1. MIDDLEWARE SYSTEMS RESEARCH GROUP A Taxonomy for Denial of Service Attacks in Content-based Publish/Subscribe Systems Alex Wun, Alex Cheung, Hans-Arno Jacobsen Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Department of Computer Science University of Toronto

2. Current State of Denial of Service Prominent DoS news in 2007:  6 of 13 Root DNS servers attacked [ICANN2007]  DC++ P2P networks used in attacks [DCPP2007]  Estonian sites: government, bank, police [Yahoo2007]  Plenty more … DoS problems are not going away

3. Research Goals Stimulate discussion about DoS in CPS  Avoid repeating old DoS weaknesses (e.g., IPv6 source routing) Identify new DoS Concerns  Will DoS attacks in CPS systems be any different?  What are the prominent issues?  How can potential DoS attacks be classified?

4. Our Contributions Study impact of CPS features on DoS effects  Distributed event delivery  Content-based processing overhead  State maintenance Classify potential DoS attack characteristics Identify CPS concepts with DoS implications

5. Messaging Middleware SSP Publishers P Subscribers Enterprise Servers Embedded Devices Sensor Networks AB C Content-based Publish/Subscribe

6. DoS Taxonomy

7. Message Propagation Effects Multi-hop routing  Localization  Transmission

8. Propagation Localized Single-Hop Multi-Hop Global Non-matching message injection Malicious unsubscribe Edge broker access control Local clients Co-operative detection not helpful Effects may still be distributed Broker multicast Per-hop security schemes Client location Matching message injection Rendezvous routing Remote clients Transmitting DoS effects remotely Flooding Global client interest May span organizations

9. State Management Effects Assumptions on distribution message type Cumulative effects

10. Statefulness Stateless Stateful Soft-state Persistent Recovery through normal processing Unretained publication injections Connection attempts Effects continue due to state change Malicious unsubscriptions Subscription injections Publications retained for CEP Recovery through normal maintenance Expiry mechanisms Periodic optimizations Recovered state causes DoS DB-based Fault-tolerance Historic data Configuration corruptions Time Attack Effects Attack stops Time Attack Effects Attack stops Time Attack Effects Attack stops Periodic cleanup Time Effects Load from persistent storage

11. Content-based Processing Effects Low content complexity High content complexity

12. Content-based Processing Effects Performance variability highly dependent on workload complexity  Response times  System recovery

13. Content-dependence Independent Proportional Inversely proportional Severity of DoS effects are the same regardless of content complexity ID-based filter removal Higher complexity content produces more severe DoS effects Inducing matching load Lower complexity content produces more sever DoS effects Filter-based filter removal Content complexity Load # of Victims # of Targets Downtime

14. Techniques - Thrashing DoS from processing repeated state changes Subscription cover thrashing example:  Many non-covering subscriptions exist from other client(s)  Adversary issues covering subscription (triggers removal)  Adversary removes covering subscription (triggers restoration)  Repeat …

15. Techniques - Stockpiling Store malicious state for use in future attack(s) Can be low rate to avoid detection Subscription flood example:  Stockpile subscription state  Issue advertisement to attract subscriptions

16. Techniques - Traffic Amplification Malicious traffic of adversary multiplied Known to be a problem in traditional Internet  Smurf attack  Source routing  Reflection (connection retries) Fundamental to many CPS features?  Highly generic subscriptions and advertisements  Uncovering and Unmerging  Historic data

17. Filter versus ID State Removal

18. Related Work Mirkovic and Reiher [Mirkovic2004]  DDoS taxonomy in traditional Internet domain Srivatsa and Liu [Srivatsa2005]  Authentication to limit flooding-based DoS Wang et al. [Wang2002]  Discussed DoS briefly along with other security concerns

19. Conclusion CPS characteristics with DoS implications  Message propagation (remote attacks)  Content complexity (highly variable performance)  State maintenance (assumptions on message type distribution) Abusing features for DoS  Stockpiling  Traffic Amplification  Filter Removal (Thrashing, Victims)

20. References [ICANN2007]  http://icann.org/announcements/factsheet-dns-attack-08mar07_v1.1.pdf [DCPP2007]  http://dcpp.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/denying-distributed-attacks/ [Yahoo2007]  http://fe48.news.sp1.yahoo.com/s/infoworld/20070517/tc_infoworld/886 10 [Mirkovic2004]  A Taxonomy of DDoS Attack and DDoS Defense Mechanisms, ACM SIGCOMM [Srivatsa2005]  Securing Publish-Subscribe Overlay Services with EventGuard, ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security [Wang2002]  Security Issues and Requirements for Internet-Scale Publish-Subscribe Systems, Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

21. MIDDLEWARE SYSTEMS RESEARCH GROUP Extra Slides

22. Messaging Middleware PublishersSubscribers Enterprise Servers Embedded Devices Sensor Networks xxxxx Distributed broker federations Subscription state management Content-based processing

23. SSP Publishers P Subscribers Content-based Publish/Subscribe