1. 1 Vipul Goyal Abhishek Jain Rafail Ostrovsky Silas Richelson Ivan Visconti Microsoft Research India MIT and BU UCLA University of Salerno, Italy Constant Round Concurrent Zero- Knowledge in the Bounded Player Model

2. Zero-Knowledge Protocols Prove trying to prove x is in L to the verifier Meet (P, V) is zero knowledge if: there exists which can emulate ’s interaction with prover and

3. Concurrent Zero Knowledge [DNS98] (P, V) is concurrent zero knowledge if ZK holds when V* may run many instances of protocol concurrently.

4. 4 Concurrent ZK (plain model) General feasibility result first given by Richardson and Kilian [RK’99] Since then, a body of literature has developed studying the round complexity –Construction with almost logarithmic round complexity [PRS02, KP01] –Shown to be almost optimal using “black-box simulation” [R00, CKPR01] No constant round protocols known under standard assumptions

5. 5 Bounded Concurrency Model In a breakthrough work, Barak [Barak01] introduced the bounded concurrency model: –Total number of concurrent sessions between prover and verifiers is apriori bounded (by a poly) Barak gave a constant round protocol in this model –introduced non-black-box simulation in cryptography Open problem: constant round concurrent ZK without this bound? –In general, what level of concurrency can we achieve in constant rounds?

6. 6 Talk Overview Bounded player model and our results Barak’s construction: very high level overview Our construction High level idea of our non-black-box simulation strategy

7. Bounded Player (BP) Model [GJORV13] A bounded number of players in the system  Each player may participate in an unbounded (poly) number of concurrent sessions...... unbounded concurrent sessions Example: number of machines over the network maybe known –However harder to accurately estimate how many processes (communicating over the network) each machine is running

8. BP model vs Bare Public Key (BPK) model BP model: can ask each player to choose a fixed public key during the first session it participates in –No setup phase –Player remembers it, to be remain the same in all sessions: only difference from plain model BPK model: setup phase involving all players –Main property: keys can’t change during rewinding Only superficial similarity: techniques from BPK model have limited relevance here

9. BP model vs Barak’s bounded concurrency model BP model: much closer in spirit to Barak’s bounded concurrency –Strengthening of the bounded concurrency model Provably requires non-black-box (NBB) simulation (unlike BPK) Goyal et al [GJORV13]: a construction with w(1) round Open: constant round concurrent ZK in BP model? Will subsume the result of Barak

10. Our Results Main theorem: constant round concurrent ZK in the BP model assuming a collision resistant hash function family Positive step towards getting constant round concurrent ZK in plain model under standard assumptions Technical contribution: new ways of performing NBB simulation –Techniques very different from the previous work of Goyal et al. [GJORV13]

11. 11 NBB vs BB Simulation Black-box simulation: simply query the adversarial verifier machine as an Oracle (rewinding) Non-black-box simulation: uses the code of the adversary in a more non-trivial way

12. 12 Barak’s Construction (oversimplified) Statement: x in L Com(M) Random r WI: x in L or M outputs r Prover Verifier Simulation: if you have code/state of verifier, can construct such M  Note: For simulation, constructing fake witness w f computationally heavy/expensive  Can only simulate a bounded number of sessions in poly-time Soundness: r is long and random

13. 13 Barak’s Construction: Abstraction Com(M) Random r  Can compute fake witness w f  Computationally expensive to compute  Can be done for only bounded number of sessions Use fake witness to complete rest Barak’s preamble

14. Building the Protocol WI PoK x LOR“I know sk” Secure two party computation: If w f valid fake witness, output sk to first party Focus: single verifier, unbounded sessions Com(M) Random r pk sk wfwf

15. Problem: Adversarial scheduling Secure two party computation: Started but didn’t finish Say adversary leaves most sessions in middle of 2pc Simulator computes fake witness in unbounded number of sessions Com(M) Random r pk sk wfwf New sessions start [GJORV13] idea: use multiple opportunities for using fake witness (higher round complexity), complex probability distributions

16. Our Idea: simple WI PoK x LOR“I know sk” Secure two party computation: If valid certified statement, fake witness given, output sk  fake witness computed in one session useable in others z = Com(M) Random r pk sk (τ, σ), w f Signature σ on τ = (z, r)  Certified statement = (τ, σ)  Compute fake witness w f

17. Handling adversarial scheduling Secure two party computation: Started but didn’t finish Simulator computes fake witness pair just once sk New sessions start Z = Com(M) Random r pk Signature σ on τ (τ, σ), w f Secure two party computation sk (τ, σ), w f

18. Are we done? This is gross oversimplification of our construction In Barak: no such fake witnesses of polynomial size Rather: fake witness is an accepting (encrypted) universal argument execution –Need to run 3-round UA and construct fake witness interactively

19. Our Construction z = Com(M) r pk heavy computation Signature σ UA first message UA challenge UA final message.... Adversarial scheduling: what if verifier leaves most sessions in middle of UA? Computation done, yet no fake witness! get fake witness

20. Completing the construction Use the same basic idea multiple times Ask the verifier to sign the UA transcript as we go along Even a partially executed (but signed) UA transcript useful –Can be completed in some other session to get a fake witness

21. Conclusions Constant round concurrent ZK in the bounded player model –Subsumes the bounded concurrent ZK of Barak –Strongest level of concurrency in plain model in constant rounds (under standard assumptions) Key technical contribution: new ways of performing NBB simulation –Reusing heavy computation

22. 22 Thank You!