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Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Economics of Human Resources Nick Bloom (Stanford Economics) Lecture 5: Power and decentralization 1.

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Presentation on theme: "Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Economics of Human Resources Nick Bloom (Stanford Economics) Lecture 5: Power and decentralization 1."— Presentation transcript:

1 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Economics of Human Resources Nick Bloom (Stanford Economics) Lecture 5: Power and decentralization 1

2 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 What is decentralization? Measurement and stylized facts Determinants of decentralization Firm Performance and decentralization

3 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 What is decentralization? One aspect of firm organization - how power and decision making are distributed Unlike basic management practices no typical “good” and “bad” – just different styles which tend to vary by country Why should you care: –Key in designing your business or advising others –Changing over time, generating broader economic effects, like increased inequality and worker empowerment

4 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 4 Business Week The 21st Century Corporation, cover story August 21-28, 2000. "Globalization and the arrival of the information economy have rapidly demolished all the old precepts. The management of global companies, which must innovate simultaneously and speed information through horizontal globe-spanning networks, has become a daunting challenge. Old, rigid hierarchies are out...." Are things really changing?

5 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 5 Delayering – Number of positions reporting to CEO Source: Rajan and Wulf, 2006, 300+ large US corporations Evidence is limited, but appears yes, firms are decentralizing

6 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Formal vs. Real Authority Formal authority in the organization chart (“organogram”) –E.g. Profit centres vs. cost/sales centres Real authority –How things actually get done. Power –http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5FRVvjGL2C0http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5FRVvjGL2C0 Can be different across different types of decisions –e.g. pricing, products and M&A

7 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Real authority models: Centralized http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wBIov_CSqyI&feature=related

8 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 e.g. Universities, but academics generally pretty inefficient Real authority models: Decentralized

9 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 What is decentralization? Measurement and stylized facts Determinants of decentralization Firm Performance and decentralization

10 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Central HQ (New York Site) Example A: Domestic Firm 2 Sites, Single Plant Plant (Albany Site) D, Decentralization

11 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Central HQ (New York Site) Example B: US Domestic Firm Multi-Site, Multi-Plants Plant 1 (Buffalo Site) Plant 3 (Scranton Site) Plant 2 (Albany Site) D1D2 D3

12 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 The Decentralization Survey Page

13 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Main measure averages the z-score (scores normalized to mean 0, standard-deviation 1) of each variable: –Hiring senior employees (discrete, 1 to 5) –Maximum Capital expenditure (continuous, in $) –Introduction of new products (discrete, 1 to 5) –Sales and marketing (discrete, 1 to 5) Our empirical decentralization measure

14 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Decentralization varies heavily across countries Most centralized Asia Southern Europe Least centralized Scandinavian countries Anglo-Saxon countries Decentralization measure

15 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Decentralization also varies across firms Decentralization measure (higher number is more decentralized)

16 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 External validation – decentralization over time Only prior firm decentralization measure to cross-check against we are aware of is from Hofstede –Surveyed c.100,000 IBM employees across 50 countries during the 1970s & 1980s –Questions on management style (autocractic/paternalistic or consultative) and preferences for delegation –Combined into Power Distance index (1-100), low means limited (preference for) delegation

17 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Power distance ‘Power distance’ measures from 1970s & 1980s matches our 2000s decentralization data quite well Decentralization Correlation= 0.80

18 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Fiscal decentralization (whether Governments are centrally run) looks similar – so something cultural? Firm Decentralization Fiscal Decentralization (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005) Correlation= 0.83

19 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Decentralization also varies across ownership types – with founder and government firms centralized Decentralization measure

20 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 What is decentralization? Measurement and Stylized facts Theories & Determinants of decentralization Firm Performance and decentralization

21 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 What do you think are the benefits and costs of decentralization? 21

22 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Some Benefits of Decentralization 1.Saves on costs of communication and information transfer 2.Improves swiftness of reacting to market changes [e.g. because of less specialization, more multi-tasking] 3.Increase in employee involvement, so possibly more job satisfaction 22

23 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Some Costs of Decentralization 1.More “mistakes” (e.g. co-ordination in price setting) 2.Harder to exploit returns to scale/specialization – i.e. repetition of same activities across different divisions 3.More stress from control? 23

24 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Factors affecting Decentralization 1.Technological 2.Economic 3.Cultural/Legal

25 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 25 Complexity: Larger Firms are more decentralized Number of employees in the firm

26 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 26 Learning: Younger firms are more decentralized

27 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 27 Learning: More technologically advanced firms more likely to be decentralized

28 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 28 Enterprise Resource Planning0.104*0.116** Information technology (0.054) NETWORK-0.098*-0.110** Communication technology (0.053) Computers/Employee-0.041-0.021-0.031 (0.031) Information technology (IT) increase decentralization Communications technology (CT) decreaseas decentralization ICT has a mixed impact on decentralization Notes: Controls are SIC3 dummies, country dummies, noise controls (interviewer dummies Interviewee tenure and seniority, etc.), public listing, CEO onsite, plant size,

29 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Factors affecting Decentralization 1.Technological 2.Economic 3.Cultural/Legal

30 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 30 Skill: Firms with more skilled workers are more decentralized Proportion of employees with a college degree

31 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Legal and Cultural Factors affecting Decentralization Trust –In high trust areas (e.g. Sweden) managers likely to be trusted to carry out more activities Rule of Law –In good rule of law areas (e.g. US) top management less worried about theft by middle management 31

32 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Trust and decentralization How to measure trust? World Value Survey has question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Trust by region of the country defined as % of people answering “yes” to first part of the trust question Experiments show this question linked with trust/trusting behavior (Glaeser et al, 2000, Sapienza et al, 2007)

33 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Trust (region)1.196***0.825***0.732** (0.429)(0.290)(0.298) Rule of law (country)0.473*** (0.102) Observations 3549 Country dummiesno yes Other controlsno yes Trust, rule of law and decentralization Notes: Other controls are SIC3 dummies, noise controls (interviewer dummies Interviewee tenure and seniority, etc.), public listing, CEO onsite, plant size, competition

34 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Also look at multinationals as another test of trust Could worry about bias due to trust proxying for other country/regional variables So look at affiliates of foreign multinationals and investigate whether trust in their home country also matters Bilateral trust: (on average) how much do people in the multinational’s home country trust people in the country where the subsidiary is located (Eurobarometer Survey)

35 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Central HQ (New York Site) Example A: Domestic Firm 2 Sites, Single Plant Plant (Phoenix Site) D, Decentralization

36 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Plant 1 (Lund Site) Global HQ (Tokyo Site) French CHQ (Paris Site) Example D Japanese MNE Sweden CHQ (Stockholm Site) Plant 2 (Lyon Site) Do not observe D Observe D

37 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Trust (region of location) 0.6090.5630.446 (0.592)(0.843)(1.908) Trust (country of origin) 0.749***0.152 (0.301)(0.152) Trust (bilateral from origin cty to location cty) 1.809*** (0.768) Full set of controls Yes Regional dummies No Country origin dummiesNo ClusteringRegion Origin country Observations867 280 Decentralization and trust in multinational firms

38 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 What is decentralization? Measurement and Stylized facts Determinants of decentralization Firm Performance and decentralization

39 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Does decentralization matter for performance? Short run: generally depends on firms circumstances (e.g. country, industry and technology). Long run: to be large you need some decentralization, so key for growth (Penrose 1959 and Chandler 1962)

40 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 40 Wrap-up Decentralization varies heavily by country and ownership Northern European and US firms decentralized, and Southern European and Asian being centralized Founder, family and government very centralized Factors driving this appear to be both economic – competition, technology and skills – but also cultural around trust and institutional (rule-of-law) In short-run decentralization is a choice variable depending on circumstances, but necessary for growth in long-run

41 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 41 Back-up

42 Nick Bloom, 147, 2011 Trust by country (means and regional spreads) The graph shows median level of trust. The vertical bars denote minimum and maximum levels.


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