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Tieteenhistorian ja – historiografian filosofia LUENTOKURSSI OULUN YLIOPISTO 27.10.2014-11.12.2014 JOUNI-MATTI KUUKKANEN.

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Presentation on theme: "Tieteenhistorian ja – historiografian filosofia LUENTOKURSSI OULUN YLIOPISTO 27.10.2014-11.12.2014 JOUNI-MATTI KUUKKANEN."— Presentation transcript:

1 Tieteenhistorian ja – historiografian filosofia LUENTOKURSSI OULUN YLIOPISTO 27.10.2014-11.12.2014 JOUNI-MATTI KUUKKANEN

2 Structure 1.Anthropological studies of science Radical empiricism Construction of facts 2.Network theory Extension of symmetry principle Rules and methods 3.Observations on Latour

3 1.Anthropological studies of science RADICAL EMPIRICISM Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar: Laboratory Life. (1979) Study of science and laboratories like an anthropologist Pretend ignorance Describe the ‘social practice’ of science as it is; ‘just describe’ how it happened Follow, document, report empirical details of historical practice In the ideal researcher historical and sociological perspectives coincide: ◦Historian as a temporally conditioned sociologist or anthropologist ◦Sociologists as on-the-spot observer of the ‘science in the making’

4 Critique of SSK: asymmetry bw. ‘society’ and ‘nature’: “There is no Nature ‘out there’ to account for the success of Boyle’s programme is obvious to them; but they seem to believe that there is a society ‘out there’ to account for the failure of Hobbes’s programme” (Callon and Latour, “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan”). “Social scientists should strop trying to determine the nature of the social structure that they believe generates … conflicts, and instead treat the latter as data. In other words, society should not be seen as the referent of an ostensive definition, but rather seen as being performed through the various efforts to define it” (Law in “Power/Knowledge and the Dissolution of the Sociology of Knowledge”)

5 ”From the moment one accepts that both social and natural science are equally uncertain, ambiguous and disputable, it is no longer possible to have them playing different role in the analysis. Since society is no more obvious or less controversial than nature, sociological explanation can find no solid foundation” (Callon in ”Some elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay”)

6 The central feature of anthropological studies of science Radical empiricism: let’s just follow scientists around and see what emerges

7 CONSTRUCTION OF FACTS Facts are born and can loose they factivity The central element in the process is decrease of modality and qualifications of statements Note: the change of title Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts ◦i.e. ’sociality’ not central, construction is A research of TRF in 1976 created a new object, which was “not the TRF of 1963, 1966, 1969, or 1975” (Latour and Woolgar 1979, 125–126)

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9 2. Actor-network theory EXTENSION OF SYMMETRY PRINCIPLE No pre-empirical category of ‘nature,’ nor ‘society’ Latour critical of Bloor not extending the principle further: “Bloor designated Durkheimian social structures to occupy the Sun’s focus and gave the name ‘symmetry’ to the principle that required us to explain successes and failures in the development of science with the same sociological terms. This was, to be sure, a major advance, since until then only good science was explained by appealing to Nature and only bad science by appealing to Society. However the very success of this principle of symmetry disguised the complete asymmetry of Bloor’s argument. Society was supposed to explain Nature! We start from one of the poles to account for the other…

10 … Bloor has not realized that his principle cannot be implemented if another much more radical symmetry is not introduced, a symmetry that treats this time the subject/society pole in the same way as the object pole (Callon, 1985). This 90° shift is what I call “one more turn after the social turn” (Figure 2). (Latour: “One more Turn after the Social Turn).

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13 What is more general after all? Philosophy or sociology? Cf. theory of everything again In Science in action: How to Follow scientists and Engineers through Society, Latour develops a network theory: science is scientists and their ‘allies in nature’ extending their networks as widely as possible Human vs. non-human actants Introduces many new concepts, such as ‘actant’ (any actor in networks), ‘immutable mobile’ (that which stays invariant in networks,’ etc.).

14 n things hold they start becoming true When things are true they hold

15 RULES OF METHOD – Science in Action, 258): Rule 1 We study science in action and not ready made science or technology; to do so, we either arrive before the facts and machines are blackboxed or we follow the controversies that reopen them. (Introduction) Rule 2 To determine the objectivity or subjectivity of a claim, the efficiency or perfection of a mechanism, we do not look for their intrinsic qualities but at all the transformations they undergo later in the hands of others. (Chapter 1) Rule 3 Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature's representation, not its consequence, we can never use this consequence, Nature, to explain how and why a controversy has been settled. (Chapter 2)

16 Rule 4 Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Society's stability, we cannot use Society to explain how and why a controversy has been settled. We should consider symmetrically the efforts to enrol human and non-human resources. (Chapter 3) Rule 5 We have to be as undecided as the various actors we follow as to what technoscience is made of; every time an inside/outside divide is built, we should study the two sides simultaneously and make the list, no matter how long and heterogeneous, of those who do the work. (Chapter 4) Rule 6 Confronted with the accusation of irrationality, we look neither at what rule of logic has been broken, nor at what structure of society could explain the distortion, but to the angle and direction of the observer's displacement, and to the length of the network thus being built. (Chapter 5) Rule 7 Before attributing any special quality to the mind or to the method of people, let us examine first the many ways through which inscriptions are gathered, combined, tied together and sent back. Only if there is something unexplained once the networks have been studied shall we start to speak of cognitive factors. (Chapter 6)

17 PRINCIPLES – Science in Action, 259): First principle The fate of facts and machines is in later users' hands; their qualities are thus a consequence, not a cause, of a collective action. (Chapter 1) Second principle Scientists and engineers speak in the name of new allies that they have shaped and enrolled; representatives among other represen­tatives, they add these unexpected resources to tip the balance of force in their favour. (Chapter 2) Third principle We are never confronted with science, technology and society, but with a gamut of weaker and stronger associations; thus understanding what facts and machines are is the same task as understanding who the people are. (Chapter 3)

18 Fourth principle The more science and technology have an esoteric content the further they extend outside; thus, `science and technology' is only a sub­set of technoscience. (Chapter 4) Fifth principle Irrationality is always an accusation made by someone building a network over someone else who stands in the way; thus, there is no Great Divide between minds, but only shorter and longer networks; harder facts are not the rule but the exception, since they are needed only in a very few cases to displace others on a large scale out of their usual ways. (Chapter 5) Sixth principle History of technoscience is in a large part the history of the resources scattered along networks to accelerate the mobility, faithfulness, combination and cohesion of traces that make action at a distance possible. (Chapter 6)

19 3. Observations on Latour “Naïve” empiricism Ontologically radical Science and politics continuous: networks, allies and strength is everything Louis Pasteur as a cunning negotiator

20 Standardisation central: Standardisation of method, practices, materials, science relies on metrological standardisation, which have a long social history ◦in this view ‘H 2 O’ comes to Amazonas when the science comes and ‘H 2 O’ is dependent on its network – and there is not science outside the network ◦The topic for next time

21 Community Ethics: Politics! Scientist


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