1. 1 II Animal Rights

2. 2 Note: Cohen’s paper was published in the New England Journal of Medicine; his primary audience consisted of doctors, not philosophers. Cohen’s main aim is to rebut the arguments against using animals in research experiments. Cohen argues that, despite speciesism, the way we treat non-human animals is (by and large) morally permissible. Cohen bases his argument on his notion of rights—in particular, that non-human animals are incapable of having them. Carl Cohen: “In Defense of Speciesism ”

3. 3 Cohen’s Reconstruction of Singer-Style Argument P1Using animals in research experiments violates the rights of animals. P2Violating rights is morally wrong. CSo it is wrong to use animals in research experiments. This is the argument Cohen wants to attack. But this is not what Singer argues.

4. 4 “Rights” What does Cohen mean by “rights”? “A right […] is a claim, or potential claim, that one party may exercise against another.” (486) “To comprehend any genuine right fully…we must know who holds that right, against whom it is held, and to what it is a right.” (486) The holders and targets of these claims fall within a “moral community”: “[Rights] are in every case claims, or potential claims, within a community of moral agents. Rights arise and can be intelligently defended, only among beings who actually do, or can, make moral claims against one another.” (486)

5. 5 “Rights” (cont’d) “Moral rights” vs. “Legal rights” It doesn’t immediately follow from the fact that you have a legal right to something that you also have a moral right to it. Nor does it immediately follow from the fact that you have a moral right to something that you also have a legal right to it.

6. 6 Structure of Cohen’s Positive Argument P1A right is a claim or potential claim held by one individual against one or more other individuals. (Positive or Negative) P2The notion of a right is intelligible only among moral agents, as a claim or potential claim within the community of moral agents. P3To be a moral agent requires having autonomy (the capacity to ascribe moral rules for others and for oneself)—a necessary condition. (Consider Warren on personhood.) P4But autonomy requires moral understanding—another necessary condition. P5And non-human animals lack moral understanding. C1Therefore, non-human animals cannot have autonomy. C2Therefore, non-human animals are not moral agents. C3Therefore, non-human animals cannot be members of the community of moral agents. C4Therefore, the notion of non-human animals having rights in unintelligible.

7. 7 Structure of Cohen’s Positive Argument (cont’d) If non-human animals can’t have rights, then we can’t infringe on any such rights. “No animal can every commit a crime; bringing animals to criminal trial is the mark of primitive ignorance. The claims of moral rights are similarly inapplicable to them.” (486)

8. 8 Cohen’s Negative Arguments (1) Cohen rejects the notion that our causing animals avoidable suffering is wrong because it involves “speciesism.” Speciesism does not equate with racism: There is no important moral distinction between members of different races, but there is an important moral distinction between different races. (487) -Humans have moral reflection. -Humans have a community of moral agents. -Etc. Cohen: “I am a speciesist,” but this isn’t like being a racist – there are important moral differences between being a human and being an animal. -Animals don’t have the capacity appropriate for moral standing: autonomy!

9. 9 Cohen’s Negative Arguments (cont’d) (2) Cohen rejects the notion that causing animals avoidable suffering is wrong because it fails to promote the general happiness. Cohen: It’s empirically misguided to argue that animal experimentation increases aggregate suffering. -It’s not that animals can’t suffer (they can!). -However, animal experimentation increases aggregate pleasure in both humans and animals: “The sum of the benefits of their use is utterly beyond quantification.” (488)

10. 10 Human Hypocrisy “One cannot coherently object to the killing of animals in biomedical investigations while continuing to eat them.” (488) Provided our objections to their use in one domain still apply in the other, we should treat them as equally ethically impermissible. “Scrupulous vegetarianism, in matters of food, clothing, shelter, commerce, and recreation, and in all other spheres, is the only fully coherent position the critic may adopt. […] A very few consistent critics adopt this position. It is the reduction ad absurdum of the rejection of moral distinctions between animals and human beings.” (488)

11. 11 Recall Singer’s Argument P1Beings have interests just in case they are capable of suffering. (481) P2Human beings and many non-human animals are capable of suffering. P3Therefore, human beings and many non-human animals have interests. P4Basic Principle of Equality: “[T]he interests of every being […] are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the interests of any other being.” (479) P5Human beings and many non-human animals have an interest in avoiding suffering. CTherefore, the interests non-human animals have in avoiding suffering is to be given the same weight as the interests human beings have in avoiding suffering. If Cohen were attacking Singer’s argument directly, which premise(s) would he disagree with?

12. 12 Discussion  On Cohen’s view, if animal experimentation did not bring about good results, would it be wrong? How would Singer respond?  Cohen claims that “scrupulous vegetarianism” is the reductio ad absurdum of a Singer-style argument. Is it?  Cohen argues that because animals do not have rights, we do not have duties regarding them. Can there be duties without corresponding rights? (Do we have a duty to the drowning child? Does he have a claim against us if we don’t?)