1. CYCLES AND TRANSITIONS

2. READING Smith, Democracy, Introduction + chs. 1-2, 4 Modern Latin America, chs. 3, 5 (Mexico, Cuba) Magaloni, “Demise of Mexico’s One-Party Regime”

3. OUTLINE 1. Concepts of democracy 2. Electoral variations 3. Transitions, To and Fro 4. Case Studies: Cuba and Mexico 5. Caveats, Causes, and Codas

4. KEY QUESTIONS What explains the spread of democracy in Latin America? Given authoritarian past? What kind of democracy? What quality? What’s new about the current phase of democratic change? How does it compare to prior periods? What role (if any) for the United States? What implications for U.S. relations with Latin America?

5. Concepts of Democracy

6. DEFINING PRINCIPLES Participation, such that no substantial segment of the population is excluded from the effective pursuit of political power Competition, such that there are free, fair, and regular contests for gaining support from the populace Accountability, such that political rulers and elected representatives serve as “agents” of their constituents and must justify their actions and decisions in order to remain in office.

7. INSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of expression 3. The right to vote 4. Eligibility for public office 5. The right of political leaders to compete for support and votes 6. Alternative sources of information 7. Free and fair elections 8. Institutions for making government policies depend on elections and other expressions of popular preference.

8. TWO KEY DIMENSIONS Elections Items 3-5, 7-8 Rights Items 1-2, 6 [missing: rule of law] Question: What if they don’t go together? What about the prospect of “illiberal democracy”?

9. Electora l Variations

10. CATEGORIES OF ELECTORAL REGIMES Electoral democracy = free and fair elections Semidemocracy = elections free but not fair; or, effective power not vested in winner of elections Competitive oligarchy = elections fair but not free; candidates restricted to socio-economic elite and suffrage restricted to minority of population Autocracy/authoritarianism = no elections, or elections neither free nor fair.

15. Transitions, To and Fro

16. DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: DOMESTIC FACTORS 1.Economic Development 2.Social Forces/Class Coalitions 3.Authoritarian Failures 4.Elite Splits, Exclusions, and Negotiations of “Compacts” with Opposition 5.“Unsolvable Problems” and the Search for Exits

17. DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 1. Imperialism and Democracy 2. Anti-Communist Crusades 3. Optimism and Uncertainty: The 1990s 4. Now: 9/11 and Its Aftermath

18. Types of Authoritarian Regime ________________Power Structure___________________ Personalist Institutionalized Leadership ____________ Traditional Caudillo orCollective Junta or Military“Man on Horseback”Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime Technocratic State, One-Party State or CivilianDelegative Semi-Democracy,Corporatist Regime or Sultanistic Despotism

19. FORMS OF TRANSITION Personalist regimes, especially “sultanistic despotism” = armed revolution Personalist regimes if military = armed revolution or military replacement Bureaucratic regimes = fissures within ruling elite, negotiation with opposition One-party regimes = winning elections

20. CASE STUDIES: CUBA AND MEXICO Cuba (1959): armed revolution (against weak state, corrupt regime, incompetent military, withdrawal of U.S. support) Mexico (1910): disputed election + armed revolution + incomplete replacement of leadership Mexico (2000): victory at polls

21. DEMISE OF THE PRI Decline from hegemony to dominance Splits within elite (1980s) Economic problems and policies (NAFTA) Deterioration of party base, strengthening of opposition ( + Zapatista uprising) Institutional reforms:  1990-93 piecemeal change  1994-96 independent IFE

22. PRI: PREFERENCES + PAYOFFS Preferences: “The PRI prefers winning to losing and having a submissive electoral institute to an independent IFE [and] … prefers the Opposition to accept the election results rather than contest them because this entails legitimacy costs.” Payoffs: Winning+ 10 Creating IFE - 2 Fraud - 2 Challenge - 4

23. OPPOSITION: PREFER + PAYOFFS Preferences: “The Opposition prefers winning to losing; it prefers an independent IFE; and it makes its decision to accept or contest contingent on the PRI’s choice to create an independent IFE or not.” Payoffs: Winning+ 10 Independent IFE+ 2 Losing/fraud - 4 Contesting/Strong IFE - 2 Contesting/Submissive IFE + 2

25. Caveats, Causes and Codas

26. Caveat No. 1 On the importance of defining terms:  Electoral democracy (Smith + others)  Liberal democracy (Smith + others) ~ Robert Dahl democracy  Illiberal democracy (Smith + Zakaria)  Nondemocracy (Smith) = Authoritarianism

27. Caveat No. 2 On choice of terms:  “Wave” vs. “cycle”  Implicit causal mechanisms On Latin America in world context:  Understanding pre-1950s  Singular profile among developing areas  Roles of ideology/culture

28. Caveat No. 3 “A weak state is a weak democracy” Taming of democracy vs. incompetent governance Democracy by permission And then: the rise of the “new left”

29. Caveat No. 4 Outcomes of Political Transitions, 1900-2000 1900-19391940-19771978-20001900-2000 ___ %______%_______ %______%____ Outcome____ Autocracy 45 47 17 39 Oligarchy 36 6 -- 15 Semidemocracy 11 20 40 22 Democracy 9 27 43 24 N transitions 56 64 35 155

30. Caveat No. 5 How to understand the “return” of the PRI?  PRI = 39.2 %  PRD = 32.4  PAN = 26.1  New = 2.3 Is it the same party? Was it a PRI victory? Or losses by other parties? What might have happened with a MRO? Does this mean “consolidation”?