1. Tacit Negotiations and Social Dilemmas
CHAPTER 11
Tacit Negotiations and Social Dilemmas

2. Exhibit 11-1: Two Major Types of Negotiation Situations
CHAPTER 11
Exhibit 11-1: Two Major Types of Negotiation Situations
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3. Exhibit 11-2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
CHAPTER 11
Exhibit 11-2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Thelma
Do not confess
(remain silent)
Confess A B
Do not confess
(remain silent)
T: 1 yr
L: 1 yr
T: 0 yrs
L: 15 yrs
Louise C D
Confess
T: 15 yrs
L: 0 yrs
T: 10 yrs
L: 10 yrs
NOTE: Entries represent prison term length: T = Thelma’s term length; L = Louise’s term length
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4. Effectiveness of Tit-for-Tat
CHAPTER 11
Effectiveness of Tit-for-Tat
Not envious
Nice
Tough
Forgiving
Simple
Extremely stable
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5. Recovering from Defection
CHAPTER 11
Recovering from Defection
Make situational attributions
One step at a time
Getting even and catching up
Make your decisions at the same time
Superrationality
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6. Social Dilemmas versus Prisoner’s Dilemmas
CHAPTER 11
Social Dilemmas versus Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Behavior more competitive in social dilemmas
Size difference
Costs of defection spread out
Social dilemmas are riskier
Social dilemmas provide anonymity
Less control over the situation
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7. Exhibit 11-7: Different Kinds of Social Dilemmas
CHAPTER 11
Exhibit 11-7: Different Kinds of Social Dilemmas
Taking
Contributing
Internal
(intraorganizational)
Resources (e.g., money, real estate, staffing)
Committee work
Recognition
Budget fudging
External
(interorganizational)
Price competition
Brand competition
Overharvesting
Pollution
Paying taxes
Public television
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8. How to Build Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Structural Strategies
CHAPTER 11
How to Build Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Structural Strategies
Align incentives
Monitor behavior
Regulation
Privatization
Tradable permits
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9. How to Build Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Psychological Strategies
CHAPTER 11
How to Build Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Psychological Strategies
Psychological contracts and the norm of commitment
Superordinate goals
Communication
Personalize others
Social sanctions
Focus on benefits of cooperation
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10. How to Encourage Cooperation When Parties Should Not Collude
CHAPTER 11
How to Encourage Cooperation When Parties Should Not Collude
Keep your strategy simple
Signal via actions
Do not be the first to defect
Focus on your own payoffs, not your payoffs relative to others
Be sensitive to egocentric bias
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11. Exhibit 11-9: Escalation of Commitment
CHAPTER 11
Exhibit 11-9: Escalation of Commitment
Perceived Utility of Current Course of Action
Low
Questionable
or Negative Outcomes
Reexamination of Current Course of Action
Commitment to Current Course of Action
Withdrawal and Assumption of Losses
Perceived Utility of Withdrawal and/or Change
High
Continued Failure
Source: Adapted from Staw, B. M. & Ross, J.(1987). Behavior in escalatin situations: Antecedents, prototypes, and solutions. In L.L. Cummings & B.M. Straw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 9, p.45). Greenwich, CT: Jai Press inc.
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12. Avoiding the Escalation of Commitment
CHAPTER 11
Avoiding the Escalation of Commitment
Set limits
Avoid decision myopia
Recognize sunk costs
Diversify responsibility and authority
Redefine the situation
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13. Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
CHAPTER 11
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Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education, Inc.  publishing as Prentice Hall