1. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Aladdin, Aladdin Knowledge Systems, the Aladdin Knowledge Systems logo, HASP, HASP SRM, HASP HL, HASP4, HASP SL, HASP TT, are trademarks or registered trademarks of Aladdin Knowledge Systems, Ltd. All other product and brand names mentioned in this presentation are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. Yariv Drory International Technical Support Manager June 2007

2. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. In This Presentation The threats and the causes The solutions Security enhancements in HASP SRM Maximizing protection with HASP SRM

3. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. The Threats Decrease in income –One license used by many users –“Free” copies are downloaded –Distributors sell more than they report Waste of R&D resources –Invest in protection rather than development

4. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Why crack an application? Fame Challenge Money

5. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Who is Behind the Cracks? Fame –Programmers who think they are better –Professional crackers (“see what else I have in my site”) Challenge –Professional (practice) –Hobby Money –Professional crackers

6. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Types of cracks Emulators: –Imitate behavior of S/W or H/W –Replay attack Application patches: –Parts of non-HASP-protected Apps –Poorly protected Apps

7. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. How Do They Crack? File replacement –Beta versions –Demo –Technicians code Tools –Debuggers –Disassemblers –Google

8. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. How to prevent cracks? Make it not worthwhile –Expensive –Long working hours –Boring In other words… Use HASP SRM

9. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Use the HASP Envelope Multi-layered random encryption Strong anti-debugging DataHASP – driver-level protection Obfuscation & Encryption of.NET Classes Background checks

10. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Security Enhancements via a simple Firmware update Opens a dormant section in HASP HL HASP HL keys in the field are HASP SRM-ready! Current HASP HL: HASP4 backward compatible Single AES encryption for all features 4 KB Read/write memory 112 protected programs HASP SRM: AES encryption per Feature Secure channel Larger memory + ROM More Features

11. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Secure Memory 112 bytes read only 12-39 features/apps 112 bytes read/write (protected) + + Pro Max, Time, Net, NetTime + 112 bytes legacy 2 KB read only 58-234 features/apps 4 KB read/write (protected) + + + 4 KB legacy

12. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. HASP DriverHASP Lib Protected Software Secure Communication Channel Eavesdropping Replay attack Man-in-the-middle Attacks Secure communication channel

13. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. LicenseOnChip Hardware “understands” and protects license logic

14. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Multiple Encryption Keys Unique protection for every feature Software-based protection doesn’t compromise hardware-based protection Feature 1 Feature 3 Feature 2 Enc Key 1 Enc Key 3 Enc Key 2 Enc Key n Feature n

15. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Vendor-Unique HASP SRM System Developer installs HASP software HASP HASP system generates API libs with embedded Vendor secrets HASP Developer introduces Developer key HASP Developer introduces Master key to get Vendor Library from Aladdin web

16. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Vendor keys - HASP SRM Master Keeps vendor private identifiers secure Contains licenses to use HASP SRM Used for customization of the runtime API per vendor Needed for signing updates and activation Contains RSA Private Key for encrypting updates

17. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Don’t Rely on ‘if’ Statements 00022B31: cmp cx,0 00022B33: jne 000022B42 00022B35: mov ax,00001 ;Go 00022B41: retn 00022B42: jmp 00002E660 ;No Go 00022B31: cmp cx,0 00022B33: nop ;Ignore the HASP check 00022B35: mov ax,00001 ;Go 00022B41: retn 00022B42: jmp 00002E660 ;No Go

18. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Encrypt Data Encrypt internal and external data Encrypt random data using AES Use DataHASP Use the HASP ROM Decrypted Data AES HASP HL HASP SL Encrypted Data

19. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Security Traps Use some of the traps rarely Don’t respond immediately Usually, don’t respond Save indication in the HASP memory

20. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Questions?

21. © 2007 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd. All rights reserved. Summary The threats and the causes The solutions Security enhancements in HASP SRM Maximizing protection with HASP SRM