1. THE US ARMY’s VANGUARD FORCE IN THE RMA
Light Reconnaissance Strike Group
THE US ARMY’s VANGUARD FORCE IN THE RMA
Essential Features: Speed, Lethality and Surprise within a Joint Framework at the CINC’s disposal.
The US Army’s Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups are designed to be on the leading edge of the revolution in military affairs and provide the blueprint for future ground force development into the next century.

2. Kosovo Lessons: U.S. Army Example is a Warning!
Must adapt force structure to future security environment within a new Joint Operational Architecture
“Army After Next” looks too much like the Army today
Division Organization Too Slow, Too Centralized; Not organized for rapid deployability within JTF
A Combination of Strategic Air and fast Sea Lift can move reorganized Army Forces faster!
Must be organized to conduct any mission the NCA assigns including both peace support operations and warfighting
Improve Army’s agility & punch through organizational change to achieve rapid deployability and real Joint Warfighting Capability.

3. During the Kosovo Crisis, a Light Recon Strike Group would have been a flexible deterrent force!
In JAN 99, an LRSG could have deployed to demonstrate US readiness to intervene and threaten the Serb position in Kosovo. Army Prepositioning Afloat could have rapidly reinforced within days if released to the CINC by the JCS. This action would have influenced Belgrade!
SFOR
BOSNIA -
SARAJEVO
Federal
Republic of
Yugoslavia
HERZEGOVINA
AOR
BULGARIA
JFLCC CLOSE
COMBAT CDR
JFC
MONTENEGRO
PRISTINA
SOFIA
KOSOVO
KOSOVO
JFACC
ALBANIA
SKOPJE
JFLCC
CDR
JFLCC
DEEP COMBAT
CDR
TIRANA
JFLCC
REAR
CBT CDR
FYROM
THESSALONIKI

4. This Light Reconnaissance Strike Group is designed to be
moved by existing USAF aircraft anywhere in the world in
24 hours with 162 C-17 Sorties!
I I
2400
TROOPS
CBT ENG
MOBILITY BN
GROUP
SPT
SQDN
AIR
ATTK
500
550
700
RECON
C 4 I
Light
Recon
-Strike Group (5,000 Troops)
3 Groups should be Conus-based and ready on a
rotational basis for immediate global deployment.
Equipment sets could be leased for 7-8 years.

5. Light Recon-Strike Group Medium Weight Brigade
REQUIRED C-17 SORTIES= 162
REQUIRED C-17 SORTIES= 168
Troops: 4,741
Equipment: 584 vehicles + (100) 463L Pallets
114 AGS 105mm gun with adv munitions (30 tons)
200 Light Strike Vehicles (18 tons) [35mm &
LOSAT + (27) 120mm Adv. Mortar system]
24 M9 ACE Engineer Vehicles
7 Fox Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Vehicles
9 MLRS rocket launchers
160 HUMMV Vehicles (various configurations)
70 Trucks (medium weight)
40 Hughes 600 Armed Helicopters
12 UH 60 (Armed and Transport Helicopters
Troops: 3,600
Equipment: 600 wheeled armored vehicles armed with 25mm and 90mm cannon plus either TOW or LOSAT + additional equipment. No stabilized gun platform; cannot fire on the move.
Colonel Commands Conventional Brigade Combat Team within the existing ten division structure. No new Joint Operational Architecture.
Not structured for independence. Without significant reinforcement, exclusively Small Scale Conflict Force (peacekeeping).
Equipment sets are purchased with enormous sunken costs and little salvage value. Technology is moving too fast to buy in most cases. Old R&D process cannot keep up! Civil leads Military!
Brigadier General with seasoned staff commands a ready, cohesive, all arms Battlegroup capable of real Independent Warfighting Operations within the Joint Task Force!
Equipment sets are leased for eight years to support the establishment of three Light Recon-Strike Groups on rotational readiness!
Note: Software system for determining individual plane loads is the Air Load Planning System (ALPS) and equipment information comes from FM Transportation Reference Data.

6. THE LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE GROUP: COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

7. Breaking the Phalanx, pages 71-73.
THE C4I BN: CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THE JOINT C4ISR OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE.
600 Troops
(C4I Battalion Structure in a Close Combat Group; configuration of Deep & Rear C4I BNs will be similar, but tailored to different needs.) I
HHC
GROUP HEADQUARTERS COMPANY: Administration and
Maintenance activities I
NLOS BATTERY
NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT
(NLOS) CO/BATTERY: Tactical UAVs/
Over-the horizon attack systems (EFOGM). I
ISR/IW CO
ISR/INFO WARFARE CO: Intelligence/Info Opns
Command and Control CO: Designed for dispersed,
mobile communications I
Command & Control CO
AIR DEFENSE BATTERY: Short-range Air Defense I
AIR DEFENSE BATTERY
CHEMICAL CO
CHEMICAL CO: Recon, Detection and limited Decon support
MILITARY POLICE SECURITY DETACHMENT: Added or integrated as necessary for deployments and training.
Breaking the Phalanx, pages

8. Reorganization creates a larger pool of ready, available Army Forces!
In the Group-based structure, Army Forces are involved in one of three 180 day operational readiness cycles in peacetime. This reduces personnel tempo, makes deployments and costs predictable.
Training Cycle (six months): Unit and Individual Training under Service control.
Deployment Cycle (six months): Units are ready for deployment to Joint Command and Control and become part of the pool that responds to Major Theater of War or Lesser Theater of War contingencies.
Reconstitution Cycle (six months): Unit returns to home station for re-fitting, modernization (if required) and leave.
This approach creates a pool of 35-40,000 ready, CONUS-based Army Expeditionary Forces that can deploy 24 hours a day, seven days a week to fight, deter or conduct any mission the National Command Authorities decide to assign.

9. Ground Force Deployment Readiness in the Group-based Force Structure
CONUS

10. Light Reconnaissance Strike Group
To make a difference in the 21st Century, the US Army should field three Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups. Fielding one LRSG is just tinkering on the margins!
Adopting the Combat Group organizational structure is the first step toward leveraging specialized modules of Army combat power within a training and readiness system that ensures the Army is relevant to Joint Operations across the spectrum of conflict.
Compression of division and brigade into new echelon to achieve fewer C2 nodes, deep/close/rear functionality and the consolidation of CSS into JTF Support Group structures are critical steps in this broader strategic process.
Implementing new Joint C4ISR architecture to facilitate the employment of Army Ground Forces within the JTF is vital!