1. Christian Children’s Explicit and Implicit Religious Preferences Larisa Heiphetz, Elizabeth S. Spelke, and Mahzarin R. Banaji Harvard University INTRODUCTION Humans are sensitive to social group differences at an early age. Young children, for example, demonstrate preferences for those who share their race (Baron & Banaji, 2006), gender (Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2009), and native accent (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007). However, previous work has not examined children’s religiously-based social preferences. Additionally, little work with adults has considered religion as an important intergroup domain. This neglect is surprising given that religion appears to be a cultural universal (Boyer, 2001), that religious diversity in the U.S. is increasing (Smith, 2002), and that scholars have examined the importance of religion in other domains, such as health (McCullough, Hoyt, Larson, Koenig, & Thoresen, 2000). The present work examines the development of Christian children’s preferences for novel individuals who share or do not share their religious identity. In two studies, 6- to 8-year-old children revealed an implicit but not an explicit preference for Christianity over Judaism. However, in Study 3, participants demonstrated both explicit and implicit preferences for Christian over Hindu characters. These findings suggest that, on an explicit level, religious preferences may function differently among children than preferences for other types of groups. We discuss potential explanations for this effect. METHODS Study 1. In Part 1, participants heard two stories, one about a Jewish character and one about a Christian character. They then responded to questions about each character. “This boy is Jewish, and he celebrates Hanukkah by lighting candles in a menorah. Here is a picture of a menorah down here.” “This boy is Christian, and he celebrates Easter by painting Easter eggs. Here is a picture of some Easter eggs down here.” “One of these children helped his friends with their schoolwork. Which one of them do you think did that?” Example: METHODS (CONTINUED) Study 1 (Continued). In Part 2, participants completed a Child IAT (Baron & Banaji, 2006). They categorized good and bad words as well as pictures of the symbols shown in Part 1. Study 2. The method was similar to Study 1 with one exception. The IAT asked children to categorize pictures of the characters rather than the symbols viewed in Part 1. Study 3. The method was similar to Study 2. However, children in Study 3 heard a story about a Hindu rather than a Christian character in Part 1. In Part 2, children completed a Christian-Hindu Child Attitude IAT. RESULTS Study 2 (N = 17, 9 girls, mean age = 8;0): Participants differentiate between the two characters on only one explicit question: “Which of these children is most like you?” However, participants show a strong implicit pro- Christian preference (M =.29, t (16) = 3.35, p =.004, Cohen’s d =.81). Study 3 (N = 24, 10 girls, mean age = 7;8): Participants differentiate between the two characters on all explicit questions except those concerning good behaviors. Participants continue to show a strong implicit pro-Christian preference (M =.21, t (23) = 3.08, p =.005, Cohen’s d =.64). DISCUSSION Results from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that Christian children do not explicitly prefer either Christian or Jewish characters. However, they exhibit an implicit pro-Christian preference. This dissociation may be driven by the relative similarity of Christianity and Judaism. When presented with a Christian and a Hindu character, Christian children maintained their implicit pro- Christian attitude; in addition, they reported a preference for the Christian over the Hindu character on all explicit items except those concerning good behaviors. The present research suggests that differences in belief may not drive children’s explicit preferences unless the differences are particularly extreme. Baron, A. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). The development of implicit attitudes: Evidence of race evaluations from ages 6 and 10 and adulthood. Psychological Science, 17, 53-58. Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New York, NY: Basic Books. Kinzler, K. D., Dupoux, E., & Spelke, E. S. (2007). The native language of social cognition. PNAS, 104, 12577- 12580. McCullough, M. E., Hoyt, W. T., Larson, D. B., Koenig, H. G., & Thoresen, C. (2000). Religious involvement and mortality: A meta-analytic review. Health Psychology, 19, 211-222. Smith, T.W. (2002). Religious diversity in America: The emergence of Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and others. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41, 577-585. Shutts, K., Banaji, M. R., & Spelke, E. S. (2009). Social categories guide young children’s preferences for novel objects. Developmental Science, 1-12. We thank Andrew Baron for assistance with the Child IAT and Danielle Hinchey for assistance with data collection. This research was funded by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship to LH and NIH Grant #5R01HD23103-26 to ES. For more information, please contact Larisa Heiphetz (larisa@wjh.harvard.edu). REFERENCES CONCLUSIONS The findings presented here suggest that the seeds of implicit religious preferences may be sown early, as young as age six. Even differences in mental states are sufficient to provoke implicit preferences at this young age. Interestingly, explicit preferences emerge only when children judge two characters who are strikingly different from each other. Implicit attitudes may be more attuned to belief differences than are self-reports. Future work can examine the question of whether implicit preferences serve as a harbinger for explicit attitudes. Study 1 (N = 29, 9 girls, mean age = 7;5): Participants differentiate between the two characters on only two questions: “Which of these children is an American?” and, “Which of these children is most like you?” However, participants show a strong implicit pro- Christian preference (M =.27, t (26) = 3.97, p =.001, Cohen’s d =.77).