1. Legal natural resource governance: Innovation in response to fundamental rural challenges. Professor Paul Martin Australian Centre for Agriculture and Law University of New England

2. v v The argument Evidence suggests that resource governance can be too costly, ineffective and/or unfair. Why? –5 basic challenges –5 rural challenges What should the next generation of resource governance be like? Proposed directions to consider –Research and investigation methods –Better frameworks for public policy –Governance instruments and systems Where might we go to from here? + IUCN/WCEL investigations of legal governance effectiveness (x2)

3. 16 th 17 th 18 th 19 th 20 th 21 st 6B-9B 2B-6B 1B-2B <1B Is this the best rural governance model? Frontier 1 Agricultural / monarchic system The instrument explosion Frontier 2 Industrialised/populist system Mercantile/technocentric system Ecolex: 2,070 treaties; 110,000 national laws and regulations 1,100 court decisions. Ecolabels Index 458 ecolabels in 197 countries, and 25 industry sectors

4. Governance effectiveness: the evidence The biophysical and social evidence plus Political and scholarly critiques; business sector critiques Rio+20 ‘The Future We Want’: Cl 19. IUCN –Natural Resource Governance Framework (NRGF) (World Commission on Environmental Law and the Environmental Law Centre. Bonn). –Academy of Environmental Law UNEP’s Environmental Governance sub-programme Memorandum of Understanding UNEP and International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI - Working Group on Environmental Auditing, WGEA) Organisation of American States Society needs fundamental governance improvement

5. 5 basic challenges 1.Ever-increasing human pressures upon the earth. 2.Governance systems that privilege harm-doing. 3.Failures of public will and institutional capacity. 4.Dynamic, complex and changing systems. 5.Fragile governance paradigms –We lack continuous improvement based upon objective performance analysis (e.g. system and instrument performance). –We are misled through instrumentalism (e.g. laws, markets). –We lack realism in design and implementation. –The evolution of methods is shackled by disciplines. Overlaid by rural-specific characteristics

6. Rurality & governance: international evidence CountryPeople./h a. Employ’t % Ag. GDP % Ag. Switzerland231 UK2.6211 USA0.3511 Canada0.0422 France1.242 Iceland0.0356 Argentina0.1659 China1.413510 Thailand1.323812 Indonesia1.393914 Ag- independen t121 Ag- Dependent12410 National accounts Gov't revenue/p (US$1000) GDP/ha (US$1000) GDP/p (US$1000) Net Public Social $ (%GDP) Ag- independent 17694418 Ag- Dependent 55164 Natural resources Biodiversity Benefits Index Renewable water (GL1000) Extraction per person (L1000/y) Ag- independent 301543936 Ag- Dependent 35860635 Social welfareSchooling Child Labour (% 5-14) Health $ (%GDP) Ag- independent 17 12 Ag- Dependent 1476

7. Rural-specific concerns, Australia as an example

8. Rural Australia in context What is feasible?

9. Pest animals – a rural problem

10. People: the issue and resource

11. Capacity: A critical limit

12. Education: shaping responses

13. “Vicious” rural system issues Depth of shading is a 3 way function of 1.Number of the 4 pest species present. 2.Population sparsity; and 3.Index of social disadvantage Indicators of variability in capacity to address target pest species

14. 5 rural-specific challenges ( # 1 & 2) 1.Major problems have special systemic cause/effect/solution characteristics. –Extensive, trans-boundary collective action problems. –“Autopoietic”, often coupled with adaptation. 2.Eco-social system complexities. –Farming and commodity system economics –Interwoven social, economic and ecological factors. –Social disadvantage linked to resource dependence. –Rural cultural and political distinctiveness. –Traditional owners’ eco-dependency and interests –Societies depend on private rural actions. –Private costs of providing these public benefits

15. 3.Spatiality has complex, often hidden, governance implications. –“Space between”, social isolation, collective action and transaction costs. –“Distance to”, cultural and political isolation, service access. –“Extensiveness” 4.Sparcity limits which interventions are feasible and fair. –Low manpower intensity of rural spaces –Low economic intensity of rural economies –Limited human capacity of rural spaces 5 rural specific challenges (# 3 & 4)

16. 5.Fragmentation limits effective (extensive scale) collective action. –Title fragmentation –Institutional fragmentation –Program and policy incoherence –Instrument proliferation –Land use and enterprise diversification –Emerging rural economies –Intensifying resource conflicts –Increasingly diverse rural values and interests –Strengthening non-local communities of interest 5 rural-specific challenges (# 5)

17. Dynamics of rural futures Unpublished Direction and magnitude of future changes in sustainability indicators for the five agro-climatic regions of Australia from 2011 to 2100 under Representative Concentration Pathways. Brett Bryan, CSIRO.

18. Where to from here ??

19. 10 directions for rural governance 1.Rural governance systems, not mere instruments. 2.Precise multi-point, multi-instrument strategies. 3.Science-informed behavioural focus. 4.Streamline institutional architectures. 5.Broaden rural regulatory evaluation. 6.Use hybrid governance, with integrity mechanisms. 7.Empower ‘collective citizen action’ via institutions. 8.Actively manage (citizen) transaction costs. 9.Implement policy risk management. 10.Apply scientific continuous improvement. Paul Martin & Neil Gunningham Improving regulatory arrangements for sustainable agriculture: Groundwater as an illustration. Macquarie Journal for International and Comparative Environmental Law Volume 1 (1), 2014

20. IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Innovation in risk management arrangements for biofuel weeds Weed pathway Whose decisions?What institutions?Risk themes ? How could we act more strategically to change a rural system? An example..

21. IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Innovation in risk management arrangements for biofuel weeds Weed pathway Whose decisions?What institutions?Risk themes ? Science institutions Enterprise investors Bio-security agencies Policy agencies Commercial insurers Land-use agencies Economic agencies Property investors Industry organisations Primary industry agencies Standards Certifiers Public media Fuel companies Legal system Consumer organisations Conservation agencies Science institutions Monitoring agencies Field scientist Lab scientist Industry Entrepreneur Risks expert Customs Bureaucrat Commercial Propagator Development agency staff Site investor/owner Land-use approver Plantation entrepreneur Plantation manager Biofuel processor Biofuel investor Biofuel consumer Extension officer Rural NGO activist Plantation neighbour Government weeds manager Regional environmental officer Local weeds manager Weeds officer Field scientists Risk/context scientific evaluation Closing the risk- responsibility/reward cycle Risk-calibrated management options Economic incentive for risk management Informed, harm- accountable investors Risk-control by the industry Risk-informed consumer choices Active harm monitoring Compensation Knowledge for avoidance/control/reme diation Incentives for control/remediation Funds for control and remediation Civil liability Scientific protocol Administrative controls Land use bonds Investor codes of conduct Industry codes of conduct “Green” branding Risk insurance policies Performance accountability Creating a systemic governance strategy. Integrity mechanisms

22. Instrument focussed or Systemic behaviour focussed?

23. 4 rural oversight reforms Regulatory processes need to drive government to more effective, efficient and fair governance: 1.Use more robust benefit/cost assessment, with realistic assumptions. 2.Make the distributions of benefits and costs transparent and contestable. 3.Evaluate the true feasibility for citizens and agencies to implement. 4.Implement a discipline of policy risk management. Martin, Bartel, Sinden, Gunningham and Hannam Developing a Good Regulatory Practice Model for Environmental Regulations Impacting on Farmers Australian Farm Institute and Land and Water Australia 2007

24. What is policy risk? The risk that a policy may: 1.Fail to be effectively implemented –Through formal political processes; or –Informal political resistance. 2.Be adopted politically but fail in practice –Transaction costs –Implementation platform failings 3.Cause excessive harmful ‘spillovers’. How often do governance policies fail?

25. They said it better than I ever could : Match the words to the mind. He who innovates will have for his enemies all those who are well off under the existing order of things, and only lukewarm supporters in those who might be better off under the new. Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.