1. Network Insecurity: challenging conventional wisdom Terry Gray UW Computing & Communications 10 October 2000

2. Words to live by... “If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don't understand the problems and you don't understand the technology. “ Bruce Schneier Secrets and Lies

3. Start with a Security Policy Defining who can/cannot do what to whom... Identification and prioritization of threats Identification of assumptions, e.g. –Security perimeters –Trusted systems and infrastructure Policy drives security… lack of policy drives insecurity

4. Approaches Operational Issues –Prevention –Detection –Recovery Policy Issues –Risk Management –Liability Management

5. Policy Priorities Education/Awareness: Security is everyone’s responsibility; there are no silver bullets. Standards and adequate resources for computer administration.

6. Technical Priorities Application security (e.g. SSH, SSL) Host security (patches, minimum svcs) Strong authentication (e.g. SecureID) Net security (VPNs, firewalling)

7. Network Security Axioms Network security is maximized… when we assume there is no such thing. Firewalls are such a good idea… every host should have one. Remote access is fraught with peril… just like local access.

8. The SCCA VPN Issue Problems with border-to-border VPNs –Costs a lot & doesn’t improve security Advantages of end-to-end strategies –Needed anyway Misconceptions about the Gigapop –Is it really a “public” network?

9. Perimeter Protection Paradox Firewall “perceived value” is proportional to number of systems protected. Firewall effectiveness is inversely proportional to number of systems protected.

10. Network Risk Profile

11. Bad Ideas Departmental firewalls within the core. VPNs only between institution borders. Over-reliance on large-perimeter defenses... E.G. believing firewalls can substitute for good host administration...

12. When do VPNs make sense? When legacy apps cannot be accessed via secure protocols, e.g. SSH, SSL, K5. AND When the tunnel end-points are on or very near the end-systems. See also ‘IPSEC enclaves’

13. When does Firewalling make sense? Large perimeter: –To block things end-system administrators cannot, e.g. spoofed source addresses. –When there is widespread consensus to block certain ports. Small perimeter/edge: –Cluster firewalls –Personal firewalls

14. The Dark Side of Firewalls Large-perimeter firewalls are often sold as panaceas but they don’t live up to the hype, because they: –Assume fixed security perimeter –Give a false sense of security –May inhibit legitimate activities –May be hard to manage –Won't stop many threats –Are a performance bottleneck –Encourage backdoors

15. Even with Firewalls... Bad guys aren’t always "outside" the moat One person’s “security perimeter” is another’s “broken network” Organization boundaries and filtering requirements constantly change Security perimeters only protect against a limited percentage of threats… must examine entire system: –Cannot ignore end-system management –Use of secure applications is a key strategy

16. More words to live by... "It's naive to assume that just installing a firewall is going to protect you from all potential security threat. That assumption creates a false sense of security, and having a false sense of security is worse than having no security at all." Kevin Mitnick eWeek 28 Sep 00

17. Suggestions Do the application, host, and auth stuff. Try to cluster critical servers, then evaluate additional protection measures... –Physical firewall protecting server rack? –Local addressing + NAT? –IPSEC enclave? –Logical firewall/Inverse VPN? –Personal firewalls, e.g. ZoneAlarm?

18. Policy & Procedure Need to work on policies, resources, and consensus (e.g. re tightening perimeters.) UW C&C Efforts: –Dittrich & Co. –Trying to get more high-level support. –Writing white papers. –Pro-active probing. –Security consulting services. –IDS, attack analysis, etc. –Virus scanning measures. –Acquiring/distributing tools, e.g.SSH. –Evaluating more aggressive port blocking.

19. Resources http://staff.washington.edu/gray/papers/credo* http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich http://www.sans.org/