1. Norms and Development: Interdisciplinary Approach Week 11 Social Norms in Dynamic Interactions II: Cooperation and Trust

2. Because of two fallacies (i.e., fundamental attribution error and aggregation fallacy), the mere snapshots of dynamic systems MAY provide erroneous conclusions about psychological characteristics of individuals embedded in a system. A Message Raised in the Last Seminar

3. H. C. Triandis (2001): Characteristics of Collectivist Culture (a)Individuals define themselves as aspects of a collective, interdependent with some ingroup… (b)They give priority to the goals of that collective rather than to their personal goals. (c)Their behavior is determined more often by the norms, roles and the goals of the collective rather than by their personal attitudes…. (d)They stay in relationships even when the costs of staying in these relationships exceed the advantages of remaining.

4. H. C. Triandis (2001): Characteristics of Collectivist Culture (a)Individuals define themselves as aspects of a collective, interdependent with some ingroup… (b)They give priority to the goals of that collective rather than to their personal goals. (c)Their behavior is determined more often by the norms, roles and the goals of the collective rather than by their personal attitudes…. (d)They stay in relationships even when the costs of staying in these relationships exceed the advantages of remaining.

5. Individualistic View of Collectivist Culture  People want to stay in relationships because they give priority to the goals of the other people (b  d).  People give priority to the others' goal because they identify themselves with the others (?social identity? a  b).  People identify with the others because it is culturally transmitted or because they stay in the relationships longer (a  a or d  a).  All factors are chained. It looks like a self-fulfilling dynamic system…

6. Anatomy of Cooperation

7. Goal/Expectation Theory (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977) Expectation “The other will cooperate” “The other will defect” Goal Mutual Cooperation Cooperate Defect Unilateral Exploitation Defect

8. Direct Evidence Supporting G/E Theory: Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma 1.The first player makes decision (C/D) and his decision is informed to the second player. 2.The second player then makes a decision (C/D) “ First player decided to cooperate (or, defect) to you. Do you cooperate or defect? Remember that this is one-shot game and you will never interact with the first player in future.“

9.  When the first player defected, almost no second players select cooperation (Hayashi et al., 1999).  When the first player cooperated, about 60- 70% of the second players select cooperation (Hayashi, et al., 1999; Kiyonari et al., 2000).

10.  On cooperative tendency in one-shot and anonymous situations, there seems to be life-long stable individual differences.  Studies on social value orientation showed about 60% of individuals are cooperative.  Takezawa & McElreath (2004) showed that cooperative people on SVO scale are very likely to be reciprocal second players in the sequential PD game.  Let’s call this characteristic trustworthiness

11. Are Japanese More Trustworthy to Unknowns than Americans? No difference exists. Kiyonari & Yamagishi (1999): U.S. = Japan Buchan et al. (2002): U.S. = Japan Takezawa et al. (SVO: in progress): U.S. = Japan

12. How About the First Player? When the proportions of trustworthy people are identical between two different cultures, is it possible that the proportion of cooperative first player is larger in one culture?  Yes. If people are more trustful to unknowns, the proportion of cooperation by the first players increases (=A proposition theoretically derived from G/E theory).

13. Are Japanese More Trustful to Unknowns than Americans? Behavioral data (e.g., first player in SPD) : U.S. >> Japan Kiyonari & Yamagishi (1999) Buchan et al. (2002) Social survey (w/wo representative sample) : U.S. >> Japan Hayashi et al. (1982) Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994)

14. Institutional View of Collectivist Culture – Partial Version (a)People don’t trust unknown people. (b)Because of (a), people don’t cooperate with unknown people. (c)Distrustful people cooperate only when they are “assured” that the other will cooperate. Assurance (but not trust!) is provided under institutions which make cooperation rational. (d)If such an institution does not exist, people are less cooperative than those in individualistic culture.

15. Questions Remains to be Solved (b)They give priority to the goals of that collective rather than to their personal goals.  If sanctioning system is so common in Japan, casual observations of the Japanese’ life may give an impression that they are much more cooperative than Americans. Q1. But, why are Americans more trustful than Japanese? Americans seem to have an illusion about benevolence of people…

16. (a)They stay in relationships even when the costs of staying in these relationships exceed the advantages of remaining.  We will see that this conclusion is clearly wrong in Yamagishi (1988). Questions Remains to be Solved (cont’d) Q2. But, Yamagishi(1988)’s finding clearly contradicts with our casual observation. How can we solve this paradox?

17. Wait for the next seminar for completing an institutional view of collectivist culture as a dynamic system…