1. © Michael Lacewing Representative realism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Realism We perceive physical objects, which exist independently of our minds. But do we perceive them ‘directly’ or via some form of mental representation> –What we perceive isn’t what exists independent of the mind The moon is bigger than my thumb The rose does not change colour under different lighting A straight stick looks bent when half-submerged in water.

3. Representative realism: illusion In illusions, you see something, but not as it really is. What you see is an appearance. In veridical perception, you still see an appearance immediately, and the object representatively.

4. Primary and secondary qualities Primary qualities: properties of an object that are not related by definition to perceivers, e.g. size, mass, and shape Secondary qualities: properties that are related to perceivers, e.g. colour and smell Are secondary qualities ‘mind-dependent’? –If so, does that show that representative realism is true, since objects are not as they appear?

5. Sense data What we see are ‘appearances’, which are mental things –What is bent if it is not the stick? –What I see in a hallucination Sense data: private, mind-dependent, and are exactly as they appear

6. Objections to representative realism Resemblance: how can the appearance, which is mental and coloured, ‘resemble’ the object, which is physical and not coloured? –Same primary qualities? –No: the appearance of these change; –and mental images don’t have size and shape the way physical objects do. Reply: Representation is not resemblance.

7. Objections to representative realism II Scepticism: how do we know there is a physical world, causing our experiences? Seeing the same thing? representative realism suggests not…

8. Replies We do not see sense data instead of physical objects –Sense data are how we see physical objects Sense data do not come between us and the world –Cp. using words –Physical objects are not a hypothesis, but are given in experience

9. Direct realism There are no sense data: perceptual experiences aren’t mental ‘things’. We can only describe the ‘appearance’ – what we see – in terms of the objects we see. Sense data cannot be independently described. –Sense data are logically dependent on physical objects! Perception is an experience of seeing something that exists independently of the experience – it is wrong to say we perceive sense data.

10. Direct realism Does your thumb look bigger than the moon? Or does the moon look further away? Not every aspect of ourexperience need be determined by properties of the object for us to perceive objects directly We experience distance and size. –Obj: we experience relative size and judge distance.

11. Illusions In an illusion, an object appears to have a property it doesn’t have. Reply 1: in illusions, there are sense data; but not in veridical perception. Reply 2: there are no sense data; the stick has two properties – it is straight, and it appears bent.