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Firewalls : usage Data encryption Access control : usage restriction on some protocols/ports/services Authentication : only authorized users and hosts.

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Presentation on theme: "Firewalls : usage Data encryption Access control : usage restriction on some protocols/ports/services Authentication : only authorized users and hosts."— Presentation transcript:

1 Firewalls : usage Data encryption Access control : usage restriction on some protocols/ports/services Authentication : only authorized users and hosts (machines) Monitoring for further auditing Packet filtering Compliance with the specified protocols Virus detection Isolation of the internal network from the Internet Connection proxies (masking of the internal network) Application proxies (masking of the « real » software)

2 Firewalls : basics All packets exchanged between the internal and the external domains go through the FW that acts as a gatekeeper –external hosts « see » the FW only –internal and external hosts do not communicate directly –the FW can take very sophisticated decisions based on the protocol implemented by the messages –the FW is the single access point => authentication + monitoring site –a set of “flow rules” allows decision taking

3 Firewalls : architecture (I) Outside world Exterior router Firewall Interior router Internal network servers DMZ (DeMilitarized Zone)

4 Firewalls : architecture (II) : merging exterior and interior FW Outside world Exterior/Interior Firewall Internal network servers DMZ

5 Firewalls : architecture (III) : merging exterior FW and servers Outside world External Firewall + servers Internal Firewall Internal network DMZ Bof…

6 Firewalls : architecture (IV) : managing multiple subnetworks Outside world Exterior/Interior Firewall Internal subnetwork B servers DMZ Backbone Internal subnetwork A Firewall

7 Firewalls : architecture (V) : managing multiple exterior FW Internet Exterior Firewall A Interior Firewall Internal network servers DMZ Exterior Firewall B E.g. supplier network Sub-DMZ A Sub-DMZ B

8 Firewalls : architecture (VI) : managing multiple DMZ Internet Exterior/Interior Firewall A Internal network Servers A DMZ A E.g. supplier network DMZ B Exterior/Interior Firewall B Servers B

9 Firewalls : architecture (VII) : internal FW Outside world Exterior/Interior Firewall Internal network servers DMZ Sensitive area Firewall Sensitive area

10 Firewalls : some recommendations Bastion hosts – better to put the bastions in a DMZ than in an internal network – disable non-required services – do not allow user accounts – fix all OS bugs – safeguard the logs – run a security audit – do secure backups Avoid to put in the same area entities which have very different security requirements

11 Using proxies (I) Proxies can be used to « hide » the real servers Interior => Exterior traffic –Give the internal user the illusion that she/he accesses to the exterior server –But intercept the traffic to/from the server, analyze the packets (check the compliance with the protocol, search for keywords, etc.), log the requests Exterior => Interior traffic –Give the external user the illusion that she/he accesses to the interior server –But intercept the traffic to the server, analyze the packets (check the compliance with the protocol, search for keywords, etc.), log the requests

12 Using proxies (II) Advantage –knowledge of the service/protocol => efficiency and « intelligent » filtering –Ex : session tracking, stateful connection Disadvantages –one proxy per service ! –may require modifications of the client –do not exist for all services

13 Static Network Address Translation (NAT) (I) From Arkoon Inc. tutorial xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx Internal network yyy.yyy.yyy.yyy xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx

14 Static Network Address Translation (NAT) (II) xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx Internal network yyy.yyy.yyy.yyy Internal network xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx yyy.yyy.yyy.yyyxxx.xxx.xxx.xxx The FW maintains an address translation table The FW transforms address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx into yyy.yyy.yyy.yyy in the field « source address » The FW transforms address yyy.yyy.yyy.yyy into address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx in the field « destination address » This operation is transparent for both the exterior and the interior hosts

15 Applications Non TCP/UDP based protocols Pre-defined partnership addresses Web server, mail….(traffic to Internet) Application server (hidden behind a FW) Host known/authenticated outside with a specific address …

16 PAT : Port Address Translation (I) Port 80 Port 2033 From Arkoon Inc. tutorial Internal network

17 Connections are open from an exterior host Translation table Use of lesser public addresses Flexible management of server ports PAT : Port Address Translation (II)

18 Web server user, @IP'U' U→P:80 U → IP1:80 IP1:80 → U P:80 → U U → P:81 U → IP2:80 IP2:80 → U P:8 → U Translation Table @IP « P » port 80 → @IP1 : port 80 port 81 → @IP2 : port 80 @IP2, port 80 Web server @IP1, port 80 FW, @IP 'P' PAT : Port Address Translation (III) From Arkoon Inc. tutorial Web server Internal network

19 Masking (I) From Arkoon Inc. tutorial Internal network

20 Connections are open by internal hosts Dynamic connection table (IP address + source port number) One single address is known outside (the FW address) Spare IP addresses Masking (II)

21 Arkoon, @IP 'M' user @IP2 Web server @IP 'W2' 1:1025->W M:10000->W W->1:1025 2:1025->W M:10001->W W->M:10001 W->2:1025 M:10000->W2 W2->M:10000 W2->2:1026 W->M:10000 Translation table @IP « M » 1:1025(10000)->W 2:1025(10001)->W 2:1026(10000)->W2 @IP2 FW, @IP 'M' From Arkoon Inc. tutorial Internal network 2:1026->W2


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