24. Implementing IP Cross-retaliation Specific implementation mechanisms: Limiting the eligibility (qualification) for protection Suspending further grants of IP rights Compulsory Licensing Early termination of protection Suspending IP Enforcement Freezing Royalties?  Necessary control over the retaliation (  equivalence, Art.22.4 DSU) only if state authorities aim to take over the right holders’ position as much as possible…

25. Conclusions  Suspension of IP protection under TRIPS can induce compliance if: The domestic market is relevant enough for right holders (& local production facilities exist) or options for to extend economic impact are legally utilised; the retaliating state has assessed and denied practicality or effectiveness of suspending same sector/same agreement obligations; Conflicts with international/bilateral obligations are solved on the basis of counter-measure doctrine; and National law provides for a functioning implementation mechanism which ensures equivalence of harms

26. Thank you for your attention Suggestions, critique and remarks to henning.gr-khan@ip.mpg.de