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The Capital Structure Decision: Theory

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1 The Capital Structure Decision: Theory
P.V. Viswanath Based on Damodaran’s Corporate Finance

2 Costs and Benefits of Debt
Tax Benefits Adds discipline to management Costs of Debt Bankruptcy Costs Agency Costs Loss of Future Flexibility This summarizes the trade off that we make when we choose between using debt and equity. P.V. Viswanath

3 Tax Benefits of Debt When you borrow money, you are allowed to deduct interest expenses from your income to arrive at taxable income. This reduces your taxes. When you use equity, you are not allowed to deduct payments to equity (such as dividends) to arrive at taxable income. The dollar tax benefit from the interest payment in any year is a function of your tax rate and the interest payment: Tax benefit each year = Tax Rate * Interest Payment The tax benefit of debt will be lower if the tax code allows some or all of the cash flows to equity to be tax deductible, as well. For instance, in Germany, dividends paid to stockholders are taxed at a lower rate than retained earnings. In these cases, the tax advantage of debt will be lower. If you do not pay taxes, debt becomes a lot less attractive. Carnival Cruise Lines, which gets most of its business from US tourists pays no taxes because it is domiciled in Liberia. We would expect it to have less debt in its capital structure than a competitor in the US which pays taxes. P.V. Viswanath

4 Tax Benefit Proposition
Proposition 1: Other things being equal, the higher the marginal tax rate of a business, the more debt it will have in its capital structure. P.V. Viswanath

5 The Effects of Taxes You are comparing the debt ratios of real estate corporations, which pay the corporate tax rate, and real estate investment trusts, which are not taxed, but are required to pay 95% of their earnings as dividends to their stockholders. Which of these two groups would you expect to have the higher debt ratios?  The real estate corporations  The real estate investment trusts  Cannot tell, without more information I would expect real estate corporations to have more debt. The forced payout of 95% of earnings as dividends by REITs to their stockholders may expose their investors to substantial personal taxes, but the absence of taxes at the entity level will make debt a less attractive option. In practice, REITs do use debt. On reason might be that they can borrow at a lower rate at the REIT level than at the property level. P.V. Viswanath

6 Implications of The Tax Benefit of Debt
The debt ratios of firms with higher tax rates should be higher than the debt ratios of comparable firms with lower tax rates. In supporting evidence, Firms that have substantial non-debt tax shields, such as depreciation, should be less likely to use debt than firms that do not have these tax shields. If tax rates increase over time, we would expect debt ratios to go up over time as well, reflecting the higher tax benefits of debt. Although it is always difficult to compare debt ratios across countries, we would expect debt ratios in countries where debt has a much larger tax benefit to be higher than debt ratios in countries whose debt has a lower tax benefit. The tax rates faced by firms can vary across markets, because of differences in the tax codes, and within markets, because of operating loss carry forwards. These differences can result in very different optimal debt ratio. Interesting fact: Most cruise line companies (Carnival, Royal Caribbean) pay no taxes because they are based in offshore islands with no taxes. They get no tax benefit from debt. P.V. Viswanath

7 Debt adds discipline to management
If you are managers of a firm with no debt, and you generate high income and cash flows each year, you tend to become complacent. The complacency can lead to inefficiency and investing in poor projects. There is little or no cost borne by the managers Forcing such a firm to borrow money can be an antidote to the complacency. The managers now have to ensure that the investments they make will earn at least enough return to cover the interest expenses. The cost of not doing so is bankruptcy and the loss of such a job. This is a quote from Bennett Stewart. Managers of firms with substantial cash flows and little debt are much more protected from the consequences of their mistakes (especially when stockholders are powerless and boards toothless). Left to themselves, managers (especially lazy ones) would rather run all-equity financed firms with substantial cash reserves. P.V. Viswanath

8 Debt and Discipline Assume that you buy into this argument that debt adds discipline to management. Which of the following types of companies will most benefit from debt adding this discipline?  Conservatively financed (very little debt), privately owned businesses  Conservatively financed, publicly traded companies, with stocks held by millions of investors, none of whom hold a large percent of the stock.  Conservatively financed, publicly traded companies, with an activist and primarily institutional holding. Conservatively financed (Equity financed), publicly traded firms with a wide and diverse stockholding. Private firms should have the incentive to be efficient without debt, because the owner/manager has his or her wealth at stake. Publicly traded firms with activist stockholders (like Michael Price) might not need debt to be disciplined. Investors looking over managers’ shoulders will keep them honest. P.V. Viswanath

9 Empirical Evidence on the Discipline of Debt
Firms that are acquired in hostile takeovers are generally characterized by poor performance in both accounting profitability and stock returns. There is evidence that increases in leverage are followed by improvements in operating efficiency, as measured by operating margins and returns on capital. Palepu (1990) presents evidence of modest improvements in operating efficiency at firms involved in leveraged buyouts. Kaplan(1989) and Smith (1990) also find that firms earn higher returns on capital following leveraged buyouts. Denis and Denis (1993) study leveraged recapitalizations and report a median increase in the return on assets of 21.5%. In all these cases, though, there are other things that change in addition to leverage. For instance, in leveraged buyouts, the managers become the owners of the firm. Thus, it is difficult to isolate the effect of leverage on efficiency. P.V. Viswanath

10 Bankruptcy Cost The expected bankruptcy cost is a function of two variables- the cost of going bankrupt direct costs: Legal and other Deadweight Costs indirect costs: Costs arising because people perceive you to be in financial trouble the probability of bankruptcy, which will depend upon how uncertain you are about future cash flows As you borrow more, you increase the probability of bankruptcy and hence the expected bankruptcy cost. Studies (see Warner) seem to indicate that the direct costs of bankruptcy are fairly smal. The indirect cost of going bankrupt comes from the perception that you are in financial trouble, which in turn affects sales and the capacity to raise credit. As an example, when Apple Computer was perceived to be in financial trouble in early 1997, first-time buyers and businesses stopped buying Apples and software firms stopped coming up with upgrades for products. Similarly, Kmart found that suppliers started demanding payments in 30 days instead of 60 days, when it got into financial trouble. The probability of bankruptcy should be a function of the predictability (or variability) of earnings. P.V. Viswanath

11 Indirect Bankruptcy Costs should be highest for….
Firms that sell durable products with long lives that require replacement parts and service Firms that provide goods or services for which quality is an important attribute but where quality difficult to determine in advance Firms producing products whose value to customers depends on the services and complementary products supplied by independent companies: Firms that sell products requiring continuous service and support from the manufacturer Indirect bankruptcy costs are likely to be higher for these types of firms and they should therefore be much more cautious about borrowing money in the first place. P.V. Viswanath

12 The Bankruptcy Cost Proposition
Proposition 2: Other things being equal, the greater the indirect bankruptcy cost and/or probability of bankruptcy in the operating cashflows of the firm, the less debt the firm can afford to use. Both the cost of bankruptcy and the probability of bankruptcy go into the expected cost. A firm can have a high expected bankruptcy cost when either or both is high. If governments step in and provide protection to firms that get into financial trouble, they are reducing the expected cost of bankruptcy. Under that scenario, you would expect firms to borrow more money. (See South Korea) P.V. Viswanath

13 Debt & Bankruptcy Cost Rank the following companies on the magnitude of bankruptcy costs from most to least, taking into account both explicit and implicit costs: A Grocery Store An Airplane Manufacturer High Technology company I would expect a grocery store to have the lowest bankruptcy costs. Customers generally do not consider the rating or default risk of grocery stores when they shop, but they definitely do consider both when placing an order for an airplane. Technology companies can have high bankruptcy costs, but the costs will vary depending upon what type of product they produce. A PC manufacturer might be affected more than someone who manufacturers software; a company which serves businesses might be affected more than one which creates games for children. P.V. Viswanath

14 Implications of Bankruptcy Cost Proposition
Firms operating in businesses with volatile earnings and cash flows should use debt less than otherwise similar firms with stable cash flows. If firms can structure their debt in such a way that the cash flows on the debt increase and decrease with their operating cash flows, they can afford to borrow more. If an external entity, such as the government or an agency of the government, provides protection against bankruptcy through either insurance or bailouts for troubled firms, firms will tend to borrow more. Firms with assets that can be easily divided and sold should borrow more than firms with assets that are less liquid. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Korean government provided an implicit backing to its large conglomerates when borrowing. Consequently, it encouraged them to become over levered. P.V. Viswanath

15 Agency Cost An agency cost arises whenever you hire someone else to do something for you. It arises because your interests(as the principal) may deviate from those of the person you hired (as the agent). When you lend money to a business, you are allowing the stockholders to use that money in the course of running that business. Stockholders interests are different from your interests, because You (as lender) are interested in getting your money back Stockholders are interested in maximizing your wealth In some cases, the clash of interests can lead to stockholders Investing in riskier projects than you would want them to Paying themselves large dividends when you would rather have them keep the cash in the business. What is good for equity investors might not be good for bondholders and lenders…. A risky project, with substantial upside, may make equity investors happy, but they might cause bondholders, who do not share in the upside, much worse off. Similarly, paying a large dividend may make stockholders happier but they make lenders less well off. P.V. Viswanath

16 Agency Cost Proposition
Proposition: Other things being equal, the greater the agency problems associated with lending to a firm, the less debt the firm can afford to use. P.V. Viswanath

17 Debt and Agency Costs Assume that you are a bank. Which of the following businesses would you perceive the greatest agency costs? A Large Pharmaceutical company A Large Regulated Electric Utility Why? I would expect a large regulated utility to have much lower agency costs because Its assets and cash flows are more observable and can be more easily monitored. Regulatory restrictions will prevent the firm from straying into new businesses. P.V. Viswanath

18 How agency costs show up...
If bondholders believe there is a significant chance that stockholder actions might make them worse off, they can build this expectation into bond prices by demanding much higher rates on debt. If bondholders can protect themselves against such actions by writing in restrictive covenants, two costs follow – the direct cost of monitoring the covenants, which increases as the covenants become more detailed and restrictive. the indirect cost of lost investments, since the firm is not able to take certain projects, use certain types of financing, or change its payout; this cost will also increase as the covenants becomes more restrictive. Agency costs can show up in a number of different ways. One is in the form of higher interest rates on debt. The other is in the form of monitoring costs or lost investments. P.V. Viswanath

19 Implications of Agency Costs..
The agency cost arising from risk shifting is likely to be greatest in firms whose investments cannot be easily observed and monitored. These firms should borrow less than firms whose assets can be easily observed and monitored. The agency cost associated with monitoring actions and second-guessing investment decisions is likely to be largest for firms whose projects are long term, follow unpredictable paths, and may take years to come to fruition. These firms should also borrow less. May provide some insight into why technology firms seldom borrow. P.V. Viswanath

20 Loss of future financing flexibility
When a firm borrows up to its capacity, it loses the flexibility of financing future projects with debt. Proposition 4: Other things remaining equal, the more uncertain a firm is about its future financing requirements and projects, the less debt the firm will use for financing current projects. Firms like to preserve flexibility. The value of flexibility should be a function of how uncertain future investment requirements are, and the firm’s capacity to raise fresh capital quickly. Firms with uncertain future needs and the inability to access markets quickly will tend to value flexibility the most, and borrow the least. P.V. Viswanath

21 Debt: Summarizing the Trade Off
Advantages of Borrowing Disadvantages of Borrowing 1. Tax Benefit: 1. Bankruptcy Cost: Higher tax rates --> Higher tax benefit Higher business risk --> Higher Cost 2. Added Discipline: 2. Agency Cost: Greater the separation between managers Greater the separation between stock- and stockholders --> Greater the benefit holders & lenders --> Higher Cost This summarizes our previous discussion in a balance sheet format. In this format, if the advantages of the marginal borrowing exceed the disadvantages, you would borrow. Otherwise, you would use equity. 3. Loss of Future Financing Flexibility: Greater the uncertainty about future financing needs --> Higher Cost P.V. Viswanath

22 6Application Test: Would you expect your firm to gain or lose from using a lot of debt?
Considering, for your firm, The potential tax benefits of borrowing The benefits of using debt as a disciplinary mechanism The potential for expected bankruptcy costs The potential for agency costs The need for financial flexibility Would you expect your firm to have a high debt ratio or a low debt ratio? Does the firm’s current debt ratio meet your expectations? This is just a qualitative analysis. It will not give you a specific optimal debt ratio but provides insight into why the firm may be using the financing mix that it is today. P.V. Viswanath

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